THE  WORLD-WAR 


AUGUSTIN    HAMON 


The  author  of  this  book,  a  well-known 
French  sociologist,  has  been  for  many  years 
a  keetf  anti-militarist,  but  in  the  case  of  the 
present  war  he  is  a  strong  supporter  of  the 
Allies.  The  book,  however,  is  not  a  propa- 
gandist work :  it  is  a  penetrating,  detached, 
and  highly  critical  study  of  the  causes  of  the 
Great  War  and  its  effects  on  the  life  of  the 
nations.  M.  Hamon  traces  in  considerable 
detail  the  political,  social,  and  economic 
changes  already  brought  about  in  the  life  of 
the  belligerent  peoples,  especially  England, 
France  and  Germany  ;  considers  the  effect^  of 
the  war  on  morality  (in  the  widest  sense),  on 
the  position  of  women,  on  liberty  and  de- 
mocracy, on  the  status  of  the  working-classes, 
and  numerous  other  matters^  and  in  his  con- 
cluding chapters  attempts  a  cautious  forecast 
of  the  situation  after  the  conclusion  of  peace. 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


PRINCIPAL  WORKS  BY  THE 
SAME  AUTHOR 

ETUDES  SUR  LES  EAUX  POTABLES  ET  LE  PLOMB 

Paris,  1884  (Turkish  translation,  Constantinople,  1889). 

DELL'  USD  DEI  TUBI  DI  PIOMBO  PER  LA  CON- 
DOTTA  DELLE  ACQUE  ALIMENTARI.  Piacenza, 
1886  (Polish  and  Spanish  translations). 

LA  NAVIGATION  AliRIENNE.    Paris,  1885. 

L'AGONIE  D'UNE  SOCIETY  (Sociological  Essay).    Paris, 

1889. 
MINISTERS  ET  MELINITE  (Sociological  Essay).  Paris, 

1891. 
LA  FRANCE  SOCIALE  ET  POLITIQUE,  1890  and  1891. 

Three  volumes,  Paris,  1891  and  1893. 

LE  SOCIALISMS  ET  LE  CONGRES  DE  LONDRES 
(Sociological  Essay).  Paris,  1897  (Portuguese  and  Spanish 
translations). 

SOCIALISMS  ET  ANARCHISME  (Sociological  Essay). 
Preface  by  Alfred  Naquet.  Paris,  1905  (Italian,  Russian, 
and  Spanish  translations). 

LA  PSYCHOLpGIE  DU  MILITAIRE  PROFESSION. 
NEL.  Paris,  1893,  1895  (German,  Bulgarian,  Italian, 
Portuguese,  Russian,  and  Spanish  translations). 

PSYCHOLOGIE  DE  L'ANARCHISTE  SOCIALISTS 
Paris,  1895  (Czech  and  Spanish  translations). 

DETERMINISMS  ET  RESPONSABILITfi.  Paris,  1897 
(English,  Portuguese,  and  Spanish  translations). 

LE  MOLIERE  DU  XX«  SIECLE :  BERNARD  SHAW. 
Paris,  1913  (English  and  Spanish  translations). 


LESSONS   OF 
THE    WORLD-WAR 


BY 

AUGUSTIN    HAMON 

PROFESSOR  IN  THE  NEW   UNIVERSITY  OF   BRUSSELS  AND  THE  FREE  COLLEGE 

OF  SOCIAL  SCIENCES,  PARIS;    LECTURER  IN  THE  FACULTY  OF  LETTERS  IN  THE 

UNIVERSITY   OF    PARIS;   LECTURER  AT  THE  LONDON   SCHOOL  OF  ECONOMICS 

AND    POLITICAL    SCIENCE 


Amicus  Plato  sed  magis  arnica  veritas. 

"There  is  no  motive  in  the  world  strong  enough  to  cause  a 
scholar  to  refrain  from  expressing  what  he  believes  to  be  the 

truth." 

ERNEST  REN AN. 


TRANSLATED  BY 

BERNARD    MIALL 

WITH     AN     INTRODUCTION     BY 

PATRICK   GEDDES 


NEW  YORK 
DODD,    MEAD   AND   COMPANY 

1919 


Printed  in  England 


All  rir&ti  rtterat  i 


TO 

HENEIETTE  HAMON 

MY  COMPANION, 

WHOSE  DILIGENT  COLLABORATION   HAS 

ENABLED  ME  TO  WEITE  THIS 

SOCIOLOGICAL  STUDY 


TO  THE  READER 

WAR,  and  above  all  a  war  such  as  that  which 
for  more  than  two  and  a  half  years  has  been 
ravaging  the  world,  hastens  and  reinforces  the 
current  of  social  events.  It  accentuates  their  conse- 
quences, which  are  rapidly  developed.  This  is  why  it 
is  possible  at  once  to  perceive  the  many  lessons  which 
arise  from  this  gigantic  social  phenomenon,  which  sets 
in  motion  all  the  material,  intellectual,  and  moral  forces 
of  the  crowd,  of  the  nations,  of  all  humanity. 

I  was  keenly  interested  by  the  wonderful  sociological 
lessons  afforded  by  this  war  when  Mr.  Victor  Branford, 
Honorary  Secretary  of  the  London  Sociological  Society, 
invited  me,  in  June,  1915,  to  take  part  in  a  Summer 
Meeting,  organized  for  July  by  the  well-known  Professor 
Patrick  Geddes,  at  King's  College  (University  of  London), 
whose  subject  was  to  be  "  The  War:  its  Social  Tasks 
and  Problems."  I  at  once  accepted,  and  decided  to 
deal  with  the  sociological  lessons  taught  by  the  world- 
war  in  four  lectures.  My  auditors,  and  among  them 
Professor  Geddes,  gave  them  a  reception  which  en- 
couraged me  to  treat  more  profoundly  the  questions 
which  I  was  able  only  to  touch  upon  in  my  four  lectures. 

When,  therefore,  Mr.  Lea,  the  Registrar  of  the 
University  Extension  Lectures  Board,  asked  me  to 
give  ten  lectures  at  Birkbeck  College  (University  of 
London)  from  November,  1915,  to  March,  1916,  I 
proposed — and  this  was  agreed  upon — to  speak  of 
"The  Lessons  of  the  World-War."  But  the  more 


1509403 


8  TO  THE  READER 

deeply  I  probed  into  the  subject  of  my  inquiry,  the 
more  it  expanded  before  my  eyes,  so  that  I  was  led  to 
give  thirteen  lectures  in  place  of  ten. 

It  is  these  lectures  which  I  now  publish  in  volume 
form.  They  have  already  appeared,  but  greatly  cur- 
tailed, since  they  were  reduced  to  less  than  half  their 
length,  in  La  Guerre  Mondiale,  a  daily  publication  of 
the  house  of  Atar,  in  Geneva.  A  complete  version  has 
been  published  in  Spanish  by  the  Prometeo  publishing 
house  in  Valencia.  Portions  of  chapters  have  appeared 
in  La  Revue  de  Hollande,  La  Grande  Revue,  The  Truth- 
Seeker,  La  Libre  Presse  Internationale,  and  Les  Docu- 
ments du  Progres.  The  text  of  the  French  and  English 
editions  is  an  almost  exact  reproduction  of  the  lectures 
which  I  delivered  before  the  English  audience  which 
attended  my  course  of  lectures  at  the  Birkbeck  College. 
I  say  "  almost,"  for  the  events  which  have  occurred 
between  March,  1916,  and  the  present  moment  have 
necessitated  a  few  additions,  and  here  and  there  some 
point  has  been  emphasized;  but  these  changes  have  not 
in  any  way  modified  the  deductions  which  I  expressed 
before  my  audiences.  I  hope  the  censorship — for  in 
1916  there  is,  in  France  and  in  England,  a  censorship 
of  the  products  of  the  human  mind — will  allow  both 
Frenchmen  and  Englishmen  to  read  what  Englishmen 
were  free  to  hear  in  the  lecture-theatres  of  the  two 
colleges  of  London  University.  This  is  a  scientific 
work,  the  result  of  objective  thought,  without  prejudice 
or  partiality.  May  it  be  read  in  the  same  spirit,  and 
thereby  assist  in  the  propagation  of  that  which  I  believe 

to  be  the  truth. 

AUGUSTIN  HAMON. 

TY  AN  DIAOUL, 

POET  BLANC  EN  PENVENAN, 

COTES  DU  NORD. 

December  20,1916. 


POSTSCRIPT 

THIS  volume,  with  its  XlVth  chapter — consisting 
entirely  of  unpublished  matter,  since  I  wrote  it, 
in  July,  1917,  for  this  English  edition — was  to  have 
made  its  appearance  in  September,  1917.  The  British 
censorship  saw  fit  to  place  a  veto  on  its  publica- 
tion. Then,  in  the  last  days  of  December,  1917,  it 
removed  this  veto. 

The  lapse  of  time  between  June,  1917,  and  the  moment 
of  writing  these  lines,  or  the  moment  when  this  volume 
is  published,  does  not,  after  all,  in  any  way  affect  the 
book  as  a  sociological  study.  The  events  analyzed 
in  these  pages  are  cited  only  as  data  from  which 
lessons  and  a  moral  are  to  be  deduced.  Lessons  of  the 
World-War,  as  the  title  intimates,  is  not  a  volume 
of  ephemeral  actuality,  which  must  of  necessity  appear 
at  a  given  moment.  It  is  a  scientific  work,  whose  value 
is  independent  of  the  date  of  its  publication. 

AUGUSTIN  HAMON. 
January  30,  1918. 


PREFACE 

The  sociological  importance  of  this  war — The  field  of  battle — The 
numbers  of  the  belligerents  and  the  combatants — The  intellectual 
and  moral  hyper-activity  of  humanity — There  are  lessons  to  be 
learned. 

THE  present  war  is  an  event  of  such  great  socio- 
logical significance  that  it  is  impossible  to  keep  in 
view  all  its  consequences,  and,  above  all,  all  its 
developments.  A  fresh  distribution  of  the  political 
world  is  about  to  result  from  this  war.  Economic 
repercussions  will  necessarily  ensue,  for  politics  and 
economics  always  exert  a  reciprocal  influence.  The 
result  of  these  economic  and  political  modifications  will 
be  a  change  in  the  social  world,  and  afterwards,  but  in 
a  lesser  degree,  a  modification  of  human  psychology. 
The  world-war  is  destined  to  play  so  great  a  part  in 
the  evolution  of  the  human  race  that  one  may  well  ask 
whether  there  has  in  the  past  been  any  event  of  equal 
gravity  and  influence. 

Be  the  consequences  and  their  development  what 
they  may,  the  war  possesses,  at  the  present  moment, 
an  enormous  importance,  owing  to  the  number  of  nations 
which  it  involves,  the  stupendous  number  of  soldiers 
who  are  mutually  contending,  and  the  considerable 
terrestrial  area  over  which  these  men  are  hurling  them- 
selves against  one  another  and  killing  one  another. 
Fourteen  Powers  are  at  war:  on  one  side  four — Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria;  on  the  other 
ten — Serbia,  Russia,  Belgium,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Montenegro,  Japan,  Italy,  Portugal,  and  Rumania; 

10 


PREFACE  11 

involving  on  the  one  side  more  than  800  million  in- 
habitants, and  on  the  other  barely  160  millions.  The 
conflict  is  spreading  over  the  whole  earth.  Men  are 
fighting  simultaneously  in  France,  Belgium,  Alsace, 
the  Trentino  and  the  Carnatic,  Macedonia,  Dalmatia, 
Galicia,  Poland,  and  Courland.  They  are  fighting  or 
have  fought  at  the  Dardanelles,  in  the  Caucasus,  in 
Mesopotamia,  in  Persia,  and  on  the  Suez  Canal.  They 
are,  or  have  been,  fighting  in  Central  Africa  and  South 
Africa,  in  the  Far  East,  in  Australasia,  in  the  Falklands, 
at  Easter  Isle,  and  in  the  Arctic  Ocean.  They  are 
fighting  on  the  earth  and  under  the  earth,  since  this  is 
a  war  of  saps  and  mines,  as  were  the  wars  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries;  they  are  fighting  on 
the  water  and  under  the  water;  lastly,  they  are  fighting 
in  the  air.  Millions  of  men  are  occupied  in  this  task  of 
butchery,  and  never  in  the  past  do  we  find  such  numbers 
of  human  beings  endeavouring  to  kill  one  another;  for 
there  are  more  than  forty  millions,  if  we  count  all  the 
armies  of  the  belligerents,  with  their  reserves  and  their 
territorials  or  Landtvehr. 

Not  only  are  millions  of  soldiers  fighting  on  the 
various  fronts,  but  the  entire  populations  of  towns  and 
villages  take  their  departure,  flying  before  the  invader, 
or  are  by  him  removed  from  their  native  soil  and  trans- 
ported to  other  and  remote  regions.  Nearly  a  million 
Belgians  have  fled  to  France,  Holland,  and  England; 
nearly  100,000  French  civilians  have  been  transported 
to  Germany,  and  afterwards  returned  to  France  by 
way  of  Switzerland.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Prus- 
sians or  Galicians  fled  westward  before  the  Russian 
armies,  and  later,  when  the  tide  had  returned  upon 
itself,  more  than  four  million  Poles,  Ruthenians,  and 
Letts  were  compelled,  whether  readily  or  unwillingly, 
to  abandon  their  countries  as  the  Austrians  and  the 
Germans  invaded  them.  More  than  100,000  Serbs  and 
Montenegrins  fled  before  the  enemy;  hundreds  of 


12  PREFACE 

thousands    of   Armenians    have    been    massacred    or 
uprooted  by  the  Turks. 

Everywhere,  in  the  Southern  as  in  the  Northern 
Hemisphere,  men  have  abandoned  their  callings,  their 
fields  or  factories,  shops  or  offices,  in  order  to  go  forth 
to  fight.  White  men,  yellow  men,  black  men,  brown 
men — all  have  met  and  are  still  meeting  in  an  in- 
describable mel^e.  Nearly  two  million  men  were  trans- 
ported from  the  ends  of  the  earth  to  the  place  of  battle. 
Nearly  four  millions  are  prisoners,  incarcerated  in  camps, 
in  the  midst  of  hostile  countries;  and  this  has  been  so 
for  months  upon  months.  These  phenomena  recall  the 
migrations  of  the  peoples  in  the  prehistoric  and  proto- 
historic  epochs,  when  men  fled  before  the  hordes  of  the 
invader. 

The  sociological  importance  of  the  world-war  is  further 
revealed  by  the  variety  of  the  methods  of  warfare  and 
by  the  duration  of  the  conflict.  The  most  recent 
methods  of  warfare  are  combined  with  the  most  ancient. 
Javelins,  slings,  grenades,  howitzers,  and  incendiary 
fluids  have  reappeared,  emerging  from  the  museums  of 
ancient  weapons  to  play  an  important  part.  And  side 
by  side  with  the  employment  of  these  ancient  weapons, 
which  are  barely  modified,  we  perceive  the  utilization 
of  the  most  recent  and  improved  scientific  and  in- 
dustrial methods:  railways,  motor-cars,  aeroplanes, 
motor-cycles,  dirigible  balloons,  submarines,  asphyxi- 
ating gases,  etc. 

The  war,  for  a  space  of  years — we  cannot  as  yet  fore- 
tell when  it  will  cease — has  broken  up  the  habitual 
social  and  political  and  economic  life.  It  has  been 
necessary  to  organize  something  different  from  that 
which  existed,  to  adapt  ourselves  to  the  new  conditions. 
This  adaptation  has  been  more  or  less  tardy,  more  or 
less  rapid,  according  to  the  rapidity  of  comprehension 
of  the  peoples,  according  to  their  plasticity  in  respect 
of  external  circumstances,  or  according  to  their  state 


PREFACE  13 

of  preparation.  A  general  fermentation  of  the  mind, 
directed  towards  a  single  end — the  war — is  everywhere 
manifest.  There  has  been  and  is  a  veritable  hyper- 
activity,  intellectual  and  above  all  scientific  in  char- 
acter. The  means  of  destruction  have  been  improved 
in  a  degree  unequalled  by  anything  else ;  but  the  means 
of  conservation  have  followed  the  same  ascensional 
process.  The  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded  has 
progressed  and  is  progressing  day  by  day,  although 
the  international  exchange  of  scientific  improvements 
and  discoveries  has  been  greatly  reduced,  since  it  occurs 
only  in  the  interior  of  the  two  belligerent  groups. 

A  moral  hyper-activity  has  manifested  itself,  paral- 
leled by  an  intellectual  hyper-activity;  there  has  been 
a  general  and  uncontrollable  need  of  action,  which  has 
manifested  itself  under  the  most  various  forms  of  mutual 
aid.  The  neutral  nations  have  felt  this  need  as  well 
as  the  belligerents.  A  breath  of  altruism  has  blown 
over  all  the  quarters  of  the  terraqueous  globe.  It  has 
on  the  whole  counterbalanced  the  sanguinary  tempest 
which  has  ravaged  the  world,  and  is  of  good  augury  for 
the  future. 

This  moral  and  intellectual  hyper-activity  is  an  effect 
of  the  war  as  a  human  cataclysm.  The  war,  by  its 
destructiveness,  its  labour  of  death,  has  produced  the 
same  effect  as  an  earthquake,  or  other  terrestrial 
cataclysm,  productive  of  an  equally  great  mortality. 
It  would  be  an  error  of  reasoning  to  count  the  moral 
and  intellectual  hyper-activity  which  the  war  has 
produced  as  an  asset  of  warfare. 

The  world-war  is  thus  a  social  phenomenon  of  the 
first  importance.  A  host  of  lessons  arise  therefrom, 
lessons  regarding  the  future  of  humanity.  Here  we 
can  obviously  do  no  more  than  outline  a  portion  of  this 
teaching,  so  various  is  it,  so  great  and  so  complex. 
But  this  outline  even  will  show  the  serious  nature  of 
the  lessons  of  the  war.  It  will  indicate,  we  believe, 


14  PREFACE 

the  paths  which  humanity  must  pursue  if  it  wishes  to 
derive  a  real  profit,  corresponding  to  the  human  heca- 
tombs and  the  mountains  of  ruins  which  the  mad 
ambition  of  a  fraction  of  the  German  rulers,  the  caste 
of  Junkers,  and  the  leaders  of  the  metallurgical  industry, 
have  let  loose  upon  humanity. 

We  must,  however,  avoid  illusions.  To  all  human 
beings  who  are  actors  or  spectators,  the  war  seems 
terribly  long;  but  compared  with  the  life  of  humanity 
the  war  has  lasted  only  for  the  briefest  moment.  And 
the  psychological  changes  which  it  will  provoke  will 
doubtless  be  very  minute,  barely  visible,  for  it  takes  a 
long  time  to  modify  the  minds  of  men.  At  the  most 
a  few  seeds  of  these  modifications  will  have  been  sown 
in  the  human  brain.  There  they  will  grow  and  develop 
under  the  influence  of  the  political,  economic,  and  social 
conditions  to  which  the  war  will  give  birth.  Only 
many  years  later,  when  the  war  is  no  longer  anything 
but  a  lifeless  memory  to  living  men,  will  humanity  feel 
the  psychical  effects  of  the  cataclysm  which,  in  the 
dawn  of  the  twentieth  century,  has  ravaged  and  is  still 
ravaging  the  earth. 


INTRODUCTION 

MY  old  friend,  M.  Hamon,  insists  that  I  write  a  word 
of  introduction  for  him  to  his  English  readers ;  for 
in  his  invincible  foreign  ignorance  he  treats  as  of 
mere  modesty,  and  refuses  as  melancholy  fact,  my 
assurance  to  him  that  I  have  not  yet  succeeded  in 
making  that  desirable  acquaintance  for  myself.  But 
in  these  times  of  common  anxiety,  any  reader  of  the 
war  news  may  drop  into  conversation  with  his  neigh- 
bour unintroduced.  So,  when  M.  Hamon's  name 
conies  up,  and  one  is  asked,  as  an  old  and  frequent 
sojourner  in  France  and  in  Belgium,  what  one  knows 
of  him,  I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  answer,  "  Much,  and 
all  to  his  credit."  He  is  a  veteran  publicist,  who  was 
for  many  years  at  the  helm  of  one  of  the  most 
open-minded  of  Franco-Belgian  reviews,  L'Humanite 
Nouvelle,  one  essentially  in  touch  with  active  and 
progressive  minds  throughout  the  world.  As  concerned 
not  only  with  social,  political,  and  economic  theses  and 
discussions,  but  also  with  literature  and  drama,  with 
art  and  science,  with  education  in  the  widest  sense,  the 
editor  of  such  a  review,  while  thus  helping  his  no  less 
varied  readers  in  many  directions,  also  educates  him- 
self, and  so  becomes  an  encyclopaedist  in  an  age  of 
specialisms.  Better  still,  he  becomes  a  man  of  sym- 
pathies outranging  party  limits,  outstepping  national 
boundaries,  and  thus  keeping  alive  to  human  facts  and 
tendencies,  both  near  and  far.  His  studies  and  his 
teachings  have  thus  ranged  from  home  schools  to 

15 


16  INTRODUCTION 

Universities;  and  his  criticisms  from  metropolitan 
activities  and  thought-streams  to  their  resultants,  as 
now  in  international  strife. 

Our  writer's  life-education  has  thus  been  in  more 
than  editorship.  As  befits  the  sociological  movement 
in  which  he  has  been  one  of  the  pioneers,  he  has  oscil- 
lated between  activity  and  reflection,  between  city  and 
studious  hermitage;  as  from  quiet  years  of  Breton 
village  life  and  reflection  to  his  academic  platforms  at 
Brussels,  Paris,  or  London.  Such,  in  summary,  has 
been  the  life-preparation  of  our  writer  for  his  present 
ambitious  task:  that  of  producing  perhaps  the  book  of 
the  war,  at  any  rate  one  of  the  most  many-sided  and 
comprehensive.  And  while  as  stoutly  and  convincingly 
loyal  to  the  common  cause  as  if  he  were  among  the 
defenders  of  Verdun,  or  the  victors  of  the  Somme,  he 
yet  maintains  the  critical  calmness  of  his  editorial  chair, 
and  never  loses  sight  of  that  general  movement  of 
European — say  rather  Occidental  and  even  human — 
development,  which,  despite  all  divisions  and  wars,  is 
yet  moving  towards  a  civilized  unity,  and  this  in  the 
future  even  more  than  in  the  past,  despite  the  wide- 
riven  present. 

Here,  then,  is  the  enormous  task  in  which  he  at  least 
relatively  succeeds,  where  full  contemporary  success  is 
impossible.  He  is  seeking  to  interpret  the  present 
supreme  efforts  of  the  nations  concerned,  in  their  inter- 
actions with  their  internal  life,  their  social  organization; 
and  these  not  only  during  the  war,  but  as  remodelling 
factors  and  influences  thereafter. 

Twenty  years  ago,  in  his  Psychologie  du  Militaire 
Professionnel,  he  foresaw  beyond  any  writer  the  horrors 
which  have  since  been  inflicted  upon  the  invaded 
territories,  and  this  exceptional  insight  has  since 
matured  and  extended  in  its  range  without  losing  its 
penetration  and  directness.  Yet  with  all  this  he  has 
no  harshness;  his  judgments  of  events,  his  views  towards 


INTRODUCTION  17 

settlement,  are  less  severe  than  will  be  those  of  most 
of  his  readers,  as  certainly  than  are  mine;  but  in  this 
one  must  all  the  more  respect  and  admire  him  for  being 
able — despite  the  frightful  menace,  trial,  and  suffering 
through  which  his  country,  only  less  than  Belgium 
itself,  has  passed — to  range  himself  along  with  those 
noblest  writers,  Belgian  and  French  alike,  who  have 
freed  their  souls  from  vindictiveness,  and  who  do  not 
despair  of  the  coming,  and  over  the  whole  world,  of  a 
deeper  philosophy  of  state,  a  remoralized  statecraft,  a 
renewed  social  education. 

Yet  the  book  is  no  mere  counsel  of  such  coming 
perfections,  nor  even  a  signpost  of  ways  of  progress 
towards    it.     Above    all,    it    remains    topical,    though 
always  in  the  larger  sense:  indeed,  in  this  respect  it  is 
wellnigh  encyclopaedic ;  so  much  so  that  even  to  indicate 
the  main  points  he  deals  with  would  require  long  pages. 
These,  however,  are  clearly  indicated  by  the  well-filled 
chapter  headings,  which  cannot  but  attract  the  reader, 
whether  he  be  concentrated  on  specific  issues,  or  in 
more  general  study  of  the  contemporary  situation.     Our 
author  is   economist  and  psychologist  by  turns,   and 
yet  together;  and  so  goes  on  interpreting  for  us,  not 
only  enemy,  allied,  and  neutral  countries,  their  soldiers 
and  civilians,  their  Governments  and  diplomatists,  but 
also  Churches  of  all  faiths,  and  those  outside  them  as 
well.     He  is  in  touch  with  the  workers,  and  at  home 
among  their  problems,  from  those  of  munition  works 
and  mines  to-day,  to  their  yet  more  anxious  and  per- 
plexing   after- war    future.      Nationalism    and    inter- 
nationalism,   capitalism    and    Socialism,    religion    and 
morals,  education  and  science,  the  old  professions  and 
the  newer,  all  come  under  his  review;  and  thus  it  leads 
onwards  towards  suggestions  well  worth  pondering,  as 
how  to  make  the  war  settlement  more  enduring  through 
wisdom,  and  reorganization  more  effective  also. 

Even    Kaisers    and    their    unthinking    cliques    are 

2 


18  INTRODUCTION 

learning  by  this  time  that  war  does  not  pay;  but  our 
writer  states  this  with  far  deeper  significance.  Even 
the  extreme  pacifists  are  realizing  that  no  arbitrational 
machinery,  however  excellent,  can  assure  the  future; 
but  M.  Hamon  goes  deeper  into  the  conditions  of  inter- 
national peace  than  they  have  done,  and  ends  with  no 
vague  Utopia,  but  with  practical  proposals. 

In  many  ways,  then,  this  book  is  needed  and  timely; 
and  even  by  those  to  whom  its  views  and  conclusions 
may  be  here  and  there  unacceptable,  it  will  be  found 
stimulating  to  further  thought.  What  better  can  be 
said  in  a  situation  when  all  men's  thought  is  more  or 
less  in  perplexity  and  in  criticism,  in  inquiry  and  search  ? 
Those  whose  minds  are  clearly  made  up  outside  the 
deeper  discussions  M.  Hamon  so  frankly  speaks  his 
mind  in,  will  not  contribute  so  substantially  to  their 
solutions,  nor  enter  so  surely  into  the  resultant  hope. 

PATRICK  GEDDES. 


CONTENTS 

PAGES 

To  THE  READER   -  .....        7 

POSTSCRIPT  -        0 

PREFACE  :  The  sociological  importance  of  this  war — The  field  of 
battle — The  numbers  of  the  belligerents  and  the  combatants 
— The  intellectual  and  moral  hyper-activity  of  humanity — 
There  are  lessons  to  be  learned  ...  10-14 

INTRODUCTION       ......  15-18 


CHAPTER  I 

TERRORISM   AND   UNTRUTH 

The  employment  of  violence  in  the  conduct  of  the  war — Losses 
— Falsification  of  German  statistics — The  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners  in  the  various  belligerent  countries — The  defeat 
of  the  Central  Empires  is  inevitable — The  total  losses — The 
nature  of  war — A  check  to  the  regulation  of  warfare — The 
conduct  of  war  depends  on  violence  and  cunning — Terrorism 
— The  military  mentality — It  is  produced  by  an  education 
based  on  fear — Untruthfulness  as  a  means  of  leading  men — 
Definition  of  what  is  meant  by  democracy  and  autocracy — 
Lying  military  communiques — The  Press  an  agent  which 
deceives  the  peoples — The  power  of  secret  diplomacy — Its 
opposition  to  the  democratic  principle — The  evil  done  and  the 
crimes  produced  by  lies  and  by  secret  diplomacy — The 
disdain  of  the  Central  Empires  for  public  opinion — The  lies 
told  and  the  documents  falsified  by  the  German  Government 
— Treaties  are  valid  only  by  the  good- will  of  the  contracting 
parties — The  principle  "Might  is  Right"  must  disappear — It 
is  at  the  basis  of  all  education,  since  this  is  based  on  fear — The 
psychological  effects  of  such  education — Passive  discipline  and 
voluntary  discipline — The  consequences  which  arise  therefrom 
— Men  are  not  automata,  and  cannot  be  treated  as  such — The 
absence  of  the  critical  spirit  in  the  Germans  is  the  cause  of 
their  psychological  blunders  respecting  foreigners  and  the 
peoples  dominated  by  them — Liberty — What  we  understand 
by  liberty — Its  power  as  a  social  force — The  critical  spirit 
and  the  sp  n  il  of  revolt  are  of  enormous  social  value  -  29-53 

19 


20  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   COST   OF   THE   WAR 

PA«IS 

The  number  of  men  under  arms — Professional  soldiers  are 
disappearing  in  the  mass  of  occasional  soldiers — The  useless- 
ness  of  long  military  service — The  importance  of  militias — 
The  bankruptcy  of  militarism — The  importance  of  individual 
initiative — Individualism — The  mentality  of  the  French 
soldier — The  engineer  and  administrator  replace  the  profes- 
sional soldier — Foreign  or  domestic  policy  conditions  military 
strategy — War  a  survival  of  barbarous  periods — Decorations 
a  survival  of  tattoo-marks — Ordinary  criminality  in  time  of 
war:  it  does  not  disappear,  but  changes  its  aim — War  is  a 
succession  of  crimes — Horror  and  hatred  of  war— The  develop- 
ment of  anti-militarism. 

War  as  a  means  of  acquiring  wealth — Pillage  and  requisi- 
tion— The  dispossession  of  conquered  peoples — Application 
to  Europeans  of  the  methods  applied  by  Europeans  to  so-called 
inferior  races — The  Germanic  race  a  superior  race  ? — The 
acquisition  of  property  by  means  of  warfare  is  a  survival — 
Its  impossibility — The  devastation  and  the  losses  of  war — 
An  estimate  of  the  losses  in  property  and  in  men — The  cost 
of  the  war — The  payment  per  head  required  to  repay  it — 
The  general  ruin  of  the  nations — The  conquered  cannot 
indemnify  the  conquerors — Justice  and  reason  would  call  for 
the  seizure  of  the  property  of  those  who  caused  the  war:  the 
Germanic  Emperors,  Kings,  Princes,  and  landowners — Dis- 
armament seems  bound  to  come  ...  54-81 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS 

Commercial,  industrial,  and  financial  disturbance — The  seizure 
of  the  means  of  transport — The  frontiers  closed :  a  survival  of 
barbarism — The  consequences  to  commercial,  industrial,  and 
domestic  life — The  importance  of  coal — The  importance  of 
mining  labour — The  impossibility  of  making  the  professions 
hierarchical — The  lesson  of  terrestrial  solidarity — The  increase 
in  the  standard  of  living — The  enrichment  of  some  and  the 
impoverishment  of  others — Disturbance  of  agriculture — The 
fixation  of  prices:  the  maximum — The  importance  of  the 
mastery  of  the  seas — The  opposition  between  the  Germanic 
policy  in  respect  of  neutrals  and  that  of  the  Allies — Neutrals 
and  the  war — Their  attitude  towards  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality — The  influence  of  the  German  threats,  lies,  and 
corruption — Fear  a  means  of  controlling  men — Commercial 
and  industrial  interests  incline  the  neutrals  to  remain  neutral 
— Diminished  authority  of  the  United  States  of  America — 


CONTENTS  21 

PAGE! 

The  opposition  between  Kings  and  peoples  in  the  Balkans 
— Conservatives,  Catholics,  and  aristocrats  in  the  neutral 
countries  are  pro-German. 

The  reconstitution  of  economic  life — The  peoples  adapt 
themselves  differently  to  the  conditions  arising  from  the 
war — Progressive  science  and  industry  due  to  mental  hyper- 
activity — The  influence  of  the  system  of  division  of  labour  on 
human  invention — The  Taylor  system  is  detrimental  to 
human  progress — The  reorganization  of  labour — The  scarcity 
of  hands  —  The  indispensable  nature  of  labour  —  Female 
labour — Forced  labour:  slavery — The  militarization  of  the 
working  class — The  necessity  of  Trade  Unionism  -  82-114 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   BELLIGERENTS  AND   THE  WAR 

The  various  nations  and  the  war — They  react  in  different  ways 
— Military  authority  assumes  the  supreme  power — Constitu- 
tions suspended  and  liberties  suppressed — Germany :  her  mili- 
tarism, her  mentality,  her  preparation  for  the  war,  her  mega- 
lomania, her  foreign  and  domestic  policy  —  Russia:  her 
bureaucracy,  corruption,  and  disorder;  authority  and  its 
effects;  its  liberalization  is  inevitable — France:  antagonism 
between  her  democratic  habits  and  the  autocratic  Govern- 
ment; the  Conservative  and  Catholic  parties;  a  vain  attempt 
to  militarize  France;  Parliament  recovers  its  power;  the 
actual  democratization  of  France  —  Great  Britain:  the 
voluntary  system  opposed  to  compulsion;  Parliamentary 
control;  the  English  mentality;  the  Conservative  and  Demo- 
cratic parties;  the  Churches;  the  Trades  Unions;  the  Welsh 
miners'  strike;  the  Munitions  Act  ...  115-144 


CHAPTER  V 

AUTOCRACY  AND   DEMOCRACY 

The  postal,  telegraphic,  and  telephonic  censorship  —  The 
Press  censorship — Subsidizing  of  newspapers — Pamphlets 
replacing  the  newspaper  Press,  which  has  become  more  or 
less  enslaved — Espionage  of  the  police — Psychological  and 
sociological  consequences  of  these  methods  of  government, 
which  are  based  on  ignorance  and  delusion — Men  are  easy  to 
govern — Opposition  between  autocratic  methods  of  govern- 
ment and  democratic  habits  and  principles — The  possession 
of  power  stultifies  the  mind — The  directing  influence  of 
minorities — The  revolt  against  the  governing  classes — Italy 
and  Bulgaria  enter  the  war :  the  effects  of  popular  revolt  and 
obedience — The  power  of  the  State — The  beneficent  influence 


22  CONTENTS 

PACKS 

of  liberty — The  loyalty  of  the  British  Dominions — The 
necessity  of  diminishing  the  power  of  the  State  and  increasing 
liberty — The  Conservative  parties  are  everywhere — The 
existence  of  a  class  mentality — Autocracies  are  inevitably 
fated  to  be  replaced  by  democracies  ...  145-178 


CHAPTER  VI 

WAE   AND   THE   CREEDS 

The  war  and  Christianity  —  The  contradictions  of  Christian 
practice — The  conduct  of  the  official  clergy — The  Catholic 
Church  and  the  attitude  of  the  Catholics  in  different  countries 
— The  fundamental  basis  of  the  Catholic  Church  and  Csesarism 
is  the  same:  authority — The  attitude  of  the  Pope — Judaism — 
Anti-Semitism  is  undone  by  the  attitude  of  the  Jews — 
Mohammedanism — The  bankruptcy  of  the  holy  war — The 
pseudo-religious  Renaissance — Its  causes:  material  interests 
and  the  fear  of  death — Animistic  and  polytheistic  supersti- 
tions. 

The  war  and  the  internationalism  of  science,  letters,  and 
the  arts — The  Chauvinism  of  scientists  and  literary  men — An 
outburst  of  hatred — It  is  only  a  passing  manifestation. 

The  war  and  Feminism — The  international  character  of 
Feminism — The  part  of  women  in  the  war — The  social  equality 
of  the  sexes — Violence  is  the  enemy  of  Feminism  -  179-204 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   WAR  AND   THE   SOCIALISTS 

The  war  and  the  "  Internationale "  —  The  attitude  of  the 
German,  French,  Belgian,  British,  and  Russian  Socialists — 
The  outbreak  of  hostilities — Their  mentality — The  attitude 
of  the  neutral  Socialists,  and  its  causes — The  preponderance 
of  German  Social  Democracy  in  international  Socialism — 
The  different  conceptions  of  Socialism  in  France  and 
Germany — State  Socialism — The  modifications  of  the  Socialist 
attitude  caused  by  the  duration  of  the  war — The  conflicts  in 
the  midst  of  the  various  Socialist  parties  in  Germany  and  in 
France — The  effect  of  the  centralized  organization  of  the 
parties,  and  of  participation  in  the  Government. 

Socialistic  measures  taken  by  the  Governments  of  all 
countries — The  lesson  to  be  learned  therefrom — This  war  is, 
in  one  of  its  aspects,  the  conflict  between  two  conceptions  of 
Socialism:  centralized  and  authoritative  Socialism;  federal- 
ized  and  libertarian  Socialism — The  spread  of  the  Socialist 
ideal  and  the  growth  of  the  forces  of  Socialism  under  the 
influence  of  the  war  .....  205-230 


CONTENTS  23 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR 

KAMI 

The  relations  between  the  two  groups  of  belligerents,  and 
between  the  various  Allied  Powers — The  difference  of  their 
conduct,  and  its  causes — The  hegemony  of  Germany  over  her 
obedient  allies — The  militarization  of  the  German  mind  is  due 
to  education,  not  to  race — The  organization  of  the  great 
Asiatic  Empires — The  militarist  education  results  in  the 
industry  of  war — Victory  is  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of 
moral  force  in  the  Central  Powers — In  the  Quintuple  Entente 
the  relations  of  the  Allies  are  those  of  equals — The  consequences 
which  arise  from  this  fact — The  opposition  of  the  interests  of 
the  various  Allies — How  the  duration  of  the  war  affects  the 
various  Allies — The  influence  of  democratic  government  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war — The  opposition  between  the  democratic 
principle  and  autocratic  methods  of  government — Its  effect 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

Friction  and  discontent  among  the  Allies  —  Causes: 
mutual  ignorance  and  fear  of  the  truth — The  part  played  by 
the  various  Allies  in  the  war — What  might  happen  in  the 
hypothetical  case  of  a  rearrangement  of  Alliances — The 
mutual  indispensability  of  the  Allies  of  the  Quintuple  Entente 
— Conservative  Russia  desirous  of  a  separate  peace. 

The  treaty  of  September  4,  1914,  and  the  separate 
peace — The  advantages  and  inconveniences  of  this  treaty  in 
the  case  of  each  Ally,  and  in  the  case  of  the  whole  group — 
Italy  and  Germany — The  necessity  of  dealing  with  all  the 
causes  of  international  conflict  and  the  free  entente  of  the 
Powers  in  question  renders  peace  exceedingly  difficult — The 
Governments  cannot  fix  the  clauses  of  the  peace  treaty — The 
small  nationalities  hope  to  be  liberated — The  other  questions 
to  be  solved. 

A  war  of  exhaustion — Its  many  points  of  similarity  to  the 
American  War  of  Secession — Germany  plays  the  part  of  the 
slave  States — The  blockade  and  its  results — The  end  of  the 
war  will  be  due  to  the  blockade,  to  economic  exhaustion — 
The  economic,  social,  and  political  consequences  of  the  war 
of  exhaustion  for  all  the  belligerents  -  281-259 


CHAPTER  IX 

FACTORS  AFFECTING   WARFARE:   REPRISALS 

The  war  and  the  government  of  soldiers  and  lawyers — The 
government  of  the  aged — Wealth  is  of  more  value  than  human 
lives — The  influence  of  geographical,  climatical,  and  geological 
conditions  on  the  war :  insularity;  the  sea,  rivers,  mountains, 
and  deserts j  snow,  rain, and  wind;  mimetism  in  war;  the  pro- 


24  CONTENTS 

PAGES 

duce  of  the  soil  and  sub-soil — Mutual  aid — The  sentiment  of 
sociality  is  most  highly  developed  in  the  British — Appearance 
of  a  universal  moral  sentiment — The  manifestations  of  hatred 
are  merely  literary. 

The  problem  of  reprisals — The  policy  of  "an  eye  for  an 
eye  " — Vengeance  is  absurd — Reprisals  are  always  useless — 
Collective  responsibility  an  idea  rejected  by  our  codes  and 
our  laws — The  real  objects  of  aerial  raids — War  is  by  nature 
a  tissue  of  crimes,  not  a  sport — There  are  no  non-combatants 
— War  itself  must  be  execrated,  not  merely  certain  methods 
of  warfare — We  should  not  condemn  aerial  raids  and 
submarine  warfare  and  not  the  other  manifestations  of  war- 
fare— The  only  criterion  of  the  employment  of  weapons  in 
warfare  is  their  military  utility  260-287 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   OBJECTS   OF   THE   WAR 

The  objects  of  the  war — Distinction  between  the  objects  of 
the  ruling  classes  and  those  of  the  popular  masses — Germany 
responsible  for  the  war — The  aims  of  her  ruling  classes — They 
are  economic — Over-population  and  neo-Malthusianism — 
The  aims  of  the  popular  masses — The  desire  for  European  and 
world-wide  hegemony — The  necessity  of  destroying  the 
British  Empire — The  Empire  of  Central  Europe — The  aims 
of  the  British  people — They  are  political  and  moral — The 
aims  of  Austria-Hungary — The  value  of  treaties  between 
States — Their  basis  is  interest,  for  they  have  no  other  sanction 
than  war — Legal  right  has  no  existence  in  itself — Natural 
rights  are  really  natural  necessities — The  aims  of  Japan — The 
aims  of  Italy — The  aims  of  Russia — The  aims  of  Turkey, 
Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Rumania — The  aims  of  France  and 
Belgium — Predominance  of  economic  aims  in  the  ruling 
classes — The  struggle  for  the  possession  of  trade  routes — The 
aims  of  the  masses  are  pre-eminently  political  and  moral — The 
war  is  a  conflict  between  the  principles  of  authority  and 
liberty — Its  great  importance  in  this  respect — The  peoples 
must  limit  the  powers  of  the  State — The  great  centralized 
States  and  the  federations  of  small  nations — The  bankruptcy 
of  the  rulin  g  classes  of  Germany  -  -  288-310 

C  HAPTER  XI 

RESULTS  OP  THE   WAH:   A     NATIONAL   SETTLEMENT 

Biological  conditions — Diminution  of  the  male  population — 
Mortality  in  the  civil  population — Falling-off  of  the  birth- 
rate— Increase  of  infant  mortality — Humanity  suffers  in  its 
biological  qualities — The  war  is  an  instrument  of  an  inverse 


CONTENTS  25 

PAGES 

natural  selection — Nervous  tension  and  mental  disequilibrium 
— Effects  of  overwork :  stupidity  of  suspending  the  laws  pro- 
tecting the  worker — The  effect  upon  children — The  different 
effect  of  the  war  on  the  two  sexes — The  superiority  of  the 
female  sex  from  the  collective  point  of  view — The  social 
and  legal  consequences  of  the  numerical  predominance  of  the 
female  sex — The  necessity  for  social  amelioration:  hygiene, 
education,  etc. 

Political  conditions — Wars  result  from  the  blunders  of  diplo- 
matists— Peace  must  be  the  work  of  the  peoples — The  victory 
of  the  Quintuple  Alliance  is  inevitable — Annexations  would 
be  acts  of  madness — The  basis  of  political  settlement  should  be 
in  accordance  with  the  example  of  liberty  and  equality  set  by 
nature — The  nature  of  national  groups — Their  essential  basis 
is  community  of  will — The  national  policy — The  State  and 
nationality:  their  fundamental  opposition — The  foundations 
of  nationality  are  liberty  and  equality — The  referendum — 
Small  national  groups  make  for  intensity  of  life — Hetero- 
geneity increases  the  production  of  individuals. 

The  Polish  problem  is  an  international  problem — The 
reconstitution  of  an  independent  Poland — The  Jewish  question 
also  is  international — The  problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
Schleswig  and  the  popular  referendum — The  disappearance  of 
the  centralized  and  militarized  German  Empire — The  free 
federation  of  the  Germanic  groups — The  disappearance  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire — The  Slav  nationalities  of  the 
North:  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Slovachia — The  Slav  nationalities 
of  the  South:  Croatia,  Slavonia,  Syrmia,  etc. — Referendum 
and  federation — Transylvania  and  a  portion  of  Banat  should 
go  to  Rumania — Independent  Hungary — The  nationalities 
of  the  Ukraine,  Lithuania,  and  Finland,  and  the  Russian 
Empire — Bulgaria — The  problems  of  Macedonia,  Thrace,  Asia 
Minor:  their  solution  on  the  basis  of  liberty  and  equality — 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles  neutralized  and  autono- 
mous— The  colonies  of  the  German  Empire  divided  among 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Belgium  on  conditions  to  be 
determined. 

The  political  consequences  of  such  a  territorial  settlement 
on  the  basis  of  liberty  and  equality  -  311-340 


CHAPTER  XII 

AFTER  THE   WAR:  ECONOMIC   PROBLEMS 

Economic  conditions — State  indebtedness  will  be  doubled  or 
trebled — The  results  of  war  loans  in  place  of  taxation — War 
indemnities — Germany  cannot  pay  an  indemnity,  save  to 
Belgium — The  budgets  of  the  nations  will  be  doubled  or 


26  CONTENTS 

PACKS 

trebled — Changes  of  assessment  of  taxation — Income  tax — 
States  must  economize. 

Most  people  will  be  poorer — A  few  will  be  richer — Displace- 
ment of  wealth — The  industrial  and  commercial  effort — The 
economic  conflict — The  policy  of  customs  unions  will  continue 
the  war — Its  international  and  national  results,  political  and 
social — The  development  of  machinery — The  need  of  capital : 
the  increase  of  the  rate  of  interest — The  dearth  of  labour  and 
its  deterioration  as  to  quality — Female  labour — The  economic 
mtersexual  conflict — The  way  to  remedy  the  deficiency  of 
labour:  the  consequences — Intensification  of  the  class  con- 
flict— The  demobilization  of  the  armies — How  will  it  be 
effected  ? — The  psychological  effects  of  the  war  and  of 
military  life — The  modifications  of  mentality  to  be  looked 
for — A  revolutionary  state  of  mind  will  coincide  with  revolu- 
tionary economic  conditions  —  The  results  —  The  idea  of 
revolutionary  movements  after  the  war  is  general — How  to 
avoid  them. 

The  condition  of  science,  letters,  and  the  arts — The  scientific 
"  boom  " — The  tendency  of  art  toward  realism — The  public 
is  surfeited  with  the  war — In  the  near  future  art  will  be 
humorous  and  cheerful,  not  tragic — International  relations 
and  artists  ------  341-365 


CHAPTER  XIII 

DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT 

The  necessity  of  budgetary  economy — Impossible  to  economize 
on  hygiene  or  social  legislation — To  economize  on  education 
is  madness — We  must  economize  on  our  armies,  fleets,  and 
armaments — The  result  of  not  disarming — The  results  of 
partial  disarmament — Complete  disarmament  is  the  keystone 
of  a  final  peace — The  advantages  of  disarmament:  budgetary 
economy,  increased  production,  disappearance  of  military 
parasitism,  disappearance  of  the  military  spirit — Political 
results:  international  juridical  relations,  the  weakening  of 
autocracies,  the  strengthening  of  democracies — The  arma- 
ments of  neutrals  are  due  to  the  fever  of  armaments  from 
which  the  belligerents  have  been  suffering — Naval  disarma- 
ment— The  opponents  of  disarmament  are  the  professional 
soldiers  and  the  Conservative  elements — The  whole  of 
humanity  longs  for  the  end  of  wars  and  armaments — The 
realization  of  disarmament  depends  on  the  will  of  the 
democracies — The  conditions  resulting  from  disarmament: 
the  suppression  of  arsenals  and  munition  factories;  an 
indemnity  to  the  proprietors;  international  tribunals  or 
courts;  the  Amphictyonic  Council  of  the  nations — Excom- 


CONTENTS  27 

PAGES 

munication  as  a  sanction — The  police  force  of  the  nations — 
The  police  army — The  federation  of  the  nations — This 
sociological  process  continues  a  process  which  has  been 
unfolding  since  the  dawn  of  time — The  need  of  union,  dis- 
turbed by  the  German  mentality,  which  is  poisoned  by  the 
spirit  of  obedience  to  authority,  has  engendered  the  war — The 
ruling  classes  of  Germany  were  the  conscious  or  unconscious 
agents  of  the  universal  determinism — The  ultimate  end  of  the 
war  must  be  disarmament — The  final  result  of  all  the  economic, 
political,  and  moral  conditions ;  it  is  no  Utopia,  but  a  necessity 

366-385 

CHAPTER   XIV 

CONCLUDING   REMARKS 

The  Russian  Revolution — The  United  States  enters  the  war — The 
victory  of  the  Entente  postponed — The  influence  of  American 
capitalism — Public  opinion  is  stirred  in  support  of  Mr.  Wilson — 
The  Central  Powers  refuse  to  divulge  their  aims — Mr.  Wilson's 
Message — The  predominance  of  altruistic  aims — The  sub- 
marine war  intensified — America  drawn  into  the  war — The 
Tsar  deposed — Mr.  Wilson's  declaration — The  Irish  question — 
Results  of  America's  intervention — Anarchy  in  Russia — The 
war  becomes  a  war  of  democratization:  a  revolution — Peace 
will  be  based  on  justice,  liberty,  and  equality — The  war  will 
result  in  the  general  democratic  progress  of  the  peoples  386-425 


INDEX  --------     426-438 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH 

The  employment  of  violence  in  the  conduct  of  the  war — Losses — 
Falsification  of  German  statistics — The  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners  in  the  various  belligerent  countries — The  defeat  of  the 
Central  Empires  is  inevitable — The  total  losses — The  nature  of 
war — A  check  to  the  regulation  of  warfare — The  conduct  of  war 
depends  on  violence  and  cunning — Terrorism — The  military 
mentality — It  is  produced  by  an  education  based  on  fear — 
Untruthfulness  as  a  means  of  leading  men — Definition  of  what  is 
meant  by  democracy  and  autocracy — Lying  military  communiques 
— The  Press  an  agent  which  deceives  the  peoples — The  power  of 
secret  diplomacy — Its  opposition  to  the  democratic  principle — 
The  evil  done  and  the  crimes  produced  by  lies  and  by  secret 
diplomacy — The  disdain  of  the  Central  Empires  for  public  opinion 
— The  lies  told  and  the  documents  falsified  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment— Treaties  are  valid  only  by  the  good- will  of  the  contracting 
parties — The  principle  "  Might  is  Right "  must  disappear — It  is 
at  the  basis  of  all  education,  since  this  is  based  on  fear — The 
psychological  effects  of  such  education — Passive  discipline  and 
voluntary  discipline — The  consequences  which  arise  therefrom — 
Men  are  not  automata,  and  cannot  be  treated  as  such — The 
absence  of  the  critical  spirit  in  the  Germans  is  the  cause  of  their 
psychological  blunders  respecting  foreigners  and  the  peoples 
dominated  by  them — Liberty — What  we  understand  by  liberty — 
Its  power  as  a  social  force — The  critical  spirit  and  the  spirit  of 
revolt  are  of  enormous  social  value. 

IN  the  world-war  now  raging,  what  impresses  us  first 
of  all  is  the  violent  and  terrifying  manner  in  which 
it  has  been,  and  is  still  being,  fought.     This  fact 
impresses  us  for  various  reasons.     In  the  first  place,  the 
Governments  involved  have  regarded  it  as  being  to  their 
advantage  to  lay  stress  upon  the  brutalities,  the  cruelties, 
and  the  violations  of  the  so-called  laws  of  warfare  which 
have  been  committed  by  the  belligerents.     Then  for 
nearly  half  a  century  there  had  been  no  war  in  the  West, 
and  the  British,  French,  and  Belgian  democracies  had 

29 


30  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

forgotten    what    warfare    is.     Moreover,    pacifist    and 
anti-militarist  ideas,  the  ideal   of  liberty,  democratic 
habits,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  ideals  of  Christianity, 
being  diffused  throughout  the  world,  a  normal  opinion 
had  been  created,  which  reproved  acts  of  violence  and 
brutal    and    forcible    attempts    upon    the    rights    and 
liberties  of  the  individual  person  or  nation.     Let  us 
add  to  these  reasons  the  perfecting  of  the  German 
organization;  the  methodical  way  in  which  the  system 
of  terrorism  on  which  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  based 
was  realized  in  practice;  the  extraordinary  discipline 
which  the  German  people  obey  in  a  passive  and  servile 
fashion;  and,  lastly,  the  application  to  the  objects  of 
warfare  of  the  most  highly  developed  scientific  know- 
ledge.    All  this  has  made  this  war  the  most  terrible 
that  has  ever  been  seen.     Besides,  if  we  consider  the 
multitude   of  men   who   are   fighting   upon   so   many 
different  points  of  the  earth's  surface,  we  shall  under- 
stand the  immense  loss  both  in  human  lives  and  in 
property  of  every  kind. 

It  is  really  impossible  to  ascertain  precisely  and 
certainly  the  figures  of  the  losses  suffered  by  each  of 
the  belligerents.  All  the  Governments,  indeed,  have 
sought  to  keep  their  peoples  in  the  completest  ignorance 
of  these  losses.  They  have  deliberately  shed  over  the 
nations  a  dense  atmosphere  of  untruth  and  ignorance; 
further,  they  have  concocted  this  atmosphere  of  a 
mixture,  cunningly  compounded,  of  lies,  truths,  and 
omissions.  The  Governmental  authorities,  in  whatever 
country,  always  endeavour  to  keep  the  minds  of  the 
governed  masses  in  swaddling-bands.  During  the  first 
eighteen  months  of  the  war  the  British  authorities 
published  figures  of  their  losses,  and  these  were  such  as 
could  be  credited.  But  since  they  have  increased, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  army  is  more  numerous  and 
occupies  a  more  extended  front,  no  totals  have  been 
published.  Some  newspapers  give  a  list  of  the  dead, 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  31 

or  sometimes  of  the  wounded,  but  no  one  knows  whether 
it  is  complete. 

France,  Russia,  Serbia,  Belgium,  Italy,  Turkey,  and 
Bulgaria  have  published  nothing  officially.  Germany 
has  given  official  lists  of  losses  as  affecting  the  various 
states  of  the  Empire.  But  when  we  study  these  lists 
closely,  we  find  that  they  are  incorrect;  that  the  totals 
given  are  less  than  the  reality.  The  statistics  are 
"  cooked  "  in  such  a  way  as  to  deceive  the  German 
and  Allied  public  as  much  as  the  enemy  and  neutral 
public.  Austria,  it  seems,  has  published  lists  of 
casualties,  but  it  is  only  at  rare  intervals  that  we  see 
them  repeated  in  the  French,  British,  or  Swiss  press. 

Naturally  in  each  country  the  public  has  tried  to 
plumb  the  obscurity  cast  over  its  losses,  and  the  in- 
dividual gives  way  to  conjecture.  As  a  rule,  thanks  to 
imagination,  one  is  inclined  rather  to  exaggerate  the 
losses;  at  all  events,  unless  one  bases  one's  calculations 
on  judicious  observation  and  deduction. 

The  analysis  of  the  figures  published  by  the  German, 
British,  and  Austrian  Governments  yields  results  which 
are  pretty  much  alike  as  regards  the  gross  losses  and 
the  elements  which  compose  them.  The  gross  casual- 
ties are  constituted  by — (1)  the  killed,  and  those  dead 
of  wounds  or  sickness;  (2)  the  seriously  wounded — 
that  is,  those  who  will  be  permanently  crippled  or 
infirm;  (3)  the  wounded  who  are  capable  of  recovery, 
and  who  after  convalescence  can  return  to  the  front; 
and  (4)  the  missing,  including  the  prisoners  and  those 
whose  fate  is  unknown,  and  who,  by  the  way,  are  most 
usually  among  the  dead.  I  have  taken  the  average  of 
the  reports  of  these  three  armies,  so  as  to  be  as  near 
the  truth  as  possible  and  as  far  as  possible  to  avoid 
errors.  In  this  way  I  have  drawn  up  the  following 
table.  But  in  reading  it  one  must  remember  that  the 
figures  must  not  be  taken  as  having  an  absolute  value, 
but  merely  as  representing  a  probability  of  accuracy 
and  an  indication  of  the  reality. 


32 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


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33 


NOTES  RELATING  TO  THE  FOREGOING  TABLE. 


(a)  The  proportion  of  recoverable  wounded  to  the  total  of  the 
wounded  is  78  per  cent.  We  think  this  proportion  is  more  correct 
than  the  80  per  cent,  to  90  per  cent,  given  in  the  German  scientific 
reports.  This,  we  consider,  is  intentionally  given  too  high.  It  results 
from  this  that,  of  the  34,405,620  men  who,  in  the  course  of  thirty 
months  of  war,  have  been  put  hors  de  combat,  15,980,960  have  been 
able  to  return  to  the  front. 

(6)  In  the  category  of  "  missing  "  are  also  great  numbers  of  dead  or 
wounded  men  who  die  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  cannot  be  picked  up 
or  recovered.  It  is  impossible  to  give  the  exact  percentage  of  these 
dead  among  the  missing.  It  is  probable  that  the  dead  form  more  than 
10  per  cent,  of  the  missing.  It  seems  to  me  probable  that  the  figures 
relating  to  prisoners  are  greater  than  the  reality  as  regards  France, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain.  When  warfare  is  a  matter  of  trench 
fighting  the  number  of  prisoners  is  small. 

(c)  We  have  not  given  the  monthly  average  of  the  gross  losses  for 
Great  Britain,  ae  the  British  Army  has  increased  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  tends  to  occupy  a  wider  and  wider  front.  As  a  result, 
this  average  increases  progressively.  In  the  first  year  of  the  war  it 
was  27,000,  then  32,300.  Since  the  middle  of  1916  it  has  oscillated 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  100,000. 

While  this  table  is  based  on  the  relations  existing  between  the  various 
categories  of  casualties  and  the  gross  casualties,  it  is  also  based  on  the 
figures  representing  the  gross  monthly  losses  for  France — 180,000. 

1.  France. — We  have  given  180,000  as  the  gross  monthly  losses  for 
France  for  various  reasons:  (a)  This  figure  was  given  us  in  1915  by 
French  politicians  who  were  likely  to  be  well  informed.  (6)  It  was 
published  by  Colonel  Feyler  in  the  Journal  de  Geneve,  and  this  writer 
obtains  his  information  from  a  reliable  source,  (c)  It  may  be  deduced 
from  the  figures  published  in  a  circular  issued  by  the  French  Relief  Fund, 
which  appeared  on  the  French  "  Flag  Day,"  July  14,  1915.  (d)  The 
monthly  number  of  the  killed  (40,000)  is  confirmed  by  the  figures 
to  be  obtained  by  arriving  at  the  numbers  of  the  dead  by  means  of  an 
inquiry  affecting  the  communes  of  France.  It  seems  that  the  percent- 
age of  the  dead  in  respect  of  the  population  varies,  at  the  end  of  two 
years  of  war,  between,  2,  3,  and  3-5  per  cent.,  according  to  the  com- 
munes. This  gives  us,  at  the  end  of  the  twenty-fourth  month  of  the 
war,  an  average  of  1,100,000  dead,  (e)  The  Society  for  the  Study  of 
the  War  (Copenhagen),  gives  in  its  Bulletin  885,000  dead  for  two  years 
of  war.  The  Correspondance  Politique  de  VEurope  Centrale  (Zurich) 
estimates,  by  an  ingenious  and  plausible  calculation,  that  the  number 
of  dead  for  two  years  of  war  amounts  to  1,100,000.  A  manifesto 
from  the  minority  of  the  French  socialist  party  speaks  of  a 
million  dead,  without,  however,  indicating  the  duration  of  the  war. 
But  as  the  manifesto  dates  from  November,  1916,  it  is  probable  that 

3 


34  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  figure  refers  to  at  least  two  years  of  war.     All  these  figures  are 
very  near  those  at  which  I  have  arrived. 

2.  Great  Britain: — As  a  basis  I  have  taken  the  official  figures  given 
to  the  House  of  Commons  in  January,  1916;  and  to  these  I  have  added, 
for  the  six  months  completing  the  second  year  of  the  war,  the  figures 
based  upon  a  monthly  rate  of  32,000  (gross  casualties),  and  for  the 
following  six   months  a  rate  of  100,000  gross  casualties   monthly. 
Great  offensives  are  always  murderous. 

3.  Russia. — For  the  first  year  of  the  war  the  proportion  of  prisoners 
is  31  per  cent.;  from  this  it  follows  that  the  proportion  of  dead  and 
wounded  is  less  than  in  the  Western  armies.     In  the  following  months 
the  proportions  tend  to  approximate  themselves  to  those  obtaining 
in  the  West.     It  is  highly  probable,  considering  the  disorder  of  the 
administrative  services,  that  the  proportion  of  the  recoverable  wounded 
able  to  return  to  the  front  is  less  than  50  per  cent.     I  have  adopted 
the  following  ratios:  Missing,  22  per  cent.;  dead,  21  per  cent.;  seriously 
wounded,  16  per  cent.;  recoverable  wounded,  41  per  cent. 

4.  Germany. — The  figures  officially  published  give  an  average  gross 
monthly  loss  of  about  150,000.     This  figure  cannot  be  correct,  for  it  is 
impossible  that  the  German  Army  has  had  fewer  losses  than  the  French 
Army  in  so  lengthy  a  campaign.     It  is  impossible  for  many  reasons: 

(a)  Germany  has  an  army  nearly  twice  the  size  of  the  French  Army. 

(b)  It  is  fighting  on  two  fronts,  whose  length  is  more  than  double  the 
front  on  which  the  French  are  fighting,  whose  length  has  been  de- 
creasing since  August,  1915.     Consequently,  the  number  of  Germans 
in  the  first  line  is  greater  than  that  of  the  French,  in  proportion  to 
the  total  size  of  the  army,  even  if  we  take  into  account  the  replacement 
of  men  by  machines  (Germany   mobilized   about   10,000,000  men). 

(c)  For  a  long  time  the  German  offensives  were  delivered  in  com- 
pact masses;  even  at  Verdun,  in  1916,  their  assaulting  waves  were 
in  close  formation. 

Considering  the  ratio  of  the  French  casualties  to  the  total  strength 
of  the  French  Army,  we  find  that  the  monthly  proportion  of  grog's 
casualties  is  one-thirty-sixth  of  the  total  of  'the  army.  According 
to  the  statements  of  a  deputy  in  the  Chamber  in  November,  1916, 
France  mobilized  one-sixth  of  her  population,  or  nearly  6,500,000  men, 
and  one-thirty-sixth  of  this  number  gives  us  180,000  as  the  gross 
monthly  wastage.  This  is  the  figure  which  I  have  taken  as  the  basis 
of  my  calculations.  It  is  rather  less  than  that  which  I  have  given  in 
an  article  published  in  The  Outlook  in  July,  1915,  and  than  the  figures 
given  by  various  Swiss  and  English  writers.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  higher  than  the  figures  given  by  those  writers  who  have  adopted 
as  exact  the  official  figures  of  the  German  Government.  These  figures 
are  erroneous.  The  error  committed  is,  we  fancy,  deliberate;  it  is 
based  simply  on  the  signification  of  the  word  "  losses."  When  we  say, 
or  read,  that  "  the  losses  of  the  German  Army  amount  to  an  average 
of  150,000  monthly,"  we  understand  that  "  the  dead,  the  missing, 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  35 

and  all  the  wounded,  whatever  the  gravity  or  the  slightness  of  their 
wounds,  amount  to  150,000  per  month."  That  is  what  the  public 
understands;  but  it  is  deluded,  for  the  actual  meaning  of  th«  phrase  in 
as  follows:  "  The  German  Army  loses  each  month  150,000  combatant! 
which  it  cannot  replace,  for  they  are  the  dead,  the  missing,  and  the 
seriously  wounded,  who,  when  healed,  will  be  incapable  of  serving." 
In  short,  those  wounded  men  who,  after  treatment,  return  to  take  their 
place  in  the  army,  are  not  included  in  the  figure  of  150,000  casualties 
per  month.  In  this  way  the  German  Government  deceives  the  public, 
without  publishing  lying  figures  !  It  is  interesting  to  note  this  Jesuiti- 
cal proceeding. 

5.  Austria-Hungary. — The  proportion  of  prisoners  is  considerable — 
17-7  per  cent. ;  which  diminishes  the  percentage  of  dead  and  of  wounded, 
which  is  16-7  per  cent,  for  the  seriously  wounded  and  44  per  cent,  for 
the  recoverable. 

6,  7,  8,  9,  10. — For  Italy,  Serbia,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey 
we  have  only  the  figures  published  by  the  Society  for  the  Study  of 
the  War  (Copenhagen).     To  judge  by  the  figures  which  this  society 
has  given  in  respect  of  the  greater  belligerents,  it  is  probable  that  the 
losses  indicated  are  less  than  the  reality. 

As  for  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  the  rate  of  mortality  is  much 
higher  on  account  of  local  circumstances,  defective  ambulance  services, 
and  defective  civilization.  On  the  other  hand,  the  percentages  of 
wounded,  both  incurable  and  recoverable,  and  of  the  missing  are 
lower.  The  Bulletin  de  la  Sociele  a" 'Etudes  de  la  Guerre  gives  the  follow- 
ing percentages  in  respect  of  gross  casualties:  44  per  cent,  of  dead 
for  Serbia;  30  per  cent,  for  Turkey;  and  29  per  cent,  for  Bulgaria. 
We  have  no  figures  for  Montenegro.  Japan  has  fought  the  Germans 
only  in  China,  and  Portugal  only  in  Africa.  Their  losses  are  very  small. 

11.  Rumania.- — Rumania  has  been  at  war  for  five  months  only; 
her  losses  must  be  fairly  large.  We  have  seen  no  figures  relating  to 
the  subject.  Those  which  we  give  are  based  on  the  ratio  between  the 
French  Army  and  an  army  of  600,000  men. 

It  will  be  noted,  in  the  foregoing  table,  that  the 
decreasing  order  of  losses  for  thirty  months  of  war,  in 
terms  of  the  belligerent  nations,  is,  as  regards  the  five 
greater  Powers,  as  follows:  Russia,  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  France,  British  Empire.  This  progression 
of  losses  according  to  nations  may  be  represented  by 
a  curve  which  runs  parallel  to  a  curve  representing  the 
numbers  of  soldiers  mobilized  by  these  nations,  and, 
excepting  the  case  of  Great  Britain,  it  is  parallel  to  the 
curve  of  population.  This  is  only  logical. 

During   these   thirty   months   of   war   the   effective 


36  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

consumption  of  "  human  material,"  according  to  the 
military  expression,  which  transforms  men  into  things, 
is,  in  round  figures,  18,000,000,  since  nearly  16,000,000 
have  been  able  to  return  to  the  front  after  being  put 
hors  de  combat.  The  total  strength  of  the  belligerent 
armies  is  about  50,000,000.  So  there  still  remains  about 
30,000,000  of  "human  material"  for  consumption. 
This,  however,  is  very  unequally  divided  between  the 
two  groups  of  belligerents.  The  Central  or  Imperial 
Powers  are  represented  by  12,000,000,  while  the  remain- 
der, or  18,000,000,  belongs  to  the  group  of  the  Entente. 
This  simple  examination  shows  us  that  the  world- 
war  can  have  only  one  logical  ending:  the  crumbling  of 
the  power  of  the  Imperial  nations.  It  is  a  question 
of  time,  as  preparation  for  war,  the  inventions  of  the 
human  mind,  and  the  check  of  the  offensive  of  the 
Imperial  Powers  in  September,  1914,  on  the  Marne, 
have  made  this  war  a  war  of  exhaustion  in  "  human 
material  "  and  material  of  other  kinds.  This  time  we 
may  approximately  estimate,  if  we  suppose  that  the 
percentage  of  losses  remains  as  it  is  at  present,  and 
taking  into  calculation  the  exhaustion  of  "  human 
material  "  only.  At  the  end  of  about  twenty-three 
months  the  exhaustion  of  "  human  material  "  would  be 
sufficient  to  force  the  Imperial  Powers  to  cease  from 
struggling.  There  would  be  left  to  them  only  6,000,000 
men,  all  of  whom  would  have  been  wounded  and  re- 
turned to  the  front,  while  the  Entente  Powers  would 
still  possess  nearly  3,000,000  men  intact,  as  well  as 
8,000,000  of  convalescent  wounded;  without  speaking 
of  the  resources  of  the  British  Empire,  which  at  present 
amount  to  2,000,000  or  3,000,000,  or  of  the  entire 
Japanese  Army.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  war 
cannot  continue  longer  than  December,  1918,  if  we 
consider  only  the  question  of  "  human  material." 

In  thirty  months  of  war  the  number  of  dead  exceeds 
7,627,220,  for  among  the  missing  we  may  probably 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  37 

count  500,000  to  600,000  dead,  if  not  more.  The 
number  of  the  seriously  wounded,  infirm,  or  crippled 
by  the  loss  of  a  limb,  of  sight,  of  hearing,  or  by  insanity, 
etc.,  amounts  to  nearly  5,000,000.  So  at  the  end  of 
January,  1917,  humanity  has  suffered  an  effective  loss 
of  13,000,000  of  men  between  eighteen  and  forty-eight 
years  of  age.  Behold  the  work  of  war  !  In  very  truth, 
humanity  is  at  present  bent  upon  its  own  destruction  ! 

Let  us  note,  moreover,  that  this  human  loss,  the  work 
of  war,  is  a  minimum;  for  we  must  add  to  it  the 
host  of  civilians  shot,  hanged,  massacred,  or  dead  of 
moral  and  physical  suffering  and  famine,  in  Belgium, 
the  East  and  North  of  France,  Galicia,  East  Prussia, 
Poland,  Armenia,  Rumania,  Macedonia,  the  Trentino, 
etc.  We  are  not  considering  the  increased  mortality, 
in  most  of  the  countries  at  war,  due  to  the  bad  condi- 
tions of  life  which  are  the  inevitable  consequences  of 
war.  Women,  and  above  all  young  children,  pay  the 
heaviest  tribute  to  the  Moloch  of  warfare.  According 
to  what  has  been  stated  concerning  the  massacres  in 
Armenia  and  the  ruin  of  Serbia  and  Poland,  we  must 
add  more  than  5,000,000  for  the  total  of  civilian  casual- 
ties. In  thirty  months  of  warfare  18,000,000  of  dead 
or  lifelong  invalids  ! 

All  the  figures  here  cited,  far  from  being  exaggerated, 
are  more  than  probably  below  the  truth.  Their  huge- 
ness immediately  demonstrates  the  extreme  harmful- 
ness  of  war.  Those  whom  death  has  taken  are  indeed 
men  in  their  youth  or  in  the  full  prime  of  their  riper 
years.  -The  products  of  their  intellectual  and  physical 
energy  are  for  ever  lost;  as  are  the  efforts  of  training, 
education,  maintenance,  and  labour  which  they  repre- 
sented. To  estimate  these  losses  in  money  is  an  im- 
possible thing,  for  no  one  knows  what  great  work  of 
science,  or  art,  or  literature,  or  industry  might  have 
been  produced  by  this  or  that  young  man  of  those  who 
rest  in  the  trenches  of  the  Yser,  in  the  mountains  of 


88  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Alsace,  the  Carpathians,  or  the  Carnatic,  on  the  plains, 
amid  the  lakes  of  East  Prussia,  or  in  the  regions  of  the 
Tigris  and  the  Euphrates,  or  on  the  slopes  of  the  hills 
of  Gallipoli,  or  in  the  great  ocean. 

War,  in  the  twentieth  century,  has  proved  to  be 
what  it  was  in  antiquity;  what  it  was  in  the  Middle 
Ages;  what  it  was  in  more  modern  times. 

War  means  not  only  to  put  soldiers,  combatants,  out 
of  action;  it  is  to  ruin,  to  exhaust  the  enemy  from  every 
point  of  view:  moral,  intellectual,  and  physical.  It  has 
always  meant  this,  and  will  always  do  so.  It  is  its 
nature.  It  is  impossible  to  change  the  nature  of  a 
being  or  a  thing  without  destroying  that  being  or  that 
thing.  One  cannot  even  alter  its  nature,  however  little, 
for,  as  the  poet  Destouches  has  said : 

"  Chassez  le  naturel,  il  revient  au  galop." 

Men  have  sought  to  alter  the  nature  of  war  by  render- 
ing it  civilized  and  humane,  or  rather  less  inhumane. 
And  they  have  codified  warfare,  believing  that  its  laws 
and  regulations  would  be  observed.  This  was  a  some- 
what childish  task,  bound  to  fail,  and  no  one  who 
really  reflected  could  have  expected  professional  soldiers 
to  observe  the  rules  established  by  diplomatists  and 
jurists.  This  humanization  of  warfare,  that  essentially 
anti-human  process,  appeared  madness  to  those  who 
were  not  content  to  observe  the  surface  of  things.  Now 
the  facts  have  demonstrated  in  a  startling  fashion  the 
complete  failure  of  all  war  legislation.  One  cannot 
codify  crime,  and  war  is  a  crime,  a  crime  of  bloodshed, 
theft,  rape,  incendiarism,  pillage,  and  ruin  of  every  kind. 

The  human  hideousness  of  war  has  more  especially 
been  emphasized  by  the  acts  of  the  German  Armies, 
which  realized  in  practice,  with  admirable  method,  the 
doctrine  of  the  conduct  of  war  as  drawn  up  by  the 
German  Great  General  Staff  in  its  famous  treatise 
Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege. 

"...  The    means    of   warfare  .  .  .  may    be    sum- 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  39 

marized  under  the  two  conceptions  of  Cunning  and 
Violence,  and  judgment  as  to  their  applicability  may  be 
embodied  in  the  statement : 

"  Any  means  of  war  may  be  employed,  lacking 
which  the  object  of  war  would  be  unattainable.  On 
the  other  hand,  all  deeds  of  violence  and  destruction 
which  are  not  demanded  by  the  object  of  war  are 
reprehensible."* 

This  very  definite  formula  summarizes  the  entire 
doctrine  concerning  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  it  has 
been  waged  in  all  times  and  all  countries.  It  is  in  reality 
terrorism  taught  as  a  system  leading  to  victory  by  the 
crushing  of  the  enemy.  We  must  render  thanks  to 
German  militarism  for  having  had  the  courage  to  throw 
off  its  mask,  and  to  speak  aloud  the  truth  concerning 
the  nature  of  war;  and  even  more  for  having  demon- 
strated, by  practice,  in  the  twentieth  century,  the  real 
and  eternal  nature  of  war. 

This  system  of  terrorization,  applied  to  armies  and 
populations,  explains  the  multitude  of  crimes  (murders, 
thefts,  rapes,  incendiarism,  slavery)  committed  against 
civilians  in  all  the  regions  invaded  by  the  enemy.  The 
system  of  reprisals,  which  is  one  of  the  forms  of  terror- 
ism, explains  the  killing  of  prisoners,  which  has  to  a 
certain  extent  been  going  on  and  is  still  being  practised. 
It  is,  in  a  word,  a  debauch  of  cruelties  committed  on 
every  side,  such  as  centuries  of  humanity  had  not 
witnessed,  because  for  centuries  there  had  been  seen 
no  such  war  of  nations  against  nations,  peoples  against 
peoples.  Formerly  one  saw  fractions  of  peoples  at 
war,  but  this  time  entire  peoples  are  involved. 

Among  the  generative  elements  of  these  acts  of 
cruelty  and  violence  are,  it  is  true,  alcoholism  and  the 
lust  of  blood,  but  the  principal  element  is  the  military 
mentality,  whose  most  important  characteristics  are: 

*  See  "  Frightfulness "  in  Theory  and  Practice,  by  Charles  Andler, 
tr.  and  ed.  by  Bernard  Miall  (pp.  116, 117).  T.  Fisher  Unwin,  1916. 


40  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  spirit  of  slavish  obedience,  infatuation,  prepotency, 
untruthfulness,  and  moral  anaesthesia.  This  military 
mentality  has  been  formed  by  education  and  disci- 
pline based  upon  fear.  We  shall  return  directly  to  this 
employment  of  fear  as  a  basis  of  education;  but  first 
let  us  make  a  few  remarks  as  to  one  of  the  results  of 
this  method  of  education — namely,  untruthfulness. 

One  of  the  great  lessons  of  the  war  is  the  light  thrown, 
for  all  those  who  have  taken  the  trouble  to  observe 
and  reflect,  on  the  employment  of  untruth  as  a  means 
of  handling  men.  This  employment  of  untruth  has 
impudently  flaunted  itself  everywhere,  but  to  a  varying 
extent,  according  to  the  state  of  democratization 
attained  by  the  various  Governments. 

*  *  *  *  * 

It  is  necessary,  before  we  probe  any  farther  into  the 
lessons  which  are  taught  by  the  world-war,  to  define 
what  we  mean  by  democracy  and  democratic  govern- 
ment when  we  make  use  of  these  terms.  We  do  not 
refer  to  an  absolute  democracy — that  is,  to  an  entire 
people  governing  itself  directly.  We  refer  to  peoples 
which  delegate  a  certain  number  of  men  to  govern  them 
for  a  determined  period.  It  results  from  this  practice, 
in  actual  fact,  that  clans  or  groups  are  formed  among 
the  mandatories  and  those  who  delegate  them,  which 
betray  a  very  strong  tendency  toward  oligarchy.  But 
as  the  numbers  of  ruling  groups,  and  of  those  who 
compose  them,  increase  with  the  degree  of  political 
civilization  attained  by  the  nations,  it  follows  that  the 
more  politically  advanced  the  nation,  the  more  repre- 
sentative are  these  ruling  clans  of  the  material  interests 
and  the  moral  aspirations  of  the  masses.  So  that  we 
may  with  certainty  assert  that  in  our  Western  state  of 
civilization  oligarchical  governments  tend  more  and 
more  to  assume  a  form  which  is  actually  democratic. 
It  is  these  governments  to  which  we  refer  when  we 
make  use  of  the  term  "  democratic  government,"  as 


41 

opposed  to  the  autocratic  system  of  government.  An 
autocratic  government  is  a  caste  government,  which 
takes  as  little  note  as  possible  of  the  interests  and 
aspirations  of  the  masses.  It  does  not  represent  them, 
nor  does  it  wish  to  represent  them.  It  governs  by  and 
for  one  or  several  determined  castes. 

*.***'  4 

Now  that  we  have  explained  what  we  mean  by  the 
terms  "democratic  government"  and  "autocratic 
government,"  let  us  return  to  the  employment  of  un- 
truth as  a  means  of  government.  It  has  been  employed 
in  all  ages,  and  in  all  countries,  with  the  greater  intensity 
the  more  autocratic  the  government,  for  the  founda- 
tion upon  which  this  system  of  government  is  based  is 
fear  and  obedience.  The  peoples  must  obey  their 
rulers;  it  is  therefore  unnecessary,  and  even  harmful, 
that  they  should  know  the  truth,  for  then  they  would 
reason  and  form  their  own  judgments.  It  is  enough 
for  them  to  believe  the  statements  of  their  rulers,  and 
to  obey  them.  To  obtain  this  result  readily,  the  best 
method  is  to  allow  only  such  things  to  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  masses  as  will  confirm  their  faith. 
This  method,  consequently,  consists  in  plunging  the 
masses  into  a  dense  atmosphere  of  ignorance  and  un- 
truth, and,  therefore,  of  illusion.  All  Governments 
have  set  themselves  this  task  during  the  present  war, 
for  democratic  methods  of  government  have  been  more 
or  less  replaced  by  the  autocratic  methods  inherent  in 
the  military  authority.  The  General  Staffs  have  sur- 
passed themselves  in  the  elaboration  of  lies.  The  palm 
must  incontestably  be  awarded  to  the  German  Great 
General  Staff  and  Government.  They  have  employed, 
and  are  still  employing,  untruth  with  perfect  method 
and  admirable  continuity.  The  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  communique's  have  not,  since  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities,  appreciably  wavered  in  their  system 
of  untruth.  They  lie  impudently,  inventing  facts,  and 


42  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

reporting  events  incorrectly.  The  object  of  these  modi- 
fications of  the  truth  is  obvious:  to  lead  the  public, 
national,  enemy,  and  neutral,  into  error.  The  military 
critic  of  the  Journal  de  Geneve,  Colonel  Feyler,  has  on 
several  occasions  drawn  attention  to  these  lies,  and  one 
of  his  articles  criticizing  the  German  communiques  was 
entitled  "  A  Romance." 

The  French  communiques  were  at  first  untruthful 
almost  in  the  German  manner — that  is  to  say,  in  the 
military  manner.  Then,  under  the  pressure  of  circum- 
stances and  the  democratic  mental  conditions  of  the 
population,  the  degree  of  untruthfulness  diminished,  and 
its  form  underwent  a  change.  The  lie  by  omission 
began  to  predominate,  and  still  holds  the  field.  The 
French  communiques  do  not  make  incorrect  statements, 
but  they  abstain  from  telling  all  the  truth.  One  may 
say  as  much  of  the  English  and  Russian  communiques. 
The  latter  were  at  first  absolutely  untruthful;  this  was 
the  effect  of  the  autocratic  Governmental  spirit.  But 
under  the  influence,  first  of  the  democratic  Western 
Allies,  and  then  of  events  which  forced  the  Russian 
bureaucracy  to  relax  its  authority,  the  Russian  com- 
munique's underwent  modification  to  the  point  of  no 
longer  sinning,  so  to  speak,  save  by  omission.  Naturally 
it  is  the  reverses  which  are  omitted. 

The  study  of  these  despatches,  although  tedious, 
leads  to  amusing  discoveries,  revealing  a  somewhat 
childlike  state  of  mind  in  the  military  men  who  draft 
them.  It  seems,  for  example,  that  they  believe  that 
by  abstaining  from  speaking  of  an  event  they  suppress 
the  occurrence  of  that  event.  They  are  like  the  ostrich, 
which  imagines  itself  entirely  concealed  when  it  hides 
its  head. 

The  military  authorities  also  resort  to  ambiguity  of 
phrase  and  expression.  When  their  communiques 
speak  of  sanguinary  losses,  it  is  always  the  enemy  who 
has  suffered  them;  and  so  forth. 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  43 

The  German  Government  has  brought  this  system  of 
untruthfulness  and  bluff,  which  is  a  mode  of  lying,  to  an 
extraordinary  development.  The  entire  Press,  what- 
ever its  political  tendency,  has  been  utilized  to  keep  the 
masses  of  the  people  not  only  ignorant  of  the  reality, 
but  in  an  atmosphere  of  illusion.  The  illustrations  in 
the  newspapers  have  been  employed  to  this  end.  They 
have  contained,  for  example,  drawings  which  represent 
untruths,  such  as  the  burning  of  the  London  Docks  by 
Zeppelins.  In  disciplined  and  obedient  Germany  the 
Press,  with  rare  exceptions,  has  been  merely  the  mouth- 
piece or  the  reflector  of  the  ideas  of  the  Government 
and  the  ruling  castes. 

In  France,  under  the  influence  of  the  military  spirit 
and  authority,  manifestations  of  a  similar  tendency  were 
observable  at  the  outset.  But  the  democratic  educa- 
tion of  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  proletariat,  and  the 
highly  developed  critical  spirit  of  the  country,  soon 
checked  and  stifled  this  autocratic  tendency.  It  became 
necessary  to  draw  the  line  at  omitting  a  portion  of  the 
truth.  The  ignorance  of  the  masses,  and  even  of  the 
intellectual  elite  of  the  masses,  is  thereby  partially 
maintained,  but  they  are  not  deceived  to  the  same 
extent  as  by  the  German  system  of  the  propagation 
of  effective  lies.  In  the  British  Empire  the  omission 
of  the  truth  has  been  practised  to  a  less  extent  than 
in  France,  but  it  undoubtedly  takes  place.  This  may 
be  verified  by  reading  the  newspapers  of  neutral  coun- 
tries, and  also  by  what  transpires  concerning  the  secret 
diplomatic  conversations  between  Allies  and  neutrals. 
It  is  impossible  to  keep  whole  nations  in  a  state  of 
complete  darkness;  some  little  ray  of  light  always  filters 
in,  which  enables  individuals  to  reconstitute  the  ap- 
proximate truth,  and  the  crowd  to  abandon  itself  to 
the  divagations  of  imagination. 


44  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  war,  and  the  events  which  preceded  it,  have 
clearly  demonstrated,  to  the  nations  educated  in  demo- 
cracy, the  power  of  secret  diplomacy.  When  I  say 
"  secret  diplomacy,"  I  mean  "  secret  "  as  regards  the 
mass  of  the  nation,  as  regards  even  the  majority  of  the 
ruling  classes.  But  this  diplomacy,  naturally,  is  not 
secret  as  regards  a  small  number  of  the  elect,  the  rulers 
of  the  rulers.  All  this  secret  diplomacy,  which  has 
ended,  for  this  party,  in  unloosing  the  present  scourge 
upon  humanity,  and  for  that  in  allowing  it  to  be  un- 
loosed, is  really  in  absolute  contradiction  of  the  demo- 
cratic principle  of  the  Governments  of  the  Western 
peoples.  The  essential  idea  of  secret  diplomacy  and 
government  by  bluff  and  untruthfulness  is  that  the 
popular  masses  are  like  flocks  of  sheep:  they  are  in- 
capable of  finding  their  own  way;  it  is  necessary  to 
lead  them.  They  need  shepherds  and  sheep-dogs. 
This  essential  idea  of  government  by  untruth  and  by 
secret  diplomacy,  by  means  of  darkness  hovering  over 
the  nations,  by  the  intellectual  swaddling  of  the  masses, 
is  absolutely  opposed  to  the  democratic  principle.  This 
principle,  in  effect,  amounts  to  this:  that  the  nations 
should  rule  themselves,  at  least  by  means  of  delegates, 
whom  they  cannot  elect  and  conscientiously  support 
unless  they  are  acquainted  with  the  truth  and  reality 
of  things. 

Government  by  means  of  untruth  and  secret  diplo- 
macy leads  to  the  worst  sort  of  folly  and  harm.  We 
may  say  positively  that  if  the  French  people  and  Parlia- 
ment had  in  1913  been  acquainted  with  the  reports 
which  figure  at  the  beginning  of  the  French  Yellow 
Book,  the  armaments  of  France  would  not  have  been 
insufficient,  as  they  were,  in  July,  1914.  From  the 
tribune  of  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  the  President, 
M.  Deschanel,  has  discreetly  hinted  as  much,  to  the 
unanimous  applause  of  the  Chamber.  If  the  conversa- 
tion between  M.  Cambon  and  M.  von  Jagow,  <i  propos 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  45 

of  the  Belgian  Congo  and  the  small  Powers  (Belgian 
Grey  Book,  1915)  had  been  made  known  to  the  inter- 
national public,  the  political  situation  would  not  have 
been  what  it  was  in  July,  1914.  It  is  probable  that  if 
the  English  people  had  known  what  was  known  to 
secret  diplomacy,  the  nation  would  have  been  prepared 
for  war,  whereas  it  was  by  no  means  so  prepared  in 
July,  1914. 

The  attitude  and  the  behaviour  of  the  peoples  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Belgium  in  this  war  show 
how  injurious  these  autocratic  methods  of  government 
have  been  to  these  peoples.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  just  as  Germany  has  pushed  to  the  highest  degree 
the  system  of  terrorism  and  military  untruthfulness,  so 
she  has  pushed  to  the  highest  degree  the  system  of 
diplomatic  deception  in  respect  of  all — her  own  citizens, 
her  allies,  her  enemies,  and  neutrals.  The  German 
Government  published,  like  all  other  Governments,  an 
official  volume,  the  White  Book,  containing  the  diplo- 
matic documents  which  preceded  the  war.  Rarely  has 
one  seen  a  more  empty  publication,  or  one  throwing  less 
light  upon  the  facts.  Only  the  Austrian  Red  Book  can 
be  compared  with  it.  The  intention  to  deceive  the  public 
is  even  outrageously  apparent  in  the  German  White 
Book,  for  the  documents — far  from  numerous — which 
figure  in  it  are  not  presented  in  their  chronological 
order.  And  one  has  to  look  into  the  matter  to  perceive 
its  signification.  This  weakness  of  the  German  and 
Austrian  diplomatic  publications  strikes  all  who  read 
them.  A  German  jurist,  in  a  very  remarkable  book, 
J' accuse,  has  expressed  himself  most  powerfully  in  this 
sense.  However,  the  manner  in  which  the  documents 
and  commentaries  are  presented  to  the  reader  reveals 
both  the  contempt  of  the  German  Government  for  public 
opinion  and  the  absence  of  the  critical  spirit  in  the 
majority  even  of  educated  Germans.  We  see  plainly 
that  the  White  Book  is  concocted  in  order  to  cast  the 


46  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

responsibility  for  the  war  upon  Russia.  And  in  the 
process  of  concoction  the  German  Government  did  not 
hesitate  to  employ  lies  which  it  very  well  knew  to  be 
lies ;  for  example,  the  statements  concerning  the  acts  of 
war  first  committed  by  the  French,  Russians,  and 
Belgians. 

The  habitual  manner  in  which  even  cultivated  Germans 
believe  the  statements  of  their  master,  of  their  rulers, 
has  prevented  them  from  perceiving  the  fundamental 
contradiction  between  the  first  attitude  of  the  Govern- 
ment, which  threw  the  whole  responsibility  upon  Russia, 
and  its  subsequent  attitude,  when  it  represented  France 
and  Russia  as  the  victims  of  British  duplicity,  which 
was  solely  responsible  for  the  war.  The  German  is 
not  troubled  by  such  contradictions:  he  believes  his 
master,  and  obeys.  For  him,  the  ruler  cannot  lie  ! 
And  the  ruler,  in  his  turn,  is  convinced  by  the  obedience 
of  the  popular  and  middle-class  masses  that  the  lie  is 
a  truth,  or  will  appear  as  such  in  the  eyes  of  all.  And 
he  is  thus  induced  to  lie  again  and  again.  One  lie  in- 
volves another,  and  so  forth.  Thus  we  have  seen  the 
German  Government  forging  and  falsifying  documents 
in  order  to  excuse  its  violation  of  Belgian  territory, 
whose  neutrality  it  had  guaranteed.  I  am  here  alluding 
to  the  report  of  the  Belgian  General  Ducarme,  of  which 
a  deliberately  falsified  reproduction  appeared  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  and  afterwards  in  a 
pamphlet  published  in  the  Dutch  language. 

***** 

The  German  Government  was  one  of  the  signatories 
of  the  treaty  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
and  it  violated  this  treaty  deliberately,  believing  that 
it  was  in  its  interest  to  do  so.  This  fact  has  plainly 
pro vedv that  treaties  between  nations,  just  as  contracts 
between  individuals,  are  of  no  value  save  by  the  will 
of  the  contracting  parties.  But  when  contracts  between 
individuals  are  in  question  their  illegitimate  rupture  is 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  47 

submitted  to  the  sanction,  more  or  less  efficacious,  of 
the  courts  of  law.  As  regards  treaties  between  nations 
there  is  at  present  no  other  sanction  than  war.  And 
if  we  consider  the  whole  matter  thoroughly,  we  see  that 
this  is  not  really  a  sanction  at  all,  for  it  may  happen 
that  the  result  of  the  war  may  favour  the  State  which 
has  violated  its  signature  and  broken  its  word.  War, 
in  short,  is  nothing  other  than  the  duel,  the  "  judgment 
of  God  "  of  medieval  times.  The  only  difference  is 
that  instead  of  being  the  "  judgment  of  God "  as 
between  individuals,  it  is  a  judgment  between  national 
collectivities. 

War,  as  a  means  of  settling  disputes  between  collec- 
tivities, is  in  truth  a  still  barbarous  if  not  a  savage 
system.  It  ought  to  be  abandoned  and  replaced  by  a 
system  analogous  to  that  existing  for  settling  disputes 
between  individuals.  It  is  possible,  even  easy,  if 
humanity  so  desires,  to  find  a  practical  sanction  which 
shall  prevent  a  State  from  violating  its  signature,  which 
shall  force  it  to  make  reparation  for  its  misdeeds, 
precisely  as  such  a  sanction  exists  to-day  for  the 
individual. 

One  of  the  consequences  of  war  is  this  principle: 
"  might  makes  right."  This  principle,  which  formerly 
prevailed  in  the  social  and  commercial  relations  of 
individual  and  individual,  has  disappeared  from  our 
code  of  morals,  since  all  disputes  between  individual 
persons  are  settled  by  judgments  which  are  theoretically 
based  upon  justice.  I  say  theoretically,  because  it  is 
fallible.  It  is  necessary  that  the  principle  "  might 
makes  right "  should  cease  to  exist  in  international 
relations,  if  humanity  wishes  to  avoid  the  perpetuation 
of  warfare  and  increasing  improvements  in  the  butchery 
of  its  members;  in  a  word,  if  it  wishes  to  avoid  self, 
destruction. 

Unhappily,  the  idea  that  "  might  makes  right  "  is 
one  of  the  most  widespread  ideas  in  existence.  It  is, 


48  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

indeed,  at  the  root  of  all  education  of  childhood  and 
all  governmental  methods.  The  root  of  this  idea  is 
fear.  And  it  is  on  fear  that  education  is  founded;  and 
it  is  on  fear  that  the  management  of  men  is  based. 
According  to  the  state  of  democratic  advancement  to 
which  the  nations  have  attained,  the  employment  of 
fear  in  education  is  more  or  less  extensive;  but  it  is 
employed  to  some  extent  everywhere,  save,  perhaps, 
in  a  few  families  whose  ideas  are  so  advanced  that  they 
are  in  some  danger  of  being  treated  as  insane. 

Naturally,  it  is  in  the  autocratic  States  that  fear  is 
most  extensively  employed.  But  in  this  respect  the 
autocratic  States  do  not  differ  in  kind  from  the  demo- 
cratic States.  There  is  only  a  difference  in  degree. 
This  is  the  case  because  the  democratic  States  are  still 
impregnated  with  autocratic  principles.  The  politics 
and  morality  of  the  democracies  is  still  based  upon  fear. 
This  is,  a  residue  of  religious  morality  and  religious 
teaching,  of  the  ideal  of  brute  force  ruling  the  world, 
the  results  of  our  animal  ancestry. 

In  Germany  the  employment  of  fear  has  been  sys- 
tematized with  perfect  method.  Germany  is  the  most 
highly  militarized  country  in  existence,  and  the  founda- 
tion-stone of  militarism  is  fear.  This  admission  is 
made  by  the  greatest  of  contemporary  German  soldiers, 
Marshal  von  Hindenburg.  He  writes,  in  fact,  that 
"  one  will  never  achieve  anything  without  compulsion." 
Now,  compulsion  means  fear,  for  compulsion  can  only 
take  effect  if  one  fears  it. 

The  consequences  of  the  education  and  control  of 
men  by  fear  are  extremely  serious,  above  all,  of  course, 
when  its  employment  is  general  and  systematic.  An 
obedient  population  results,  whose  spirit  is  servile  and 
its  credulity  childish.  There  is  an  actual  suppression 
of  all  spirit  of  criticism.  The  word  of  the  ruler  takes 
precedence  of  everything.  The  noxious  effects  of  this 
mental  condition  are  enormous,  not  only  in  the  case  of 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  49 

individuals,  but  also  in  collectivities.  It  is  true  that 
the  passive  discipline  of  a  population  makes  massed 
action  possible,  but  this  massed  action  is  not  so  powerful 
as  it  would  be  were  the  discipline  voluntary.  Passive 
obedience,  in  fact,  has  suppressed  individual  initiative, 
or  has  at  least  very  greatly  restrained  it.  It  tends  to 
reduce  it  to  zero.  The  result  is  that  the  mass  of  the 
people  becomes  an  aggregate  of  machines  moved  by  an 
external  will.  It  is  the  sum,  purely  and  simply,  of 
identical  units;  of  arms  without  heads.  Voluntary 
discipline  gives  quite  another  result;  for  then  obedience 
is  rational.  The  mass  of  the  people  is  then  an  aggregate 
of  individuals  possessing  one  single  will.  It  is  no  longer 
a  sum  of  units,  but  a  multiple,  and  the  units  are  not 
arms  without  heads;  they  are  heads  with  arms. 

This  difference  between  passive  discipline  and  volun- 
tary discipline  explains  why  the  German  Army,  despite 
its  strength  in  men,  which  was  three  times  as  great  as 
that  of  the  French  Army,  and  despite  its  armament 
and  its  supplies,  which  were  greatly  superior  to  those 
of  the  French  Army,  was  beaten  at  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne.  A  German  physician,  Dr.  Delius,  understood 
this  very  clearly  when  he  wrote  in  Der  Tag :  "  The 
French  soldier  possesses  a  manifest  superiority  over 
other  soldiers.  He  feels  that  he  is  a  citizen  of  his  coun- 
try, instead  of  a  machine  yielding  blindly  to  discipline. 
He  understands  the  duties  which  his  rank  as  citizen 
imposes  upon  him  for  the  defence  of  his  country.  It 
is  from  this  conscious  patriotism  that  the  French  derive 
their  powers  of  resistance,  their  obstinate  determination 
to  conquer.  This  patriotism  would  have  enabled  them 
to  undergo  trials  even  greater  than  those  which  they 
have  suffered." 

This  difference  between  passive  discipline  and  volun- 
tary discipline  explains  why  the  Germans  were  held  up 
by  the  Belgians  at  Liege  and  on  the  Yser;  why,  for  two 
and  a  half  years,  despite  their  methodical  preparation, 

4 


50  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

they  have  been  held  up  along  the  whole  of  the  Franco- 
Belgian  front.  The  German  Army  found  itself  con- 
fronted by  nations  in  arms,  by  nations  having  one 
thought  and  one  intention:  to  defend  their  liberty, 
their  autonomy,  their  right  to  dispose  of  themselves. 
And  this  thought,  this  intention,  were  not  imposed 
on  the  peoples  by  the  will  of  a  master;  they  were  born 
spontaneously,  the  inevitable  consequences  of  circum- 
stances acting  upon  men  accustomed  to  live  in  freedom, 
a  freedom  which  as  yet,  alas !  is  imperfect,  but  which, 
by  the  very  nature  of  things,  will  increase  from  more 
to  more.  It  is  because  these  circumstances  did  not 
appear  to  the  British  citizen  in  an  identical  light  that 
the  British  participation  in  the  war  was  so  gradual, 
although  the  war  was  vital  to  Great  Britain — more  vital 
even  than  to  France  and  Russia.  We  have  the  proof 
of  this  in  the  fact  that  each  direct  attack  upon  the 
British  nation,  such  as  the  bombardment  of  the  coast 
towns,  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  the  murder  of  Miss 
Cavell,  etc.,  provoked  a  rush  to  enlist. 

The  superiority  of  voluntary  discipline  over  the 
discipline  imposed  by  fear  is  clearly  revealed  in  this 
war.  Another  fact  which  is  revealed  is  the  importance 
of  not  breaking  the  initiative  of  individuals,  and  of 
not  believing  that  men  can  be  compared  to  machines, 
and  controlled  as  such.  This  is  a  lesson  to  which  we 
would  call  the  attention  of  the  partisans  of  the  Taylor 
system*  in  the  industrial  utilization  of  human  beings. 
The  benefits  which  the  industrial  production  derives 
from  such  treatment  are  apparent,  not  actual,  for  they 
will  be  detrimental  to  future  production.  The 
*l  mechanization "  of  individuals  lessens  their  intel- 
lectuality, and  there  is  no  task,  however  trivial  and 
however  mechanical,  which  does  not  demand  intellectual 
effort  and  a  critical  mind.  Living  beings  are  different 

*  A  system  of  industrial  organization  exemplified  in  the  well-known 
Ford  automobile  factory.  Its  essence  is  specialization. — Tr. 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  51 

from  the  machines  which  men  construct,  and  the  forget- 
fulness  of  this  truth  leads  to  the  commission  of  a  thou- 
sand stupidities,  and  the  formation  of  a  host  of  false 
conceptions. 

The  passive  discipline  which  impregnates  the  whole 
German  people  has  almost  entirely  abolished  the  critical 
spirit  in  the  majority  of  Germans.  The  result  of  this 
has  been,  and  still  is,  that  the  Germans  fall  into  the 
grossest  psychological  errors  as  regards  other  peoples. 
They  have  measured  others  by  their  own  ell,  and  have 
supposed  them  like  themselves — that  is,  yielding  to 
fear,  obedient  machines.  The  German  rulers  had  so 
little  critical  spirit  that  they  were  unable  to  foresee 
that  all  the  British  dominions,  Ireland,*  and  India, 
would  be  loyal.  They  could  not  understand,  being 
reared  in  obedience  and  the  habit  of  executing  orders — 
that  is,  under  the  incessant  influence  of  authority — what 
the  power  of  liberty  was  in  those  nations  accustomed 

to  enjoy  it. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Liberty  !  So  different  are  the  things  which  men 
understand  by  this  word  that  it  will  be  best  to  explain 
it  a  little.  Cicero  said:  "  Liberty  is  potestas  vivendi  ut 
velis"  And  Sir  Robert  Fulmer  writes:  "  Liberty  is 
the  liberty  of  each  to  do  as  he  desires,  to  live  as  he 
pleases,  and  not  to  be  fettered  bylaws."  This  is  abso- 
lute liberty,  which  in  truth  exists  nowhere,  for  the  will 
of  each  of  us  is  subject  to  the  influence  of  a  thousand 
ties,  to  the  fact  of  the  universal  environment.  The 
liberty  of  which  we  are  speaking  is  political  and  social 
liberty — that  is,  the  absence  of  constraint  alien  to  the 
individual  and  imposed  upon  him  against  his  will.  A 
people  is  free  when  the  mass  of  individuals  composing 
it  have  the  right  to  establish  laws  and  regulations  for 

*  The  Sinn  Fein  rebellion  of  April,  1916,  was  not  an  event  of  impor- 
tance. Only  a  few  thousand  insurgents  were  involved.  But  it  shows 
how  harmful  was  the  old  English  policy  of  coercion,  for  the  psychical 
condition  of  the  Sinn  Feiner  is  a  product  of  this  ancient  policy. 


12  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

themselves ;  it  ceases  to  be  free  when  a  human  will  foreign 
to  its  own  will  forcibly  constrains  it  to  act  as  it  did  not 
wish  to  act.  In  the  peoples  whose  government  is 
democratic  liberty  is  less  restrained  than  in  peoples 
whose  government  is  autocratic.  Authority  makes 
itself  less  felt  in  such  peoples,  and  this  condition  of 
comparative  liberty  creates,  for  those  who  enjoy  it, 
a  social  environment  which  is  of  such  a  nature  that  they 
would  not  at  any  price  be  deprived  of  it. 

The  German  rulers,  accustomed  to  being  obeyed, 
cannot  conceive  the  power  of  the  love  of  liberty  in  those 
peoples  which  enjoy  it.  They  cannot  imagine  that  the 
Belgian  people  would  rather  die  than  cease  to  be  free 
to  govern  itself  in  its  own  way,  free  to  speak  the  tongue 
which  pleases  it.  The  German  rulers  could  not  con- 
ceive that  the  Poles,  Alsatians,  Czechs,  etc.,  would  bear 
in  mind  the  permanent  efforts  at  "  Germanization  "  to 
which  they  have  been  subjected.  The  German  rulers 
could  not,  because  of  their  education,  comprehend  the 
force  of  aspiration  toward  liberty.  And  this  force  was 
such  that  those  nations  which  had  been  conquered  and 
subjugated  for  years  or  for  centuries  prayed  for  the 
victory  of  an  autocracy  like  Russia  !  They  set  their 
hopes  upon  the  Western  democracies:  the  British 
Empire  and  France.  They  trusted  in  their  moral  force 
for  the  accomplishment  of  the  official  promises  of  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  of  Russia.  Germany  and  Austria 
had,  it  is  true,  made  the  same  promises  to  the  Poles, 
even  before  the  Russian  Government  had  done  so. 
But  how  could  men  build  on  the  promises  of  the  German 
Government,  when  they  saw  it  violate  its  signature  by 
the  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxemburg  ?  The  development  of  the  results  of 
these  actions  was  infinite  and  inevitable. 

The  German  lack  of  the  critical  spirit,  a  result  of 
German  discipline,  prevented  the  Germans  from  per- 
ceiving the  consequences  of  the  violation  of  their  signa- 


TERRORISM  AND  UNTRUTH  58 

ture,  just  as  they  did  not  understand  the  revolt  of  the 
world's  opinion  against  their  actions:  against  the 
rupture  of  their  treaties,  their  acts  of  violence  and  of 
terrorism. 

The  events  of  this  war  demonstrate,  therefore,  in  the 
first  place,  the  enormous  social  value  of  the  spirit  of 
criticism,  and  the  great  harm  worked  by  passive  obedi- 
ence, by  discipline  suffered  and  enforced.  From  this  war, 
too,  results  the  glorification  of  the  spirit  of  revolt,  that 
spirit  which  is  the  begetter  of  all  the  progress  won  by 
the  human  mind. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR 

The  number  of  men  under  arms — Professional  soldiers  are  disappear- 
ing in  the  mass  of  occasional  soldiers — The  uselessness  of  long 
military  service — The  importance  of  militias — The  bankruptcy  of 
militarism — The  importance  of  individual  initiative — Individual- 
ism— The  mentality  of  the  French  soldier — The  engineer  and 
administrator  replace  the  professional  soldier — Foreign  or  domestic 
policy  conditions  military  strategy — War  a  survival  of  barbarous 
periods — Decorations  a  survival  of  tattoo-marks — Ordinary 
criminality  in  time  of  war:  it  does  not  disappear,  but  changes  its 
aim — War  is  a  succession  of  crimes — Horror  and  hatred  of  war — 
The  development  of  anti-militarism. 

War  as  a  means  of  acquiring  wealth — Pillage  and  requisition — 
The  dispossession  of  conquered  peoples — Application  to  Euro- 
peans of  the  methods  applied  by  Europeans  to  so-called  inferior 
races — The  Germanic  race  a  superior  race  ! — The  acquisition  of 
property  by  means  of  warfare  is  a  survival — Its  impossibility — 
The  devastation  and  the  losses  of  war — An  estimate  of  the  losses 
in  property  and  in  men — The  cost  of  the  war — The  payment  per 
head  required  to  repay  it — The  general  ruin  of  the  nations — The 
conquered  cannot  indemnify  the  conquerors — Justice  and  reason 
would  call  for  the  seizure  of  the  property  of  those  who  caused  the 
war:  the  Germanic  Emperors,  Kings,  Princes,  and  landowners — 
Disarmament  seems  bound  to  come. 

THE  present  war  is  remarkable  for  the  enormous 
number  of  men  engaged  in  it.  If  in  these  numbers 
one  includes  all  the  reserves  and  territorials  con- 
formable with  the  law  in  those  countries  in  which 
obligatory  service  exists  for  all  men,  we  find  that  the 
number  of  soldiers  of  all  arms  and  all  ranks  amounts 
to  more  than  50,000,000  for  the  fourteen  belligerents 
(British  Empire,  France,  Belgium,  Italy,  Russia,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Japan,  Portugal,  Rumania,  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  Bulgaria).  This  enormous 
mass  of  men  is  a  product  of  compulsory  service,  and  only 

54 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  55 

of  compulsory  service,  for  the  British  Empire,  including 
its  colonies,  accounts  for  only  one-tenth  part  of  these 
50,000,000  soldiers.  Moreover,  in  the  course  of  1916 
the  Empire  also  resorted  to  compulsion,  which  increased 
its  resources  in  men. 

The  greater  number  of  these  men,  of  course,  were> 
before  the  war,  civilians — business  men,  manufacturers, 
professors  or  school-teachers,  artisans  or  peasants — and 
to-morrow,  after  the  war,  those  who  survive  will  return 
to  their  trades  and  professions.  From  this  it  follows 
that  the  professional  soldiers  have  been  swamped  in 
the  midst  of  the  combatant  masses.  In  the  beginning, 
as  officers,  they  held  the  posts  of  command,  so  that 
their  importance  was  great.  But  the  longer  the  war 
continued,  the  more  this  importance  diminished.  The 
continued  effect  of  battles  and  the  fatigues  of  war 
played  a  part,  where  they  were  concerned,  analogous 
to  that  of  the  sea  on  the  rocks,  which  it  lashes  with 
incessant  surf.  At  the  end  of  a  few  months  a  great  pro- 
portion of  the  professional  officers  were  out  of  action — 
killed,  wounded,  or  prisoners — and  the  subaltern  com- 
mands were  filled  by  occasional  soldiers,  lately  civilians. 
This  phenomenon  occurred  in  all  the  armies — in  those 
obtained  by  voluntary  recruitment  as  well  as  those 
which  resulted  from  compulsory  service. 

We  may,  therefore,  positively  assert  that  the  present 
war  is  a  war  not  of  professional  soldiers,  but  of  civilians 
made  soldiers  for  the  moment.  And  it  has  already 
lasted  more  than  two  and  a  half  years  !  This  proves 
the  value  of  a  few  weeks'  training — of  three  months  at 
most — in  transforming  the  peaceful  civilian  into  a  skilful 
combatant. 

From  the  general  fact  that  the  war  is  being  waged 
entirely  by  the  civilians  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow, 
it  results  that  we  have  a  striking  proof  of  the  uselessness 
of  long  military  service  in  time  of  peace.  The  famous 
French  three  years'  law,  which,  according  to  the  mill- 


56  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tarists,  was  necessary  to  save  France,  has  had  no  time 
to  take  effect  in  this  war,  yet  France  has  held  her  own 
and  is  holding  her  own,  and  is  even  doing  so  better  than 
at  the  beginning.  The  uselessness  of  this  law  is  demon- 
strated by  the  facts.  Another  thing  which  is  taught 
by  this  war  is  the  utility  and  importance  of  militias, 
of  the  armed  nation,  able  to  rise  up  swiftly  in  defence 
of  its  threatened  liberties.  Training  is  necessary,  but 
there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  making  it  exceed  a 
few  weeks;  the  facts  prove  this.  We  have  here  a 
striking  proof  of  the  consequences  which  emerged  from 
the  war  of  secession  in  America,  and  which,  owing 
to  the  influence  of  professional  soldiers,  had  been 
misunderstood  and  contradicted. 

Another  of  the  lessons  of  this  gigantic  war,  a  war 
such  as  humanity  had  never  seen,  is  the  complete 
bankruptcy  of  the  militarism  based  on  passive  discipline 
and  indisputable  authority.  Despite  her  wonderful 
organization  and  the  sheep-like  obedience  of  her  millions 
of  men,  Germany  will  be  defeated.  But  if  to  her  powers 
of  organization  and  her  numbers  she  had  added  the  force 
of  individual  initiative,  a  moral  force,  France  could 
not  have  resisted  her  in  September,  1914.  England 
would  have  been  powerless,  being  without  an  army, 
and  Germany  would  have  triumphed.  But  her  military 
system  of  education  and  of  life  had  broken  within  her 
the  mainspring  of  individual  initiative,  leaving  only  the 
force  of  the  collective  initiative.  Man  obeyed  because 
he  was  accustomed  to  obey,  like  a  beast  in  a  herd. 

In  France  a  different  phenomenon  was  to  be  ob- 
served. The  entire  nation,  excepting  a  very  small 
number  of  bellicose  Chauvinists,  was  pacific;  but  when 
it  saw  that  war  was  inevitable,  and  that  it  was  neces- 
sary either  to  obey  the  Germans  or  to  fight  them  in 
order  to  resist  them,  there  was  a  rush  for  the  firing-line, 
and  all  these  men  were  ready  to  make  war  upon  war. 
I  cannot  prove  this  better  than  by  quoting  a  fragment 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  57 

of  a  letter  written  in  the  trenches  of  the  Yser  on 
December  11, 1914.  The  writer,  a  simple  Breton  farmer, 
highly  intelligent,  a  soldier  in  a  territorial  regiment, 
disappeared  in  March,  1915,  probably  killed  at  the 
time  of  the  first  employment  of  asphyxiating  gases. 

"...  Wounded  the  30th  of  October  before  Bix- 
schotte,"  writes  M.  Olivier  Guyomarch,  "by  a  shell- 
splinter  in  the  foot,  while  returning  from  carrying 
information  to  a  Lieutenant  of  artillery  who  was  killed 
(I  was  homme  de  liaison — that  is  to  say,  a  messenger  on 
the  field  of  battle),  I  was  evacuated  to  Mortain,  then 
sent  home,  and  rejoined  the  3rd  of  December,  at  the 
depot  at  Guingamp.  The  same  day  I  asked  leave  to 
go  to  the  front  once  more  in  the  place  of  a  father  of 
five  children.  I  had  gone  of  my  own  will  on  the  18th 
of  September,  too.  It  is  not  that  I  am  a  Jingo.  I  make 
war  with  enthusiasm  upon  the  warlike  spirit  incarnate  in 
Germany,  and  I  will  fight  to  the  end  in  the  same  faith, 
to  lay  low  the  Prussian  '  corporalism,'  which  is  the  cause 
of  so  much  sorrow  and  so  much  desolation.  Sorrow 
and  desolation  ?  No  need  to  tell  you  at  any  length  if 
this  is  true.  If  one  has  not  been  present  one  cannot 
picture  to  oneself  what  a  battle  is  in  our  days.  What 
an  immense  faith  in  a  peaceful  future  is  needful  in  order 
that  one  may  hold  out  against  so  many  horrible  things, 
so  much  suffering,  material  and  moral.  This  is  why  I, 
a  bachelor,  an  anti-militarist,  am  to-day,  with  delirious 
enthusiasm,  making  war  on  what  I  believe  to  be  the 
obstacle  to  the  progress  of  society  toward  more  good- 
ness, more  brotherhood,  more  civilization;  on  the 
German  soldiers  and  the  spirit  which  animates  them. 

"  We  are  in  the  trenches  facing  the  Yser.  The 
fighting  is  less  violent  here  than  where  we  were  before 
this. 

"  Do  not  pity  me  if  I  fall,  for  I  believe  I  am  serving 
a  noble  cause,  a  cause  worthy  of  absorbing  »all  our 
energies,  all  our  enthusiasm.  .  .  .  May  a  fruitful  peace, 


58  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

which  shall  repair  all  this  desolation,  emerge  from  our 
sufferings." 

The  spirit  which  dictated  this  letter,  so  admirable  in 
its  simplicity,  was  and  is  that  of  nine-tenths  of  the  French 
combatants.  To  save  their  liberty  !  To  live  in  free- 
dom !  That  is  what  fired  them,  that  is  what  still  in- 
spires them.  Herein  a  phenomenon  has  occurred  analo- 
gous to  that  which  occurred  a  hundred  and  twenty-five 
years  ago,  at  the  period  when  the  Imperials  were 
threatening  the  growing  French  Revolution,  at  the 
period  when  Rouget  de  Lisle  symbolized  the  aspirations 
of  France  in  the  Marseillaise. 

Every  citizen  was  conscious  of  the  menace  hanging 
over  him,  the  menace  of  the  victory  of  the  modern 
Imperials.  Every  citizen  rose  and  hastened  to  defend, 
not  his  terrestrial  country,  not  his  economic  country, 
but  his  patrimony  of  liberty,  his  manners  and  his 
customs.  It  is  this  individualistic  spirit  which  exists 
in  every  Frenchman  and  Frenchwoman,  which  formed 
a  national  consciousness  of  enormous  strength,  which 
enabled  the  French  to  resist  and  partly  to  repulse  an 
invader  who  was  both  more  numerous  and  better 
organized,  and  better  prepared  than  the  French  were. 

The  present  war  has  proved  that  voluntary  discipline — 
that  is,  the  discipline  which  the  soldier  imposes  upon 
himself,  by  reason  and  not  by  fear — gives  the  com- 
batant a  superiority  over  his  enemy.  We  know,  indeed, 
that  the  Frenchman  is  by  no  means  a  docile  soldier; 
his  critical  spirit  is  highly  developed;  he  "  growls  " 
at  everything.  Let  us  recall  his  popular  nickname 
of  grognard — "growler."  But  in  action  he  disciplines 
himself  instantaneously  under  the  pressure  of  circum- 
stances and  his  own  reason  and  his  own  judgment. 
He  is  not  a  machine  in  movement;  he  is  a  living,  intel- 
ligent being  in  action.  And  the  result  is  that  he  has 
triumphed,  on  the  Marne  and  elsewhere,  over  troops 
more  numerous  and  more  highly  disciplined.  Some- 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  59 

times  even  he  has  triumphed  in  spite  of  leaders  who, 
frightened  and  bewildered,  ordered  retreats — orders 
which  were  not  obeyed.  Thus  in  this  war  the  role  of 
individual  initiative,  of  the  tense  and  reasoned  will  of 
each  individual,  appears  to  be  very  considerable.  The 
basis  of  this  initiative,  of  this  individualism,  is  liberty, 
the  autonomy  of  the  individual.  Moreover,  even  in 
those  who  imagine  that  the  force  of  a  collectivity 
passively  obeying  its  leaders  is  always  greater  than  that 
of  a  reasoning  collectivity,  there  exists  some  intuition 
of  the  force  of  the  individual  initiative,  since  we  see  the 
German  and  Russian  autocracies  invoking  the  ideals  of 
liberty  and  the  defence  of  liberties  in  order  to  sweep 
the  nations  into  the  war.  But  in  these  nations  there 
could  be  only  vague  aspirations,  for  the  basis — educa- 
tion and  the  habit  of  liberty — was  lacking,  owing  to  the 
autocratic  methods  of  government  prevailing.  Perhaps 
in  this  absence  of  individual  energy  and  initiative  we 
should  perceive  one  of  the  causes  of  the  defeat  of  the 
Russian  armies  by  the  armies  of  Germany,  better 
organized  and  better  led. 

One  of  the  lessons  of  this  war  is  the  considerable 
diminution  of  the  role  of  the  professional  soldier,  while 
that  of  the  engineers  and  administrators  increases  in 
importance  in  proportion.  Here  we  have  a  true  in- 
dustrialization of  the  war;  the  professional  soldier  has 
had  to  adapt  himself  to  the  new  form  of  warfare,  so 
different  from  the  traditional  and  classic  form.  Bayonet 
fighting  has  in  reality  grown  rare;  there  are  relatively 
few  wounded  by  the  arme  blanche,  although  the  news- 
papers, illustrated  and  otherwise,  represent  or  describe 
bayonet  charges.  On  the  Western  front  the  men  often 
shrink  from  employing  the  bayonet  or  the  dagger,  which 
has  been  substituted  for  the  bayonet  in  trench-fighting. 
They  prefer  the  grenade.  In  this  we  must  recognize 
a  diminution  of  the  spirit  of  violence,  of  the  taste  for 
murder  in  the  human  being. 


60  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Humanity  is  witnessing  not  merely  a  war  of  armies 
and  fleets,  but  a  war  of  artisans  and  industrial  engineers. 
It  is  as  much  an  industrial  struggle  as  a  military  struggle, 
on  account  of  the  quantity  of  munitions,  weapons, 
equipments,  and  provisions  which  are  required.  Every- 
thing, therefore,  works  together  in  reducing  more  and 
more  the  importance  of  the  professional  soldier. 

But  the  command  still  remains  in  the  hands  of  the 
professional  soldiers.  From  this  results  an  inevitable 
disorder  in  many  services,  and  in  the  employment  of 
the  physical  and  intellectual  energies  of  the  men  avail- 
able. The  echo  of  this  disorder  is  heard  even  in  Parlia- 
ment, and  we  find  proofs  of  it,  related  at  length,  in  the 
official  reports.  Everywhere  we  find  this  disorder,  even 
in  Germany,  where  organization  had  nevertheless 
reached  a  high  degree  of  perfection. 

One  little  fact  which  the  sociologist  and  psychologist 
ought  to  note  is  the  fact  that  during  these  two  and  a  half 
years  of  war  the  great  General  Staffs,  those  of  the 
Commanders-in-Chief,  have  never  been  bombarded  by 
aeroplanes  or  dirigibles.  The  spots  in  which  they  are 
established  is  known  to  all,  enemies  as  well  as  friends, 
and  yet  they  remain  untouched,  while  aeroplanes  and 
dirigibles  set  out  to  sow  their  bombs  upon  distant 
cities  !  The  fact  is  curious  and  significant.  It  is  a  proof 
of  the  solidarity  which  unites  all  professional  soldiers, 
independently  of  the  nations  to  which  they  belong.* 

This  war,  then,  has  enormously  reduced  the  import- 
ance of  the  professional  soldier,  even  in  the  exercise  of 
his  profession:  warfare.  He  is  even  forced  to  sub- 
ordinate his  strategy  to  policy;  he  is  the  servant  of  the 
politician,  the  statesman.  Never  has  this  function  of 
the  professional  soldier  been  more  plainly  apparent  than 
in  this  war,  and  it  has  fallen  to  Germany,  the  military 
nation  par  excellence,  to  demonstrate  the  subordinate 

*  See  Psychologic  du  Militaire  prof  ess  ionnel,  by  A.  Hamon,  Paris, 
1808,  p.  25. 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  61 

role  of  the  professional  soldier  !  This,  however,  is  only 
logical,  for  military  strategy  is  only  the  means  of  realizing 
the  end  indicated  by  the  politician. 

When  we  consider  the  German  offensive  we  see  very 
plainly  that  this  or  that  act  of  war  has  been  executed 
with  reference  to  this  or  that  political  object,  or  with 
reference  to  several  political  objects,  such  as  to  influence 
neutrals  in  the  Balkans  or  America,  to  influence  the 
German  population,  to  affect  the  subscriptions  to  the 
war  loan,  etc.  This  is  plainly  apparent  to  any  thinking 
person,  for  these  acts  of  war  have  no  direct  utility  in 
themselves.  Their  only  direct  result  is  a  great  con- 
sumption of  men  and  munitions,  without  a  correlative 
weakening  of  the  enemy.  The  same  phenomenon,  by 
the  way,  has  been  observable  in  certain  offensive  actions 
of  the  Allies. 

War  is  truly  a  barbaric  survival  in  our  century  of 
industrialism;  so  that  it  was  bound  to  bring  in  its  train 
a  whole  revival  of  customs  dear  to  our  ancestors  of 
bygone  centuries.  Thus  we  beheld  a  display  of  the 
most  miscellaneous  decorations.  To  existing  decora- 
tions fresh  ones  were  added.  Crosses  of  War,  Orders 
of  Merit,  Victoria  Crosses,  etc.,  were  pinned  to  a  multi- 
tude of  breasts.  Not  that  these  various  playthings 
were  the  parents  of  heroic  acts  !  No,  they  had  no 
influence  on  the  occasional  combatants,  the  civilians 
of  yesterday  and  to-morrow.  The  soldier,  in  the 
moment  of  battle  or  in  the  trenches,  thinks  of  one  thing 
only:  of  "pulling  through"  as  well  as  he  can,  at  all 
events  without  being  killed;  and  he  says  to  himself: 
"  The  more  I  kill,  the  less  chance  I  have  of  being  killed." 
This  often  leads  him  to  commit  heroic  actions,  but  this 
heroism,  none  the  less,  is  based  on  egoism,  on  the  idea 
of  self-preservation.  Never  does  the  idea  of  a  reward 
intervene  to  impel  him  to  action.  This  discovery,  which 
resulted  from  a  psychological  investigation  conducted 
by  M.  Lahy  and  confirmed  by  the  letters  from  the  front 


62  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

which  I  myself  have  received,  is  highly  important,  for 
it  follows  from  this  that  rewards  are  useless,  and  with- 
out any  value  in  determining  human  action.  This 
confirms  what  I  have  written  concerning  rewards  and 
punishments  as  a  method  of  education.* 

The  decorations  which  our  rulers  are  distributing  so 
liberally,  thinking  thereby  to  repay  the  sacrifice  and 
the  suffering  of  millions  of  human  beings,  are  simply 
the  survival  of  the  tattooings  and  other  marks  of  war- 
like valour,  such  as,  for  example,  the  wolf-tails  of  the 
Redskins,  so  dear  to  our  savage  ancestors.  Man  still 
remains  something  of  a  child,  contenting  himself  with 
little,  and  above  all  contenting  himself  with  appear- 
ances. 

However,  it  is  also  important  to  see  in  these  decora- 
tions an  aesthetic  aspect  of  warfare.  War  is  so  horrible, 
with  its  train  of  death  and  desolation,  that  humanity, 
in  the  course  of  the  years,  has  felt  the  need  to  beautify 
and  adorn  it.  And  hence  arises  a  multitude  of  medals 
and  also  of  uniforms.  He  who  wears  the  uniform  loves 
to  display  it.  In  England,  for  example,  the  military 
spirit  is  non-existent,  and  the  officer  always  goes  abroad 
without  his  weapons.  However,  one  sees  the  khaki 
uniform  there,  often,  for  that  matter,  very  smartly  cut 
and  worn,  displaying  itself  in  drawing-rooms  and  in  the 
streets,  to  the  great  delight  of  the  women,  who,  to  what- 
ever social  class  they  belong,  are  almost  all  sensitive 
to  the  charm  of  modern  tattoo-marks  and  wolf-tails. 
*  *  *  *  * 

An  interesting  phenomenon,  which  has  been  noted  in 
every  country,  is  the  diminution,  in  this  war,  of  ordinary 
criminality.  The  correctional  courts  and  the  assizes 
have  much  less  work  to  do.  This  is  the  repetition  of 
a  phenomenon  which  was  observed  at  the  time  of  the 
war  of  1870.  Those  who  only  perceive  the  appearance 

*  See  The  Universal  Illusion  of  Free  Will  and  Criminal  Responsibility, 
London,  1898 ;  Education  et  Liberte,  Paris,  1012. 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  63 

of  things  have  deduced  therefrom  the  fact  that  war  is 
a  moral  agency.  This  is  an  absolutely  false  interpreta- 
tion of  an  actual  fact.  Criminality  diminishes  during 
the  war,  not  because  men  are  more  moral,  but  because 
men  who  have  the  instinct  of  murder,  rapine,  and 
parasitism — criminals,  in  short — find  in  the  very  feats 
of  warfare  an  outlet  and  expression  for  these  instincts. 
This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  feminine  criminality 
does  not  diminish,  while  juvenile  criminality  increases. 
Crime  is  not  disappearing;  it  is  not  even  changing  its 
form;  it  is  simply  changing  its  object.  To  kill  a  man 
becomes  meritorious,  for  he  is  the  enemy;  the  rape  of 
the  daughter  of  an  enemy  is  a  matter  of  no  importance ; 
as  for  pillage  and  t!\eft,  they  are  not  even  venal  offences, 
but  the  current  coin  of  war.  Moreover,  a  host  of  acts 
which  are  purely  and  simply  common  crimes  are 
methodically  organized  by  all  the  belligerents;  for 
example,  the  theft  of  documents,  of  despatches.  But 
the  palm  in  this  kind  of  common  criminality  must 
uncontestably  be  rewarded  to  Germany,  whose  official 
representatives  in  the  United  States,  for  example, 
fabricated  false  passports  and  false  depositions,  and 
even  went  to  the  length  of  assassination,  of  blowing  up 
bridges,  factories,  and  ships. 

The  leaders,  in  short,  excite  in  their  men  the  most 
perverse,  inhuman,  and  brutal  instincts  of  humanity; 
and  by  a  complete  reversal  of  the  ordinary  ideas  of 
morality  they  transform  the  lowest,  cruellest,  and  most 
sordid  actions  into  admirable  performances,  worthy  of 
all  imitation.  Far  from  punishing  them,  they  reward 
them  by  money,  decorations,  promotion,  and  titles. 

Militarism  is  a  school  of  crime.  This  aphorism,  which 
I  wrote  in  1893,  has  unhappily  been  only  too  abundantly 
proved  by  the  events  of  this  war.  On  certain  fronts 
or  portions  of  fronts  the  command  has  erected  into  a 
system  the  "cleaning  up"  of  the  trenches — that  is  to 
say,  the  killing  with  the  knife  of  all  the  "  human 


64  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

material  "  found  therein.  Before  offensives  the  men 
are  made  to  drink  wine,  or  ether,  or  a  mixture  of  these 
two  narcotics,  according  to  the  army  in  question. 
Semi-drunkenness  is  indispensable  if  a  man  is  to  do  his 
deadly  work  and  give  rein  to  his  brutal  and  anti-human 
instincts.  War  thus  becomes  a  school  of  crime,  a 
university  of  hooliganism  and  worse,  whose  bitter  fruit 
may  well  be  tasted  in  the  years  after  the  war. 

War,  indeed,  is  merely  an  endless  succession  of  crimes 
of  every  sort:  assassination,  murder,  concerted  and 
individual  theft,  rape,  attempted  murder  or  assassina- 
tion, destruction  of  property,  fabrication  of  false  docu- 
ments, etc.  The  official  inquiries  undertaken  by 
the  various  Governments  concerning  acts  of  warfare 
have  shown  that  this  is  indeed  the  case.  It  is  enough, 
for  example,  to  read  the  "  Report  of  the  Committee  on 
Alleged  German  Outrages,"  presided  over  by  the  Right 
Hon.  Viscount  Bryce,  with  its  volume  of  evidence,  and 
Les  Violations  des  Lois  de  la  Guerre  par  I'Allemagne, 
published  by  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
This  contains  photographic  proofs  impossible  of  denial, 
for  they  constitute  an  actual  confession  by  the  authors 
of  the  criminal  acts  in  question. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  present  war  is  causing  so  many  horrors,  with  its 
millions  of  dead,  its  millions  of  cripples,  its  millions  of 
wounded,  its  thousands  of  millions  of  loss,  that  if  all 
humanity  consisted  of  reasonable  beings  a  stupendous 
anti- warlike  feeling  would  spread  throughout  the  whole 
world.  Will  it  be  thus  ?  Will  this  war  be  the  last 
war  ?  It  is  impossible  to  predict  with  certainty.  But 
one  thing  is  certain:  that  among  the  combatants — 
and  all  those  who  have  had  letters  from  or  conversations 
with  those  who  have  been  at  the  front  will  testify  to 
this — a  veritable  horror  of  warfare  has  sprung  up. 
Soldiers  and  officers  of  all  the  belligerent  armies  have 
seen  things  so  frightful  that  they  have  acquired  a 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  65 

hatred  of  war.  Listen  to  these  fragments  of  letters, 
two  from  common  soldiers  and  the  third  from  a  British 
officer.  One,  cited  by  Romain  Rolland,  comes  from 
a  German,  and  is  written  to  a  professor  in  German 
Switzerland;  the  other  is  from  a  letter  which  was 
sent  to  me  by  a  working  cabinet-maker,  a  French 
reservist. 

"  All  of  us,"  writes  the  German  soldier,  "  even  those 
who  at  first  were  the  most  eager  in  the  struggle,  wish 
for  nothing  to-day  but  peace,  our  officers  as  well  as 
ourselves.  .  .  .  The  desire  for  peace  is  intense  with 
us — with  all  those,  at  least,  who  are  at  the  front,  and 
are  obliged  to  kill  and  to  be  killed.  The  newspapers 
say  that  it  is  hardly  possible  to  moderate  the  warlike 
ardour  of  the  combatants.  They  lie,  knowingly  and 
unknowingly." 

"From  the  25th  of  September  (1915),"  writes  the 
French  soldier,  "  until  the  1st  of  October,  I  was 
living  amid  frightful  and  unprecedented  bloodshed. 
Never  has  the  — th  Regiment  seen  such  things  as 
have  happened  during  these  six  days.  It  is  horrible. 
You  and  all  the  learned  folk  do  not  know  what  the 
trench  war  is,  for  if  you  knew  you  would  all,  in  the 
name  of  humanity  and  civilization,  demand  peace. 
You  should  see  men  or  portions  of  men  fly  into  the  air, 
to  a  height  of  40,  60,  or  100  feet.  You  should  see  heads, 
arms,  and  legs  of  men,  horses,  and  mules  lying  about 
everywhere  on  the  field  of  battle." 

Any  comment  would  lessen  the  horror  of  this  de- 
scription. 

And  the  officer,  a  young  Englishman,  a  volunteer, 
writes:  "  I  do  not  think  of  what  I  do,  of  what  I  see, 
of  what  I  hear,  of  what  I  feel,  for  if  I  did  I  could  not 
bear  it.  It  is  not  myself  that  is  here;  it  is  some  fellow 
who  doesn't  think,  but  does  his  work,  whether  for  good 
or  ill;  it  is  only  thus  that  one  can  keep  one's  nervous 
equilibrium.  Life  in  the  trenches  is  a  hell  full  of 

5 


66  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

vermin,  cold,  and  damp,  and  ignobly  filthy,  mentally 
as  well  as  physically.  All  those  who  are  there  hope 
only  for  one  thing — to  get  wounded  so  that  they  can 
go  home.' 

All  those  soldiers  who  have  been  under  fire  hate  the 
war,  which  is  a  veritable  hell,  as  many  Englishmen 
have  written  in  the  letters  published  by  the  newspapers. 
The  civil  population  on  the  Continent  has  the  same 
anti-warlike  feeling,  for  it  has  felt  the  results  of  the 
war  more  strongly  than  the  British  population,  which, 
thanks  to  its  insular  position,  has  partly  escaped  them. 

One  of  the  lessons  of  this  war  is  therefore  the  hatred 
of  war  and  the  love  of  peace.  The  lesson  is  dearly 
bought,  but  we  think  it  will  be  effective. 

***** 

Parallel  to  this  growth  of  anti-warlike  feeling  there 
has  been  a  development  of  anti-militarism.  This  is 
entirely  logical,  since  war  and  militarism  go  hand  in 
hand.  Military  discipline  is  always  harsh  and  brutal. 
It  shocks  all  men  accustomed  to  the  relative  liberty  of 
civilian  life,  and  the  result  is  discontent,  and  finally 
an  anti-militarist  feeling. 

That  man,  whosoever  he  may  be,  who  possesses 
power  tends  to  abuse  that  power.  He  likes  to  display 
his  power,  and  he  can  do  so  only  to  the  detriment  and 
vexation  of  those  who  are  under  him.  Naturally  the 
result  is  that  a  spirit  of  opposition  grows  up  in  these 
latter,  a  spirit  of  hatred  for  the  social  organization  which 
is  wronging  them.  The  basis  of  military  discipline  is 
always  constraint  by  a  will  external  to  the  individual. 
Obedience  is  based,  not  on  the  free  will  of  the  soldier, 
but  on  his  absence  of  will;  the  soldier  is  transformed 
into  an  obedient  machine  which  is  set  in  motion  by  the 
commander.  It  results  from  this  that  military  discipline 
is  based  on  the  fear  of  punishment,  the  variety  of  which 
is  small  and  the  severity  great,  for  it  extends  to  the 
death  penalty. 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  67 

From  the  psychological  point  of  view  the  results  of 
military  discipline  are  serious.  On  the  one  hand  this 
discipline  diminishes  individual  initiative;  on  the  other, 
it  produces  a  hyper- excitation  of  the  spirit  of  authority. 
In  all  those,  indeed,  to  whom  a  fraction  of  power  is 
imparted — that  is,  in  the  officers,  from  the  corporal  to 
the  General — a  kind  of  madness  or  intoxication  of  power 
supervenes.  This  phenomenon  occurs  even  in  those 
who  only  the  day  before  were  civilians,  and  who  will 
become  civilians  again  to-morrow.  The  results  of  this 
surexcitation  of  the  spirit  of  authority  are  innumerable 
acts  of  arbitrariness  and  prepotency.  Such  actions  shock 
those  who  are  the  witnesses  or  victims  of  them,  the 
more  violently  when  they  are  used  to  the  democratic 
customs  and  the  liberty  of  our  Western  countries. 
There  is  a  gulf  between  the  aspirations  of  the  men  and 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  treated  !  Thus  a  pro- 
fessor, now  a  soldier,  wrote  to  me  in  1915:  "  For  fourteen 
months  I  have  been  a  slave !"  These  words  truthfully 
express  the  feeling  which  inspires  the  great  majority 
of  French  soldiers,  who  need  a  big  share  of  energy  in 
order  to  hold  out  against  all  the  nuisances  and  dis- 
comforts of  militarism,  and  to  maintain  their  desire 
to  continue  this  war  until  the  triumph  of  the  Allies,  so 
as  to  kill  warfare.  But  little  by  little  there  accumulates 
in  these  men  a  mass  of  petty  and  restrained  rebellions, 
which  at  the  end  of  the  war  will  break  forth  in  a  vast 
outcry  against  militarism. 

I  believe  the  feeling  of  the  English  soldiers  is  the 
same,  to  judge  by  some  fragments  of  letters  which  I 
have  been  enabled  to  read.  This  anti-militarist  feeling 
of  the  British  citizen  who  has  become  a  soldier  in  defence 
of  his  liberty  is  entirely  logical,  and  it  would  be  sur- 
prising if  it  did  not  exist  in  all  the  citizens  of  a  country 
in  which  there  is  so  much  love  of  individual  liberty. 

And  this  spirit  of  anti-militarism,  which  is  growing 
up  even  among  the  neutrals — it  is  enough  to  read  the 


68  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Swiss  newspapers,  for  instance,  to  perceive  this — is  it 
also  developing  in  the  Germans  ?  We  cannot  say 
certainly  that  it  is,  but  it  seems  probable.  The  servile, 
passive  obedience  of  the  Germans  is  a  source  of  surprise 
to  us  Western  democrats.  The  soldiers  submit  without 
flinching  to  treatment  which  would  provoke  mutiny  in 
the  French  and  English  armies.  It  is  a  positive  fact 
— I  have  it  from  the  letter  of  a  French  soldier  who  was 
an  ocular  witness — that  German  soldiers  are  chained  to 
the  machine-guns !  However,  despite  this  passive 
acceptance  of  the  worst  of  treatment,  abasing  the  dignity 
of  a  man  to  the  point  of  causing  its  disappearance,  there 
is,  in  the  depths  of  the  German  masses,  civilian  yesterday 
and  to  be  civilian  to-morrow,  a  vague,  secret  feeling  of 
revolt  against  militarism.  We  can  perceive  this  in 
certain  of  the  daily  notes  written  by  soldiers  and  pub- 
lished in  the  official  publication  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, Les  Violations  des  Lois  de  la  Guerre  par  VAllemagne, 
and  in  M.  Joseph  Be*dier's  pamphlet,  Les  Crimes  alle- 
mands  d'apres  des  temoignages  allemands.  We  can  also 
perceive  it  in  some  fragments  of  German  letters  pub- 
lished by  Romain  Rolland  in  the  Journal  de  Geneve. 
For  the  rest,  it  would  be  rather  astonishing  if  the  German 
people  were  to  submit,  without  any  feeling  of  rebellion, 
to  the  misdeeds  of  an  exacerbated  militarism.  It  is 
still  obeying,  owing  to  its  fear  of  punishment,  but  in 
the  depths  of  its  nature  there  exists  a  violent  contra- 
diction between  the  economic  and  intellectual  condition 
of  its  civilization  and  its  political  condition,  which  is  a 
century  in  arrears.  This  contradiction  is  provoking  a 
subterranean  activity  which  will  one  day  manifest  itself 
in  a  terrible  explosion  of  anti-militarism.  Logic  shows 
that  this  is  so,  and  we  believe  the  phenomenon  of  the 
present  war J will  confirm  the  principle:  all  action  en- 
genders a  reaction. 

Suffering  is  essentially  educative.     And  in  this  war 
the  men  of  all  countries  will  have  suffered  so  much, 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  69 

or  have  witnessed  such  suffering,  that  they  will  have 
learned  many  things.  One  of  their  lessons  will  be:  the 
development  in  the  human  heart  of  a  profound  anti- 
bellicose  and  anti-militarist  feeling. 

*  *  *  *  * 

In  all  times  war  has  been  a  means  of  acquiring 
property,  like  trade,  industry,  or  brigandage.  The 
present  war  has  not  failed  in  this  sociological  mission. 
By  means  of  requisitions  and  acts  of  pillage,  methodi- 
cally organized,  whole  regions  have  been  emptied  of 
provisions,  of  machinery,  of  raw  materials,  and  even  of 
household  articles  of  furniture,  which  have  been  trans- 
ported to  Germany.  The  fact  has  been  denied,  but  it 
exists  none  the  less,  and  we  have  a  proof  of  it  in  the  order 
of  a  corps  commandant,  who  complains  of  disorder  in 
the  transports,  caused  by  the  despatch  of  articles  of 
plunder — a  printed  order  of  the  day,  which  was  pub- 
lished in  the  Berner  Tagwacht.  There  have  even  been 
advertisements  of  the  sale  of  the  products  of  pillage  ! 
The  review  of  Dr.  Ostwald,  the  chemist,  Das  Monistische 
Jahrhundert,  published  such  an  announcement  in  its 
issue  for  September  30,  1915.  At  the  head  figured 
these  words:  War  Booty. 

That  has  come  to  pass  in  the  war  of  the  twentieth 
century  which  has  occurred  in  all  previous  wars.  The 
only  difference,  as  far  as  there  is  any,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  method  and  organization  of  modern  spoliation.  One 
of  the  goods  which  war  enables  men  to  seize  is  money, 
and  one  of  the  methods  of  collecting  it  is  the  system  of 
collective  fines,  of  ransom  for  offences,  supposed  or  real. 
This  has  been  practised  on  a  large  scale  in  Belgium, 
France,  and  Poland — in  short,  in  all  the  regions  invaded. 
It  is  purely  and  simply  the  revival  of  the  Wehrgeld  of 
the  old  Germanic  law.  This  enables  the  victorious 
collectivity  to  enrich  itself  cheaply  by  the  spoils  of  the 
vanquished  collectivity. 

Moreover,  the  intention  to  despoil  the  vanquished— 


70  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

that  is,  the  theory  that  war  is  a  method  of  acquiring 
wealth — has  been  openly  avowed  by  the  German  leaders. 
They  have  repeatedly  declared  their  intention  of  ap- 
propriating the  conquered  territories  by  seizing  the 
soil,  the  factories,  the  houses,  and  expelling  the  original 
inhabitants.  It  is  impossible  otherwise  to  understand 
the  following  phrases,  which  we  cite  from  two  official 
petitions  sent  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  Herr 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  by  some  very  important 
associations  of  agriculturalists  and  manufacturers,  and 
by  a  body  of  "  intellectuals."* 

"  The  means  of  economic  power,"  we  read  in  these 
petitions,  "  existing  in  these  (French)  territories,  in- 
cluding large  and  medium-sized  estates,  will  be  placed 
in  German  hands  by  such  methods  that  it  will  be  France 
who  will  indemnify  and  receive  the  owners.  .  .  .  Enter- 
prises and  properties  (Belgian)  must  pass  from  anti- 
German  into  German  hands.  .  .  .  The  territories  which 
Russia  will  be  forced  to  cede  to  us  will  be  ...  terri- 
tories of  agricultural  colonization.  .  .  .  The  Russian 
war  indemnity  must  be  paid  in  kind  .  .  .  the  political 
cession  of  territorial  property,  freed  from  all  private 
proprietorship.  .  .  .  The  most  important  enterprises 
and  properties  must  pass  from  anti-German  to  German 
owners,  the  indemnities  payable  to  the  old  proprietors 
being  the  charge  of  France." 

-  In  short,  all  these  phrases  mean  only  one  thing:  the 
expropriation  of  the  landlords,  the  expulsion  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  soil.  The  conquered  territories  are 
colonies,  territories  to  be  populated.  The  Germans 
pretend  to  need  such  colonies  owing  to  the  increase  of 
their  population,  thanks  to  their  high  birth-rate.  The 

*  There  have  been  two  petitions — one  from  the  intellectuals  and 
professors,  the  other  from  the  "  League  of  Agriculturalists,"  the 
"  Directing  Committee  of  the  League  of  German  Peasants  "  (now  the 
Westphalian  Peasants),  the  "  Central  Union  of  German  Manufacturers," 
the  "Manufacturers'  League,"  and  the  "  Union  of  the  Middle  Classes 
of  the  Empire."  This  is  dated  May  20,  1915. 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  71 

ruling  classes  of  Germany  have  thus  affirmed  their 
intention  of  applying  on  a  large  scale  the  system  which 
they  introduced  in  so-called  German  Poland.  This 
transformation  of  European  territories  into  colonies  to 
be  peopled  can  only  take  place  on  one  condition:  the 
expulsion  en  masse  of  the  owners  of  the  soil,  without 
troubling  about  their  nationality,  by  the  simple  right 
of  superior  might,  quia  nominor  leo.  The  German  rulers, 
in  making  these  demands,  care  nothing  for  the  neutrals 
who  may  be  the  proprietors  of  factories  and  estates  in 
the  territories  conquered  by  Germany.  The  right  of 
ownership  is  for  them  non-existent  from  the  moment 
that  such  becomes  their  will.  Always  the  conception 
that  might  is  right,  which  necessarily  implies  the  sup- 
pression of  liberty  in  the  regions  where  this  conception 
prevails  and  is  applied. 

This  system  of  appropriating  the  goods  of  the  van- 
quished, in  contradiction  with  our  customs  and  the 
so-called  laws  of  war,  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  applied 
with  more  or  less  rigour  by  all  the  Western  peoples  to 
the  Asiatic,  African,  and  American  peoples  of  the  soil. 
Europeans  have  regarded  them  as  inferiors,  whom  they 
honoured  greatly  by  devouring  them.  The  Germans 
wish  to  apply  this  system  to  Europeans,  their  neigh- 
bours, because  they  consider  that  these  Europeans 
belong  to  inferior  races,  and  that  the  Germanic  race  is 
the  only  superior  race,  the  chosen  of  God,  elected  to 
rule  the  world.  Here  is  a  curious  phenomenon,  due  to 
a  veritable  hypertrophy  of  the  ego,  provoked  by  a 
military  education  acting  upon  a  caste  which  is  steeped 
in  the  pride  of  caste,  and  upon  classes  accustomed 
through  the  generations  to  passive  obedience  and 
servility.  This  conception  of  the  Germanic  race  as  the 
chosen  people  of  God  is  merely  the  transformation,  in 
our  days,  of  the  ancient  belief  that  the  Jewish  race  was 
the  Chosen  People.  It  is,  in  short,  a  survival  of  a 
barbaric  epoch. 


72  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Similarly,  war  as  a  means  of  acquiring  property  is 
a  survival  from  earlier  periods,  from  those  in  which 
industry  and  commerce  had  not  attained  their  present 
development.  The  employment  of  this  system  of 
acquiring  wealth  betrays  in  those  who  practise  it  a 
complete  absence  of  the  spirit  of  analysis  and  deduction. 
It  is  a  conception  of  a  wholly  primitive  nature.  And 
it  is  only  logical  that  it  should  be  found  in  the  military 
mentality,  in  which  all  spirit  of  criticism  has  been 
eliminated  by  the  hypertrophy  of  the  spirit  of  authority 
and  the  spirit  of  obedience. 

If  we  reflect  even  for  a  moment  we  perceive  the  impos- 
sibility of  the  realization  of  the  Germanic  ideal :  the  in- 
dustry of  war  as  a  means  of  acquiring  wealth.  The  finan- 
cial, industrial,  and  commercial  conditions  of  the  modern 
world,  with  their  infinite  complexity,  interpenetration, 
and  international  character,  are  absolutely  opposed  to 
such  a  system.  The  whole  edifice  of  production  and 
exchange  in  our  societies  is  founded  in  the  last  resort 
on  credit — that  is,  on  the  good  faith  of  the  contracting 
parties,  on  the  security  of  contracts.  Dispossession  by 
war  is  the  very  opposite  of  these  factors.  It  is,  accord- 
ingly, the  destruction  of  the  whole  structure  of  finance, 
industry,  and  commerce.  It  is  a  return  to  the  com- 
mercial methods  of  the  Middle  Ages,  which  existed 
in  continual  fear  of  the  bands  of  mercenaries  in  the 
pay  of  the  petty  nobles.  One  requires  the  primitive 
intelligence  of  the  perfect  professional  soldier,  the  perfect 
petty  noble,  to  imagine  that  war  would  enrich  the  con- 
queror in  the  twentieth  century.  But  if  the  German 
ruler  has  been  endowed  with  this  rudimentary  intel- 
ligence it  is  the  fault  of  his  military  education,  of  his 
military  mentality,  which  leads  him  to  regard  men  as 
machines,  and  which  deprives  him  of  all  critical  spirit 
and  kills  in  him  the  spirit  of  liberty.  We  here  discover 
by  another  road  what  we  have  already  discovered: 
the  noxious  character  of  the  military  mentality,  the 


73 

begetter  of  death,  and  the  excellence  of  the  spirit  of 
liberty,  the  leaven  of  human  progress. 

War  is  not  a  mode  of  acquiring  wealth,  for  it  does 
not  pay,  to  employ  a  commercial  expression.  It 
destroys  more  than  it  brings  in. 

Let  us  consider  the  present  war.  What  do  we  see  ? 
Towns  and  villages  in  ashes;  factories  and  workshops 
dismantled;  fields  ploughed  by  shells;  forests  splintered 
and  destroyed;  roads  obliterated;  bridges  broken;  rail- 
way lines  and  stations  blown  up;  and  vessels  sunk. 
We  behold,  in  short,  all  the  means  of  production  and 
exchange  demolished  and  annihilated.  Ashes  and 
shapeless  heaps  of  stone  and  metal,  tangled  heaps  of 
trees,  and"  unsown  fields  replace  them.  And  in  this 
work  of  destruction  are  included  all  the  achievements 
of  the  human  mind,  both  in  the  present  and  in  the  past. 
Furniture,  books,  stuffs,  tools  and  machinery,  works 
of  art  of  the  bygone  centuries — all  this  is  now  but  a 
waste  of  desolation.  Here  is  the  direct  work  of  the  war, 
the  actual  manner  in  which  it  enriches  humanity,  and  also 
the  conqueror,  who  thus  finds  himself  the  owner  of  ashes 
and  ruins,  if  so  be  that  he  can  remain  in  possession  of  them . 

But  beside  these  losses  by  the  destruction  of  things 
there  is  the  loss  due  to  the  misuse  of  human  energies, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  very  implements  of  war: 
munitions  and  weapons.  Human  energies  tend  to 
employ  the  implements  of  death  rather  than  the  imple- 
ments of  life.  There  is,  therefore,  a  misuse  of  the  forces 
of  humanity,  the  inevitable  result  of  a  state  of  war. 
Arms  and  munitions,  manufactured  unrestingly,  are 
destroyed  by  the  mere  fact  of  their  employment,  and 
with  extreme  rapidity.  All  the  human  labour  absorbed 
by  this  manufacture  vanishes  without  leaving  behind 
it  anything  of  use  to  the  human  collectivity.  It  leaves 
dead  and  wounded  men,  a  product  which  cannot  be 
regarded  as  useful  to  the  life  of  humanity  ! 


74  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

After  the  war,  in  short,  there  will  be  fewer  products 
than  before  the  war,  on  account  of  their  violent  destruc- 
tion, their  non-production,  or  their  rapid  wear  and  tear. 
It  follows  from  this  that  the  result  of  war  is  a  stupendous 
destruction,  which  far  exceeds  the  few  useful  or  favour- 
able results  which  may  ensue,  such  as  the  reconstruction 
of  destroyed  houses,  villages,  or  towns  under  conditions 
of  greater  salubrity;  or  the  improvement  and  replace- 
ment of  machinery.  In  war  there  is  an  infinite  multi- 
tude of  human  efforts  which  disappear  by  reason  of  the 
destruction  of  the  things  in  which  they  are  embodied. 
*  *  *  *  * 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  estimate  the  value  of  the 
things  destroyed,  and  still  more  difficult  to  estimate 
the  value  of  the  men  killed  or  crippled  for  life.  How- 
ever, we  can  arrive  at  a  very  approximate  result  which 
will  enable  us  to  form  some  idea  of  the  immensity  of 
the  losses  suffered  by  humanity  as  the  outcome  of  this 
war.  Economists  and  statisticians  have  given  different 
figures;  but  those  of  English,  French,  and  Belgian 
origin  are  fairly  similar.  The  figures  given  by  a  German 
statistician,  Herr  W.  Michaelis,  and  published  by  him 
in  Ueber  Land  und  Meer,  are  very  much  lower.  Exam- 
ining his  statistical  inquiry,  we  plainly  perceive  that  it 
is  his  desire,  not  to  reveal  the  actual  situation  to  the 
public,  but  to  conceal  at  least  a  portion  of  the  losses 
and  the  expenditure  caused  by  the  war.  Science  is 
subordinated  to  a  political  aim;  so  here  again  the  truth 
is  falsified. 

The  losses  in  property  and  goods  destroyed  are 
enormous,  without  speaking  of  the  losses  resulting 
from  the  consumption  or  wear  and  tear  of  munitions, 
weapons,  and  equipment;  from  the  non-utilization  of 
the  factories  and  the  merchant  fleets  of  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary;  from  the  disorganization  of  the  in- 
dustry, commerce,  and  finance  of  the  world;  from  the 
unproductiveness  of  the  millions  of  manual  and  intel- 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  75 

lectual  workers  employed  in  warfare.  Let  us  consider 
only  the  landed  property  and  real  estate,  the  industrial 
products  and  the  movable  property  destroyed  in  Belgium, 
Poland,  Lithuania,  the  north-east  of  France,  Eastern 
Prussia,  the  Bukovina,  Transylvania,  Galicia,  Serbia, 
Rumania,  the  Trentino,  Macedonia,  etc.,  and  the  ships 
of  the  belligerents  and  neutrals  which  have  been  sunk 
in  every  sea.  We  may  without  fear  of  exaggeration 
estimate  that  all  this  devastation  represents  at  least 
£2,000,000,000.  So  much  for  things. 

The  value  of  the  men  is  still  more  difficult  to  deter- 
mine, for  all  depends  on  the  value  attached  to  the  aver- 
age individual.  We  find  this  valuation  floating  between 
£400  and  £1,000.  I  will  take  the  lower  figure,  £400. 
Then  the  8,000,000  dead  represent  a  value  of 
£3,200,000,000.  The  seriously  wounded  will  almost  all 
be  unproductive.  The  little  they  may  produce  will 
hardly  compensate  for  the  diminished  value  of  the  men 
slightly  wounded,  or  sick,  or  enfeebled  by  fatigue  and 
privation.  Attaining  the  number  of  5,000,000  after 
two  and  a  half  years  of  war,  they  represent  a  loss  of 
£2,000,000,000,  for  we  may  estimate  the  value  of  each 
as  £400,  as  in  the  case  of  the  dead.  And  as  a  matter 
of  fact  they  will  not  only  be  almost  unproductive,  but 
they  will  still  be  consumers.  They  will  therefore 
expend  without  producing. 

So  the  loss  in  men,  dead  and  crippled  and  infirm, 
estimated  in  money,  amounts  approximately  to  more 
than  £5,200,000,000,  giving  each  unit  a  minimum  value 
of  £400.  Here  we  have  an  absolute  loss,  with  no  possi- 
bility of  recuperation.  To  this  we  must  add  the  value 
of  the  women,  children,  and  civilian  adults  killed, 
massacred,  or  dead  of  want  and  privation.  We  thereby 
reach  a  total  money  value  of  £6,000,000,000,  perhaps 
£7,000,000,000,  as  representing  the  loss  in  human  beings. 
Let  us  note  that  the  end  of  the  world-war  is  not  even 
in  sight  as  yet;  that  it  mayjast  a  year,  perhaps  two 


76 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


years  longer;  that  other  nations  may  take  part  in  it; 
that  everything  leads  us  to  suppose  that  the  devastation 
will  increase ;  for  the  rulers  of  the  Imperial  Powers,  know- 
ing themselves  lost,  will  strive  to  bury  themselves  under 
the  ruins  and  to  shake  the  world  as  they  disappear. 


Let  us  now  examine  the  cost  of  the  upkeep  of  the  war 
— that  is,  the  expenditure  which  enables  the  belligerents 
to  obtain  rifles,  guns,  machine-guns,  aeroplanes,  diri- 
gibles, motor-cars,  submarines,  cruisers,  transport  ser- 
vices, tons  of  shells,  explosives,  provisions,  and  clothing, 
etc.,  for  the  soldiers,  and  even  for  the  civilians.  Accord- 
ing to  the  credit  voted  by  the  Chambers  and  the  de- 
clarations of  Ministers,  one  may  approximately  estimate 
the  annual  war  expenditure  at  an  average  figure  of 
£2,456,000,000  for  Great  Britain  (not  counting  the 
credits  of  the  Dominions,  but  including  the  advances 
to  the  Allied  Governments);  £1,400,000,000  for  Ger- 
many; £1,200,000,000  for  France;  and  £1,000,000,000 
for  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia.  As  for  Italy,  her 
expenditure  did  not  amount  to  £320,000,000  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war,  but  it  increased  during  the  course 
of  the  second  year.  We  do  not  know  what  is  the 
expenditure  of  Belgium,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Turkey, 
Bulgaria,  Portugal,  Rumania,  and  Japan.  We  may 
estimate  it,  without  fear  of  exaggeration,  at  £800,000,000 
for  the  thirty  months  of  war.  To  sum  up:  we  have, 
as  the  expenses  of  war  by  the  end  of  January,  1917,  the 
following  figures,  in  millions  of  pounds : 


British  Empire 

France 

Russia 

Italy 

Germany 

Austria -Hungary 

Other  belligerents 


Total 


Million  Pounds 
Sterling. 
3,640 
3,000 
2,500 
560 
3,500 
2,500 
800 


..    16,500 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  77 

This  refers  only  to  the  belligerents,  and  the  figures 
are  below  rather  than  above  the  reality  !  But  the 
expenses  incurred  by  the  war  are  not  confined  to  these; 
for  the  neutral  Powers — Holland,  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Switzerland — have  been  obliged  to  place  their  armies 
more  or  less  upon  a  war  footing.  The  result  has  been 
a  very  heavy  expenditure  for  all  these  peoples. 

We  may  say,  then,  at  the  end  of  thirty  months,  that 
the  war  has  involved,  for  all  the  European  nations,  an 
expenditure  of  more  than  16,000  million  pounds.  And 
as  the  war  does  not  seem  likely  to  end  yet,  it  follows 
that  this  expenditure  will  continue,  and  that  this 
gigantic  total  will  increase,  attaining  perhaps  23,000 
millions  if  the  war  lasts  until  the  end  of  1917,  or  29,600 
millions  if  it  does  not  cease  before  the  close  of  1918. 
The  monthly  expenditure  of  the  whole  of  the  belligerents 
must  be  estimated  at  not  less  than  1,550  millions. 
The  nations  at  war  are  literally  rushing  upon  their  own 
ruin. 

However,  much  of  this  expenditure  does  not  repre- 
sent a  total  loss.  All  this  money  does  not  disappear  in 
smoke  and  shell-splinters.  Some  of  it  only  changes 
hands.  But  a  great  proportion  of  these  vast  sums  is 
a  total  loss,  owing  to  the  destruction  of  munitions,  the 
rapid  wear  and  tear  of  things,  and  the  employment  of 
all  the  material  of  war  to  the  ends  of  destruction. 

Apart  from  this,  moreover,  the  expenditure  is  always 
borne  by  the  mass  of  each  nation,  which  will  have  every 
year  to  pay  the  interest  and  the  sinking  fund,  for  all 
these  sums  are  raised  in  the  form  of  loans  at  long  or 
short  date.  Great  Britain  alone  resorted  to  taxation 
in  order  to  cover  a  portion  of  the  war  expenditure  during 
the  two  first  years.  Reckoning  the  interest  and  amor- 
tizement  at  6  per  cent.,  we  see  that  the  peoples  of  the 
belligerent  Powers  will  have  each  year  to  pay  nearly 
one  thousand  million  pounds  in  order  to  redeem  this 
indebtedness  after  thirty  months  of  war;  about 


78  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

£1,400,000,000  if  the  war  does  not  terminate  before  the 
end  of  1917,  and  £1,800,000,000  if  it  lasts  until  the  end 
of  1918. 

This  is  not  all,  for  we  must  add  to  this  sum  the 
pensions  awarded  to  the  widows,  aged  parents,  and 
children  of  the  killed,  together  with  the  pensions  of 
the  disabled  and  the  families  whose  support  they  were. 
What  will  these  pensions  amount  to  ?  We  may  reckon 
upon  an  average  of  £20  per  annum  per  killed  or  dis- 
abled soldier.  So  for  the  13  millions  of  dead  or  disabled 
soldiers  we  obtain  an  annuity  of  260  million  pounds, 
which  we  must  add  to  the  1,000  millions  already  cited. 
So  that  if  the  war  were  to  last  one  or  two  years  longer 
these  260  millions  would  become  360  or  460  millions. 

To  sum  up :  by  the  end  of  thirty  months  the  war  has 
burdened  the  future  generations  of  the  belligerent 
nations  with  an  annual  payment  of  £1,260,000,000 
merely  in  respect  of  the  redemption  of  war  loans  and 
the  pensions  of  widows,  children,  and  disabled  soldiers. 
This,  I  repeat,  is  a  minimum,  for  I  have  reckoned  the 
interest  and  sinking  fund  at  6  per  cent.,  and  they  will 
be  higher,  to  judge  by  the  loans  already  made.  The 
average  pension  will  probably  exceed  £20,  at  all  events 
for  the  Western  peoples. 

This  is  not  all.  Indeed,  the  £1,260,000,000  which 
the  belligerent  nations  will  be  forced  to  pay  annually, 
in  order  to  provide  war  pensions  and  sinking  funds, 
must  be  increased  by  the  sinking  fund  of  the  indemnities 
and  other  expenditure  which  will  make  good  the  de- 
struction of  property,  and  this,  as  we  have  seen,  re- 
presents a  capital  of  at  least  2,000  million  pounds. 
This  means  another  120  millions  po"  annum.  That  is, 
if  peace  had  been  signed  by  January  31,  1917,  the 
belligerent  peoples  would  have  to  submit  to  taxation 
to  over  some  1,400  millions  annually,  in  order  to  redeem 
all  the  indemnities  and  war  expenditure  and  pensions  ! 
If  the  war  lasts  till  the  end  of  1917,  the  annual  amount 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  79 

of  these  taxes  will  reach  1,860  millions;  if  it  lasts  till 
the  end  of  1918,  nearly  2,400  millions.  Before  the 
vastness  of  these  burdens  one  asks  oneself  whether  the 
nations  will  consent  to  support  them,  or  whether  they 
will  go  into  financial  liquidation. 

Of  course  the  proportion  of  losses  and  expenditure, 
and  therefore  of  indebtedness,  varies  with  the  different 
belligerents.  It  follows  that  the  annual  interest  will 
vary  in  the  same  fashion.  We  are  thus  able  to  draw 
up  an  approximate  table  showing  the  financial  situation 
of  the  five  great  belligerents  at  the  end  of  thirty  months 
of  warfare: 


France. 

Great 
Britain. 

Russia. 

Germany. 

Austria  - 
Hungary. 

Expenditure  in  mil- 
lions of  pounds  .  . 

3,000 

3,640 

2,500 

3,500 

2,500 

Sinking  fund  and  in- 
terest 

180 

218 

150 

210 

150 

Killed  and  disabled 

1,938,600 

484,700 

3,885,000 

3,015,600 

2,527,800 

Pensions  in  millions 
of  pounds 

38-8 

9-68 

77-6 

60 

50-6 

Indemnities  for  de- 
struction in  mil- 
lions of  pounds  .  . 

240 

_ 

400 



_ 

Interest  on  and  sink- 
ing fund  of  these 
indemnities 

14-4 

24 

_ 

Total  of  interest,  pen- 
sions, and  sinking 
funds  in  millions  of 
pounds 

233 

228 

251 

270 

200 

Population  in  mil- 
lions 

39 

47 

170 

68 

51 

Taxation  per  head  in 
pounds  sterling  .  . 

5-96 

4-64 

1-48 

3-96 

3-92 

The  figures  in  this  table  are  approximate,  and  are 
of  no  value  save  as  an  indication  of  the  reality.     Their 


80  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

approximation  is,  we  think,  below  the  reality — perhaps 
10  per  cent,  to  15  per  cent,  below  it. 

From  these  figures  we  may  judge  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  financial  disaster  which  has  overtaken  the  nations 
as  a  result  of  this  war.  It  is  truly  ruin  for  them.  And 
it  will  be  impossible  for  the  victors  to  demand  an 
indemnity  from  the  vanquished.  The  only  means  by 
which  the  conquerors  could  partially  indemnify  them- 
selves for  their  expenditure  would  be  the  seizure  of 
territories  and  the  expropriation  of  individual  pro- 
prietors, whether  indemnified  or  not  by  the  conquered 
nation  thus  dispossessed  of  its  territories.  This  means 
is  inapplicable,  as  I  have  shown,  and  could  only  have 
been  conceived  by  the  primitive  military  mentality. 

However,  justice  would  require  that  the  authors  of  the 
world-catastrophe  should  use  their  wealth  to  repair  the 
devastation  heaped  up  by  them.  This  is  possible,  but 
it  is  doubtful  if  it  could  be  enforced,  as  it  would  be 
an  attack  upon  the  capitalist  class,  which  always  dis- 
plays a  certain  degree  of  solidarity,  independently  of 
frontiers.  If  the  Kings,  Princes,  and  landowners  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  to  be  forced  partly 
to  repair  the  ruin  of  which  they  are  the  authors,  it 
would  be  necessary,  on  the  conclusion  of  peace,  to  seize 
their  land,  their  personal  and  real  estate.  The  property 
thus  seized  would  be  handed  over  to  the  German  nation 
and  the  nations  on  whose  territory  it  lay,  but  it  would 
be  burdened  with  a  heavy  mortgage,  so  that  the  entire 
rental,  instead  of  belonging  to  the  Kings,  Princes,  and 
landowners,  would  for  a  term  of  years  be  employed  to 
indemnify  the  ruined  Belgians,  French,  Poles,  Ru- 
manians, and  Serbs.  After  the  lapse  of  these  years  the 
revenue  would  once  more  belong  to  the  German,  Hun- 
garian, and  other  nations.  This  system  would  make  it 
possible  to  indemnify,  to  some  extent,  those  who  have 
been  ruined  by  the  war,  and  this  without  impoverishing 
the  German,  Hungarian,  Czech,  and  other  peoples,  the 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  81 

victims  of  the  rapacious  folly  of  their  rulers.  Only  the 
landowners,  princes,  and  kings  would  suffer  the  natural 
and  logical  consequences  of  their  actions.  Impover- 
ished, condemned  to  work  for  their  living,  their  mentality 
would  gradually  undergo  modification  under  the  in- 
fluence of  changed  social  conditions.  They  would  cease 
to  be  harmful  parasites,  and  would  be  transformed  into 
useful  producers.  But  this  is  a  dream:  men  are  not 
wise  enough  to  realize  it.  They  will  only  be  so  when 
all  men  rule  themselves,  refusing  to  be  divided  into 
rulers  and  ruled. 

Thus  at  the  end  of  the  war  each  nation  will  have  to 
maintain  the  sinking  fund  of  its  expenditure  and  the 
devastation  it  has  suffered.  This  will  be  a  stupendous 
burden  for  all,  in  addition  to  already  heavy  taxation. 
It  seems  improbable  that  the  nations  will  be  able  to 
support  this  combined  burden;  it  will  follow  that  they 
will  be  obliged  to  reduce  their  other  expenses.  This 
reduction  can  only  be  made  in  respect  of  military  and 
naval  expenditure.  This  alone  can  be  reduced.  I 
believe,  therefore,  that  the  present  war  will  render 
impossible  the  system  of  armed  peace  which  since  1870 
has  been  ruining  Europe. 

The  suppression  of  armed  peace  means  disarmament. 
War  will  have  killed  war  by  the  very  excesses  which  it 
has  committed;  and  this  benefit,  resulting  from  thou- 
sands of  crimes,  may  be  laid  to  the  credit  of  those  who 
unloosed  it  upon  the  world.  We  must  credit  them  with 
this  result  of  their  actions,  but  at  the  same  time  we 
must  observe  that  it  is  contrary  to  their  intention. 
They  intended  to  fortify  militarism  and  autocracy,  but 
by  the  force  of  events  militarism  and  autocracy  will  be 
largely  destroyed  and  diminished  by  the  war.  This 
result  will  prove  once  again  that  the  complete  develop- 
ment of  the  consequences  of  our  acts  escapes  us,  and 
that  these  consequences  are  often  the  contrary  of  the 
aim  pursued. 

6 


CHAPTER  in 

ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS 

Commercial,  industrial,  and  financial  disturbance — The  seizure  of  the 
means  of  transport — The  frontiers  closed :  a  survival  of  barbarism — 
The  consequences  to  commercial,  industrial,  and  domestic  life — 
The  importance  of  coal — The  importance  of  mining  labour — The 
impossibility  of  making  the  professions  hierarchical — The  lesson  of 
terrestrial  solidarity — The  increase  in  the  standard  of  living — 
The  enrichment  of  some  and  the  impoverishment  of  others — Dis- 
turbance of  agriculture — The  fixation  of  prices :  the  maximum — 
The  importance  of  the  mastery  of  the  seas — The  opposition  between 
the  Germanic  policy  in  respect  of  neutrals  and  that  of  the  Allies — 
Neutrals  and  the  war — Their  attitude  towards  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality — The  influence  of  the  German  threats,  lies,  and 
corruption — Fear  a  means  of  controlling  men — Commercial  and 
industrial  interests  incline  the  neutrals  to  remain  neutral — 
Diminished  authority  of  the  United  States  of  America — The  oppo- 
sition between  Kings  and  peoples  in  the  Balkans — Conservatives, 
Catholics,  and  aristocrats  in  the  neutral  countries  are  pro-German. 
The  reconstitution  of  economic  life — The  peoples  adapt  them- 
selves differently  to  the  conditions  arising  from  the  war — Pro- 
gressive science  and  industry  due  to  mental  hyperactivity — The 
influence  of  the  system  of  division  of  labour  on  human  invention 
— The  Taylor  system  is  detrimental  to  human  progress — The  re- 
organization of  labour — The  scarcity  of  hands — The  indispensable 
nature  of  labour — Female  labour — Forced  labour:  slavery — The 
militarization  of  the  working  class — The  necessity  of  Trade 
Unionism. 

TO  the  stupendous  devastation  and  expenditure  of 
which  we  have  already  spoken  we  must  add  the 
general  and  profound  perturbation  suffered  by  the 
entire  trade  and  industry  of  the  whole  world.     Any 
precise  valuation  of  this  perturbation,  and  of  the  losses 
which   inevitably   resulted    therefrom,    is    almost    im- 
possible; but  we  can,  without  fear  of  being  accused  of 
exaggeration,  estimate  it  as  being  at  least  four  thousand 
millions  sterling  for  the  first  thirty  months  of  the  war, 

82 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        83 

All  the  figures  which  we  give  are,  we  hasten  to  repeat, 
a  mere  indication  of  the  reality,  which,  we  believe, 
exceeds  them.  These  are  dead  losses,  both  for  the 
individual  and  the  nation. 

The  disturbance  of  trade  and  industry  extends  to 
numbers  of  non-belligerent  peoples.  The  Stock  Ex- 
changes and  other  exchanges  were  closed  at  the  outset 
of  the  war,  even  in  the  United  States.  The  German 
exchanges  remained  open,  but  the  business  done  on 
them  was  purely  fictitious.  Here  again  we  have  a 
method  of  bluffing  and  deceiving  the  public  concerning 
the  actual  state  of  affairs.  The  holders  of  metallic 
currency,  especially  of  gold,  held  on  to  it,  and  there 
was  an  end  of  heavy,  ringing  coin  for  purposes  of  ex- 
change. In  all  the  belligerent  countries  there  was  an 
enforced  legal  currency  of  bank  notes  of  various  kinds. 
The  State  Banks  issued  fresh  notes,  while  at  the  same 
time  they  gathered  in  as  much  gold  as  possible.  In 
England  they  created  bank  notes  of  10s.  and  £l  sterling, 
and  while  these  were  being  prepared  postal  orders  were 
made  negotiable  and  were  enforced  as  legal  tender.  In 
France  the  notes  of  20  francs,  which  were  in  existence, 
but  were  no  longer  in  general  circulation,  reappeared. 
Notes  of  5  francs  and  10  francs  were  issued  by  the  State. 
Cities  and  Chambers  of  Commerce  were  authorized  to 
issue  notes  of  1  franc  and  50  centimes,  to  have  currency 
only  in  the  department  of  issue,  which  were  always 
redeemable  for  notes  of  the  Bank  of  France.  In  the 
Central  Empires  also  notes  of  50  pfennigs,  25  pfennigs, 
and  even  5  pfennigs  or  a  heller  were  issued.  Metallic 
small  change  was  replaced  by  paper  small  change. 

In  many  countries  a  postponement  of  debts  and 
rentals — that  is,  a  moratorium — was  declared.  Even 
to-day,  after  two  and  a  half  years  of  war,  the  mora- 
torium still  exists,  but  modified  and  diminished  in 
various  ways,  according  to  the  country.  War  has 
closed  the  frontiers  to  the  exportation  and  importation 


84  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

of  a  host  of  manufactured  products,  in  belligerent  as 
well  as  in  neutral  countries.  The  ships  of  the  belli- 
gerents were  seized  in  all  enemy  ports.  Moreover,  as 
the  empire  of  the  sea  belongs  to  the  Allies,  thanks  to  the 
British  Navy,  the  German  and  Austrian  merchant 
vessels  took  refuge  and  became  immobilized  in  all  the 
neutral  ports. 

The  industrial  or  commercial  properties  of  the  enemy 
were  in  the  same  way  either  seized  or  sequestrated. 
This  did  not  occur  immediately  in  all  countries.  Even 
after  a  year  of  war  certain  mining  industries,  in  the 
British  Dominions,  were  still  controlled  by  German 
proprietors !  There  is  such  an  interpenetration  of 
economic  interests  between  the  citizens  of  different 
nations  that  these  conservative  and  defensive  measures 
have  everywhere  profoundly  disturbed  production  and 
exchange.  The  moratoria  have  prevented  bankruptcies, 
save  in  Germany,  where  the  Press  refers  to  such.  In 
that  country,  no  doubt,  the  Government  resorted  only 
to  a  partial  moratorium.  But  one  thing  is  certain, 
that  there  was  one,  just  as  in  other  countries,  for  about 
July,  1915,  the  German  and  neutral  newspapers  were 
speaking  of  measures  which  suspended  the  action  of 
certain  items  of  the  moratorium.  Another  thing  is 
equally  certain — that  the  Imperial  Government  officially 
denied  the  existence  of  this  moratorium:  still  the  same 
policy  of  untruth,  to  "  bluff "  and  delude  the  German 
and  foreign  public. 

Certain  branches  of  commerce  have  been  almost 
entirely  checked,  or  have  at  least  very  greatly  dimin- 
ished, especially  the  "  luxury  trades,"  even  in  neutral 
countries.  The  maritime  commerce  of  Germany  and 
Austria  was  entirely  annihilated.  Belgian  industry 
and  commerce  were  brought  to  a  dead  stop  by  the 
invasion  of  the  country.  The  mobilization  of  the  men 
between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-eight  on  the 
Continent  suspended  the  activity  of  almost  all  the 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        85 

factories,  or  at  least  enormously  decreased  it.  Only 
Great  Britain,  thanks  to  her  insular  position  and  the 
absence  of  compulsory  service,  was  able  to  continue  to 
conduct  business  almost  as  usual.  What  still  further 
disturbed  commercial  and  industrial  affairs  was  the 
seizure  by  the  State  of  the  railways  for  purposes  of 
military  transport,  and  of  the  telegraph  and  telephone 
services,  and  the  posts.  Everything  was  subordinated 
to  the  armies,  and  all  civilian  communications  were 
naturally  held  up  and  delayed.  Now  commerce  depends 
on  the  rapidity  and  certainty  of  all  means  of  com- 
munication, and  without  commerce  industry  is  neces- 
sarily idle.  Production  is  useless  if  there  is  no  con- 
sumption. 

The  frontiers  of  the  belligerent  countries  were  natur- 
ally entirely  closed.  Moreover,  during  the  course  of 
the  war  the  frontiers  between  certain  belligerent  and 
neutral  countries  were  completely  impassable  for  various 
periods  of  time.  They  were  strictly  guarded  in  a 
permanent  manner,  and  more  or  less  closed.  Thus  the 
frontier  between  Belgium  and  Holland  was  covered  by 
a  network  of  barbed  wire  and  iron  wires  traversed  by 
a  high-tension  electric  current.  Between  Alsace  and 
Switzerland  the  German  Government  created  a  neutral 
zone  on  Alsatian  territory,  and  divided  it  from  the  zore 
of  military  operations  by  a  barrier  of  barbed  wire.  I 
quote  from  the  Journal  de  Geneve  the  following  lines, 
which  depict  the  situation:  "  Circulation  is  free  between 
the  neutral  zone  and  Switzerland,  but  prohibited 
between  the  neutral  zone  and  Alsace  and  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Baden.  Those  who  wish  to  pass  from  the 
neutral  zone  into  Germany  must  go  by  way  of  Switzer- 
land, but  they  cannot  without  special  permission  send 
letters  across  the  frontier.  In  a  few  exceptional  cases 
the  inhabitants  of  the  neutral  zone  are  allowed  to  pass 
directly  into  Alsace  and  the  Grand  Duchy,  making  use 
of  passages  contrived  for  the  purpose.  It  is  forbidden 


86  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  approach  within  20  metres  of  the  barrier  or  to  com- 
municate with  persons  on  the  other  side.  Between 
8  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
small  quantities  of  provisions  and  merchandise  may 
pass  the  barrier  from  north  to  south;  they  must  be 
deposited  at  a  distance  of  30  metres  from  the  barrier; 
after  examination  they  will  be  passed  through  the 
barrier  by  the  officials  and  sentries.  For  indispensable 
agricultural  work  the  passage  of  the  barrier  may  be 
permitted  to  peasants  who,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  will  be  under  military  supervision  while  at 
work." 

I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  give  the  condensed  text 
of  the  decree  of  the  German  General  commanding  the 
frontier  region,  for  it  is  characteristic.  One  feels,  on 
reading  it,  as  though  carried  back  to  a  period  some 
centuries  ago,  when  State  was  isolated  from  State. 
The  famous  Great  Wall  of  China  is  surpassed  in  the 
twentieth  century  by  these  barriers  of  cement-lined 
trenches  and  barbed  or  electrified  wires.  Men  are 
applying  to  themselves  the  methods  of  isolation  and 
imprisonment  which  they  apply  to  the  animals  in  their 
zoological  gardens  !  It  would  be  grotesque  were  it  not 
so  profoundly  sad. 

All  the  Powers  have  been  practising  isolation  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent.  A  Bulgarian  regulation  concern- 
ing travellers  says:  "  Travellers  are  strictly  forbidden 
to  descend  at  intermediate  stations  or  to  enter  into 
relations  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  country,  either  in 
the  railway-stations  or  in  the  train  itself.  Travellers 
are  strictly  forbidden  to  carry  with  them  printed  matter 
or  manuscripts  of  any  kind,  photographs,  or  photographic 
apparatus."  England  prohibits  private  persons  from 
sending  printed  matter  to  neutrals.  In  France,  during 
the  first  months  of  the  war,  it  was  necessary  to  have 
a  permit  if  one  wished  to  travel  a  greater  distance  than 
twelve  kilometres  (about  seven  and  a  half  miles).  At 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        87 

the  time  of  the  Irish  rebellion  England  literally  isolated 
the  "  sister  isle  "  from  the  whole  world.  Even  at  the 
frontiers  between  allied  countries  the  supervision  was 
so  strict  that  people  were  often  undressed  in  order  to 
be  searched.  Moreover,  travelling  was  made  so  dis- 
agreeable that  no  one  wanted  to  travel. 

This  isolation  of  one  country  from  another  is  a  pure 
survival  of  the  methods  and  conceptions  of  barbarous 
periods.  And  here  we  find  yet  another  proof  that  war 
appeals  to  all  the  surviving  traces  of  savage  and  bar- 
barous epochs.  But  as  a  result  of  centralization  and  of 
State  power,  these  methods  of  isolation  were  much  more 
restrictive,  prohibitive,  and  effective  in  the  twentieth 
than  in  the  tenth  century  ! 

The  material  closing  of  frontiers  between  belligerents 
and  neutrals  was  completed  by  the  prohibition  of 
exports  which  all  Governments  enforced  in  the  case  of 
a  number  of  products,  both  raw  materials  and  manu- 
factured articles.  The  logical  result  of  these  prohibi- 
tions was  a  serious  check  to  commerce  and  industry 
and  a  vast  disturbance  of  domestic  life.  The  belligerents 
employed,  as  one  of  their  weapons,  their  power  of 
permitting  or  prohibiting  the  exportation  not  only  of 
the  goods  which  they  themselves  produced,  but  also  of 
those  goods  which  used  merely  to  pass  through  their 
territories,  or  which  were  carried  on  the  adjacent  seas. 
In  this  way  they  endeavoured  to  prevent  the  neutral 
nations  from  exporting  goods  to  the  belligerent  Powers. 
Owing  to  their  geographical  situation  and  their  mastery 
of  the  sea,  Great  Britain  and  France  made  the  greatest 
use  of  this  weapon.  And  it  was  thus  Germany  and 
her  allies  who  suffered  most  from  this  species  of  blockade. 
But  the  enemies  of  Germany  and  the  neutrals  had  also 
to  put  up  with  the  commercial  and  industrial  conse- 
quences of  the  suppression  of  exports.  Thus,  for 
example,  certain  dye-stuffs  were  lacking  everywhere 
because  they  were  of  German  origin  and  their  ex- 


88  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

portation  was  impossible.  Italy,  before  entering  the 
war,  was  unable  to  obtain  the  sulphate  of  copper  so 
necessary  to  her  vines  save  by  the  good  will  of 
Great  Britain.  Switzerland  was  able  to  obtain  cocoa 
and  oils  only  because  France  and  Italy  wished  her 
well. 

Germany  was  greatly  lacking  in  raw  materials:  wool, 
cotton,  copper,  nitrates,  etc.  And  to  procure  these  she 
had  to  have  recourse  to  the  neutrals,  from  whom  she 
bought  them  at  a  very  great  cost,  due  as  much  to  over- 
charging and  unavoidable  limitation  of  supplies  as  to 
the  fact  that  these  materials  were  more  often  than  not 
contraband  of  war.  A  host  of  products  were,  in  fact, 
declared  contraband  of  war,  which  legalized  their  seizure 
upon  the  seas  if  they  were  destined  for  the  enemy.  But 
the  list  of  these  contraband  substances  was  increased 
only  in  a  slow  and  progressive  manner.  Capitalistic 
interests,  in  the  Western  Powers  as  well  as  in  neutral 
countries,  opposed  the  establishment  of  a  strict  blockade 
of  the  Central  Powers.  Such  a  blockade  might  have 
existed  at  the  end  of  the  first  six  months  of  the  war,  if 
not  earlier,  and  it  was  only  toward  the  twentieth  month 
of  hostilities  that  it  became  serious,  though  still  incom- 
plete. An  example  of  these  capitalistic  interests  was 
given  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  December  2,  1915. 
It  was  proved  by  a  member,  Mr.  Bigland,  that  the 
exportation  of  linseed  oil,  at  first  prohibited,  had  been 
authorized  anew  because  the  manufacturers  refused  to 
continue  its  manufacture  if  they  could  not  export  the 
oil.  Great  Britain  required  the  manufacture  to  con- 
tinue, so  that  the  oil-cake  essential  to  the  feeding  of  her 
cattle  should  be  produced.  As  Mr.  Bigland  remarked, 
it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  for  Great  Britain 
to  manufacture  oil  in  order  to  obtain  oil-cake.  But 
this  was  not  done,  on  account  of  capitalistic  interests. 
In  March,  1916,  it  was  proved  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  the  British  Navy  was  delberately  allowing  cargoes 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        89 

of  petroleum  to  pass,  although  their  enemy  destination 
was  known.  This  was  the  result  of  conventions  con- 
cluded with  the  American  Oil  Trust. 

Economists  used  to  write — as  M.  Leroy-Beaulieu, 
for  example — that  "  war  is  the  seed-time  and  harvest- 
time  of  the  capitalists."  Once  again  this  has  been 
verified  during  the  present  war,  thanks  to  the  blockade, 
which  was  a  possibility,  but  was  deliberately  ineffective. 
And  among  those  who  enriched  themselves  the  most 
were  the  neutral  capitalists,  principally  those  of  the 
maritime  countries. 

It  is  understood,  then,  how  greatly  all  obstacles  to 
rapidity  of  communications,  how  all  restraint  of  ex- 
portation, must  react  upon  the  world's  commerce  and 
industry.  There  was  a  coffee  crisis  in  Brazil  because 
the  German  market  was  closed,  and  time  was  required 
to  reopen  it  partially  through  the  intervention  of 
neutrals.  In  the  United  States  cotton-mills  were  shut 
down  for  the  same  reason.  Cocoa,  iron,  and  coal  were 
almost  unobtainable  by  the  Swiss  factories;  dye-stuffs 
were  lacking  in  the  United  States,  etc.  While  certain 
industries  were  held  up,  others  were  overworked,  because 
they  were  connected  with  the  war;  trades  disappeared, 
but  others  were  created,  and  increased  to  extreme 
proportions,  owing  to  the  paralysis  of  Germany. 

Statistics  presently  showed  that  the  Central  Powers, 
besieged,  so  to  speak,  by  the  Western  Allies  and  Russia, 
were  obtaining  provisions  and  raw  materials  from  the 
neutrals.  The  Western  Allies  sought  to  prevent  this, 
more  or  less  rapidly,  in  accordance  with  the  interests 
of  their  own  capitalists.  Then  guaranteed  import  trusts 
were  created,  or  a  neutral  State  would  intervene, 
guaranteeing  the  non-exportation  of  goods  to  Germany 
and  Austria.  New  commercial  organisms  came  to  life 
as  needed.  But  you  have  seen  what  a  profound  and 
general  disturbance  of  the  whole  world's  commerce 
and  industry  has  been  caused  by  the  war. 


90  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  importance  of  coal  became  obvious  to  aJl  those 
who  reflected  for  a  moment.  It  was  seen  to  be  truly 
the  life-blood  of  industry  and  commerce,  and  of  the  war 
itself;  as  indispensable  to  their  continuance  as  is  blood 
to  the  life  of  man.  The  European  neutrals  thus  found 
themselves  the  tributaries  of  Great  Britain,  for  Great 
Britain  alone  could  export  coal.  Germany  owned  many 
coalmines  capable  of  providing  coal  for  export,  but  her 
merchant  fleet  could  not  sail  the  seas,  and  her  exports 
were  confined  to  the  neutrals  bounding  the  German 
Empire.  Great  Britain  and  Germany  employed  their 
exportable  coal  as  a  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  neutral  States.  This  phenomenon  is  of  great 
sociological  interest,  for  it  reveals  the  great  part  played 
by  geological  and  geographical  conditions  in  the  matter 
of  national  power.  The  pressure  which  Germany  could 
exert  was  very  limited,  owing  to  the  fact  that  she  did 
not  enjoy  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 

Another  fact  was  brought  into  prominence  by  the 
coal  problem — namely,  the  indispensable  nature  of 
man-power  in  the  mining  districts.  While  the  nations 
were  able  to  dispense  with  not  only  the  rich  folk  who 
do  no  work,  but  also  with  many  others  belonging  to  the 
professional  classes,  such  as  barristers,  magistrates, 
professors,  solicitors,  merchants,  business  men,  artists, 
etc.,  the  manual  trade  of  the  miner  proved  to  be  abso- 
lutely indispensable.  This  fact  is  of  great  importance, 
for  it  shows  that  in  a  complex  humanity  such  as  ours 
everything  is  so  intimately  interconnected  that  it  is 
impossible  to  form  a  hierarchy  of  the  professions  and 
the  classes.  It  is  impossible  to  establish  the  superiority 
of  one  over  another — that  is,  from  the  standpoint  of 
social  utility,  which  is  evidently  the  only  existing 
criterion.  And  from  this  fact,  that  it  is  impossible  to 
create  a  professional  hierarchy,  we  deduce  the  equiva- 
lence of  all  functions  and  all  professions  in  our  human 
societies.  Here  is  a  great  acratic  lesson:  No  masters. 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        91 

It  is  the  verification  of  the  moral  of  Lafontaine's  fable, 
"  The  Limbs  and  the  Stomach." 

Rubber,  cotton,  petroleum,  copper,  wool,  hides, 
nitrates,  and  many  other  products,  appear  to  be  in- 
dispensable to  the  war  and  to  the  life  of  all.  And  thus 
it  became  apparent  to  all  how  dependent  is  man  on  the 
products  of  the  soil,  and  on  the  soil  itself.  In  these 
facts  may  be  read  a  veritable  lesson  in  terrestrial 
solidarity.  Man  is  thus  visibly  and  indissolubly  bound 
to  his  terrestrial  environment,  to  the  terraqueous  globe 
on  which  he  lives,  and  to  all  of  whose  conditions  he  is 
subject.  He  is  one  of  its  products,  like  all  the  other 
products,  animal,  vegetable,  and  mineral,  which  he 
finds  indispensable.  What  a  lesson  of  world-wide  and 
universal  solidarity  ! 

***** 

In  agriculture,  in  the  belligerent  and  even  in  the 
neutral  countries,  the  reaction  of  the  war  was  no  less 
perturbing  than  in  commerce  and  industry.  Labour 
was  lacking  everywhere,  even  in  North  America,  on 
account  of  the  mobilization  of  Europe.  In  the  regions 
occupied  by  the  troops,  when  there  was  fighting,  the 
countryside  was  ploughed  up  by  shells,  and  the  sowing 
of  crops  suffered.  The  Germans,  and  to  some  extent 
the  French  and  Russians,  employed  prisoners  of  war 
on  agricultural  work,  in  order  to  replace  the  lacking 
labour.  In  a  sense,  this  was  forced  labour.  Every- 
where the  herds  and  flocks  were  decimated — even  in 
South  America.  The  armies  had  need  of  meat,  and  the 
belligerents  lacked  fodder.  Germany  had  no  grain  for 
the  pigs.  There  were  slaughterings  en  masse.  The 
grazing  industry  was  in  this  way  more  or  less  affected; 
in  Belgium,  Poland,  Galicia,  and  Serbia,  bled  white  by 
the  invaders,  this  industry  was  really  annihilated. 
Horses  became  rare,  and  hundreds  of  thousands  were 
brought  from  overseas. 

Everywhere  the  prices  of  products  went  up,  in  vary- 


92  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

ing  proportions  in  different  countries.  In  Germany 
and  Austria,  deprived  of  direct  imports,  certain  products 
rose  200  per  cent,  and  300  per  cent.  But  thanks  to  her 
long  preparation  for  the  war,  and  her  organization, 
Germany  was  for  a  long  time  able  to  avoid  a  too  general 
and  excessive  increase  of  prices.  Moreover,  she  re- 
sorted to  requisitions  and  the  fixing  of  maximum  prices. 
The  other  belligerents  and  some  of  the  neutrals  did  the 
same.  It  was  in  the  Central  Empires  that  the  increase 
of  prices  was  greatest.  In  other  countries  it  averaged 
from  25  per  cent,  to  40  per  cent.,  but  certain  products 
underwent  an  increase  of  100  per  cent,  and  even  more. 
These  increases  are  by  no  means  due  to  the  difficulties 
of  the  moment,  above  all  in  the  Western  countries  of 
the  Entente.  The  scarcity  of  labour,  the  increase  of 
freight  dues  on  account  of  the  decrease  of  shipping 
available  for  mercantile  transport  and  the  danger  of 
navigation,  the  diminished  areas  devoted  to  certain 
crops,  etc.,  have  not  been  responsible  for  increasing  the 
prices  of  products  to  their  present  level.  The  cause 
of  this  increase  is  principally  speculation.  Patriotism 
notwithstanding,  business  is  business.  So,  side  by  side 
with  the  heaping  up  of  ruin,  fortunes  are  made  both  in 
belligerent  and  in  neutral  countries.  Mercantilism 
never  loses  its  rights. 

The  Governments,  so  that  they  may  appear  to  prevent 
this  scandalous  fortune-making,  which  was  and  is  based 
on  death  and  devastation,  resorted  to  requisitions, 
confiscation,  maximum  prices,  and  the  taxation  of  war- 
profits.  But  whether  in  the  case  of  the  sale  price  of 
things  indispensable  to  the  life  of  man,  or  in  that  of  the 
profits  of  industry,  the  maximum  was  always  so  fixed 
as  to  leave  a  handsome  first  profit  for  capitalism.  The 
power  of  the  State  has  actually,  despite  appearances, 
been  exercised  for  the  benefit  of  the  capitalist  class. 
This  sociological  phenomenon  has  been  visible  in  the 
case  of  all  the  nations  at  war,  just  as  it  has  been  obvious 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        93 

that  the  municipalities  have  everywhere  endeavoured, 
so  far  as  they  were  able,  to  act  rather  on  behalf  of  the 
people.  They  have  striven,  in  fact,  to  regulate  prices 
more  in  the  interests  of  the  masses  than  in  the  interest 
of  a  capitalist  minority.  This  was  the  case  because  the 
municipality  is,  as  a  rule,  in  more  intimate  contact  with 
the  population  than  is  the  Government,  which  is  prin- 
cipally in  contact  with  the  ruling  class  of  great  capitalists 
— landowners,  merchants,  manufacturers,  and  financiers. 
Everywhere,  moreover,  the  State  has  more  or  less 
inhibited  the  action  of  the  municipalities.  From  these 
sociological  phenomena,  which  are  constant,  and  brought 
into  full  prominence  by  the  war,  these  consequences 
result:  that  in  the  interest  of  the  democracy  the  ad- 
ministrative group  should  be  small;  there  is  an  opposi- 
tion between  democratization  and  centralization. 

The  important  part  played  by  the  mastery  of  the  sea 
is  one  of  the  great  lessons  of  this  war.  It  is  thanks  to 
this  mastery  that  those  countries  which  do  not  possess 
it  are  all  but  isolated.  The  men  of  to-day  have  witnessed 
a  spectacle  which  has  never  been  witnessed  before:  that 
of  the  siege  of  two  nations.  To  be  sure,  this  siege  was 
not  at  first  very  effective,  and  even  now  it  is  not  com- 
plete. The  cause  of  this  is  the  complexity  and  the 
profound  interpenetration  of  capitalistic  interests  in 
both  the  belligerent  and  the  neutral  nations.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  was  necessary  to  take  into  account  the 
rights  of  those  neutrals  which  possess  common  frontiers 
with  the  Central  Empires.  This,  for  the  Allies,  was  a 
moral  no  less  than  a  material  obligation.  The  life  of 
Great  Britain,  on  account  of  her  property  system, 
which  is  detrimental  to  agriculture,  is  dependent  upon 
alimentary  imports;  with  these  the  country  cannot 
possibly  dispense.  It  is  also  obliged  to  export  products, 
manufactured  or  otherwise,  in  order  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  exchanges  and  not  to  impoverish  itself. 

All  this  forced  the  British  Empire  to  make  only  a 


94  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

moderate  use  of  its  naval  power.  But  the  reverse  of 
the  picture  is  this:  that  this  moderation  has  enabled 
Germany  to  obtain  a  certain  amount  of  provisions  and 
raw  materials,  and  the  result  of  this  has  been  the  pro- 
longation of  the  war,  with  its  retinue  of  death  and 
mutilation  and  devastation. 

The  Western  Allies  were  veritably  the  masters  of  the 
sea.  The  fleets  of  the  Central  Empires  were  blockaded 
in  their  ports,  whence  they  emerged  only  for  occasional 
raids.  With  wonderful  energy  and  audacity  the  Ger- 
mans endeavoured  to  contest  this  mastery  by  means 
of  their  submarines.  In  the  course  of  the  war  their 
fighting  powers  and  their  navigable  qualities  have  been 
greatly  improved.  Negligible  at  the  outset,  their  work 
of  destroying  the  merchant  shipping  of  belligerents  and 
neutrals  has  become  more  considerable.  At  the  end  of 
thirty  months  of  war  it  has  become  so  considerable  that 
the  Allies  are  forced  to  give  it  their  full  attention.  But 
in  order  to  appreciate  this  work  justly  we  must  re- 
member the  number  of  ships  from  all  the  ports  of  the 
globe  which  daily  enter  or  leave  the  Allied  ports.  Their 
work  then  appears  far  less  considerable  than  it  does 
when  we  read  the  newspaper  announcements  of  the 
vessels  sunk.  The  Western  Allies  were  the  true  masters 
of  the  sea  at  the  opening  of  hostilities.  Had  they  chosen 
they  could  have  effected  a  complete  and  effective 
maritime  blockade  of  Germany  and  Austria.  It  was 
their  right.  "  To  interrupt  the  navigation  of  the 
enemy,"  said  the  German  Chancellor,  Caprivi,  in  1892, 
"  is  an  indispensable  means  of  warfare.  He  who  makes 
war  desires  victory,  and  if  he  has  sufficient  energy  he 
attains  this  end  by  employing  all  and  every  means, 
including  those  of  naval  warfare  and  the  interruption 
of  all  trade  with  the  enemy." 

It  was  therefore  the  right  of  the  Entente  to  blockade 
the  Central  Empires ;  but  to  make  the  blockade  effective, 
as  they  could  have  done,  they  must  to  a  certain  extent 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        95 

have  infringed  the  rights  of  neutrals.  In  that  case 
they  must  have  resorted  to  the  policy  of  menace  and 
intimidation  practised  by  Germany. 

The  brutal  and  insolent  policy  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment originates  in  the  militarist  spirit  in  which  it  is 
steeped  to  the  marrow.  But  another  cause  of  this 
policy  is  the  fact  that  the  caste  of  Junkers  plays  a  very 
important  part  in  the  government  of  the  country.  The 
Junkers  are  before  all  else  landed  proprietors,  who,  by 
the  very  fact  that  their  wealth  consists  of  landed 
property,  are  indifferent  to  the  displeasure  of  neutrals. 
The  British  position  is  very  different.  The  political 
government  of  Great  Britain  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
commercial  and  industrial  upper  middle  class,  which 
is  dependent  upon  neutrals  both  as  customers  and  as 
providers. 

Here  we  perceive  the  economic  causality  of  political 
phenomena.  And  here  is  yet  another  lesson  which 
arises  from  this  war  for  the  observer  who  is  able  to 
analyze  events. 

In  the  world-war  now  raging  we  plainly  perceive  the 
opposition  and  the  results  of  the  different  policies  of  the 
two  belligerent  groups.  On  the  one  hand  Germany  acts 
with  decision  and  audacity,  compelling  events,  intimi- 
dating neutrals  by  her  threats,  and  often  forcing  them 
to  do  things  that  they  do  not  wish  to  do.  On  the  other 
hand  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  hesitating, 
groping,  consulting  one  another,  and  regarding  them- 
selves as  bound  by  international  laws  which  their 
enemies  disregard,  tend  to  arrive  at  compositions,  to 
gain  time,  to  postpone  decisions,  to  accept  compromises, 
waiting,  to  tell  the  truth,  for  time  to  solve  problems  by 
the  logical  development  of  events  and  their  consequences. 
The  opposition  between  these  two  policies  is  absolute. 
The  results  also  are  very  different.  The  policy  of  the 
Allies  prolongs  the  war,  postponing  victory  or  diminishing 
its  importance,  and  lessens  the  moral  force  of  the  masses. 


96  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

who  understand  neither  hesitations  nor  delays  nor 
tergiversations.  On  the  other  hand,  this  policy  en- 
genders genuine  sympathies  in  neutral  countries, 
although  the  effects  of  these  sympathies  are  not  always 
visible,  as  the  immediate  material  interests,  and  the  fear 
inspired  by  Germanic  threats,  have  prevented  their 
manifestation.  The  other  policy,  that  of  Germany, 
produces  discontent,  irritation,  and  disaffection  in 
neutral  countries.  But  rf  gives  an  appearance  of  victory 
which  maintains  the  moral  of  the  nation  at  the  required 
level.  This  policy  once  more,  by  its  brutality  and 
insolence,  reveals  the  noxious  character  of  the  militarist 
spirit  and  education,  which  have  instilled  into  the 
Germanic  mind  this  naive  belief:  that  fear  is  the  principal 
motive  of  human  action. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  first  acts  of  the  war  were  the  violation  of  the 
territory  and  the  will  of  two  small  neutral  States: 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  These 
acts,  committed  by  a  great  Power  against  two  small 
Powers,  were  a  direct  menace  to  all  other  small  States. 

Might  comes  before  Right;  Might  creates  Right: 
these  are  maxims  which  the  small  States  cannot  accept 
without  signing  their  own  death-warrant.  It  therefore 
seemed  only  logical  that  all  the  other  neutral  Powers 
should  be  conscious  of  their  solidarity  with  the  two 
small  violated  States,  and  should,  before  the  whole 
world,  protest  against  this  violation:  an  act  which,  in 
reality,  is  between  collectivities  what  theft  and  murder 
are  between  individuals.  However,  no  official  protest 
was  made  by  Sweden,  or  Norway,  or  Denmark,  or 
Switzerland,  or  Holland,  or  the  Balkan  States,  or 
Spain,  or  the  United  States,  or  South  America. 
Everywhere  the  iniquity  committed  was  greeted  by 
silence  !  Rulers  and  peoples  remained  speechless,  save 
a  few  individuals  who  here  and  there  had  the  courage 
to  flagellate  the  workers  of  iniquity.  The  spirit  of 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        97 

international  solidarity  was  dominated  by  fear  in  the 
hearts  of  the  rulers.  Sometimes  even,  as  in  Switzer- 
land, the  rulers  sought  to  impose  silence  on  those  who 
dared  to  protest  against  the  crime. 

This  silence  of  the  neutrals  was  due  to  two  chief 
causes:  fear  and  interest,  commercial  and  industrial. 
Then  the  military  strength  of  the  Imperial  Powers  had 
created,  in  certain  neutral  countries,  an  atmosphere  of 
admiration,  especially  in  the  military  world,  which, 
with  its  customary  lack  of  intelligence,  regarded  the 
victory  of  the  Germans  as  assured.  Accustomed  to 
obey  and  to  be  obeyed,  passively,  the  soldier  insensibly 
loses  all  spirit  of  criticism;  he  grows  stupid.  He  did 
not  therefore  see  that  the  Imperial  Powers,  whatever 
their  military  strength  and  their  organization  and  their 
degree  of  preparation,  could  not  conquer  the  Allies, 
who  were  far  richer  in  men,  in  money,  and  in  resources 
of  every  kind,  while  they  possessed,  moreover,  the 
mastery  of  the  sea. 

And  in  truth  the  principal  agents  of  the  immobility 
of  the  neutrals  were  fear  and  their  material  interests, 
petty  and  immediate.  They  refused  to  see  that  the 
victory  of  the  Empires  would  mean  death  to  their 
liberties,  and  that  without  liberty  life  is  not  worth 
living.  They  were  afraid,  and  fear  suppresses  all  possi- 
bility of  reasoning.  Moreover,  this  fear  was  skilfully  fed 
by  threats,  lies,  and  corruption.  In  Sweden,  Holland, 
Denmark,  the  United  States,  the  Balkans,  and  Spain — 
everywhere,  in  fact — a  campaign  of  intimidation, 
untruth,  and  corruption  was  systematically  organized. 
Untruthfulness  attained  heights  of  which  none  had 
ever  dreamed.  In  China  and  America  the  most  be- 
wildering news  was  published.  Newspapers  announced 
the  disappearance  of  the  British  Navy,  sunk  by  the 
Germans.  Others  declared  that  Germany  had  imposed 
peace,  and  had  taken  such  and  such  British  or  French 
or  Russian  provinces  or  colonies,  etc.  There  was  no 

7 


98  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

shame  apparent  in  this  campaign  of  lies  and  subter- 
ranean manoeuvres;  it  was  conducted  even  by  official 
personages.  Everyone  will  remember  the  revelations 
of  the  New  York  World,  when  it  published  the  official 
German  documents  and  the  correspondence  of  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  and  other  papers  seized  upon  Mr. 
Archibald  or  Captain  von  Papen.  All  means  were  good 
from  the  moment  they  seemed  to  lead  to  the  desired 
end.  Fear  was  not  enough,  so  Germany  sought  to  employ 
corruption.  She  offered  money  to  the  Italian  Socialist 
party,  which  of  course  refused  it.  But  individual 
persons  accepted  it,  so  that  one  saw  so-called  democrats 
defending  the  Imperial  Powers,  and  Jews  like  Sven 
Hedin  on  the  side  of  the  Imperial  Empires,  whose 
Governments  and  rulers  are  anti-Semite,  and  against 
France,  which  was  the  first  of  all  countries  to  liberate 
the  Jews  ! 

Let  us  remark,  in  passing,  upon  the  immoral  effects 
of  all  these  manoeuvres  of  intimidation  and  untruthful- 
ness  and  bribery.  Once  more  we  perceive  the  falsity 
of  this  maxim :  that  war  is  a  moralizing  agency. 

More,  perhaps,  than  by  fear  the  neutrals  were  im- 
pelled by  material  interest  to  accept  with  good  grace 
the  violation  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium  and  to  smile 
upon  the  brutal  and  insolent  Germans.  The  basis  of 
modern  society  is  wealth;  it  is  founded  upon  money. 
Money,  therefore,  does  not  smell,  whatever  its  origin, 
and  whatever  results  may  follow  its  employment. 

Now  although  the  war  is  more  or  less  checking  pro- 
duction in  the  belligerent  countries,  it  has  not  decreased 
consumption.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  that  the 
neutrals  should  if  possible  fill  up  the  deficit  in  produc- 
tion and  supply  the  belligerents.  The  mastery  of  the 
seas,  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  put  a  stop  to  the 
movements  of  German  vessels.  Neutrals  had  thus  to 
replace  Germany.  So  in  Holland,  Sweden,  Norway, 
Denmark,  and  the  United  States  the  war  has  been  a 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS        99 

time  of  harvest  for  capitalists.  The  countries  bordering 
on  Germany  have  become  storehouses  of  goods;  and 
they  levy  a  handsome  tribute  on  Germany.  The  more 
difficult  it  becomes  to  obtain  raw  materials  of  all  kinds, 
the  higher  the  prices  fixed  by  neutral  manufacturers 
and  merchants  become.  They  make  up  for  the  smaller 
bulk  of  products  by  an  increase  of  prices. 

All  laws  and  regulations  are  liable  to  be  broken  when 
interest  points  the  way.  The  Germans  pay  hand- 
somely, and  there  has  been  a  battle  of  wits  in  hiding 
contraband  on  the  one  hand  and  discovering  it  on  the 
other.  But  what  a  harvest  of  gold  in  those  neutral 
countries  ! — not  for  the  whole  nation,  indeed,  but  for 
a  minority  of  merchants  and  manufacturers,  whose 
directing  influence  has  increased  accordingly. 

Of  course  their  influence  is  active  in  a  pro-German 
sense.  One  does  not  willingly  kill  the  goose  with  the 
golden  eggs.  And  it  would  have  meant  killing  it,  had 
the  neutrals  qualified  the  conduct  of  the  German 
Government  as  it  deserved,  or  protested  officially 
against  the  deliberate  attack  upon  the  liberties  of 
Belgium  and  of  Luxemburg.  This  pacific  attitude, 
little  worthy  of  neutrals  such  as  Denmark,  Holland, 
Switzerland,  etc.,  still  further  emphasizes  the  moral 
greatness  of  Belgium,  who  dared  to  defend  her  liberty 
weapons  in  hand. 

Moreover,  in  these  neutral  countries  the  interests  of 
the  manufacturers  and  business  men  act  in  concert  with 
those  of  the  military  and  aristocratic  classes,  in  a  pro- 
German  sense.  It  is  an  interesting  sociological  fact 
that  in  all  neutral  countries  the  aristocracies,  the 
military  classes,  and  the  Princes  have  been  more  or  less 
in  favour  of  the  Germans.  Autocratic  and  conservative 
forces — whether  Catholic,  as  in  Spain,  and  to  some 
extent  in  Holland  and  Switzerland,  or  Protestant,  as  in 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  Denmark — have  always  proved 
to  be  desirous  of  the  triumph  of  the  Imperial  Powers. 


100          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

These  latter  were,  and  have  truly  become,  the  symbol 
of  autocracy.  The  forces  of  reaction  in  these  countries 
had  a  clear  conscience,  as  well  as  the  democratic  forces, 
for  it  was  seen  that  these,  in  the  neutral  countries,  had 
openly  declared  for  the  Western  Allies.  Class  and 
caste  interest  came  into  action,  dividing  the  individuals 
of  the  same  nationality.  The  lower  classes,  whether 
in  town  or  country,  the  lower  middle  and  the  middle 
classes,  were  in  all  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe 
opposed  to  the  landed  aristocracy,  the  great  capitalists 
of  commerce,  industry,  and  finance,  the  military  caste, 
and  the  Kings. 

This  social  phenomenon  was  very  sensible  in  the 
Balkans,  where  a  flagrant  opposition  between  the  Kings 
and  the  peoples  manifested  itself.  This  opposition  was 
reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  Sovereigns 
were  more  or  less  of  German  origin,  or  connected  with 
German  Princes.  The  fact  is  undeniable,  but  we  do  not 
think  it  can  be  the  result  of  a  preconceived  policy 
settled  long  beforehand.  The  German  Government 
knew  how  to  profit  by  the  circumstances,  but  had  not, 
I  think,  prepared  them  some  ten  to  thirty  years  before- 
hand. 

However  this  may  be,  it  was  obvious  that  Kings  had 
it  policy  calculated  in  their  own  personal  interest,  in 
opposition  to  the  actual  interests  of  the  peoples  whom 
they  governed.  Insensibly  the  Kings  came  to  persuade 
themselves  that  the  State  was — themselves.  Naturally, 
they  tended  as  autocrats  to  seize  the  reins  of  power, 
and  to  govern  without  troubling  about  constitutions 
and  elected  bodies.  The  Parliamentary  and  constitu- 
tional democracy  tends  to  change  into  a  personal  auto- 
cracy. This  phenomenon  is  constant,  everywhere  an. I 
in  all  ages.  A  pronounced  development  of  democratic 
customs  and  the  spirit  of  democracy  is  needful  if  a 
people  is  to  prevent  the  triumph  of  this  tendency.  The 
Balkan  peoples,  whatever  the  democratic  spirit  which 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      101 

may  lie  at  the  very  root  of  their  being,  have  not  yet 
attained  the  level  of  civilization  on  which  the  peoples 
of  France,  Great  Britain,  Belgium,  and  Switzerland 
have  their  being.  The  personal  policies  of  their  Kings 
were  therefore  possible,  although  in  opposition  to  the 
interest  and  traditions  and  aspirations  of  the  peoples. 
Thus  King  Carol  of  Rumania,  violating  the  Rumanian 
Constitution,  was  able  to  sign  a  private  treaty  with 
Germany,  a  treaty  which  his  Ministers  declared  null 
because  ultra  vires.  Thus  we  saw  King  Constantine 
dissolve  the  Greek  Chamber  on  two  occasions  because 
it  favoured  the  policy  of  Venizelos,  and  not  his  own. 
Thus,  too,  we  saw  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  draw 
the  Bulgarians  into  a  war  against  the  Russians  who 
had  given  them  independence  !  And  in  all  countries 
we  saw  Parliaments  prevented  from  sitting,  so  that 
the  will  of  the  peoples'  representatives  might  be  dis- 
regarded. The  antagonism  between  Kings  and  peoples 
presented  itself  in  the  twentieth  century  as  it  had  in 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  in  England 
and  France.  But  while  the  peoples  of  the  Balkans 
gave  way,  the  more  highly  evolved  peoples  of  England 
and  France  revolted.  The  Kings  lost  their  heads. 

From  these  facts  we  must  draw  one  lesson,  which 
can  only  be  that  of  the  harmful  nature  of  autocratic 
Kings  and  Governments.  This  harmfulness  has  once 
more  been  confirmed  by  the  patience  which  the  Allies 
of  the  Entente  have  treated  Constantine,  the  King  of 
the  Greeks.  This  appeared  so  contrary  to  the  interests 
of  the  Allies  that  the  English,  loyal  though  they  were, 
asked  themselves  whether  dynastic  interests  and  caste 
interests  were  not  the  cause  of  this  patience.  It  seems 
to  us  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  patience,  which 
has  been  highly  injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  Western 
Allies,  has  its  cause  in  the  solidarity  of  caste  which 
unites  Kings  and  Emperors.  Thus  the  interest  of  men 
is  to  govern  themselves  in  small  collectivities,  rendering 


102          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

needless  any  delegation  of  powers,  for  we  must  never 
forget  that  every  delegate  tends  to  govern  in  his  own 
interest,  and  the  interest  of  his  caste  or  class,  and  not 
in  the  interest  of  his  mandatories,  the  people. 

Fear  and  material  interest  guided  not  only  the  neutrals 
adjacent  to  the  Central  Empires,  but  even  the  great 
Republic  of  the  United  States.  The  German  menaces, 
crossing  the  Atlantic,  affected  the  American  rulers.  To 
the  attacks  upon  its  citizens,  killed  by  German  sub- 
marines when  they  sunk  the  Lusitania,  the  Arabic,  etc., 
the  Government  replied  by  diplomatic  Notes,  to  which 
Germany  replied  in  her  turn.  And  what  with  reply 
upon  reply  the  time  passed,  and  .  .  .  Germany  con- 
tinued to  sink  ships  !  It  would  have  been  laughable, 
had  it  not  been  melancholy,  to  see  a  strong  and  numerous 
people  consenting  to  be  thus  befooled. 

To  what  causes  was  such  an  attitude  due  ?  It  seems 
that  we  must  attribute  it:  (1)  to  the  German  menaces — 
not  the  menace  of  the  Germanic  armies  or  fleets,  but 
the  menace  of  an  insurrection  of  the  populations  of 
German  origin  which  are  dwelling  in  the  United  States; 
and  (2)  above  all  that  false  form  of  humanitarianism 
and  pacifism  which  leads  men  to  accept  all  insults  and 
iniquities  without  revolt.  To  revolt  against  iniquity 
is  the  surest  sign  of  the  humanitarian  spirit.  Non- 
resistance  to  evil,  the  eschewing  of  violence,  is  a  childish 
conception,  for  it  encourages  evil. 

Material  interests  seem  to  have  played  a  less  part 
in  American  neutrality  than  in  the  neutrality  of  the 
small  European  States.  Indeed,  by  the  very  fact  that 
they  did  not  possess  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  the  Ger- 
mans could  obtain  but  relatively  little  in  the  way  of 
supplies  from  the  United  States.  The  great  purchasers 
were,  by  the  force  of  things,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Italy.  However,  as  under  the  benevolent 
eye  of  the  Allies  American  products  were  reaching 
neutral  countries,  and  thence  Germany,  the  continued 


neutrality  of  the  States  possessed  a  certain  material 
interest.  But  far  greater  material  interests  were  in- 
volved in  neutrality  toward  the  Allies,  or  an  alliance 
with  them,  on  account  of  the  great  exportation  of 
machine-tools,  arms,  ammunition,  hides,  cotton,  horses, 
mules,  etc.  The  rupture  of  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany  would  have  involved  little 
material  loss,  while  the  rupture  of  relations  with  the 
Allies  would  have  resulted  in  a  loss  to  American  com- 
merce of  hundreds  of  millions  of  pounds. 

Thus,  the  United  States  made  no  protest  against  the 
attack  upon  the  liberties  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg. 
They  continued  to  maintain  courteous  relations  with 
the  Governments  which  were  traitors  to  their  own 
signature.  They  did  not  protest  in  any  way  against 
the  obvious  violation  of  the  Hague  Conventions,  of 
which  they  were  signatories  !  They  allowed  their  own 
signature  to  be  protested,  thus  upholding  the  doctrine 
that  conventions  are  "  scraps  of  paper."  And  they 
submitted  to  the  drowning  of  their  citizens  by  order  of 
the  German  Government. 

By  such  an  attitude  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  which  meant  to  be  humanitarian  and  pacifist, 
was  really  anti-humanitarian  and  anti-pacifist.  It 
prolonged  the  war,  and  therefore  the  slaughter  and  the 
devastation  of  the  war.  Its  conduct  upheld  the  con- 
cept: "  Might  creates  Right."  This  maxim,  let  us 
remember,  is  essentially  immoral,  for  its  basis  reposes 
on  violence,  constraint,  and  fear.  By  such  an  attitude 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  considerably 
diminished  the  moral  authority  which  it  enjoyed.  It 
made  itself  the  laughing-stock  of  the  belligerents  and 
the  small  neutral  nations,  which  remembered  that  the 
United  States,  so  humble  before  mighty  Germany,  had 
behaved  very  differently  to  feeble  Spain.  The  popular 
masses  of  the  Entente  and  of  certain  neutrals  thought 
thus  because  they  were  ignorant  of  the  real  state  of 


104          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

opinion  and  feeling  prevailing  in  the  midst  of  the 
American  people,  the  great  majority  of  whom  intended 
to  apply  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  to  keep  out  of  war; 
so  that  it  was  painful  for  European  democrats  to  see  the 
Great  Republic  acting  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  in- 
terests of  humanity,  and  itself  in  some  degree  destroying 
the  moral  force  which  it  possessed.  Very  often  the 
most  realistic  policy  is  that  which  is  able  to  rise  superior 
to  the  petty  contingencies  of  immediate  individual 
interests,  and  to  perceive  the  ideal  collective  interests. 
However,  the  American  people  saved  its  country  from 
complete  moral  bankruptcy  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  by 
the  admirable  impulse  of  solidarity  with  which  it 
succoured  the  Belgians,  the  Serbs,  and  the  French  of 
the  northern  departments. 

***** 
The  war,  by  its  continuance,  has  forced  all  the  nations 
to  reconstitute  their  economic  life.  They  have  been 
forced  to  take  measures  to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  raw 
materials,  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  war  in  arms  and 
munitions,  to  allow  for  the  changes  of  taste  and  habit 
caused  by  the  state  of  war.  Industries  have  been 
created;  others  have  disappeared;  others  have  changed 
their  locality.  And  the  migration  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  persons  has  played  its  part  in  these  in- 
dustrial displacements,  just  as  in  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  the  wars  of  religion  and  the 
accompanying  exodus  resulted  in  industrial  displace- 
ments. The  Governments  joined  forces  with  private 
initiative,  and  supported  it,  in  order  to  effect  this  re- 
constitution  of  the  economic  life,  and  to  adapt  the  people 
to  the  new  conditions  of  life.  Germany  and  France 
displayed  most  activity  in  this  respect.  Germany, 
partly  prepared  for  present  contingencies,  found  the 
work  of  adaptation  easier,  while  France  had  to  im- 
provise everything.  However,  the  preparedness  of 
Germany  did  not  prevent  her  metallurgical  and  other 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      105 

industries  from  suffering  deprivation.  Everyone,  the 
governing  classes  as  well  as  others,  had  counted  on  a 
struggle  of  a  few  weeks'  duration,  or  at  most  of  three 
or  four  months,  and  now  the  war  threatened  to  last  for 
years.  As  soon  as  the  ruling  classes  were  aware  of  this 
they  caused  German  industry  to  be  organized  for  war 
production.  This  was  done  rapidly,  thanks  to  the  habit 
of  passive  obedience  and  the  mechanization  of  the 
individual.  And  very  soon  all  the  productive  energies 
of  the  country,  intellectual  as  well  as  manual,  were 
co-ordinated  to  obtain  the  maximum  result. 

France  was  not  quite  so  prompt,  although  she  soon 
arrived  at  a  correct  view  of  the  situation.  But  every- 
thing had  to  be  created,  everything  improvised;  her 
leading  industrial  provinces  were  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  Her  admirable  intellectual  suppleness,  her 
great  imagination,  her  capacity  for  work  were  apparent 
to  all  under  these  tragic  circumstances.  And  only  those 
were  astonished  who  had  not  known  France,  or  had 
known  her  only  through  her  fashionable  newspapers,  or 
by  frequenting  the  cosmopolitan,  fashionable,  and 
parasitical  society  of  Paris,  the  capital  which  devours 
so  many  men.  And  again  the  centralized  bureaucracy 
and  the  military  autocracy  which  ruled  the  country 
were  forces  which  inhibited,  rather  than  stimulated,  any 
individual  initiative. 

All  autocratic  tendencies  are  essentially  distrustful 
of  novelty.  The  more  centralized  and  authoritative  a 
Government — such  as  the  military  authority  which  ruled 
France  during  the  first  months  of  the  war,  and  to  a 
certain  extent  rules  it  still — the  more  inimical  it  is  to 
novelty  and  change.  The  natural  law  of  the  least 
effort  explains  this  characteristic  of  authority,  and 
another  cause  is  the  inevitable  process  of  stultification 
apparent  in  any  person  who  wields  power  uncontested 
and  uncriticized.  Now  the  love  of  novelty  is  an  essential 
cause  of  progress,  which  results  always  from  a  change. 


106         LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

It  is  not  every  change  which  causes  progress,  but  all 
progress  is  engendered  by  a  change.  And  from  this 
truth  we  derive  this  lesson:  man  should  be  a  lover  of 
novelty,  and  a  change  should  always  be  preferred  to 
the  status  quo,  even  at  the  risk  of  making  things  worse. 
The  perfection  of  things  and  persons  is  only  the  con- 
sequence of  many  and  incessant  experiments.  So  we 
ought  to  be  willing  to  make  these  experiments. 

While  France  rapidly  grasped  the  situation  created 
by  the  war  in  all  its  amplitude,  Great  Britain  failed 
to  realise  it.  Yet,  curiously  enough,  many  of  the 
country's  rulers  were  aware,  from  the  outset  of  the 
war,  that  it  would  last  for  years. 

The  economic  life  of  Great  Britain  was  far  less  pre- 
judiced, on  account  of  its  insular  conditions,  which  also 
saved  it  from  territorial  invasion.  Great  Britain  was 
also  less  prompt  in  organizing  its  industry  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  war.  Nearly  a  year  elapsed  before  this 
was  done. 

All  branches  of  human  knowledge  are  affected  by  this 
war:  metallurgy,  physics,  chemistry,  mechanics,  elec- 
tricity, optics,  photography,  naval  architecture,  aircraft 
construction,  therapeutics,  serotherapy,  dietetics,  micro- 
biology, surgery,  and  many  other  arts  and  sciences  play 
an  important  part  in  the  tragic  events  of  the  day.  All 
human  energies  are  directed  to  increasing  the  means  of 
conflict  and  resistance  and  the  means  of  repairing  losses. 

The  difficulty  of  obtaining  certain  raw  materials,  or 
even  their  complete  suppression,  accordingly  as  the 
countries  which  produced  or  consumed  them  were  or 
were  not  free  to  export  and  import  them,  has  compelled 
men  either  to  seek  substitutes  for  these  products,  or  to 
endeavour  to  find  them  at  home  or  in  other  countries. 
Thus  old  abandoned  mines  have  been  re-exploited;  and 
mines  have  been  opened  which  in  better  times  would 
have  been  left  closed  on  account  of  difficulties  of 
exploitation. 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      107 

The  necessity  of  creating  things  promptly,  of  replacing 
machinery  which  could  no  longer  be  obtained  and 
labour  which  was  lacking,  etc.,  has  provoked,  in 
scientists  and  inventors,  a  mental  tension  productive 
of  new  things.  At  the  same  time,  collectivities  have  felt 
the  need  of  organizing  individual  efforts,  the  better  to 
bring  to  light  the  inventions  of  the  human  mind. 

So  long  as  the  war  lasts  it  will  be  impossible  to  esti- 
mate the  progress  realized  in  all  branches  of  human 
knowledge,  for  each  belligerent  jealously  guards  the 
secrets  of  the  work  of  its  scientists.  In  neutral  countries 
the  desire  to  profit  by  their  inventions  leads  to  the 
same  result.  Personally  I  have  no  doubt  that  when 
peace  is  concluded  we  shall  find  that  the  same  inven- 
tions will  have  been  made  in  the  various  countries, 
which  are  now  like  water-tight  compartments,  without 
means  of  communication,  of  the  vast  ship  of  humanity. 
This  absence  of  communications  in  the  international 
scientific  and  intellectual  world  retards  the  work  of  the 
human  mind,  which  cannot  profit  here  by  what  is 
discovered  there. 

Yet,  considering  all  things,  we  may  say  that  war,  by 
surexciting  the  minds  and  energies  of  all,  has  promoted 
scientific  and  industrial  progress.  Good  often  results 
from  evil,  for  every  coin  has  a  reverse  and  an  obverse 
side.  But  for  a  just  appreciation  one  must  first  of  all 
note,  and  enter  to  the  debit  side  of  the  war,  the  fact 
that  this  surexcitation  of  mind  and  energy  produces  a 
physical  and  psychical  exhaustion,  which  sometimes 
amounts  to  mental  disequilibrium,  while  it  sometimes 
becomes  a  matter  of  pathology.  It  must  be  noted, 
secondly,  that  in  this  connection  the  action  of  war  is 
simply  catastrophic.  It  is  probable,  we  may  even  say 
certain,  that  humanity  could  so  organize  itself  as  to 
enjoy  in  time  of  peace  an  equally  great  production  and 
utilization  of  human  inventions. 

As  far  as  can  be  judged  from  what  is  known,  it  does 


108          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

not  seem  that  there  have  been  any  great  inventions: 
nothing  actually  new.  There  have  been,  more  particu- 
larly, improvements,  developments,  and  enlargements  of 
existing  apparatus  and  machines.  Nothing  really  new 
has  as  yet  appeared  in  this  war.  This  absence  of 
notable  new  inventions  should  not  surprise  us.  It  is 
due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  fact  that  as  human  progress 
increases,  the  field  of  actually  novel  discoveries  grows 
smaller;  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  division  of  labour 
and  the  specialization  of  the  worker  which  are  the 
regrettable  rule  of  modern  society.  The  manual  and 
intellectual  worker  is  turned  into  a  machine  which 
unceasingly  performs  the  same  series  of  movements  to 
produce  the  same  series  of  effects.  Industry  and 
science,  under  the  conscious  and  unconscious  influence 
of  German  science,  and  the  desire  for  the  maximum 
immediate  yield — a  result  of  the  capitalistic  basis  of 
human  society — have  undergone  a  veritable  process  of 
militarization,  whose  consequences  are  disastrous  to 
the  human  mind.  Human  intelligences  have  been 
literally  reduced  to  the  condition  of  mechanical  elements; 
they  have  become  the  mere  organs  of  a  mechanism  of 
greater  or  smaller  dimensions,  created  for  a  determined 
end. 

The  horizon  of  the  worker  has  been  diminished,  his 
intellectual  and  manual  liberty  restrained.  Now  the 
work  of  truly  novel  invention  can  be  accomplished  only 
by  free  human  beings,  with  wide  horizons,  endowed 
with  an  imagination  which  is  not  fettered  by  the  in- 
veterate habitude  of  an  always  identical  task.  The  work 
of  invention  can  only  be  accomplished  by  human  beings 
capable  of  a  great  many  kinds  of  work,  possessing  a 
great  variety  of  knowledge,  and  a  critical  spirit  con- 
tinually on  the  alert  and  always  at  work.  In  a  word, 
invention  is  always  the  product  of  a  brain  in  love  with 
change  and  in  revolt  against  that  which  is.  All  this 
amounts  to  saying  that  the  brain  of  the  inventor  is 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      109 

just  the  contrary  of  the  brains  produced  by  specializa- 
tion and  the  division  of  labour.  The  latter  produce 
stone-masons,  not  architects.  Here  we  find  yet  another 
injury  which  the  spirit  of  authority,  the  militarist  spirit, 
inflicts  upon  human  beings,  and  yet  another  form  of  the 
injury  caused  by  restraint  of  liberty. 

There  is  one  important  lesson  which  the  war  teaches 
us:  the  absolute  condemnation  of  the  Taylor  system, 
which  some  would  like  to  see  generally  introduced 
throughout  the  industrial  world.  Man  is  an  animal 
living  with  a  life  of  his  own,  and  not  a  machine  driven 
by  a  will  external  to  itself.  All  tendencies  and  efforts 
to  effect  the  mechanization  of  man  are  monstrous 
stupidities  born  of  the  more  or  less  atrophied  brains  of 
specialists,  ignorant  of  psychology  and  the  science  of 
education. 

Perhaps,  too,  we  ought  to  regard  the  public  ignorance 
of  the  needs  created  by  the  war,  deliberately  maintained 
by  the  Governments,  as  responsible  for  the  absence  of 
great  inventions.  To  be  sure,  these  needs  are  more  or 
less  understood  in  the  limited  circles  of  the  specialists, 
and  according  to  their  specialities;  but  they  are  not 
understood  by  the  public  in  general,  which  is  the  real 
productive  reservoir  of  human  invention.  We  find  here 
yet  another  instance  of  the  prejudice  caused  by  the 
ignorance  imposed  on  the  masses  by  the  policy  of 
Governments  which  are  glad  in  this  way  to  escape 
criticism  and  the  labour  which  this  would  impose.  The 
enregimenting  of  men  in  water-tight  compartments  is 
fatal  to  the  creative  faculties  of  humanity.  It  is  fatal 
to  the  development  of  the  individual.  It  is  because 
this  system  of  enregimentation  is  so  highly  developed 
in  our  modern  society,  in  which  everything  is  bureau- 
cratized  and  centralized,  that  we  have  nowhere  seen  an 
individuality  emerge  during  this  world-crisis. 

Than  the  catastrophic  environment  none  could  be 
more  favourable  to  the  revelation  of  strong  and  original 


110          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

individualities.  Remember  the  host  of  great  soldiers, 
scientists,  orators,  and  statesmen  who  appeared,  for 
example,  during  the  crisis  of  the  great  French  Revolu- 
tion, when  Frenchmen,  both  upon  the  frontiers  and 
within  them,  were  struggling  for  liberty.  The  present 
environment  is  of  a  similar  nature,  yet  it  does  not  yield 
the  same  harvest.  The  cause  of  this  difference  is  the 
existence  of  a  social  framework  so  powerful  that  men 
are  retained  in  the  national  regiment  at  a  determined 
spot,  favourable  or  unfavourable,  no  one  cares  which. 
It  is  impossible  to  escape  from  this  framework  in  order 
to  act  and  to  work  freely.  And  this  is  the  same  every- 
where, in  the  independent  organizations  of  industry, 
politics,  and  the  labour  world,  as  well  as  in  those  of 
the  Governments.  What  a  waste  of  energy,  what  loss 
of  intelligence  and  power  !  Man  is  truly  insane  when 
he  is  loth  to  remember  that  liberty  is  the  only  social 
environment  in  which  the  individual  can  fully  develop 
in  energy  and  intelligence,  and  in  which,  as  a  result, 
the  aggregate  of  individuals  which  we  call  the  collec- 
tivity displays  the  greatest  power,  the  truest  greatness. 
*  *  *  *  * 

To  reconstitute  the  economic  life,  it  has  been  neces- 
sary to  reorganize  labour,  which,  on  the  Continent,  was 
almost  completely  disorganized  by  mobilization.  Great 
Britain,  owing  to  her  insular  position,  escaped  this  dis- 
organization. In  France  and  Germany  work  was  at 
first  actually  resumed  only  in  all  those  industries  which 
were  necessary  to  the  war  and  to  the  life  of  the  nation. 
This  could  not  be  otherwise,  since  all  the  workmen  were 
soldiers.  In  France  the  labour  unions  (syndicats]  were 
unable  to  play  the  part  they  might  have  played  had 
they  counted  a  greater  number  of  members.  The 
whole  country  suffered  by  this,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
organization  of  labour  in  the  munition  factories  and 
arsenals,  the  replacement  of  skilled  artisans  by  men 
who  were  not  artisans  at  all,  but  were  seeking  to  escape 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      111 

the  danger  of  the  trenches.  In  this  connection  there 
was  a  loss  of  time,  a  waste  of  skill,  and  a  waste  of  energy, 
which  at  the  front  became  a  loss  of  men  and  property. 

The  country  is  thus  suffering  from  the  result  of  the 
opposition  of  the  middle  classes  and  the  weakness  of 
the  working  class  in  the  matter  of  labour  organization. 
We  thus  discover  that  actions  develop  their  conse- 
quences long  after  the  moment  of  action.  We  also 
perceive  how  great  is  the  solidarity  of  humanity,  despite 
the  apparently  contrary  nature  of  class  interests.  The 
final  result  which  arises  from  our  observations  is  that 
the  existence  of  classes  is  detrimental  to  humanity. 

Another  result  of  the  weakness  of  the  labour  syndi- 
cates has  been  that  the  workers  have  not  profited  by 
the  current  conditions  as  the  capitalists  have  done, 
thanks  to  the  power  of  their  unions.  Wages  hardly 
rose  at  all  except  in  Great  Britain.  There  the  working 
class  applied  to  itself  and  its  individual  interests  the 
same  spirit  as  that  which  has  everywhere  been  dis- 
played by  the  capitalist  class,  which  has  sought  to  profit 
by  the  circumstances  and  to  enrich  itself.  The  British 
working  class  had  a  clear  idea  of  its  indispensability,  of 
the  scarcity  of  labour,  of  the  necessary  intensification 
of  production,  and  therefore  demanded,  and  obtained, 
an  increase  of  wages.  This  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
modest,  and  did  not  correspond  either  with  the  enrich- 
ment of  certain  classes  of  manufacturers  and  business 
men,  or  with  the  indispensable  nature  of  the  workers. 

In  France  and  Germany  things  were  not  the  same, 
although  wages  were  in  some  cases  increased.  The  lack 
of  national  labour,  to  a  certain  extent  in  Germany, 
and  more  in  France — in  the  course  of  the  war  the 
positions  became  reversed — made  it  necessary  to  resort 
to  workers  from  neutral  countries,  to  whom  higher 
wages  were  offered,  and  then  there  was  a  scarcity  of 
labour  in  the  neutral  countries.  And  owing  to  the  lack 
of  male  workers  in  all  the  belligerent  countries  it  became 


112          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the  labour  of  women. 
They  have  taken  the  place  of  men  on  the  railways,  the 
tramways,  the  arsenals,  the  munition  works,  etc. 
Everywhere  an  equality  of  wages  between  the  sexes 
has  been  demanded,  but  as  in  most  industries  the  trades 
unions  were  weak  and  the  employers  strong,  women's 
wages  have  been  lower  than  those  of  men.  However 
this  may  be,  we  have  here  an  important  social  pheno- 
menon, for  it  tends  to  develop  the  idea  of  the  economic 
equality  of  the  sexes,  which  would  certainly  result  in 
political  equality.  One  of  the  results  of  the  world-war 
will  certainly  be  the  promotion  of  Feminism. 

A  curious  revival  of  past  methods  of  work  has  reap- 
peared, especially  in  the  invaded  countries,  but  in  a 
modified  form  in  other  countries.  I  am  speaking  of 
forced  labour. 

German  militarism,  which  is  very  consistent,  applies 
its  method  of  menace  and  intimidation  to  labour.  It 
forces  workers  of  both  sexes  to  work  for  it,  under  penalty 
of  imprisonment,  or  even  of  death.  At  the  outset,  the 
German  Government  practised  this  system  with  a 
certain  timidity,  for  it  applied  it  only  here  and  there 
to  a  small  number  of  persons.  But  as  the  war  con- 
tinued, it  needed  both  to  increase  the  rate  of  production 
of  munitions  and  to  liberate  German  workers  from  its 
war  factories  or  from  agriculture.  Then  it  put  into 
practice  the  theory  which  its  Great  General  Staff  had 
frankly  expounded  in  the  Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege. 
It  forced  the  male  inhabitants  of  the  countries  which 
it  had  conquered,  and  of  which  it  was  for  the  time  being 
in  occupation,  to  labour  for  it.  It  employed  constraint, 
officially  and  without  the  slightest  shame,  although  this 
was  a  violation  of  the  Hague  Conventions  of  which  it 
was  one  of  the  authors  and  signatories;  and  although, 
in  the  case  of  the  Belgians,  it  was  a  violation  of  the 
promises  made  to  the  Dutch  Government  and  to  Car- 
dinal Mercier.  Perhaps  a  million  men,  as  many  Belgians 


ECONOMIC  FACTORS  AND  RESULTS      113 

as  Poles  and  Frenchmen,  were  thus  deported  and  trans- 
ported where  need  was,  like  so  many  cattle.  The 
majority  of  these  slaves — for  this  is  really  a  revival  of 
slavery — belong  to  the  working  class,  and  the  rest  to  the 
lower  middle  classes.  No  doubt,  if  the  war  continues, 
this  slavery  will  be  extended  to  the  rest  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
and  perhaps  to  the  aristocracy.  The  decrees  and 
regulations  of  the  German  Government,  the  manifestoes 
of  protest  issued  by  the  Belgian  workers,  by  Cardinal 
Mercier,  etc.,  which  may  be  read  in  all  the  newspapers, 
show  with  what  impudence,  brutality,  method,  and 
detail  this  slavery  was  effected  by  the  German  military 
caste.  It  also  made  use  of  its  two  millions  of  prisoners 
for  various  kinds  of  labour.  Field  labour,  and  even 
military  works,  were  carried  out  by  enslaved  enemies. 
In  a  less  degree  the  other  belligerent  nations  have  fol- 
lowed this  example  of  the  employment  of  prisoners. 
But  the  labour  has  not  been  forced.  In  France  prisoners 
are  only  employed  in  the  fields,  in  the  mines,  on  the 
roads,  and  in  the  quarries,  far  from  the  battlefields. 

And  seeing  these  millions  of  men  working  for  their 
enemies,  one  inevitably  recalls  the  works  whose  greatness 
is  attested  by  their  still  stupendous  ruins  executed  by 
men  enslaved  in  the  same  fashion,  thousands  of  years 
ago,  by  the  Emperors  of  Assyria,  Medaea,  Persia,  or 
Egypt. 

In  virtue  of  her  conception  of  discipline  based  on  the 
fear  of  punishment,  Germany  regulated  the  labour  of 
her  citizens  until  they  were  really  slaves.  They  had  to 
remain  in  the  factories  or  the  fields  even  against  their 
will.  There  was  a  special  militarization  of  the  working 
class,  which  the  middle  class  to  some  extent  escaped. 
The  same  phenomenon  occurred  in  France  in  a  less 
degree,  for  the  method  was  applied  only  to  the  munition 
factories  and  arsenals  and  to  workers  mobilized  as 
soldiers. 

Despite   these   notable   and   perceptible   differences, 

8 


114          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

this  extremely  important  fact  was  observed:  the  liberty 
of  the  individual  in  labour  contracts  was  suppressed. 
This  is  a  tendency  to  enslave  one  class  for  the  profit 
of  the  collectivity,  administered  and  commanded  by 
another  class. 

In  England  the  power  of  the  trades  unions  prevented 
the  same  thing  from  happening.  There  were  attempts 
in  that  direction;  there  was  even  a  law  passed,  the 
Munitions  Act,  which  would  have  had  the  same  result; 
but  a  law  is  of  no  value  unless  everybody  accepts  it, 
and  the  few  opponents  are  weak.  A  law  is  a  non- 
existent thing  when  hundreds  of  thousands  of  indi- 
viduals deliberately  refuse  to  obey  it.  The  trades 
unions,  conscious  of  their  strength  and  their  right  to 
defend  their  individual  and  class  interests — as  did  the 
employers'  unions — rendered  this  law,  which  was  an 
attempt  to  destroy  their  liberties,  inoffensive.  This  fact 
shows  the  enormous  value  for  the  proletariat  of  com- 
bining in  powerful  trade  associations. 

From  all  these  economic  phenomena  which  we  have 
just  passed  in  review  one  general  characteristic  emerges: 
the  diminution  of  liberty,  the  tendency  of  the  rulers 
to  resort  to  constraint  and  intimidation  as  soon  as  this 
is  possible.  And  from  this  results  this  consequence: 
that  men  must  unite  in  order  to  be  strong  and  to  resist 
all  attempts  to  diminish  liberty,  and  to  annihilate  all 
attempts  to  resort  to  intimidation. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR 

The  various  nations  and  the  war — They  react  in  different  ways — Mili- 
tary authority  assumes  the  supreme  power — Constitutions  sus- 
pended and  liberties  suppressed — Germany:  her  militarism,  her 
mentality,  her  preparation  for  the  war,  her  megalomania,  her 
foreign  and  domestic  policy — Russia:  her  bureaucracy,  corrup- 
tion, and  disorder;  authority  and  its  effects;  its  liberalization 
is  inevitable — France :  antagonism  between  her  democratic  habits 
and  the  autocratic  Government;  the  Conservative  and  Catholic 
parties ;  a  vain  attempt  to  militarize  France ;  Parliament  recovers 
its  power;  the  actual  democratization  of  France — Great  Britain: 
the  voluntary  system  opposed  to  compulsion;  Parliamentary 
control;  the  English  mentality;  the  Conservative  and  Democratic 
parties;  the  Churches;  the  Trades  Unions;  the  Welsh  miners' 
strike ;  the  Munitions  Act. 

DIRECTLY  the  war  broke  out,  even  before  the 
commencement  of  hostilities,  the  military  autho- 
rities took  the  upper  hand  in  the  different  countries 
affected.  There  were  declarations  of  a  state  of  war,  as 
in  Germany,  or  of  a  state  of  siege,  as  in  France.  In 
those  countries  in  which  the  Parliamentary  power  was 
a  fiction — as  in  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia 
—the  Sovereigns  acted  in  an  autocratic  manner.  In 
the  truly  Parliamentary  countries  the  Parliaments 
suspended  the  Constitution  and  gave  the  fullest  powers 
to  the  military  authorities.  Certain  neutral  Powers 
considered  themselves  forced  by  circumstances  to  act 
in  the  same  manner,  for  mobilization  was  decreed  in 
these  countries.  Switzerland,  for  example,  mobilized  on 
July  31,  twenty-four  hours  earlier  than  France.  Every- 
where the  suspension  of  Constitutions  resulted  in  the 
suppression  of  a  portion  of  the  liberties  acquired  by 
the  peoples.  This  was  naturally  greater  or  smaller 

116 


116          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

according  to  the  country.  In  Germany  and  Russia  the 
suppression  of  liberties  was  excessive;  Germany  was  in 
reality  isolated  from  the  world  from  July  27  or  28, 
1914.  Beyond  the  frontiers  nothing  leaked  out  of  what 
was  being  done  in  Germany.  Nothing  of  what  was 
being  thought  and  said  beyond  the  frontiers  entered 
the  country. 

Germany,  under  the  fiction  of  Parliamentarianism, 
is  in  reality  an  autocracy.  The  power  is  centralized  in 
the  hands  of  a  few  men.  The  rest  obey.  German 
unity  was  achieved  under  the  hegemony  of  Prussia, 
and  it  was  imposed  upon  individuals  and  collectivities 
by  fear.  Among  the  consequences  of  this  unity  and 
this  spirit  of  obedience  we  must  note  rapidity  of 
action  and  organization,  and  audacity  in  decision  and 
action.  German  authoritatism  provokes  events,  and, 
careless  of  obstacles,  makes  straight  for  the  aim  which 
it  sets  itself.  .  .  .  But  it  has  set  itself  this  aim  with 
an  intelligence  perverted  and  diminished  by  the  absence 
of  all  criticism,  by  the  habitude  of  being  passively 
obeyed.  And  so  this  aim,  instead  of  being  the  great- 
ness of  Germany,  becomes  the  ruin  of  Germany.  The 
excessive  power  of  the  rulers,  by  destroying  their  own 
critical  faculties,  has  rendered  them  megalomaniac, 
absolutely  incapable  of  seeing,  judging,  and  under- 
standing realities.  The  military  mentality,  which  has 
penetrated  them  to  the  marrow  of  their  bones,  has  put 
blinkers  on  their  eyes.  They  can  perceive  only  a 
portion  of  the  factors  concerned.  Therefore  they  make 
gross  and  clumsy  mistakes  in  their  foreign  policies,  and 
in  the  psychology  of  peoples,  especially  of  Western 
peoples.  They  go  into  foreign  countries  without  really 
entering  into  them  and  without  comprehending  them. 
Their  megalomania  has  clouded  their  understanding. 
They  imagined  that  India,  South  Africa,  and  Ireland 
were  about  to  revolt  against  England;  that  the  Dominions 
were  about  to  break  loose.  They  believed  that  the  revo- 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     117 

lutionaries  in  France  and  Russia  were  about  to  cause  a 
revolution  because  of  their  dread  of  war,  and  without 
heeding  that  Germany  would  enslave  them.  They  thought 
that  Belgium  would  be  only  too  happy  to  give  them 
passage;  and  they  perceived  nothing  insulting  in  the 
proposals  which  they  made  Great  Britain  in  the  hope 
of  securing  her  neutrality.  They  understood  nothing 
of  all  this,  because  they  are  accustomed  to  obey  and  to 
be  obeyed  mechanically,  and  do  not  really  understand 
the  meaning  of  the  word  "  dignity "  applied  to  in- 
dividuals or  collectivities.  For  them  everything  is 
subordinate  to  the  limited  and  immediate  object. 
Nothing  else  counts.  .  .  .  Moreover,  they  have  the 
profoundest  contempt  for  human  life.  Men  are  cattle, 
flesh  to  be  slaughtered  according  to  the  interests  of  the 
herd-keepers.  One  must  go  far  back  into  the  past  ages 
to  find  such  conceptions.  They  were  part  of  the  mental 
furniture  of  the  Emperors  of  the  Medes  and  Persians 
and  Assyrians  thousands  of  years  ago. 

How  is  it  that  the  German  mind  has  been  completely 
invaded  by  this  intense  general  megalomania  ?  Nearly 
a  century  and  a  half  of  preparation  has  been  needful: 
preparation  undertaken  by  Prussia,  and  executed  by 
the  schools,  Universities,  and  barracks.  But  it  was  in 
the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  that  this 
work  attained  its  full  scope,  and  ended  in  an  extra- 
ordinary faith  on  the  part  of  all  Germany  in  the  superi- 
ority of  the  Germanic  race — tall,  blond,  and  dolicho- 
cephalic. Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  majority  of  the 
Germans  are  neither  tall  nor  blond  nor  dolichocephalic ! 
The  Germanic  race  is  fully  as  non-existent  as  the  Latin 
race.  It  is  a  romantic,  poetical  idea,  not  a  scientific 
fact  or  idea.  And  it  is  worth  noting  that  it  was  not 
the  Germans  who  conceived  the  idea  of  the  superiority 
of  the  tall,  blond,  dolichocephalic  race.  It  was  a  French- 
man, Gobineau,  who  was  the  first  in  the  field.  His 
great  supporters  and  propagandists  were  a  Pole, 


118          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Treitschke,  and  an  Englishman,  Houston  Stewart 
Chamberlain  !  The  Germans  did  not  create  the  idea, 
they  developed  it — a  result  of  their  limited  intelligence, 
restrained  by  their  spirit  of  discipline,  which  prevents 
all  creation,  all  invention,  and  only  permits  of  im- 
provements. 

The  critical  spirit  being  suppressed  in  the  Germans, 
they  did  not  see  how  unscientific  it  was  to  conceive  of 
a  race  with  a  linguistic  basis.  A  common  language 
has  never  indicated  unity  of  race.  Unity  of  race  can 
be  based  only  on  anatomical  and  physiological  character- 
istics. There  is  no  Germanic  race,  yet  Germany  has 
a  cast-iron  belief  in  its  existence  and  its  superiority. 
It  believes  in  it  to  the  point  of  believing  that  all  the 
really  great  men  of  the  whole  world  are  Germans.  We 
have  seen  German  writers  and  University  professors 
claim  as  Germans:  Dante,  Michelangelo,  Da  Vinci, 
Murillo,  Giotto,  Velasquez,  Voltaire,  Diderot,  Shake- 
speare, Bernard  Shaw — but  I  know  I  am  forgetting 
some  of  them. 

The  idea  which  the  Germans  entertain  of  the  so-called 
Germanic  race  has  nothing  to  do  with  science:  it  is  a 
religious  idea.  It  is  not  based  on  reason  at  all:  it  is 
founded  on  faith.  It  is  at  the  same  time  both  a  cause 
and  an  effect  of  the  power  of  the  State,  of  the  religion 
of  the  State,  I  should  say,  to  be  more  precise.  The 
God  obeyed  and  adored  in  this  religion  is  the  State. 
It  is  not  a  metaphysical  abstraction;  it  is  a  concrete 
reality,  embodied  in  the  person  of  its  High  Priest,  the 
Kaiser,  and  the  entire  hierarchy  of  its  priests:  the 
warriors,  professors,  great  landowners,  and  capitalists. 

The  whole  nation  has  for  years  undergone  training 
in  order  to  obtain  the  fusion  of  all  its  individuals  in  a 
single  collective  being,  the  State.  One  must  neither 
discuss,  nor  reason,  nor  judge;  one  must  believe,  one 
must  have  faith.  In  order  to  maintain  this  blind  faith 
the  rulers,  the  priests  of  this  religion,  distort,  alter,  or 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     119 

suppress  the  facts.  Everything  is  subordinated  to  the 
aim  pursued;  so  that  we  see  "  cooked  "  statistics,  while 
foreign  scientific  works  are  deliberately  neglected  and 
ignored.  The  people  must  be  kept  in  ignorance  of  all 
that  may  shake  its  faith.  This  system  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  critical  spirit  has  been  methodically  followed 
for  years,  but  it  has  of  course  attained  its  maximum 
in  this  war.  For  months  the  German  people  were 
ignorant  of  the  French  victory  of  the  Marne,  or  the 
reply  of  Belgium  to  the  German  ultimatum  of  August  2, 
1914.  It  is  in  absolute  good  faith  that  the  generality 
of  the  Germans  live  in  blindness.  The  German  Empire 
has  slain  the  German  mind,  as  Nietzsche  predicted. 
For  the  German  masses  there  is  but  one  truth:  the 
official  truth,  announced  by  the  German  Government. 
All  that  others  may  say  is  tainted  with  error  by  the 
simple  fact  that  it  does  not  emanate  from  the  German 
authority. 

It  is  this  blind  faith  which  explains  how  it  is  that 
the  German  censorship  urges  the  Press  to  publish 
official  enemy  communiques.  It  knows  that  not  only 
will  the  masses  refuse  to  believe  them,  but  that  on 
comparing  them  with  the  German  communiques  they 
will  perceive  the  differences,  and  will  thus  become  more 
and  more  impressed  with  their  untruth  and  the  veracity 
of  the  German  communiques. 

It  is  this  blind  faith  which  explains  the  stupefac- 
tion manifested  by  the  German  people  when  they 
realized  the  contents  of  President  Wilson's  Note, 
after  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex,  in  April,  1916 — above 
all,  when  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged 
to  admit,  almost  openly,  that  its  original  denial  was 
a  lie. 

The  State  is  God,  and  everybody  behaves  more  or 
less  as  a  functionary.  To  the  God  everything  must  be 
sacrificed.  The  greatness  of  the  God  justifies  all  the 
means  employed  to  increase  his  power.  And  so  we  see 


120          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  German  rulers  violating  their  signature,  with  nai've 
candour,  by  the  invasion  of  countries  whose  neutrality 
was  guaranteed  by  them,  by  the  employment  of  weapons 
which  they  had  pledged  themselves  not  to  employ,  by 
the  deportation  and  enslavement  of  the  Belgians,  which 
they  had  promised  Holland  they  would  not  accomplish. 
"  Necessity  knows  no  law,"  says  Chancellor  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  with  brutal  frankness,  to  the  applause  of  the 
Reichstag.  "  Our  troops,"  he  said,  "  have  occupied 
Luxemburg,  and  have  perhaps  already  set  foot  upon 
Belgian  territory.  This  is  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations. 
.  .  .  The  illegality — I  speak  frankly — the  illegality  which 
we  are  thus  committing  we  shall  seek  to  repair  so  soon 
as  our  military  object  shall  have  been  attained."  One 
cannot  more  openly  assert  that  the  end  justifies  the 
means.  This,  let  us  remember,  is  a  religious  maxim, 
a  Jesuit  maxim. 

In  this  State  religion,  as  in  every  religion,  there  is  a 
clergy  and  a  clerical  hierarchy.  At  the  top  are  the 
soldiers,  then,  beneath  them,  the  mass  of  the  priests, 
represented  above  all  by  the  professors,  the  educators 
of  youth.  As  in  the  great  Asiatic  Empires,  we  observe 
the  intimate  union  of  the  warrior  and  the  priest.  The 
one  does  not  act  without  the  other;  mutually  they  sup- 
port one  another.  Militarism  is  the  support  of  Im- 
perial Germany,  the  antithesis  of  the  Germany  of 
Goethe  and  Beethoven.  Listen  to  the  University  pro- 
fessors in  their  famous  Manifesto:  "  Without  German 
militarism,  German  culture  would  long  ago  have  dis- 
appeared from  the  surface  of  the  globe.  .  .  .  The 
spirit  which  reigns  in  the  army  is  also  that  which  reigns 
in  the  German  people." 

With  such  a  militarist  frame  of  mind,  the  German 
professorial  phalanx  could  only  endeavour  to  train  the 
population  to  become  a  flock  of  sheep.  It  tended  to 
suppress  all  individuality,  and  to  confine  minds  and 
characters  to  one  type.  What  was  the  result  of  this 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     121 

work  of  enslaving  the  human  mind,  methodically  carried 
on  for  decades  ? 

We  have  had  testimony  as  to  this  result  in  the  docility 
with  which  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  went  to 
the  slaughter  at  Verdun,  exactly  as  sheep  go  to  the 
slaughter-house,  without  the  slightest  gain  to  them- 
selves or  their  national  collectivity.  We  have  testi- 
mony to  this  effect  in  the  philosophy,  literature,  and 
arts  of  the  period  of  the  Prussian  hegemony.  For  half 
a  century  Germany  has  given  to  the  world  no  great 
philosopher,  no  great  artist,  no  great  literary  man. 
Since  Wagner,  the  revolutionary,  Germany  has  produced 
no  great  musician.  In  painting,  the  same  is  true,  so 
true  that  Germany  had  to  adopt  and  make  her  own 
two  Swiss  painters,  Bocklin  and  Hodler,  who  were  as 
a  matter  of  fact  products  of  the  Swiss  democracy. 

The  general  militarization  of  the  people  has  killed 
the  germs  of  greatness  which  might  have  existed  in 
the  Germanic  soul.  To  give  birth  to  strong  personalities 
who  should  dare  to  emerge  from  the  beaten  path  and 
rebel  against  accepted  forms  and  ideas,  an  atmosphere 
of  liberty  is  needful.  It  is  lacking  in  Germany,  just  as 
it  was  lacking  in  France  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  I. 
Imperialistic  greatness,  which  always  reposes  on  the 
greatness  of  arms,  excludes  the  greatness  of  arts  and 
letters. 

By  destroying  all  traces  of  the  critical  spirit  and  the 
spirit  of  revolt  the  militarization  of  the  German  people 
has  engendered  a  veritable  pathological  condition: 
megalomania.  This  state  of  collective  mania,  produced 
by  the  spirit  of  obedience,  obtained  by  fear,  is  a  socio- 
logical phenomenon  of  enormous  importance.  Differences 
of  age,  class,  profession,  education,  and  religion  seem 
to  play  no  part  whatever  in  the  spread  of  this  megalo- 
mania, which  has  stricken  everybody. 

"  Germany  is  the  physician  who  will  heal  the  human 
race,"  says  one,  while  another,  the  secretary  of  the 


122          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences,  M.  Hermann  Diels,  writes : 
"  Germany  is  the  sanctuary  upon  this  earth  in  which 
the  principle  of  order  and  discipline  has  taken  refuge." 

The  megalomaniac  always  expects  the  rest  of  the 
world  to  accept  him  at  his  own  valuation,  and  is  angered 
if  one  appears  to  doubt  his  greatness.  So  with  the 
German.  As  proof  of  this  I  will  cite  these  few  lines 
written  by  a  German  jurist,  Herr  Otto  von  Gaerke:  "  All 
the  nations,  willingly  or  unwillingly,  must  understand 
that  the  German  Kultur  is  the  best,  the  most  solid, 
the  most  robust;  that  it  is  the  most  indispensable 
element  of  the  world's  civilization." 

Facts  can  never  modify  the  convictions  of  a  megalo- 
maniac. With  the  best  faith  in  the  world,  he  interprets 
them  in  the  sense  of  his  delirium,  or  else  he  denies  their 
existence.  Such  is  the  German. 

"  We  are  waging  war,"  said  the  Court  preacher, 
"  with  a  conscience  and  a  gentleness  of  which  history 
has  hitherto  afforded  no  example."  "  Kultur  and 
religion,"  we  read  in  a  manifesto,  "  render  the  soldier 
incapable  of  committing  atrocities,  of  behaving  with 
cruelty.  The  assertions  of  our  enemies  are  incompatible 
with  the  flourishing  condition  of  our  schools." 

One  sees  to  what  a  pathological  state  of  mind  the 
Germans  are  reduced.  The  present  war  has  torn  away 
all  the  veils  which  concealed  it  from  the  eyes  of  the 
world.  There  is  here  an  actual  and  regrettable  diminu- 
tion of  a  people  which  was  great  in  its  intelligence  and 
its  accomplishment. 

What  has  permitted  the  general  expansion  of  this 
deadly  megalomania  ?  The  absence  of  the  political 
spirit  in  the  German  masses.  Prince  von  Biilow  has 
recognized  that  the  Germans  are  not  a  political  people, 
but  he  has  not  inquired  into  the  purely  educative  and 
social  causes  of  a  state  of  affairs  so  prejudicial  to  the 
Germanic  people.  The  absence  of  the  political  spirit, 
to  which  all  the  events  of  this  war  bear  witness,  is  due 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     123 

simply  to  the  docility  of  the  German  people,  to  its  habit 
of  putting  its  faith  in  its  rulers,  and  the  fact  that  it  is 
not  accustomed  to  choose  its  own  path.  The  German 
people  is,  from  the  political  point  of  view,  at  a  stage  of 
civilization  perhaps  fifty  years  in  arrears  of  the  peoples 
of  France,  Great  Britain,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and 
Scandinavia.  Its  political  revolution  was  cut  short  in 
1870  by  the  victory  of  Prussia  over  France.  This 
victory  was  in  reality  a  far  greater  defeat  for  the  whole 
of  Germany  than  for  France.  The  moral  and  political 
impulse  of  France  continued,  and  was  even  augmented; 
that  of  Germany  was  arrested,  and  only  its  economic 
impulse  has  continued  to  develop. 

Consider  for  a  moment  how  the  consequences  of  an 
act  make  their  appearance  after  a  long  period  of  years. 
In  this  case  it  needed  almost  half  a  century  for  them 
to  develop  in  their  true  amplitude.  Earlier  than  this 
one  saw  only  one  aspect  of  these  consequences — the 
brilliant  aspect,  the  appearance  rather  than  the  reality. 
Only  a  few  men,  geniuses  enlightened  by  extraordinary 
foresight,  had  perceived  the  actual  reality.  Thus 
Nietzsche  wrote,  in  the  midst  of  the  war  of  1870:  *'  I 
regard  Prussia  as  a  power  extremely  dangerous  to 
culture.  ..."  And  in  his  Unreal  Considerations  this 
philosopher  writes  a  passage,  which  I  may  substantially 
summarize  as  follows:  "A  great  victory  is  a  great 
danger.  It  is  easier  to  win  it  than  so  to  act  that  a 
profound  defeat  does  not  result  from  it.  This  defeat, 
more  irreparable  than  any  military  rout,  would  be  the 
extirpation  of  the  German  spirit  on  behalf  of  the  German 
Empire.  .  .  .  The  German  Empire  will  slay  the 
German  spirit.  It  is  a  costly  thing  to  achieve  power. 
Power  brutalizes  the  mind."  And  elsewhere,  returning 
to  this  idea,  Nietzsche  writes:  "  Deutschland,  Deutsch- 
land  uber  alles  !  I  fear  that  this  may  have  been  the 
end  of  German  philosophy." 

It  was,  for  the  time  being,  the  end  alike  of  German 


124          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

philosophy  and  German  literature  and  German  art, 
which  were  killed  for  a  time  by  the  methodical  training 
which  men  received  in  passive  obedience — that  is,  in 
the  habit  of  no  longer  thinking,  no  longer  reflecting, 
no  longer  judging,  no  longer  criticizing.  Authority  has 
stifled  all  desires  of  individualism  in  the  German  soul. 
Without  individualism  one  may  have  large  and  powerful 
flocks  of  men,  but  one  has  neither  art,  nor  science,  nor 
philosophy,  nor  literature,  nor  real  humanity,  rejoicing 
fully  in  life. 

The  German  Empire  has  obscured  the  German  spirit, 
if  it  is  true,  as  Niebuhr  said,  that  "  the  true  constitu- 
tion of  the  German  is  anarchy."  The  German  Empire 
has  not  killed  this  spirit  for  all  time,  because  education 
cannot  kill  nature.  It  can  only  obscure  it,  veil  it, 
cover  it  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  according  to  its 
degree  of  vigour  and  the  degree  of  weakness  of  the  folk 
subjected  to  it. 

During  the  whole  of  the  nineteenth  centuiy  Germany 
celebrated  and  practised  "  organization "  without 
analyzing  what  she  meant  by  the  term.  She  did  not 
see  that  the  organization  which  she  was  realizing  was 
mechanical,  not  a  living  thing.  Her  aim  was  to  organize 
the  world  as  a  mechanism  set  in  motion  by  mechani- 
cians, just  like  a  locomotive  or  a  weaving-loom.  Im- 
pregnated to  the  depth  of  their  being  by  the  militarist 
conceptions  of  authority  and  constraint,  the  German 
rulers  have  seen  humanity  as  a  lifeless  mechanism,  like 
the  machinery  of  a  foundry  or  ironworks.  They  have 
forgotten  that  it  is  a  living  collective  organism,  composed 
of  living  individual  organisms. 

Why  did  they  not  recall  the  thought  of  their  great 
Schiller:  "  Organization  has  condemned  to  crawl  like 
a  snail  him  who  should  have  soared  like  an  eagle. 
Organization  has  not  yet  produced  a  single  great  man; 
it  is  liberty  that  gives  birth  to  colossi  and  extraordinary 
beings  "  ?  They  would  then  have  realized  their  funda- 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     125 

mental  error.  And  instead  of  this  mechanical  organiza- 
tion, they  would  have  created  a  living  organization, 
founded  on  liberty,  imitating  living  nature  and  not  dead 
machinery.  The  natural,  not  the  mechanical,  sciences 
should  serve  to  guide  men  in  the  organization  of  human 
society.  Here  is  one  of  the  great  lessons  of  the  world- 
war. 

It  is  probable  that  Germany  will  emerge  re-tempered 
from  the  tragic  circumstances  of  the  present.  Defeated, 
she  will  free  herself  from  the  authority  of  blood  and 
iron,  and  her  spirit  will  resume  its  natural  course.  Her 
former  culture,  which  was  human  and  not  Germanic, 
the  culture  of  her  thinkers  and  artists  of  the  past 
centuries,  will  be  born  anew  in  the  brains  of  her  children, 
because  this  culture  is  the  true  German  culture,  that 
which  corresponds  to  the  nature  of  the  German  people, 
while  her  present  Kultur  is  a  deformity  which  has,  like 
a  varnish,  covered  the  real  nature  of  the  people.  It 
has  been  superimposed  on  this  nature  by  a  skilful 
training,  imposed  little  by  little  by  the  authority  of  the 
Prussian  Junkers,  by  means  of  fear  and  untruth. 

So  from  such  a  state  of  affairs  we  must  draw  this 
conclusion:  authority  tends  inevitably  to  diminish  the 
individual,  and  therefore  the  collectivity,  which  is  an 
aggregate  of  individuals.  Liberty,  which  is  the  antag- 
onist of  authority,  is  the  leaven  of  greatness,  both  in 
individuals  and  in  collectivities. 

We  find  yet  another  proof  of  the  harmful  nature  of 
autocracy  in  the  manner  in  which  Russia  has  behaved 
during  the  war.  In  the  stupendous  struggle  which  she 
had  to  maintain,  she  needed  the  effort  of  all.  This 
could  be  obtained  only  by  an  honest  agreement,  by 
the  union  of  all  parties.  The  Russian  revolutionaries 
and  Socialists  understood  this.  So  we  saw  exiles  like 
Prince  Kropotkin,  Bourtsev,  Rubanovitch,  and 
Plekhanov  pronouncing  themselves  energetically  in 
favour  of  the  Allies,  and  calling  the  Russians  to  fight 


126          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

as  one  man  against  militarism  and  Germanism.  .  .  . 
Bourtsev,  who  lived  in  Paris,  left  for  Petrograd  with 
the  object  of  placing  his  knowledge  and  his  intelligence 
at  the  service  of  his  country.  .  .  .  He  was  at  first 
met  with  arrest,  then  with  a  sentence  of  penal  servitude. 
The  reactionary  bureaucracy  had  not  laid  aside  its 
arms ;  without  recking  of  the  interests  of  the  collectivity, 
it  continued  its  disorder  and  its  fraud.  Moreover,  the 
factions  continued  to  fight  among  themselves  for  the 
benefits  of  power.  The  more  autocratic  elements,  com- 
posed very  largely  of  nobles  of  Teutonic  origin,  as 
were  many  of  the  Baltic  nobles,  dared  even  to  be  openly 
pro-German.  They  obtained  support  in  the  highest 
circles  of  the  Court,  and  also  among  the  Ministers.  On 
several  occasions  there  were  veritable  acts  of  treachery, 
such  as  that  of  Colonel  Miassoyedov  and  his  accom- 
plices. They  professed  to  have  been  actuated  by 
patriotism;  the  triumph  of  Germany  was  to  insure 
the  victory  of  the  autocracy  over  the  democracy  of  the 
Western  Allies. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Orthodox  clergy,  owing  to 
their  narrow  spirit  of  proselytism  and  their  longing  to 
employ  violence  in  order  to  bring  the  heretics  to  their 
way  of  thinking,  urged  those  factions  which  were 
Russophile  but  autocratic  in  tendency  to  place  the 
forces  of  the  State  at  their  service.  And  in  conquered 
Galicia  one  saw  Russian  soldiers  compelling  the 
Ruthenian  Uniats  to  accept  conversion  to  orthodoxy. 
Persecution  flourished.  He  who  persecutes  is  sowing 
hatred.  The  Russians  realized  this  when,  the  tables 
having  been  turned,  they  had  to  abandon  Galicia  and 
withdraw.  These  persecutions,  the  fruit  of  Russian 
authoritatism,  did  more  harm  to  the  cause  defended  by 
Russia  and  her  Allies  than  many  military  defeats. 

Although  powerful,  the  Russian  bureaucracy  was  not 
so  strongly  organized  that  it  was  able  to  suppress  all 
discordant  efforts.  In  its  bosom,  and  in  the  Govern- 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     127 

ment,  men  of  liberal  tendencies  endeavoured  to  struggle 
against  the  death-dealing  autocracy.  It  was  thus  that 
they  obtained  public  promises  of  the  autonomy  of  a 
united  Poland,  of  the  political  equality  of  the  Jews, 
etc.  But  all  these  were  vain  promises,  often  given 
with  the  object  of  deceiving  the  Western  Allies.  No 
liberties  were  actually  granted;  the  forces  of  reaction 
were  again  triumphant  over  the  forces  of  progress.  The 
Government,  either  through  lack  of  comprehension 
or  through  autocratic  interest,  refused  to  employ  the 
stupendous  moral  force  which  would  have  resulted 
from  a  complete  political  amnesty  and  a  truly  liberal 
and  democratic  policy.  This  policy,  however,  is  in  the 
very  bones  of  the  Russian  people.  Its  tastes  and  habits 
are  essentially  democratic,  as  may  be  discovered  by 
reading  the  realistic  novels  of  Turgenev,  Tolstoy, 
Dostoievski,  Gorky,  etc. 

The  Duma  was  powerless,  despite  its  unanimity. 
The  Council  of  Empire  was  in  the  same  case.  Yet  the 
leaders  of  the  autocratic  parties  were  leaving  it,  in  order 
to  adopt  Liberal  ideas:  such  was  Baron  von  Rosen, 
a  great  Baltic  noble.  The  forces  of  reaction  gave  way 
for  a  moment  during  the  great  retreat.  Bourtsev  and 
a  few  others  were  liberated.  It  was  possible  to  believe 
that  the  Duma,  upheld  by  the  people  of  the  cities  and 
the  countrysides  and  the  Zemstvos,  would  succeed  in 
saving  Russia  from  the  deadly  slough  into  which  the 
bureaucracy  was  plunging  it.  But  alas  !  this  was  not 
so.  The  forces  of  reaction  soon  recovered  themselves, 
and  continued  to  pursue  their  Germanic  policy.  The 
military  mentality  had  so  far  penetrated  the  bureau- 
cratic caste  that  some  revolutionary  cataclysm  was 
needed  to  rid  the  country  of  it. 

Not  only  is  this  policy  of  autocratic  violence  and 
constraint  prejudicial  to  the  Russian  people;  it  is  pre- 
judicial to  Russia's  Allies  in  the  present  world- war. 

It  is  the  Russian  claim  to  endless  annexations  of 


128          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

territory — evidence  of  a  veritable  German  policy— 
which  has  alienated  the  sympathies  of  the  Swedes  in 
the  north,  and  of  the  Bulgarians,  the  Rumanians,  and 
the  Greeks  in  the  south-west.  It  was  these  Russian 
demands  which  prevented  the  conclusion  of  alliances 
with  the  latter  Powers  during  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war,  which  delayed  the  conclusion  of  this  auto-destruc- 
tion of  humanity.  Millions  of  deaths  and  the  ex- 
penditure of  thousands  of  millions  of  francs  have 
resulted  from  this  narrow  policy  of  the  Russian  auto- 
cracy. The  path  of  autocracies,  whether  Russian, 
German,  or  otherwise,  is  sown  with  death  and  devasta- 
tion ! 

In  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world  the  Russian  autocracy 
diminished  the  moral  force  of  the  Western  Powers, 
representatives  of  the  principle  of  liberty  fighting 
against  the  principle  of  authority  symbolized  by  Ger- 
many. It  is  probable  that  the  war  will  not  end  before 
the  forces  of  progress  have,  in  Russia,  conquered  the 
forces  of  reaction.  The  Liberalization  of  Russia  seems 
to  us  to  be  an  inevitable  consequence  of  this  war.  In 
the  behaviour  of  Russia,  and  its  consequences,  we  see 
how  great  is  the  evil  of  autocracy,  of  the  principle  of 
governing  peoples  by  authority  based  upon  constraint 
and  fear. 

In  the  dawn  of  the  war,  in  all  countries,  the  rulers 
appealed  to  the  union  of  all  classes  and  opinions,  to  a 
party  truce.  Everywhere,  except  in  Russia,  there  was 
an  amnesty  for  political  offences  and  for  strikers. 
However,  the  truce  of  parties  was  rather  apparent  than 
real,  for  everywhere  there  was  a  clash  between  the 
tendencies  of  Liberalism  and  those  of  authority. 

In  France  this  antagonism  was  most  emphatic.  The 
country  remained  five  months  without  a  Parliament. 
We  can  hardly  say  that  the  Press  existed,  so  strong 
and  so  numerous  were  the  restrictions  with  which  the 
censorship  surrounded  it.  There  was  a  Government 


which  consisted  of  a  President  and  a  Ministry  and 
soldiers,  and  under  cover  of  this  the  forces  of  reaction 
rapidly  assumed  a  combative  attitude.  The  Catholic 
Church,  relying  on  the  reactionaries  of  every  shade, 
thought  the  occasion  favourable  for  recovering  its 
former  preponderance.  It  began  a  tactless  and  violent 
propaganda.  It  considered  everything  permissible:  the 
violation  of  laws  and  consciences.  It  was  a  clumsy 
policy,  for  the  forces  of  the  vanguard  immediately 
responded  to  the  forces  of  reaction.  Protests,  at  first 
isolated,  became  united  and  increased  in  force.  Demo- 
cracy resisted  the  attempt  of  the  clericals  and  reaction- 
aries. Its  leaders,  pushed  on  by  the  mass  of  the  people, 
took  part  in  the  campaign  of  resistance. 

In  reality  the  "  holy  alliance "  died  before  it  had 
seen  much  life.  ...  It  was  only  a  formula,  which 
for  a  time  deceived  the  simplicity  of  the  masses.  The 
movement  of  opposition  to  the  reactionary  thrust  came 
from  the  crowd  and  not  from  the  politicians.  It  was 
the  crowd  which  inspired  the  Parliamentarians  with  the 
courage  to  resist  the  Governmental  attempts  to  restrain 
the  action  of  Parliament,  in  imitation  of  the  German 
Government. 

The  complexity  of  the  problems  to  be  solved,  the 
stultified  and  routine-bound  mind  of  the  military 
authority  which  was  in  part  substituted  for  the  civil 
authority,  facilitated  the  spread  of  disorder  and  fraud; 
while  some  men  were  dying  in  the  trenches  others  were 
growing  rich  ! 

However,  the  powers  of  Conservatism  could  not  lay 
their  hands  on  the  Governmental  organism,  for  resist- 
ance was  organized  everywhere.  Urged  on  by  the 
soldiers,  the  civilians  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow,  by 
the  citizen  soldiers  and  by  the  non-militarized  crowd, 
the  Members  of  Parliament  and  other  politicians  reacted 
and  reminded  the  Government  that  Parliament  was 
the  real  and  only  representative  of  the  national  will. 

9 


180          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  Radicals,  effectually  assisted  by  the  Socialists  and 
Syndicalists  (Trades  Unionists)  forced  the  Chambers  to 
reopen  some  months  after  the  opening  of  hostilities, 
and  since  then  they  have  actually  been  sitting  con- 
tinuously, supported  by  the  opinion  of  the  popular 
masses,  despite  the  more  or  less  open  or  underhand  cam- 
paigns conducted  by  the  Conservatives  and  reactionaries 
of  every  shade. 

The  work  of  Parliament  since  its  reunion  has  been  a 
task  of  control,  whose  great  utility  is  apparent  to  all 
unprejudiced  eyes.  It  would  have  been  far  more 
important  had  there  not  existed,  in  certain  Govern- 
mental circles,  a  more  or  less  secret  opposition,  and 
intrigues,  due  to  distrust  of  the  democracy,  to  diminish 
the  activity  of  the  Radical  and  Socialist  parties.  This 
anti-democratic  task  will  probably  have  disastrous 
results  for  the  parties  of  reaction,  for  a  sullen  discontent 
is  gaining  a  hold  over  the  entire  nation,  affecting  the 
citizen  soldiers,  perhaps,  even  more  than  the  civilians. 
This  discontent  has  been  actually  fomented  by  abuses 
of  power,  by  the  clumsiness,  the  mistakes,  and  the 
deficiencies  of  military  and  civilian  authorities  and  the 
Catholic  leaders.  It  hardly  seems  probable  that  this 
will  fail  to  end  in  more  or  less  violent  and  universal 
demonstrations  against  militarism  and  in  favour  of 
liberty.  The  French  nation  is  on  the  whole  profoundly 
democratic.  It  has  progressed  enormously  during  the 
last  twenty-five  years. 

The  manner  in  which  it  has  passed  through  the 
present  crisis  during  the  last  year  or  more  shows  that 
the  people  possess  the  mental  maturity,  the  will  to 
action,  and  the  energy  which  are  necessary  if  they  are 
to  be  their  own  master. 

The  resistance  of  the  masses  and  the  democratic 
leaders  to  the  militarization  of  France  has  naturally 
reawakened  the  conflict  of  the  political  parties.  This 
was  fatal  and  inevitable.  And  it  is  as  well,  for  this 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     131 

conflict  forces  men  to  use  their  critical  faculties,  and 
prevents  them  from  slumbering  in  the  far  niente  of 
power.  A  country  in  which  there  was  no  conflict  of 
political  parties  would  soon  be  the  prey  of  an  autocracy, 
or  would  disappear  in  death.  Criticism  is,  in  fact,  the 
essential  element  of  life  and  human  progress. 

In  Great  Britain  the  change  of  life  provoked  by  the 
war  was  far  less  considerable  than  in  Germany  and 
France.  The  process  of  change  was  different,  owing  to 
the  insular  position  of  the  country.  And  this  is  not 
one  of  the  least  important  lessons  of  the  war,  this  new 
demonstration  of  the  very  great  part  which  geographical 
conditions  play  in  the  lives  of  nations.  The  war  did 
very  little  to  disturb,  the  customary  life  of  Great  Britain, 
especially  in  the  first  months.  Commerce,  industry, 
and  the  life  of  business  and  pleasure  continued  there 
almost  as  before.  It  was  only  after  the  lapse  of  a  few 
months  that  the  scourge  of  war  made  itself  really  felt 
by  the  English  people.  It  is  true  that  Parliament,  in 
the  first  days  of  August,  had  voted  a  Defence  Act 
which  suppressed  all  liberties — liberty  of  the  Press, 
liberty  of  speech,  publicity  of  justice,  habeas  corpus ; 
etc. — but  it  was  applied  only  with  extreme  prudence, 
and  almost  imperceptibly.  The  modification  of  every- 
day life  was  all  the  smaller  in  that  there  was  no  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  men  capable  of  service,  as  there  was  no 
compulsory  service. 

In  order  to  obtain  an  army  the  United  Kingdom  had 
to  rely  upon  voluntary  recruiting.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  expression  must  be  understood  in  the  sense  that 
no  legal  coercion  was  employed  in  order  to  force  men 
to  enlist.  But  many  forces  were  brought  to  bear  upon 
Englishmen  to  compel  them  to  enlist.  Ideas  of  patriotic 
duty,  and  of  the  necessity  of  setting  a  good  example, 
and  the  fear  of  public  opinion,  exerted  a  powerful  effect 
upon  the  intentions  of  the  upper  and  middle  classes. 
As  for  the  proletariat,  the  economic  conditions  certainly 


182          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

constituted  one  of  the  most  influential  factors.  The 
pay  and  the  separation  allowance  for  wives  and  children 
were  satisfactory.  And  many  employers  brought  all 
possible  weight  to  bear  upon  their  clerks,  workmen, 
or  servants,  in  order  to  compel  them  to  enlist.  They 
cut  down  wages,  and  in  some  cases  even  went  so  far 
as  to  dismiss  their  employees.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  were  some  who  opposed  the  enlistment  of  their 
employees,  as  this  would  have  unsettled  their  business 
affairs.  It  is  important  to  take  note  of  all  these  social 
phenomena,  for  they  teach  us  this  great  lesson:  that 
effective  liberty  does  not  exist  when  there  is  economic 
dependence.  Actual  liberty  presupposes  economic 
equality.  As  La  Boetie  said,  nearly  three  hundred 
years  ago:  "  He  who  is  poor  is  a  slave." 

However,  in  this  voluntary  system  we  must,  on  the 
other  hand,  admit  an  improvement  on  the  system  of 
legal  compulsion  with  penal  sanction.  It  is  an  improve- 
ment because  the  penal  sanction — that  is  to  say,  fear — 
does  not  enter  into  it;  because  the  individual,  obliged 
to  choose,  acts  on  his  own  responsibility,  after  having 
weighed,  more  or  less,  the  consequences  of  his  actions. 
To  tell  the  truth,  this  voluntary  system,  in  which  a 
man  acts  from  free  choice,  raises  a  man  instead  of 
reducing  him  to  the  level  of  a  machine,  or  a  wheel  in 
a  machine.  Voluntary  recruitment  gave  the  British 
Empire — counting  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Dominions,  the  army  and  the  navy — more  than  five 
million  men  !  This  is  a  result  which  we  cannot  suffi- 
ciently emphasize,  for  it  shows  to  what  a  degree  of 
political  development  this  Empire  has  attained,  in  which 
so  many  men  have  had  a  sufficient  notion  of  their 
collective  interests  to  make  the  voluntary  sacrifice  of 
their  lives  in  the  interest  of  the  liberty  of  all. 

With  the  voluntary  system  it  is  necessary  that  the 
rulers  shall  convince  the  masses  of  the  utility  of  this  or 
that  action.  One  can  no  longer  enforce  it;  a  man 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     133 

must  be  persuaded  to  act.  This  necessitates  the  use 
of  the  Press,  and  of  speeches,  and  public  meetings — 
that  is,  it  necessitates  an  intensification  of  political  life. 
And  from  this  follows  the  necessity  of  a  real  Parlia- 
mentary system,  with  a  Parliament  which  effectively 
controls  the  acts  of  the  Ministerial  authority.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  some  injury,  under  the  name  of 
the  "  party  truce,"  was  done  to  this  strict  Parliamentary 
system.  The  censorship  partially  stifled  the  Press; 
the  control  of  Parliament  was  diminished  under  the 
pretext  that  everything  could  not  be  told.  There  was 
a  tendency,  as  elsewhere,  but  in  a  less  degree,  toward 
a  return  to  autocratic  forms  of  government.  Regressive 
conditions  of  environment  tended  to  provoke  a  regression 
of  governmental  methods.  This  is  a  sociological 
phenomenon  which  is  always  recurring. 

However,  the  intense  political  life  which  impregnates 
the  whole  British  nation  insured  that  the  majority  of 
the  nation  should  for  a  long  time,  and  with  the  greatest 
energy,  oppose  compulsory  service,  involving  measures 
of  coercion  which  certain  newspapers  and  societies 
were  recommending.  The  obligatory  nature  of  military 
service  was  not  insisted  upon  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  but  only  when  the  lapse  of  time  had  enabled  the 
war  to  make  its  talons  felt  in  the  British  Isles. 

While  in  France  the  longer  the  war  lasted  the  more 
ordinary  life  tended  to  re-establish  itself,  in  the  British 
Isles  it  tended  to  become  modified.  The  political 
power  of  the  Conservative  elements  seemed  to  increase. 
As  in  France  and  in  Germany,  they  attempted  to  utilize 
the  war  for  their  individual  and  class  aims.  But  as  in 
France,  they  encountered  the  resistance  of  the  demo- 
cratic forces,  and  it  seems  that  in  France,  as  in  Great 
Britain,  these  democratic  forces  have  triumphed, 
although  in  a  different  manner. 

The  forces  of  reaction  which  led  the  campaign  in 
favour  of  compulsory  service  finally  won  the  day — 


134          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

in  April,  1916.  But  their  victory,  from  the  reactionary 
point  of  view,  was  as  a  matter  of  fact  entirely  spoilt 
by  the  long  resistance  of  the  democrats.  It  was  a 
victory  without  a  morrow.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  com- 
pulsory service  only  very  slightly  increased  the  number 
of  soldiers;  but  the  principle  was  admitted,  and  then, 
according  to  requirements,  it  was  possible  to  raise  the 
age-limit. 

The  movement  for  compulsory  service,  which  even- 
tually triumphed,  was  provoked  by  the  Conservatives, 
more,  in  truth,  for  capitalistic  than  for  national  ends. 
The  Liberals  and  the  Labour  Party,  who  were  opposed 
to  it,  were  also  its  opponents  for  individual  and  class 
reasons  rather  than  for  national  reasons.  However,  in 
upholding  the  voluntary  principle  they  were  upholding 
the  principles  of  liberty  and  democracy,  which  the 
Conservative  elements  were  in  real  truth  attacking. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  two  parties,  in  their 
arguments  for  and  against,  relied  particularly  upon  one 
single  fact:  the  suppression  of  the  French  railway 
workers'  strike  of  1910.  This  strike  will  be  remem- 
bered; the  military  mobilization  of  the  workers  and 
clerks  broke  it.  Hence  the  Conservatives  argued  that 
compulsory  service  would  enable  them  to  dominate  the 
trades  unions  and  to  check  strikes  when  these  threat- 
ened. As  for  the  Radicals  and  Labour  men,  they 
deduced  a  similar  argument :  that  they  would  not  accept 
compulsory  service  because  this  would  result  in  their 
being  enslaved  by  the  capitalists. 

When  one  looks  beyond  the  surface  aspect  of  the 
French  strike  of  1910  one  perceives  the  unsoundness  of 
the  argument  on  which  Conservatives,  Liberals,  and 
Labourites  took  their  stand.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
illegal  mobilization — for  it  was  absolutely  illegal — of 
the  railway  clerks  and  workers  only  succeeded  owing 
to  the  weakness  of  the  railway  unions.  If  all  the  rail- 
way-men had  been  members  of  a  union,  instead  of  a 


small  percentage,  the  illegal  decree  of  mobilization 
would  have  been  like  a  cautery  upon  a  wooden  leg. 
No  one  would  have  obeyed  it,  even  had  it  been  legal. 
And  no  one  would  have  dared  to  apply  it.  A  law  is 
never  applied  when  those  who  infringe  it  number  tens 
or  hundreds  of  thousands.  Apparently  the  strike  of  the 
French  railway-men  in  1910  failed  because  of  the  Minis- 
terial decree;  in  reality  it  failed  because  of  the  weakness 
of  the  union. 

Compulsory  service  in  Great  Britain  will  not  weaken 
trade  unionism,  which  constitutes  one  of  the  founda- 
tion stones  on  which  the  entire  democratic  structure 
of  that  country  is  based.* 

The  power  of  the  Conservative  elements  seems  to  be 
increasing  for  various  reasons.  One  is  the  lack  of  the 
spirit  of  equality  in  Great  Britain.  The  social  differen- 
tiation of  the  classes  is  much  more  pronounced  there 
than  in  France.  In  Great  Britain  the  nobility,  as  a 
class,  is  constantly  renewing  itself  by  relations  with 
the  middle  classes.  The  principal  owner  of  landed 
property,  and  deeply  interested  in  industry  and  com- 
merce, it  plays  a  very  considerable  part  in  political  life, 
while  in  France  the  political  role  of  the  same  class  is 
so  small  as  to  be  all  but  negligible.  This  social  pheno- 
menon is  due  to  the  property  system.  The  result  is 
that  in  England  there  is  no  solid  and  powerful  peasant 
class,  a  class  of  small  owners  attached  to  the  soil,  and 
in  spirit  equalitarian  and  democratic.  France  possesses 
such  a  class:  it  is  the  great  reservoir  which  nourishes 
the  life  of  the  labour  world  and  the  intellectual  world, 
which  are  the  foundation  stones  of  the  greatness  and 
energy  of  France. 

*  The  truth  of  this  deduction,  which  I  announced  in  December, 

1915,  to  my  audience  at  Birkbeck  College,  was  proved  in  December, 

1916,  when  Mr.  Lloyd  George  became  Prime  Minister.     He  promised 
the  Labour  party  that  various  of  their  demands  should  be  realized. 
This  fact  shows  that  the  Minister  recognized    the  power  of  trade 
unionism,  which  compulsory  service  had  not  diminished. 


136          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Although  the  political  spirit  exists  in  the  brain  of 
every  British  citizen,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  working 
classes  are  not  greatly  interested  in  political  life.  They 
seem  to  be  preoccupied  only  by  economic  and  trade 
conditions.  They  leave  political  management  to  the 
aristocracy  and  the  middle  classes,  which  provide 
the  greater  portion  of  the  Parliamentary  personnel. 
There  are  various  causes  for  this  sociological  fact. 
First,  the  property  system,  by  stimulating  emigration, 
causes  those  elements  which  are  most  deeply  imbued 
with  the  spirit  of  liberty,  equality,  and  criticism  to 
emigrate,  to  the  impoverishment  of  the  country,  for  it 
loses  its  best  and  most  energetic  citizens.  Second,  the 
great  amount  of  political  liberty  enjoyed  prevents  the 
proletariat  from  feeling  very  acutely  the  need  of  in- 
teresting itself  closely  in  political  life;  a  certain  number 
of  middle  class  politicians  and  aristocrats  look  after 
matters  political;  it  is  accounted  their  work.  Third, 
the  feeble  imagination  and  slow  comprehension  of  the 
majority  of  the  English  people. 

To  what  is  this  lack  of  intellectuality  due  ?  To  my 
mind  it  is  the  result  of  the  kind  of  education  and  in- 
struction in  vogue.  Games  and  sports  have  too  far 
taken  the  place  of  studies  and  intellectual  subjects. 
The  result  is  an  idleness  of  mind  which,  by  virtue  of 
the  natural  law  of  the  least  effort,  maintains  itself  and 
tends  to  increase.  The  Englishman  of  the  middle  class 
does  not  attach  the  same  importance  to  education  and 
scientific  or  literary  knowledge  as  does  the  Continental 
citizen.  It  is  necessary  to  maintain  a  proportion 
between  sports  and  intellectual  tasks,  so  as  to  develop 
the  human  animal  in  all  his  fulness  and  physical  and 
intellectual  beauty.  France  and  England  have  often 
forgotten  this,  the  first  neglecting  sports  and  the  second 
intellectual  studies.  This  predominance  of  sports  has 
maintained  in  the  British  mind  a  certain  spirit  of 
brutality,  of  which  we  find  the  effects  not  only  in  the 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     137 

proletariat,  but  often  in  the  so-called  superior  classes. 
They  accept,  for  example,  and  approve  of  the  educa- 
tional methods  of  the  great  schools,  where  the  system  of 
corporal  punishment  is  piously  maintained. 

Blows  as  punishments  actually  lower  the  dignity  of 
those  who  receive  and  those  who  administer  them. 
There  is  herein  a  still  greater  moral  abasement  for  the 
master  than  for  the  child.  This  preservation  of  corporal 
punishment  in  the  schools  of  the  aristocracy  and  the 
middle  class  is  a  mere  survival  of  the  Biblical  ideal  of 
an  eye  for  an  eye  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth.  It  is  a 
remnant  of  the  barbarous  conceptions  of  antiquity.  It 
is  also  a  certain  sign  that  the  educators  believe  that 
fear  is  the  best  means  of  training  and  controlling  men. 
And  in  this  those  educators  who  resort  to  corporal  and 
other  punishments  belong  to  the  same  psychological 
category  as  the  German  soldiers  who  evolved  the  theory 
of  terrorism  expounded  in  the  Kriegsbrauch  im  Land- 
kriege,  and  realized  it  in  practice  in  the  legal  assassina- 
tion of  Miss  Cavell. 

The  British  love  of  punishment  is  a  very  interesting 
sociological  phenomenon,  for  it  shows  that  the  dead  of 
thousands  of  years  ago,  the  dead  of  little,  barbarous 
Judaea,  are  still  ruling  the  men  of  the  twentieth  century. 
This  is  rather  a  painful  discovery  for  the  thinker  who 
loves  progress,  and  it  must  be  still  more  painful  for  the 
Christian  who  venerates  these  words  of  Christ:  "  Judge 
not,  that  ye  be  not  judged.  He  that  is  without  sin,  let  him 
cast  the  first  stone" 

Other  factors  also  intervene  to  engender  this  intel- 
lectual slowness  of  the  British  citizen.  Tobacco,  per- 
haps, which  is  a  narcotic,  must  be  incriminated,  for  the 
inhabitants  of  the  United  Kingdom  smoke  to  excess. 
The  Englishwoman  is  in  general  more  intellectual  than 
the  Englishman.  There  must  also  be  anthropological 
causes,  for  there  is  no  doubt  that  notable  differences 
are  observable  as  regards  rapidity  of  comprehension 


138          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

and  imagination  between  the  Englishman,  the  Welsh- 
man, the  Scotsman,  and  the  Irishman. 

Lastly,  however  it  may  be,  intellectual  sluggishness 
engenders  slowness  of  action  and  lack  of  foresight. 
These  are  the  two  characteristics  which  have  led  to  the 
policy  of  "  wait  and  see,"  which  has  been  the  great 
principle  of  the  British  Government  during  this  war. 
The  insularity  of  the  country  has  permitted  of  its  appli- 
cation without  any  mortal  danger  resulting.  The  result 
of  this  policy  is  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  for  the 
British  Empire  has  by  no  means  rapidly  exerted  the 
effort  of  its  whole  power.  It  has  not  done  so  even  after 
two  years  of  war.  There  results  from  this  prolongation 
of  the  war  a  considerable  increase  in  the  loss  of  men 
and  money  by  all  the  belligerents.  It  is  true  that  in 
compensation  the  ruin  of  Germany  is  all  the  more  com- 
plete, and  that  advantages  accrue  to  British  industry 
and  commerce.  Another  result  of  the  prolongation  of 
the  war  is  the  engendering,  in  all  the  nations  at  war, 
of  a  truly  revolutionary  situation,  due  to  impoverish- 
ment and  suffering.  Class  antagonisms  are  exasperated, 
class  interests  are  clashing;  at  the  same  time  the  violent 
conditions  under  which  men  are  living  is  reflected  in 
their  mentality,  and  is  developing  in  them  a  spirit  of 
violence  which  peace  tended  to  abolish. 

The  policy  of  "  wait  and  see  "  has  other  causes  also: 
the  differences  of  opinion  concerning  the  war  which 
existed  in  Great  Britain,  especially  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world-crisis.  The  French  people  rose  as  a  single 
man,  having  one  single  mind,  when  it  saw  the  German 
Government  hurling  its  armies  against  it  in  order  to 
enslave  it.  The  Belgian  people  did  the  same.  But  in 
Great  Britain  the  situation  was  different.  As  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  has  said,  if  on  July  31,  1914,  a  referendum  had 
been  taken  in  the  United  Kingdom  to  discover  whether 
the  country  was  to  enter  into  the  war  then  imminent, 
there  would  have  been  95  per  cent,  of  votes  against  any 


139 

such  intervention.  Influential  financiers  in  the  City 
told  this  Minister  that  they  ardently  trusted  that  Great 
Britain  would  keep  out  of  the  Continental  conflict ! 
The  British  nation  was  not  attacked.  Its  insular 
position  made  it  believe  that  it  lay  outside  the  struggle. 

There  was  a  real  incomprehension  of  the  actual  Euro- 
pean situation.  The  war  unloosed  by  the  great  land- 
owners and  industrial  capitalists  of  Germany  was  directed 
far  more  against  the  British  Empire  than  against  France 
or  Russia.  The  German  rulers  desired  the  hegemony  of 
the  world,  and  they  could  achieve  it  only  by  destroying 
the  British  power,  and  the  independence  and  liberty  of  the 
Empire. 

They  expected,  moreover,  to  arrive  at  this  hegemony 
by  means  of  two  stages:  First,  the  hegemony  of  Europe, 
obtained  by  crushing  France  and  Russia  in  1914,  thanks 
to  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain.  Second,  ten  to  twenty 
years  later,  the  hegemony  of  the  world,  by  crushing 
Great  Britain,  thanks  to  the  forces  of  the  whole  of  an 
enslaved  Europe. 

One  of  the  reasons  of  the  incomprehension  of  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  is  historic:  the  intangibility  of  this 
country  in  the  past,  thanks  to  its  insularity,  and,  as  a 
result,  its  triumph  over  the  other  Continental  Powers. 
People  did  not  perceive  that  conditions  were  changed, 
on  account  of  the  progress  of  science,  and  that  intangi- 
bility was  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  lack  of  intellectuality 
in  the  British  mind  explains  this  incomprehension. 

Happily  for  the  future  of  humanity,  Germany  violated 
little  Belgium,  whose  neutrality  was  guaranteed  by  the 
signature  of  the  British  Government.  And  this  com- 
pletely changed  the  anti- warlike  feeling  of  the  population. 
The  majority,  without  being  conscious  that  it  was  to  its 
interest,  from  a  pure  sense  of  loyalty  and  justice,  pro- 
nounced in  favour  of  the  war,  and  in  so  doing  decreed 
the  defeat  of  Germany.  If  the  majority  of  the  nation 
felt  the  necessity  of  crushing  the  Germanic  power  with 


140          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

its  autocratic  spirit,  there  was  a  strong  minority  which 
thought  otherwise  because  it  did  not  realize  the  situation. 
Under  the  influence  of  time  this  minority  weakened, 
but  even  now  it  is  sufficiently  important,  by  reason  of 
its  numbers  and  its  quality,  to  be  reckoned  with.  It  is 
composed  more  particularly  of  democrats,  the  Con- 
servative element  being  wholly  for  the  war. 

The  attitude  of  this  minority  must  be  attributed  very 
largely  to  its  Christian  ideals.  Its  members  are  more  or 
less  partisans  of  non-resistance  to  evil  by  violence,  and 
this  led  some  to  defend  the  ideal  of  peace  at  any  price. 
This  was  to  expose  the  flank  to  the  attacks  of  the  Con- 
servative party,  which  did  not  fail  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunity. It  seemed  thereby  to  increase  in  importance, 
while  the  strength  of  the  democratic  party  seemed  at 
the  same  time  to  diminish.  Besides  the  fact  that  these 
differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  war  diminished  the  liberty 
of  action  of  the  British  Government,  and  to  a  certain 
extent  explained  its  policy  of  "  wait  and  see,"  they 
revealed,  in  all  classes  of  the  population,  a  narrowness  of 
conception  due  to  a  lack  of  intellectuality.  Only  a 
few  isolated  individuals  perceived  that  the  world-war 
was  far  more  than  a  conflict  of  economic  interests.  The 
force  of  events  had  transformed  it  into  a  conflict  between 
two  political  principles,  and  two  moralities:  that  re- 
posing on  liberty,  and  that  reposing  on  authority  and 
fear. 

The  war,  as  it  continues,  has  made  the  British  popula- 
tion keenly  aware  of  its  grip.  All  have  seen  the  incon- 
veniences of  the  policy  of  accommodation,  of  the  principle 
of  "  wait  and  see."  All  have  come  to  understand  that 
the  struggle  is  a  matter  of  life  or  death.  And  the 
minority  has  continually  crumbled  away. 

It  happens,  however,  notwithstanding  the  errors  of 
conception  of  this  small  democratic  minority,  that  its 
resistance  to  the  pretensions  of  the  capitalist  class — 
landowning  and  industrial — has  played,  and  is  playing, 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     141 

an  eminently  useful  social  role.  It  is  upholding  the 
spirit  and  the  politics  of  liberty.  I  would  almost  say 
that  it  is  saving  the  European  democracy  from  sinking 
into  the  slough  of  militarism  and  the  autocracy  dear  to 
the  capitalist  classes  of  all  countries. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  action  of  the  workers  and 
their  unions  will  have  a  happy  and  considerable  influ- 
ence, far  greater  than  the  inconsiderable  temporary 
evils  which  may  result  therefrom.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  such  evils  have  occurred,  for  the  trades  unions 
have  continued  to  carry  out  their  policy  as  though  the 
country  were  not  at  war. 

In  times  of  peace  the  employers  responded  to  the 
intensified  labour  of  the  workers  by  cutting  down  wages. 
The  retort  of  the  workers  was :  the  reduction  of  the  out- 
put of  each  worker.  Gradually  the  habit  of  reducing 
output  took  a  hold  of  them,  for  it  was  the  only  means 
by  which  they  could  maintain  their  wages  at  a  figure 
sufficient  for  their  very  modest  livelihood.  When  the 
war  broke  out  the  collective  interest  called  for  an  in- 
tensification of  production  in  the  munition  works.  This 
the  workers  did  not  understand.  Reduced  production 
had  become  a  habit :  they  continued  in  that  habit.  And 
so  the  Allies  and  the  British  nation  reaped  what  the 
capitalist  class  had  sown.  The  collectivity  suffered  the 
disastrous  consequences  of  the  policy  of  class  interest 
pursued  by  capitalism. 

The  miners'  strike  in  South  Wales  in  1915  once  more 
illustrated  this  same  phenomenon,  although  perhaps  in 
a  different  way.  This  strike,  against  which  so  many 
people  of  all  political  opinions  fulminated,  was  one  of 
the  most  useful  acts  which  a  labour  collectivity  has  ever 
committed.  The  miners  defended  their  interests  exactly 
as  the  capitalists  who  are  enriching  themselves  do  every 
day  of  the  war.  But  from  this  defence  of  private  in- 
terests we  learn  a  lesson  of  immense  importance:  in  the 
first  place,  we  learn  the  strength  of  the  proletariat  when 


142          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

organized  in  their  unions ;  in  the  second  place,  we  learn 
— and  this  is  even  more  important — what  an  enormous 
part  is  played  by  manual  labour,  which  is,  in  fact,  in- 
dispensable. How  petty,  after  this,  appeared  the  role 
of  the  mine-owners,  landlords,  and  others !  Every 
thinking  man  was  made  aware  that  the  British  collec- 
tivity, that  the  whole  of  humanity,  could  live  without 
these  owners,  while  it  could  not  live  without  the  miners. 
This  lesson  is  one  of  the  most  important  I  know  of. 

The  law  relating  to  munitions,  which  was  passed  in 
order  to  obtain  a  modification  of  the  Labour  policy,  has 
very  largely  failed.  The  miners'  strike  in  South  Wales, 
and  many  other  incidents,  have  made  this  clear.  The 
non-application  of  this  law  has  been  the  general  rule, 
wherever  those  who  infringed  it  have  been  numerous. 
Once  again  we  may  put  this  fact  on  record:  that  a  law 
is  only  valid  when  the  majority  of  the  persons  to  whom 
it  applies  accept  it  with  good  will.  If  those  who  infringe 
it  are  numerous  and  powerful,  it  is  not  applied.  And 
from  this  fact  we  derive  this  lesson:  the  power  of  a  law 
depends,  not  in  the  sanction  or  the  power  of  the  Govern- 
ment, but  in  its  free  and  voluntary  acceptance  by  the 
majority  of  the  collectivity. 

The  partial  non-application  of  the  Munitions  Act  is 
also  an  illustration  of  the  moral  inculcated  by  our  great 
thinker,  the  worthy  fabulist,  La  Fontaine: 

"  Selon  que  vous  serez  puissant  ou  miserable, 
Les  jugements  de  cour  vous  rendronl  blanc  ou  noir." 

("  As  you  are  powerful  or  a  beggar,  so 

The  courts  will  make  you  black,  or  white  as  snow.") 

The  Munitions  Act  could  not  exert  any  beneficial 
action  on  the  workers,  because  it  was  a  one-sided  law, 
detrimental  to  a  class,  and  without  any  compensation. 
The  political  spirit  of  the  working  class  was  too  highly 
developed  to  allow  it  to  obtain  a  footing,  even  had  their 
leaders  sanctioned  it.  To  be  effectual,  this  law  should 


THE  BELLIGERENTS  AND  THE  WAR     143 

have  been  bi-lateral — that  is,  there  should  have  been  a 
counterpart  to  the  present  Act,  affecting  the  capitalist 
class.  A  partial  nationalization  of  fortunes,  of  mining 
property,  and  of  the  means  of  transport,  would  have  de- 
prived the  workers  of  any  logical  or  possible  excuse  for 
resisting  the  Munitions  Act.  This  was  not  effected 
because  in  the  conflicts  between  the  capitalist  class  and 
the  proletariat  the  State  is  always  on  the  side  of  the 
capitalist.  It  gives  way  only  when  it  sees  that  it  cannot 
do  otherwise,  on  account  of  the  strength  of  the  workers. 
Sociology  once  again  verified  this  phenomenon  amid  the 
tragic  circumstances  of  the  world-war,  in  which  the 
destinies  of  civilization  are  at  stake. 

Such  conflicts,  indeed,  are  always  conflicts  between 
forces,  and  it  is  only  force  which  decides.  No  idea  of 
justice  presides  over  the  solutions  or  the  compromises 
arrived  at. 

Thanks  to  his  intellectual  sluggishness,  the  British 
citizen  is  less  liable  than  the  Frenchman,  for  example, 
to  be  affected  by  the  trickery  of  words.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  his  political  spirit  is  more  highly  developed, 
owing  to  a  longer  practical  acquaintance  with  political 
life,  the  English  working  man,  or,  to  be  more  exact, 
the  English,  Welsh  or  Scottish  working  man,  has  proved 
to  be  as  much  of  a  realist,  and  as  careful  of  his  individual 
and  class  interests,  as  any  member  of  the  capitalist  class. 
Hence  conflicts  whose  sociological  importance  should 
be  observed,  for  they  ended  in  a  check  to  the  autocratic 
forces  in  their  attempt  to  profit  by  the  war.  Democracy 
was  saved  from  the  attempted  militarization  by  which 
its  enemies  sought  to  kill  it. 

That  the  democratic  parties  of  Great  Britain  were 
able  to  save  democracy  from  shipwreck,  without  great 
prejudice  to  the  Allies  and  the  nation,  was  due  to  the 
insular  position  of  the  country.  The  French  democrats 
could  not  have  done  the  same  under  the  same  condi- 
tions, because  their  country  was  invaded  by  the  enemy. 


144          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

You  perceive  that  at  every  moment  we  are  led  to  observe 
the  enormous  part  which  geographical  conditions  play 
in  determining  sociological  phenomena.  This  proves 
once  more  that  all  things  in  this  universe  are  inter- 
connected, interlinked.  In  time  and  in  space  all  is 
indissolubly  connected.  Every  act  has  consequences 
which  develop  to  infinity  long  after  the  act  itself  has 
been  accomplished.  And  in  this  endless  chain  of  causes 
engendering  effects,  which  are  themselves  causes  in 
their  turn,  the  non-existence  of  one  link  suffices  to 
modify  everything,  to  change  everything.  The  universe 
is  a  whole:  it  possesses  solidarity.  Creatures  and  things 
are  inevitably  pre-determined,  because  they  are  the 
necessary  product  of  the  multiple  pre-existing  conditions. 
Here  is  yet  another  lesson  taught  by  the  gigantic  and 
sanguinary  crisis  through  which  humanity  is  passing. 


CHAPTER  V 

AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY 

The  postal,  telegraphic,  and  telephonic  censorship — The  Press  censor- 
ship— Subsidizing  of  newspapers — Pamphlets  replacing  the  news- 
paper Press,  which  has  become  more  or  less  enslaved — Espionage 
of  the  police — Psychological  and  sociological  consequences  of 
these  methods  of  government,  which  are  based  on  ignorance  and 
delusion — Men  are  easy  to  govern — Opposition  between  autocratic 
methods  of  government  and  democratic  habits  and  principles — 
The  possession  of  power  stultifies  the  mind — The  directing  influence 
of  minorities — The  revolt  against  the  governing  classes — Italy 
and  Bulgaria  enter  the  war:  the  effects  of  popular  revolt  and 
obedience — The  power  of  the  State — The  beneficent  influence  of 
liberty — The  loyalty  of  the  British  Dominions — The  necessity  of 
diminishing  the  power  of  the  State  and  increasing  liberty — The 
Conservative  parties  are  everywhere — The  existence  of  a  class 
mentality — Autocracies  are  inevitably  fated  to  be  replaced  by 
democracies. 

EVEN  before  the  armies  had  entered  upon  enemy 
territory  all  the  Governments  were  censoring  tele- 
graphic despatches;  in  Germany  all  correspondence 
was  stopped  in  the  post  and  held  back.     As  soon  as 
hostilities   had   commenced  the   censorship   was   estab- 
lished everywhere:  a  postal,  telegraphic,*  and  telephonic 
censorship,  as  well  as  the  censorship  of  the  Press. 

In  all  the  belligerent  countries,  then,  the  very  moderate 
liberties  which  were  enjoyed  became  smaller  still. 

Naturally  this  censorship  differed  in  different  countries. 
Here  it  was  very  strict;  there  it  was  very  lax;  and  else- 
where all  the  intermediate  degrees  were  observable. 
Just  at  first  it  was  excessively  severe  in  France:  the 
soldiers — and  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  they  were 

*  In  times  of  peace  the  telegraphic  censorship  exists  everywhere, 
but  is  discreetly  applied,  although  often  in  a  stupid  and  harmful 
fashion. 

145  10 


146          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

all  men  from  twenty  to  forty-six  years  of  age — were 
able  to  write  postcards  only,  or  open  letters.  In  Ger- 
many it  was  the  same.  And  when,  in  her  turn,  Bulgaria 
entered  the  world- war  she  adopted  identical  measures. 
She  even  exaggerated  them,  no  doubt  fearing  internal 
disturbances  and  revolts,  for  all  letters  had  to  be  posted 
open.  It  was  very  soon  observable  everywhere  that 
the  censorship  of  all  correspondence  was  a  stupendous 
task,  occupying  so  great  a  staff  that  it  was  impossible 
to  effect  it  without  completely  arresting  the  life  of  the 
nations.  Then  the  system  of  retarding  letters  by  twenty- 
four  or  forty-eight  hours  or  even  longer  was  resorted  to, 
and  the  censorship  was  applied  only  from  time  to  time, 
letters  being  taken  at  random. 

Time  went  by,  and  under  the  pressure  of  public 
opinion,  Parliament,  and  the  Press,  the  postal  censor- 
ship, in  France,  showed  signs  of  weakening.  The  news- 
papers of  neutral  countries  were  able  to  enter  freely. 
However,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  war, 
at  the  front  the  censorship  was  applied  with  varying 
severity,  and  also,  according  to  the  censors,  in  the 
various  postal  districts.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  the 
first  year  of  the  war  the  letters  of  the  poilus  were  no 
longer  opened,  though  the  poilu  did  not  hesitate  to  call 
a  spade  a  spade  and  a  Rollet  a  rascal. 

We  know  that  any  wielder  of  power  is  inevitably 
impelled  to  abuse  it  and  to  commit  arrogant  and  bully- 
ing actions.  Our  censors  did  not  fail  to  act  thus. 
According  to  the  French  law,  there  should  have  been 
only  a  military  censorship — that  is,  a  censorship  relating 
to  the  operations  of  the  armies.  This  was  often  for- 
gotten by  our  censors,  who  cut,  mutilated,  and  held  up 
letters  at  random  and  illegally.  Thus,  in  a  letter  written 
from  England  to  a  French  non-commissioned  officer, 
the  censor  cut  out  all  that  concerned  the  miners'  strike 
in  Wales !  The  inanity  of  this  illegal  measure  is  ob- 
vious; but  we  must  at  the  same  time  observe  that  it 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    147 

is  quite  characteristic  of  the  censorship.     An  intelligent 
censorship  has  never  been  and  will  never  be  seen. 

While  in  France  the  censorship  grew  less  strict  with 
the  lapse  of  time,  in  Great  Britain  matters  worked  the 
other  way.  Just  at  first  the  postal  censorship  was,  for 
letters  entering  the  country  as  for  those  leaving  it, 
almost  non-existent.  From  the  British  Isles  to  their 
Allies,  and  vice  versa,  letters  and  newspapers  passed 
unexamined.  Correspondence  to  and  from  neutral 
countries  more  often  than  not  escaped  the  slightest 
inspection.  But  little  by  little  the  censorship  grew 
strict,  and  after  a  year  of  warfare  one  might  say  that 
almost  all  correspondence  from  neutrals  was  examined 
and  bore  the  paper  band  now  well  known  in  the  United 
Kingdom:  "  Opened  by  the  censor."  Even  letters  from 
France  are  opened  from  time  to  time. 

At  the  front  the  English  censorship  was,  and  still  is, 
strict.  Soldiers  and  officers  were  allowed  to  tell  nothing 
of  what  they  saw.  This  was  a  ridiculous  demand,  for 
one  cannot  prevent  the  light  from  piercing  the  darkest 
fog  !  All  letters  from  the  front  are  opened.  Words  are 
erased,  phrases  obliterated.  The  censors  have  even  gone 
so  far  as  to  erase  on  picture  postcards  the  names  of  the 
towns  in  which  the  photographs  were  taken  !  They 
imagined  that  they  were  thus  able  to  conceal  the  where- 
abouts of  the  sender !  Only  they  forgot,  like  the 
monkey  in  the  fable,  to  light  their  lantern;  they  left  the 
name  of  the  church,  monument,  or  place  represented, 
and  it  was  easy  enough  to  find  the  name  of  the  town. 
There  are  things  connected  with  the  postal  censorship 
which  smack  of  comic  opera.  Thus,  the  sending  of 
printed  matter  (newspapers,  books,  etc.)  is  prohibited 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  neutral  countries  of 
Europe.  It  is  not  prohibited  between  France  and  the 
neutral  countries,  nor  between  France  and  England. 
Private  persons  in  France  may  not  receive  German  or 
Austrian  newspapers;  but  private  persons  in  England 


148          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

may  !  The  English  censorship  opens  all  correspondence 
from  America,  but  the  French  censorship  does  not.  I 
repeat,  it  is  impossible  for  the  censorship  to  be  intelli- 
gent. It  is  contrary  to  its  nature. 

It  is  in  Germany  that  the  censorship  is  most  severe 
and  most  methodical,  and  I  believe  we  may  say  that  it 
has  been  at  practically  the  same  level  since  August, 
1914.  Perhaps  it  may  have  tended  to  become  more 
severe  than  it  was  at  the  outset,  above  all  where  the 
correspondence  of  neutrals  is  concerned.  Thus  cer- 
tain letters,  in  1915,  took  three  or  four  weeks  to  get 
from  Berlin  to  Geneva !  In  Alsace-Lorraine  corre- 
spondence for  the  interior  of  the  provinces,  as  well  as 
for  the  rest  of  the  Empire,  was  authorized  only  on  the 
condition  that  it  was  open.  This  strict  censorship, 
however,  does  not  prevent  the  truth  from  becoming 
known  both  in  the  Empire  and  outside  it.  No  law,  no 
regulation  can  stop  the  truth.  It  always  ends  by 
filtering  through.  The  censorship,  like  all  Govern- 
mental functions,  is  exercised  by  men;  it  is  optional  for 
these  men  to  nullify  the  decisions  of  their  chiefs  by  not 
censuring  or  by  censuring  badly  the  correspondence 
which  passes  before  their  eyes.  Thus  we  find  German 
prisoners  in  France  receiving  letters  in  which  their 
families  complain  of  great  poverty,  of  the  lack  of  food,  etc. 

However  perfect  organization  and  order  may  be  in 
Germany,  there  are  gaps  in  the  censorship  through 
which  a  few  rays  of  the  light  of  truth  can  pass.  Could 
it  be  otherwise  in  Austria,  whose  organization  has  never 
been  brilliant  ?  Obviously  not;  indeed,  the  censorship 
proved  to  be  very  irregular  in  that  country.  In  Russia, 
too,  all  letters  were  open,  those  addressed  to  Allied 
countries  with  the  rest;  perhaps  even  more  than  the 
rest,  for  the  Russian  bureaucracy  had  to  hide  its  light 
under  a  bushel.  It  had  no  wish  that  the  Allies  should 
learn  of  the  autocratic  manner  in  which  it  was  treating 
the  Poles,  Finns,  Jews,  Letts,  and  Ruthenians. 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY     149 

In  Italy  the  censorship  was  very  strict;  all  letters 
which  left  the  country  were  censored,  even  those  ad- 
dressed to  Allied  countries. 

The  postal  and  telegraphic  censorship  was  not  content 
with  dealing  with  all  that  went  from  belligerent  to 
neutral  countries,  or  vice  versa  ;  indeed,  the  correspon- 
dence between  one  neutral  country  and  another  was 
censored.  All  trans-oceanic  telegraphic  cables  were  in 
the  hands  of  the  Allies,  mostly  in  those  of  Great  Britain. 
Consequently  all  telegrams  passed  before  the  eyes  of 
the  censors,  whatever  their  origin  or  destination.  It  was 
the  same  with  postal  correspondence.  Switzerland,  for 
example,  no  longer  receives  anything  from  Spain, 
America,  or  Rumania,  unless  it  is  examined  by  the 
French,  Italian,  or  Austrian  censorship.  The  same 
censorship  is  exercised  in  respect  of  postal  correspondence 
addressed  to  the  Scandinavian  countries,  Holland,  and 
Spain,  and  correspondence  originating  from  these 
countries.  Switzerland  has  made  official  protests  to 
the  belligerent  Powers  respecting  this  incursion  upon 
her  sovereignty,  and  has  requested  the  other  neutrals 
to  join  her  in  these  protests. 

The  evil  of  the  censorship  and  the  holding  up  of 
letters  is  keenly  felt  in  respect  of  commercial  and  other 
relations,  which  once  again  shows  the  harmful  nature  of 
authority.  The  world-war  has  reduced  the  liberties  of 
all,  even  of  those  who  do  not  belong  to  the  belligerent 
nations.  But  happily  the  axiom  of  mechanical  physics, 
which  states  that  every  action  is  followed  by  a  reaction, 
is  also  true  in  sociology.  This  is  why  we  discover 
everywhere  that  this  reduction  of  liberties  has  increased 
the  love  of  liberty.  Men  have  seen  the  worth  of  it, 
and  are  seeing  it  every  day. 

Moreover,  the  Press  censorship  has  added  itself  to 
the  postal  censorship,  in  order  to  make  the  value  of 
liberty  more  plainly  perceptible.  It  varies  in  its  appli- 
cation in  different  countries,  belligerent  or  otherwise, 


150          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

for  it  has  been  established  in  neutral  countries,  such  as 
Switzerland,  Holland,  Rumania,  etc. 

In  Germany  it  has  been  very  strict,  although  it  has 
not  always  been  preventive.  It  is  rare  that  the  news- 
papers appear  with  blank  spaces.  The  military  autho- 
rities, in  fact,  require  that  the  articles  suppressed  shall 
be  replaced  by  others.  In  these  articles  lines  and  even 
single  words  are  suppressed.  But  the  censorship  of 
the  Press  is  facilitated  in  Germany  by  the  fact  that  the 
Press,  for  the  most  part,  is  completely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Government.  But  we  will  consider  this  point  later 
on.  The  censorship  is  such  that  in  the  Reichstag,  in 
October,  1916,  deputies  of  various  political  shades  com- 
plained of  it.  "  The  censorship,"  said  one  of  them, 
"  has  in  this  country  become  the  docile  instrument  of 
the  political  police.  The  Press  is  not  treated  as  an 
instrument  of  culture,  but  like  a  brute  beast  which  is 
trained  with  sugar  and  the  whip."  Often  enough  the 
military  authorities  prohibit  or  suspend  the  publication 
of  newspapers  for  a  longer  or  shorter  space  of  time. 
The  authorization  to  reappear  is  only  given  after  the 
erring  journal  has  promised  to  be  "  very  prudent." 
Consequently,  clandestine  publications  are  flourishing, 
leaflets  and  pamphlets;  and  in  spite  of  the  censorship 
and  the  police  they  find  their  way  everywhere.  The 
acts  of  authority  in  restraint  of  liberty  are  always 
answered  by  the  acts  of  those  that  love  liberty.  In 
Germany  one  can  as  a  rule  readily  buy  or  receive  the 
newspapers  of  France  or  Great  Britain.  It  often 
happens,  however,  that  these  newspapers  are  seized  as 
they  enter  the  country.  The  German  Government 
permits  this  degree  of  liberty  only  because  it  knows  that 
the  German  people  would  never  believe  the  statements 
of  its  enemies,  because  it  is  so  accustomed  to  admire 
the  State,  obey  its  orders,  and  believe  in  its  statements. 

In  Great  Britain  also  the  Press  displays  no  blank 
spaces,  and  if  one  went  by  appearances  one  would  not 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY     151 

believe  that  any  censorship  existed.  Were  not  questions 
relating  to  this  subject  asked  in  the  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment— questions  which  the  newspapers  report  and 
comment  upon — the  lower  classes  in  town  and  country 
would  know  nothing  of  the  existence  of  the  censorship. 
Democratic  England  resorts  to  the  same  hypocritical 
procedure  as  autocratic  Germany.  In  Germany  the 
censorship  is  exercised  over  everything;  military  opera- 
tions, the  political  and  economic  life  of  the  country, 
diplomatic  relations,  news  from  abroad — all  is  censored. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  Press  censorship  has  not 
attained  this  perfection,  for  the  economic  and  political 
life  of  the  country  lies  beyond  the  province  of  the 
censorship.  But  for  all  the  rest — foreign  politics,  mili- 
tary operations,  news  from  abroad,  etc. — the  censorship 
is  systematically  applied.  The  British  public  is  kept 
in  ignorance  of  important  articles  which  appear  in 
neutral  newspapers,  and  of  items  concerning  the  internal 
politics  of  Russia.  The  official  telegrams  of  enemy 
Powers  were  at  one  time  carefully  expurgated  before  the 
papers  were  allowed  to  print  them.  To  read  them  in 
the  papers,  without  any  indication  of  erasures,  one 
might  well  have  supposed  that  they  were  published 
intact.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  proverb,  "  One  must  not 
trust  to  appearances,"  is  still  true. 

The  newspapers  published  in  England  appear,  I  have 
remarked,  without  blank  spaces;  however,  there  are  at 
least  two  exceptions:  L' Independance  Beige  and  La 
Belgique  Nouvelle,  which  are  published  in  French  in 
London.  On  several  occasions  I  have  seen  white  blanks 
in  the  place  of  lines  or  articles  which  the  censorship 
had  suppressed.  I  suspect  also  that  some  English  news- 
papers publish  articles  without  submitting  them  to  the 
censorship,  for  weeklies  like  the  Labour  Leader  have 
given  information  concerning  Russia  which  was  not  to 
be  found  in  the  great  dailies.  The  Government  has  no 
doubt  shrunk  from  applying  the  Defence  of  the  Realm 


152          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Act,  as  it  shrunk  from  applying  it  in  connection  with 
the  Evening  News,  which  published  an  item  of  news 
although  the  censorship,  the  Press  Bureau,  had  forbidden 
its  publication.  From  these  facts  we  learn  these  lessons : 
man  enjoys  only  those  liberties  which  he  takes.  Never 
has  authority  willingly  diminished  itself  by  granting 
liberties. 

In  Austria,  France,  and  Italy  the  Press  leaves  blank 
the  spaces  in  which  the  prohibited  articles  or  passages 
were  to  have  appeared.  According  to  the  vote  of  the 
French  Parliament,  the  Press  censorship  ought  to  be 
applied  only  in  respect  of  military  matters.  But  we 
know  that  every  individual  or  collective  body  which 
possesses  power  tends  to  abuse  it.  This  is  a  law  of 
nature.  So  the  censorship  has  day  after  day  exceeded 
its  legal  powers.  It  has  prohibited  many  and  many 
an  article  of  a  purely  political  nature ;  it  has  suppressed, 
here,  there,  and  everywhere,  lines  and  phrases  which 
were  simply  critical  of  the  Government.  The  more 
independent  the  writer,  the  more  he  was  censored,  and 
if  he  did  not  obey  the  censorship  the  newspaper  found 
that  its  publication  was  suspended,  or  even  suppressed. 
Thus  M.  Clemenceau's  Homme  Libre  was  doomed  to 
disappear,  only  to  reappear  under  a  title  which  was  a 
symbol,  L'Homme  Enchaine. 

In  all  the  belligerent  countries  the  Governmental 
authority,  whether  military  or  civil,  has  arrogated  to 
itself  the  right  to  seize  newspapers  and  forbid  their 
publication.  This  has  happened  fairly  frequently  in 
Germany  and  in  France;  rarely  in  Great  Britain.  One 
single  daily  newspaper  was  suspended  in  London  for 
a  few  weeks.  Prohibitions  were  most  usually  tem- 
porary. As  a  rule  they  affected  newspapers  of  no 
particular  importance.  The  net  of  the  law  stops  the 
little  fish,  but  allows  the  big  fish  to  pass.  Power  is  a 
force  which  is  always  imposing  itself.  The  British 
Government,  not  daring  to  suppress  the  Labour  Leader 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY     153 

and  the  U.D.C.,  the  organ  of  the  "  Union  of  Democratic 
Control,"  whose  pacifist  policy  was  prejudicial  to  its 
war  policy,  prohibited  its  export  from  the  United 
Kingdom.  It  thought  thereby  to  localize  the  poison, 
if  poison  there  was.  I  very  much  doubt,  however, 
whether  these  methods  of  stifling  opinion  have  succeeded, 
for  I  have  since  then  seen  many  copies  of  the  Labour 
Leader.  Each  device  of  the  authorities  for  restraining 
the  free  commerce  of  thought  is  met  by  a  device  of  the 
opposing  side  for  giving  free  expression  and  currency 
to  their  thoughts. 

In  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe  the  direct  or  in- 
direct censorship  has  been  general,  with  the  object  of 
restraining  the  expression  of  opinion,  in  order  to  main- 
tain the  neutrality  of  the  Press.  This  is  really  an 
arbitrary  measure  on  the  part  of  the  Governments; 
Governmental  neutrality  does  not  imply  the  neutrality 
of  the  citizens  and  the  Press.  The  right  of  each  citizen 
to  judge  the  facts  and  to  express  his  feeling  or  his  judg- 
ment has  nothing  to  do  with  the  neutrality  of  a  Govern- 
ment. The  intimidation  resulting  from  the  terrorist 
policy  of  Germany  has  impelled  the  majority  of  the 
neutral  Governments  of  Europe  to  abuse  their  power 
by  treating  the  Press  as  a  Governmental  organ.  It  has 
to  be  silent  concerning  its  feelings  for  the  Western 
Allies  because  these  would  displease  the  Governments 
of  the  Central  Empires.  The  Press  has  to  see  to  it 
that  there  is  some  sort  of  a  balance  between  the  pro- 
Entente  and  the  pro-Imperial  articles.  I  say  a  sort  of 
balance,  not  an  exact  balance,  for,  according  to  what 
Dr.  Kristian  Aars,  a  member  of  the  Christiania  Academy 
of  Sciences,  writes  to  me,  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to 
content  the  German  Government,  to  publish  at  least 
four  articles  in  its  favour  as  against  three  in  favour  of 
the  Entente. 

In  Switzerland  the  censorship  has  been  more  re- 
pressive than  preventive.  There  have  been  prosecu- 


154          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tions  and  seizures  which  many  Swiss  jurists  declare  to 
be  illegal,  because  unconstitutional.  The  Romance 
journals  organized  an  energetic  resistance,  which  found 
an  echo  in  the  Federal  Council.  The  officers  who 
exercised  the  censorship  had  to  set  a  limit  to  their 
Caesarean  tactics — that  is,  to  their  mania  for  authority. 

In  those  neutral  countries  of  Europe  which  speak  the 
language  of  one  of  the  belligerents  another  kind  of 
censorship  was  organized:  the  consular  censorship. 
Those  newspapers  which  hoped  to  effect  sales  in  the 
neighbouring  belligerent  country  submitted  some  of 
their  -articles  to  a  consular  inspection  !  And  of  course 
the  general  public  knew  nothing  of  this  ! 

Everywhere  the  journalistic  censorship  has  aroused 
protests.  Everywhere  writers  have  endeavoured  to 
ridicule  and  to  destroy  it.  Thus,  for  example,  in  France, 
in  the  Homme  Enchaine,  M.  Clemenceau's  article  was 
one  day  reduced  to  the  signature  of  the  writer,  and 
nothing  else  ! — but  all  the  politicians  of  Paris,  the  other 
journalists,  and  the  subscribers  received  this  article  in 
a  sealed  envelope,  and  a  few  days  later  the  Berliner 
Tageblatt  gave  it  in  extenso.  In  England  the  censors 
one  day  excised  some  lines  of  Browning !  Another 
day  they  prohibited  the  publication  of  the  news  of  the 
Ochta  munition  works,  which  had  been  printed  in  all 
the  Petrograd  newspapers  !  In  August,  1914,  all  the 
Belgian  newspapers  announced  the  arrival  of  British 
troops  on  French  and  Belgian  soil,  but  the  English 
newspapers  were  forbidden  to  divulge  this  news  !  In 
September,  1914,  the  Swiss  newspapers  spoke  of  the 
landing  of  Indian  troops  in  Marseilles,  which  news  was 
not  published  in  London  for  another  fortnight.  In 
France  the  censorship  prohibits  the  publication  of  enemy 
communique's.  But  the  Frenchman  can  read  them  by 
buying  the  Swiss  or  English  newspapers  ! 

As   the   censorship   has   been   exercised   in   different 
countries   and  in  different  cities  by  different   men — 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY     155 

tot  capita  tot  sententcel — one  had  the  delightful  ex- 
perience of  seeing  the  same  article  authorized  in  Paris, 
prohibited  at  Carcassonne,  and  mutilated  at  Nantes;  or 
the  same  news,  originating  from  Rome,  was  permitted 
in  London  and  prohibited  in  Paris,  or  vice  versa.  How- 
ever, to  draw  up  a  balance-sheet  of  the  absurd  decisions 
of  the  censorship  of  all  countries,  to  note  all  the  unreason- 
able excisions  which  it  has  effected,  would  require 
several  volumes.  The  Press  censorship  has  everywhere 
made  itself  ridiculous.  And  a  very  little  reflection  will 
show  that  it  could  not  have  been  otherwise.  To 
exercise  it  necessarily  required  an  army  of  employees. 
Intelligence  is  not,  unhappily,  a  universal  attribute. 
When  unintelligence  has  unlimited  power  in  its  hands, 
and  there  is  no  appeal,  which  is  the  case  with  the 
censorship,  results  are  obtained  which  are  monstrously 
stupid  and  ridiculously  grotesque.  In  Great  Britain 
the  censorship  of  the  Press  and  the  postal  censorship 
have  always  been  in  civilian  hands.  In  France  the 
postal  censorship,  which  is  exercised  only  at  the  expense 
of  neutrals  and  soldiers,  has  always  remained  an  ap- 
panage of  the  military  power.  During  the  first  months 
of  the  war  in  France,  and  during  the  whole  of  the  war 
in  Germany,  the  Press  censorship  has  been  exercised  by 
soldiers.  The  special  mentality  of  the  professional 
soldier  increases  the  tyranny  of  the  censors.  One  may 
judge  of  this  by  the  reply  of  a  German  General,  a 
regional  commander,  to  whom  someone  complained  of 
the  censorship :  "It  is  we  who  are  the  Ministry,  the 
Bundesrath,  the  Chancellor,  and  the  Reichstag."  (Cited 
in  the  Reichstag,  on  May  24,  1916,  by  Herr  Liesching.) 
It  is  the  common  fate  of  all  autocratic  organisms  to 
perpetrate  more  blunders  and  absurdities  than  useful 
actions.  The  enjoyment  of  power  inevitably  leads  to 
tyranny  and  hypertrophy  of  the  ego. 

The  censorship,  in  fact,  is  everywhere  an  organism 
which  completes  that  secret  diplomacy  of  which  the 


156          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

present  world-war  is  one  of  the  great  achievements. 
The  aim  of  the  censorship  is  in  reality — and  we  must 
not  forget  it,  for  this  is  one  of  the  lessons  of  the  war — 
to  keep  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  all  countries  in 
ignorance  of  existing  facts.  This  is  one  of  the  methods 
of  lying  to  the  peoples,  who,  in  the  conception  of  their 
Governments,  are  flocks  of  sheep  requiring  shepherds 
and  dogs.  The  evil  of  the  censorship,  owing  to  the 
very  ignorance  in  which  it  is  obliged  to  maintain  the 
public,  is  greater  than  the  few  military  advantages 
which  may  result  from  it,  if  such  advantages  do  result. 

One  of  the  consequences  of  the  Press  censorship  has 
been  to  increase  the  responsibility  of  the  Government, 
which  has  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  everything 
which  is  printed.  Nothing,  in  fact,  can  appear  without 
its  authorization.  And  it  follows  that  everything  which 
is  printed  in  the  newspapers  assumes  an  official,  or  at 
least  a  semi-official,  character.  But  the  most  serious 
consequences  of  the  censorship  are  these:  that  an 
atmosphere  of  ignorance  is  maintained,  and  the  peoples 
are  habituated  to  hide  the  truth  from  themselves,  to 
delude  themselves.  It  was  the  Press  censorship  in 
England  which  was  partly  responsible  for  the  slowness 
of  the  English  people  in  realizing  the  war.  It  was 
kept,  and  is  kept,  in  the  ignorance  of  the  facts,  of  which 
it  is  acquainted  with  a  portion  only,  and  those  favour- 
able ones.  Ignorance  is  the  worst  defect  of  democracies, 
since  in  order  to  govern  oneself  one  must  form  judg- 
ments and  decisions.  Now  one  cannot  form  judgments 
and  decisions  without  knowledge.  Ignorance  maintains 
illusions.  It  is  a  profound  psychological  error  to  sup- 
pose that  illusion  maintains  moral  force.  This  is  as 
great  a  psychological  error  as  the  physiological  error 
which  administers  alcohol  in  order  to  give  strength. 

The  censorship  is  a  cerebral  narcotic,  just  as  are 
alcohol,  cocaine,  or  morphia.  It  depresses  the  will  by 
maintaining  illusions,  by  accustoming  men  to  fear  the 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    157 

truth.  It  is,  like  secret  diplomacy,  in  opposition  to  the 
democratic  principles  of  the  Western  Governments,  and 
for  this  very  reason  it  can  only  lead  to  blunders  and 
mistakes.  The  establishment  and  operation  of  the 
censorship  bring  into  prominence  a  curious  facet  of 
the  mentality  of  the  rulers.  It  proves,  in  fact,  that 
the  rulers  imagine  themselves  to  be  the  sole  possessors 
of  the  truth,  and  the  only  persons  designed,  from  all 
eternity,  to  guide  the  people,  exactly  as  parents  imagine 
that  they  are  from  all  eternity  designed  for  the  guidance 
of  children.  Both  these  conceptions  are  equally  false, 
for  they  may  both  be  summed  up  by  the  conception  of 
the  "  ruler  by  right  divine."  It  is  impossible,  there- 
fore, not  to  perceive  an  absolute  contradiction  between 
these  ideas  and  the  democratic  method  of  government 
which  are  based  on  representation  and  Parliamentary 
delegation — that  is  to  say,  on  the  system  of  manda- 
tories obliged  to  justify  all  their  acts  to  constituents. 

The  rulers  actually  believe  that  the  people  is  in- 
capable of  ruling  itself,  incapable  of  understanding  the 
facts  of  life  and  of  assimilating  the  lessons  which  they 
teach,  incapable  of  realizing  what  moral  and  intellectual 
nourishment  it  requires;  consequently,  "  superior 
beings  "  are  required  to  select  and  prepare  this  nourish- 
ment, to  the  exclusion  of  any  other;  and  it  is  these 
rulers  who  are  these  "  superior  beings."  So  one  sees 
the  censorship  suppressing  philosophic  ideas  expressed 
years  or  centuries  before  the  war,  excising  sociological 
or  moral  deductions,  etc.  It  is  obvious  that  such  a 
state  of  affairs  is  the  symptom  of  an  acute  condition  of 
Csesarism,  which  attacks  every  person  who  wields  an 
authority  which  is  more  or  less  unbalanced  by  opposing 
forces.  Moreover,  if  we  reflect  that  before  the  war  the 
censorship  did  not  exist  in  Occidental  countries,  and 
that  after  the  war  it  will  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself 
in  these  countries,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  realize  the 
stupidity  of  such  a  system,  which  makes  the  publica- 


158         LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tion  of  philosophical,   social,  or  moral  ideas  good  or 
bad  according  to  the  date  of  publication. 

The  policy  of  the  wielders  of  authority  always  recalls 
the  foolishness  of  the  ostrich.  They  imagine  that  by 
suppressing  the  expression  of  ideas  or  feelings  they 
can  suppress  the  ideas  and  feelings  themselves.  Whether 
through  ignorance  or  forgetfulness,  they  allow  this  truth 
to  escape  them:  that  ideas  and  feelings  are  generated, 
not  by  the  ideas  and  feelings  of  others,  nor  by  their 
expression,  but  by  the  acts  which  annoy  the  individual, 
and  cause  him  more  or  less  prejudice.  Words  only  give 
a  concrete  form  to  the  ideas  and  feelings  dispersed 
through  the  human  brain.  It  merely  plays  the  part 
of  the  pinch  of  salt  dropped  into  a  super-saturated 
solution,  which  enables  it  to  form  itself  into  a  mass  of 
crystals.  To  restrain  the  expression  of  thought  may 
slightly  retard  the  solidification  of  the  ideas  and  opinions 
dispersed  throughout  the  masses,  it  can  never  prevent 
the  production  of  these  ideas  and  opinions,  which  are 
the  inevitable  results  of  acts  which  have  aggrieved  the 
individual.  To  restrain  the  expression  of  thought  ends 
always  by  stimulating,  in  the  minds  of  those  who  are 
directly  affected,  the  idea  of  resorting  to  violence  as 
a  demonstration  of  opinion.  Among  the  masses,  who 
are  indirectly  affected,  this  restriction  results  in  allowing 
ideas  and  opinions  to  develop  chaotically,  inorganically, 
and  immoderately.  It  produces  in  the  human  race  the 
same  phenomenon  which  is  produced  when  one  lights 
a  fire  under  a  hermetically  sealed  boiler.  The  water 
is  vaporized,  and  the  pressure  increases  until,  being 
stronger  than  the  metallic  envelope,  it  causes  an  ex- 
plosion. Thus  we  have  seen  an  intellectual,  an  advo- 
cate and  professor,  Dr.  Friedrich  Adler,  resorting  to  a 
revolver,  and  killing  the  Prime  Minister  of  Austria. 
The  censorship,  whether  Press  or  postal,  is  far  from 
achieving  the  object  which  the  Governmental  authori- 
ties have  proposed  to  themselves.  The  slightest  ob- 


AUTOCRACY  AND^DEMOCRACY          159 

server  of  human  psychology _will  be  inclined  to  say 
that  it  produces  the  very  reverse  of  the  desired  effect. 

Once  again  we  perceive  the  truth  of  the  apophthegm 
of  Kant,  that  the  enjoyment  of  power  more  or  less 
deprives  men  of  the  faculty  of  reasoning.  It  is  indeed 
a  melancholy  fact  that  in  the  twentieth  century  we 
must  still  repeat  what  Milton  said  in  the  seventeenth: 

"  The  censorship  is  not  only  an  insult  to  human 
dignity,  it  is  a  completely  useless  invention  which  has 
not  achieved  its  object.  ...  If  contagion  be  feared 
so  greatly,  all  criticism  must  be  renounced.  .  .  .  No, 
no,  Lords  and  Commons  !  Men's  minds  must  not  be 
imprisoned;  the  time  has  come  to  speak  and  to  write 
freely  concerning  all  public  matters.  Should  the  winds 
of  all  the  doctrines  blow  upon  the  earth  together,  the 
truth  is  in  the  field:  let  it  contend  with  error.  Who 
has  ever  seen  the  truth  vanquished  in  a  free  and  open 
battle  ?"  (Areopagitica). 

***** 

Another  means  of  the  policy  of  untruth  of  which  the 
censorship  forms  part  is  the  system  of  subsidizing 
newspapers.  It  has  been  practised  by  all  the  belli- 
gerents, and  above  all  by  Germany.  With  admirable 
method,  the  German  Government  has  employed  every 
means  to  attain  its  ends,  which,  however,  it  will  not 
attain.  The  German  Press  ceased  to  express  the 
opinion  of  political  parties  and  individual  writers;  it 
expressed  only  the  desires  and  aspirations  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. Not  only  news,  but  even  leading  articles, 
were  furnished  by  a  Government  agency  to  all  sorts 
of  newspapers,  even  in  the  smallest  towns.  It  was 
necessary  to  mould  public  opinion,  and  there  was  no 
better  method  of  doing  this  than  to  allow  none  but 
selected  news,  commentaries,  and  estimates  to  reach 
the  public.  This  task  of  stultifying  the  German  mind 
has  been  methodically  carried  out,  as  is  proved  by  an 
official  and  confidential  circular  which  Vorw'drts  pub- 


160         LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

lished  in  October,  1915.  This  task  has  also  been  carried 
out  abroad  and  in  countries  for  the  time  being  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  such  as  Belgium,  Poland,  and  the  north- 
east of  France.  Newspapers  have  been  created,  others 
have  been  purchased  or  assisted,  while  journalists  and 
political  writers  have  been  subsidized  by  the  Imperial 
Governments  in  the  Scandinavian  countries,  Holland, 
the  United  States,  Greece,  Spain,  etc. 

The  same  system  has  been  followed  by  the  other 
belligerents,  but  on  a  smaller  scale  and  with  less  method ; 
and  the  result  everywhere  has  been  that  the  news- 
papers have  been  discredited  and  are  distrusted. 
Towards  the  end  of  1915  the  French  bureaucracy 
created  a  so-called  organization  of  propaganda.  It 
established  it  on  the  same  lines  as  those  employed  in 
Germany,  but  of  course  in  a  far  less  precise  and  orderly 
manner;  the  men  employed  were  not,  as  in  Germany, 
reared  in  admiration  of  the  State  and  passive  obedience. 
In  England  this  propaganda  is  less  the  product  of 
Governmental  action  than  of  the  actions  of  free  in- 
dividuals and  societies;  also  it  is  more  pliable,  more 
varied,  and  therefore  more  influential. 

The  selection  of  news,  the  delayed  publication  of 
telegrams,  comments  whose  insertion  is  paid  for,  and 
the  absence  of  independent  criticism,  have  everywhere 
had  the  result  of  destroying  all  confidence  in  the  Press, 
which  has  thus  seen  its  powers  of  controlling  public 
opinion  diminished.  Here  we  perceive  an  important 
result  of  autocratic  modes  of  government.  This  result 
would  have  been  still  greater  had  the  mass  of  the  people 
everywhere  realized  the  actual  conditions  of  the  Press. 
However,  many  people,  even  among  the  masses,  have 
had  an  intuition  of  the  reality,  to  judge  by  their  con- 
versation and  correspondence.  Besides,  to  read  one 
newspaper  is  to  read  all,  for  all  are  strangely  alike — 
the  effect  of  the  censorship  on  news  and  commentaries. 

The  "  intellectuals  "  promptly  realized  the  true  state 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    161 

of  affairs,  and  in  order  to  escape,  at  least  partially, 
from  the  Governmental  censorship  of  the  Press,  and 
to  express  their  opinions  a  little  more  freely,  they  had 
recourse  to  pamphlets.  This  was  the  only  way  in 
which  they  could  satisfy  their  need  of  expressing  their 
thoughts.  In  some  countries  there  was  no  preventive 
censorship  of  pamphlets,  but  the  writers  could  be 
prosecuted  if  they  infringed  or  appeared  to  infringe  the 
Defence  Acts.  Thus  we  have  seen  magistrates  con- 
demning pamphlets  in  London,  while  these  same  pam- 
phlets were  freely  circulating  in  Manchester  or  Glasgow  ! 
The  defence  of  the  kingdom  has  mysteries  which  one 
cannot  fathom.  But  one  fact  is  obvious:  the  harmful 
nature  of  the  authority  which  permits  the  occurrence 
of  such  illogical  and  irrational  actions. 

For  the  rest,  the  censorship  of  reviews,  pamphlets, 
and  books  in  the  countries  in  which  it  existed  was  less 
severe  than  that  of  the  newspapers.  Anyone  who 
could  spend  a  few  shillings  on  a  book  had  the  right  to 
read  things  which  the  reader  of  a  twopenny  pamphlet 
was  not  allowed  to  know.  The  latter,  however,  had 
the  right  to  learn  of  things  of  which  the  knowledge  was 
forbidden  to  the  ordinary  reader  of  the  halfpenny 
Press.  Knowledge  must  be  in  proportion  to  wealth: 
such  is  the  policy  of  Governments,  which  once  again 
justifies  the  idea  that  the  rich  man  always  enjoys 
more  liberty  than  the  poor  man.  Thus,  for  example, 
a  notice  in  respect  of  the  war  appeared  intact  in  the 
Intermediaire  des  Chercheurs  et  des  Curieux,  but  was 
deprived  of  a  sentence  in  L'Humanite.  In  Germany 
the  opposition,  whether  ultra-reactionary  or  extreme 
Socialist,  resorted  not  only  to  pamphlets,  but  also  to 
single  sheets,  printed  articles  which  circulated  secretly 
from  hand  to  hand,  as  letters,  or  in  the  midst  of  other 
printed  matter,  despite  the  police  and  the  authorities 
of  every  species. 

The  number  of  pamphlets,  and  even  of  books,  which 

11 


162          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

have  everywhere  seen  the  light  during  this  period  of 
world-wide  crisis  is  such  that  one  must  go  back  to  the 
time  of  the  English  Revolution,  or  that  of  the  French 
Revolution,  in  order  to  discover  an  equivalent.  Great 
social  crises  always  engender  a  need  to  express  ideas 
and  opinions,  and  when  the  Press  is  limited  as  to  its 
numbers,  or  is  not  free,  the  necessary  refuge  is  the 
pamphlet.  Independently  of  periods  and  of  nations, 
the  same  causes  produce  identical  effects. 

This  copious  publication  of  pamphlets,  expressing 
men's  thoughts  almost  with  freedom,  shows  the  power 
of  the  love  of  liberty  in  the  human  heart.  Men  have 
been  so  accustomed  to  enjoy  this  liberty  that  they 
have  little  by  little  forgotten  that  love.  The  continued 
possession  of  a  thing  dulls  the  idea  and  the  sense  of  its 
value.  Before  we  can  feel  its  full  value  we  must  be 
deprived  of  it.  This  is  why  one  of  the  lessons  of  the 
war  is  the  appreciation  of  the  value  of  liberty,  and  an 
increase  of  the  love  of  liberty. 

***** 

The  atmosphere  of  ignorance  created  by  the  policy 
of  actual  lying,  or  lying  by  omission,  which  is  practised 
by  all  the  Governments,  exerts  a  democratizing  influ- 
ence over  the  individual.  The  Governmental  procedure 
of  the  moment  is  far  from  being  a  school  of  morality. 
This  is  all  the  more  true  in  that  the  use  of  lying  com- 
munique^ and  the  censorship,  in  the  various  belligerent 
and  neutral  countries,  are  aggravated  by  an  extra- 
ordinary development  of  espionage  and  counter- 
espionage. This  is  a  bold  and  cunning  attempt  to 
purchase  men's  consciences.  Where  there  are  buyers, 
there  the  sellers  will  always  be  found,  even  if  it  is  a 
question  of  betraying  the  confidence  of  friends  and 
acquaintances.  The  soul  of  Judas  is  still  living:  to 
tempt  it  is  a  devil's  work. 

The  war  forces  the  Governments  to  offer  this  tempta- 
tion. So  here  we  see  another  side  of  the  school  of 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY     163 

crime  which  is  war.  But  its  bloodstained  aspect  we 
find  in  the  violence  of  the  repression  of  so-called  es- 
pionage. In  Brussels,  Liege,  London,  Prague,  Agram, 
etc.,  on  the  French  and  Russian  fronts,  in  the  Dar- 
danelles, etc.,  men  and  women  are  shot  for  spying  for 
love  of  their  country  or  the  love  of  gain.  They  are  shot 
even  when  they  are  not  spies,  shot  for  giving  fraternal 
and  humane  aid  to  enemies  or  fellow-countrymen  and 
co-allies.  Death — always  death;  that  is  the  military 
code,  which  is  based  solely  on  terrorism.  But  it  must  be 
confessed  that  this  terrorism  does  not  terrify.  The  love  of 
country,  of  gain,  and  of  humanity  is  stronger  than  fear ; 
and  espionage  continues,  and  fraternal  aid  continues. 

From  these  facts  we  deduce  this  result:  the  useless- 
ness  of  punishments,  which  never  prevented  a  crime 
or  any  other  act  whatever.  One  always  hopes  to 
escape  the  penalty.  It  is  not  by  means  of  fear  and 
terror  that  we  must  educate  men,  but  by  love.  The 
man  who  desires  to  be  a  leader  of  men  and  a  teacher 
must  always  keep  in  mind  these  maxims  of  Jesus: 
"  Love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself.  .  .  .  Judge  not,  that 
ye  be  not  judged.  .  .  .  Condemn  not,  that  ye  be  not 
condemned." 

Humanity,  in  the  twentieth  century,  has  not  yet 
attained  comprehension  of  the  wisdom  of  these  words. 
Thus,  men  still  condemn  one  another.  War  has  even 
increased  the  number  of  crimes.  The  expression  of 
certain  opinions  has  become  criminal.  Men  are  for- 
bidden, by  order  of  the  Governmental  authority,  to 
express  any  opinion  that  has  not  received  the  Govern- 
mental impress.  We  are  going  back  to  the  customs 
against  which  our  great-grandfathers  revolted  in  our 
Western  countries.  But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
crime  is  non-existent  unless  the  author  of  it  is  of  the 
lower  classes.  The  same  opinion  is  not  a  crime  if 
expressed  by  a  University  professor,  a  barrister,  a 
politician,  or  a  journalist,  while  if  it  is  expressed  by  a 


164          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD- WAR 

• 
cafe-keeper,  a  commercial  traveller,  or  a  clerk  it  is  a 

crime.  And  this  is  true  of  France  as  of  the  British 
Isles.  Again  we  perceive  the  moral  of  the  great  French 
fabulist  in  his  Les  Animaux  Malades  de  la  Peste. 

As  for  Germany,  the  liberty  of  thought,  speech,  and 
literary  expression  has  in  that  country  been  even  more 
restrained.  Many  Socialists,  Danes,  and  Alsatians  have 
learned  this  to  their  cost.  All  these  Governmental 
procedures — censorship,  purchase  of  newspapers,  sup- 
pression of  liberty  of  opinion,  etc. — have  psychological 
and  social  results  which  the  sociologist  should  note. 

While  temptations  and  offers  of  money  degrade  men's 
characters,  the  absence  of  the  elements  of  judgment, 
due  to  the  censorship,  diminishes  the  general  intelli- 
gence. The  suppression  of  criticism  leads  to  the 
tyranny  and  infatuation  of  the  rulers,  and  therefore 
obscures  their  understanding.  They  see  the  success  of 
their  temptations,  and  the  result  is  a  disdain  of 
humanity.  And  in  all,  both  rulers  and  ruled,  there  is 
a  diminution  of  human  dignity  and  morality.  All  these 
Governmental  procedures  are  absolutely  opposed  to  the 
principles  of  democracy.  Their  employment,  then, 
would  result  in  diminishing  the  democratic  forces  of 
the  country  and  augmenting  the  autocratic  forces,  if 
it  did  not,  on  the  contrary,  produce  a  reaction — that 
is  to  say,  if  it  did  not  provoke,  in  the  best  elements 
of  humanity,  a  spirit  of  revolt  against  those  systems 
of  government  which  teach  immorality. 

The  war  has  caused  a  revival  of  bygone  methods  of 
government.  These  were  tending  to  disappear  under 
the  influence  of  human  progress  and  of  ever-increasing 
liberty.  By  creating  conditions  analogous  to  those  of 
barbarous  ages,  war  has  caused  these  ancient  methods 
of  governing  men  to  reappear.  It  is  not  that  they  were 
really  necessary,  but  they  were  believed  to  be  necessary. 
Misoneism,  traditional  customs,  mental  idleness,  and 
the  desire  for  the  least  possible  effort,  resulted  in 


AUTOCRACY 'AND  DEMOCRACY    165 

the  revival  of  these  ancient  methods  of  government, 
instead  of  the  continuance  of  the  methods  of  the  times 
of  peace,  or  a  recourse  to  fresh  methods. 

The  facility  with  which  all  the  peoples  have  submitted 
to  these  restrictions  of  liberty  shows  how  easy  it  is  to 
govern  men.  A  few  big  words,  condescension,  and 
friendly  gestures  on  the  part  of  the  rulers,  and  men 
readily  allow  themselves  to  be  killed.  They  are  satisfied 
with  their  shepherds,  who  were  unable  to  preserve 
them  from  the  present  cataclysm.  Men  too  readily 
forget,  as  Kant  has  said,  that  "  the  possession  of  power 
inevitably  corrupts  the  judgment  of  the  reason." 
*  *  *  *  * 

The  mental  stultification  of  the  rulers  would  be  still 
more  perceptible  were  there  not  always  a  minority 
which  resists  and  rebels  with  more  or  less  energy  and 
success  against  the  will  of  the  Governments.  The 
latter  are  forced  to  reckon  with  this  minority,  more  or 
less,  according  to  circumstances. 

Among  the  events  of  this  war  we  may  seize  upon  the 
important  sociological  phenomenon  of  the  action  of 
minorities,  whether  popular  or  governmental. 

It  is  certain  that  the  majority  of  the  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian  peoples,  like  the  majority  of  the 
peoples  of  France,  Belgium,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Russia,  and  Serbia,  did  not  in  the  least  desire  war.  If 
a  popular  referendum,  masculine  and  feminine,  had 
been  taken  in  July,  1914,  throughout  all  Europe,  on 
the  question  of  peace  or  war,  an  overwhelming  majority 
everywhere  greater  than  80  per  cent.,  and  reaching  even 
95  per  cent,  or  97  per  cent.,  would  have  voted  against 
war.  Yet  the  war  took  place;  a  German  minority  of 
capitalists,  landowners,  and  manufacturers,  who  wielded 
the  Governmental  power,  unloosed  this  scourge  upon 
the  world.  Using  all  the  forces  which  the  possession 
of  the  Government  gave  it,  it  deceived  the  masses  of 
the  people,  maintaining  them  in  ignorance  and  driving 


166          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

them  to  the  slaughter.  And  by  acting  thus  this  small 
minority  of  rulers  forced  the  peoples  of  France,  England, 
Belgium,  and  Serbia  to  make  war  in  turn  in  order  to 
defend  their  threatened  liberties.  They  could  not  do 
otherwise. 

The  intervention  of  Italy  in  the  war  has  exhibited 
another  aspect  of  the  action  of  minorities  in  the  deter- 
mination of  the  course  of  events.  There  is  no  longer 
any  doubt  that  at  least  95  per  cent,  of  the  Italian 
population  desired  the  maintenance  of  peace.  Nations 
do  not — and  it  is  very  natural — care  about  killing  and 
getting  killed.  They  prefer  the  works  of  peace,  which 
are  a  help  to  the  life  of  man.  The  desire  of  the  Italian 
people  to  maintain  peace  resulted  for  a  long  time  in 
confining  the  theatre  of  war  to  the  actual  frontiers  of 
Italy.  It  succumbed,  however,  beneath  the  effort  of 
the  stronger,  because  more  active,  will  of  an  intellectual 
minority.  Professors,  artists,  men  of  letters,  barristers, 
and  journalists  believed — rightly,  as  we  think — that  it 
was  to  the  interest  of  civilization  and  of  the  Italian 
nation  that  Italy  should  join  the  Western  Allies.  And 
there  was  also  an  ardent  propaganda,  very  powerfully 
assisted  by  three  Belgians,  who  expounded  the  fate  of 
their  country  under  the  heels  of  the  Imperialists,  the 
violators  of  their  signature.  Everything  being  con- 
sidered, it  seems  that  if  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  had 
not  been  violated  the  Italian  "  intellectuals  "  would  not 
have  been  uplifted  by  the  same  desire  to  defend  the 
right,  liberty,  and  justice.  Here  again  we  find  a 
consequence  of  Germany's  action,  a  logical  consequence, 
and  one  on  which  Germany  had  not  counted.  The 
intellectual  minority  did  not  confine  itself  to  a  passive 
propaganda,  but  engaged  in  street  demonstrations, 
which  involved  the  students  and  the  youth  of  Italy, 
always  quickly  roused  to  enthusiasm.  The  Royal 
Government  gave  way  because  it  felt  the  throne  rocking. 
And  Italy  entered  the  war  on  the  side  chosen  by  a 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    167 

minority  of  the  people,   a  minority  conscious  of  the 
interests  of  humanity. 

Cast  a  glance  on  the  other  side  of  the  Adriatic,  on 
the  Balkan  Peninsula.  There  political  evolution  is  in 
a  backward  state,  and  the  civilization  which  causes  the 
peoples  to  desire  to  govern  themselves  has  not  pene- 
trated the  ignorant  masses,  although  their  mentality 
is  democratic.  So  the  Governmental  minority,  even 
one  single  man,  the  King,  was  able  to  check  the  im- 
pulse of  the  people,  as  in  Greece,  or  to  drive  the  nation 
in  a  direction  contrary  to  its  interests,  as  in  Bulgaria. 
The  thousand  means  which  the  wielders  of  power 
possess  for  deceiving  the  people,  buying  consciences, 
and  maintaining  an  atmosphere  of  obscurity,  were 
employed  without  scruple  by  the  Governmental  minority 
in  order  to  attain  its  ends.  And  the  opposition  minority, 
even  when  led  by  a  great  statesman  such  as  Venizelos, 
has  been  forced  to  submit  to  the  royal  will.  It  submits 
because  its  opposition  is  purely  passive,  not  active,  as 
was  the  Italian  opposition. 

We  see  here,  by  living  examples,  how  utterly  errone- 
ous is  the  Tolstoyan  and  Quaker  theory  of  non-resist- 
ance to  evil  by  violence.  Just  as  in  mechanics  a  given 
action  determines  a  precise  and  necessary  reaction,  so 
in  life  an  act  of  violence  often  compels  a  reaction  of 
violence.  It  is  unhappily  impossible  that  it  should  be 
otherwise,  unless  we  wish  to  support  violence  and 
submit  to  the  will  of  those  who  employ  it.  Revolt 
becomes  the  first  of  duties,  indicated  by  the  self-respect 
which  each  of  us  should  feel  for  his  own  dignity.  Re- 
sistance to  evil  in  a  passive  form  is  certainly  a  method 
of  revolt  which  has  its  value.  But  in  the  long  run 
those  who  practise  it  are  always  compelled  either  to 
obey  or  to  allow  the  evil  to  spread.  This  method  of 
revolt  could  have  no  effective  value  unless  practised 
by  the  majority  of  mankind. 


168          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  difference  between  the  events  which  occurred 
in  Italy,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  and  Rumania,  in  respect  of 
the  entrance  of  these  countries  into  the  world-war, 
shows  that  the  action  of  the  governing  classes  is  always 
the  action  of  violence  supported  by  the  governed  classes. 
It  shows  also  that  the  only  means  by  which  the  governed 
can  free  themselves  from  the  government  which  they 
find  maleficent  is  to  employ  violence  in  their  turn,  in 
order  to  show  their  strength.  This  lesson  is  perhaps 
a  depressing  one,  but  it  is  true.  In  fact,  the  control 
of  the  conduct  of  the  nations  is  the  appanage  of  the 
individuals  and  collectivities  which  dare  and  do  not 
fear  to  translate  their  desires  and  aspirations  into 
action.  The  saying  of  Danton:  "  Be  bold,  be  bold, 
and  again  be  bold  !"  is  still  true. 

If  we  regard  from  this  point  of  view  the  events  which 
have  for  months  been  drenching  the  world  with  blood, 
we  see  very  clearly  that  the  obedience  of  the  peoples 
is  the  ruin  and  destruction  of  the  peoples.  Let  us  for 
a  moment  suppose  that  the  German  people  had  refused 
to  obey  its  leaders  in  July,  1914.  The  war  would  not 
have  taken  place.  Humanity  would  not,  by  January, 
1917,  have  lost  more  than  eight  millions  of  men,  would 
not  have  numbered  five  million  cripples.  The  thousands 
of  millions  of  pounds'  worth  of  things  destroyed,  swal- 
lowed up,  or  vanished  in  smoke  would  not  have  been 
lost.  No  doubt  the  revolt  of  the  German  people  would 
have  led  to  attempts  of  repression.  But  however 
bloody  this  repression  might  have  been,  it  could  not 
have  cost  the  German  nation  more  than  a  million  and  a 
half  of  dead  and  more  than  a  million  disabled  men, 
which  loss  this  people  has  suffered  on  account  of  the 
war.  The  German  people  would  not  have  had  to 
endure  the  poverty  which  it  has  been  enduring  for 
months,  suffering  from  lack  of  food  and  clothing.  Its 
revolt  would  have  meant,  for  itself  and  for  the  whole 
world,  a  stupendous  economy  in  human  lives  and 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    169 

property.  By  obeying  its  rulers  in  July,  1914,  it  was 
fated  once  more  to  prove  to  the  world  the  truth  of 
La  Fontaine's  moral: 

"  Helas,  on  voit  que  de  tous  temps 

Les  petils  ont  pati  des  soltises  des  grands." 
("  We  see,  alas  !  in  every  age  and  state 

The  humble  suffer  from  the  follies  of  the  great.") 

We  perceive,  then,  how  great  would  have  been  the 
utility  of  this  revolt,  and  how  beneficial  to  humanity 
it  must  have  been.  And  from  this  we  deduce  this 
conclusion:  let  us  cultivate  in  ourselves  and  in  others 
the  spirit  of  revolt,  in  all  its  various  forms.  Let  us 
remember  the  saying  of  which  Benjamin  Franklin  was 
so  fond:  "  Rebellion  to  tyrants  is  obedience  to  God." 
***** 

The  great  obstacle  to  the  idea  of  revolt  and  to  revolt 
itself — which  two  things  are  the  salt  of  the  earth — is 
the  power  of  the  State.  Never,  we  believe,  has  this 
power  appeared  so  vividly  as  in  this  war  of  autocracy 
against  democracy.  All  the  restrictions  of  liberties, 
all  the  censorships,  all  the  seizures  of  ships  and  rail- 
ways, all  the  militarization  of  male  citizens,  all  shows 
how  far  the  powers  of  the  State  dominate  the  whole 
nation.  This  domination  is  so  extreme  that  for  long 
months  free  peoples  such  as  the  British  Empire  and 
France  have  endured,  almost  without  complaint,  the 
disorder,  the  deceit,  and  the  blunders — the  price  of 
which  was  death  and  desolation — which  the  State 
untiringly  piled  up.  Only  after  the  incessant  action 
of  small  democratic  minorities,  and  the  increase  of 
these  mistakes,  did  the  popular  forces  of  control  recover 
a  little  of  the  vigour  with  regard  to  the  powers  of  the 
State. 

From  these  events  we  must  deduce  this  moral:  Let 
us  beware  of  a  strong  and  powerful  State.  Let  us  as 
far  as  possible  diminish  this  power,  which  inevitably 
leads  to  abuse.  Let  us  always  remember  these  words, 


170          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

which  Jesus  spoke  to  His  disciples:  "  Call  no  man  your 
master."  Once  again  the  moral  of  our  good  La  Fon- 
taine, "  Our  enemy  is  our  master,"  is  proved  to  be 
true. 

The  truth  of  this  moral  is  proved  once  more  by  the 
beneficent  influence  of  liberty.  Many  facts  have 
demonstrated  this  during  the  course  of  the  world-crisis. 
Thus,  during  the  twenty-four  hours  which  preceded 
Germany's  declaration  of  war  upon  France,  certain 
French  Ministers,  forgetting  that  they  were  the  servants 
of  the  nation,  and  imagining  themselves  to  be  autocrats, 
wished  to  have  some  thousands  of  Socialists  or  Syndi- 
calists arrested,  in  order,  so  they  said,  to  prevent  the 
wrecking,  the  sabotage,  of  the  mobilization.  Happily 
a  man  opposed  this  measure  with  so  much  energy  that 
the  Ministry  abandoned  this  idea,  whose  execution,  by 
dividing  France  in  two,  by  provoking  riots  and  dis- 
turbances, would  inevitably  have  led  to  defeat.  The 
liberty  which  the  advanced  elements  of  French  opinion 
enjoyed  permitted  them  to  assert  themselves  freely. 
And  of  this  assertion  the  whole  world  has  heard:  the 
unanimous  uprising  of  the  whole,  without  the  slightest 
opposition,  in  defence  of  their  liberties,  which  were 
threatened  by  militarist  Germany. 

Another  proof  of  the  beneficent  influence  of  liberty 
is  to  be  found  in  the  loyalty  of  the  British  Dominions. 
All  rose  to  hasten  to  the  help  of  Great  Britain,  because 
all  are  autonomous  and  their  own  masters.  Note  what 
happened  in  South  Africa.  Boers,  who  yesterday  were 
fighting  against  England,  protested  their  loyalty,  ex- 
cepting a  small  minority.  Liberty  has  bound  them 
to  the  Empire  more  strongly  than  all  the  bonds  which 
fear  might  have  created.  And  the  loyalist  Boers 
suppressed  the  revolt  of  a  few  simple-minded  Boers 
who  were  deceived  by  the  fallacious  promises  of 
Germany. 

Let  us  note,  on  the  other  hand,  the  behaviour  of 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    171 

Ireland  !  In  the  first  place,  it  did  not  rise  as  a  single 
man  to  assist  the  Empire  of  which  it  formed  a  part. 
Its  attitude  was  hesitating ;  some  were  for  the  war,  some 
were  against  it.  The  cement  of  national  liberty,  which 
would  have  joined  all  Ireland  into  a  single  body,  ready 
to  defend  its  liberties,  was  lacking.  England  had  left 
the  Irish  but  little  liberty  during  the  past  centuries,  and 
they  had  not  yet  been  able  to  enjoy  Home  Rule,  which 
had  scarcely  been  passed  into  law,  and  which,  moreover, 
could  only  become  operative  after  the  war. 

Then,  in  April,  1916,  at  Easter,  a  rebellion  broke  out 
in  Dublin  and  a  few  other  places.  It  was  an  absolutely 
childish  affair,  because  of  the  small  numbers  of  the 
Sinn  Feiners  and  the  revolted  Larkinites,  the  great 
strength  of  the  Governmental  troops,  and  the  loyalism 
of  the  very  great  majority  of  the  Nationalist  Home 
Rulers.  It  was,  in  part,  a  mere  matter  of  buffoonery, 
a  comic  opera  rebellion,  with  romantic  and  melodramatic 
incidents.  Naturally  the  civil  Governmental  authority 
was  anxious  to  show  its  strength,  and  gave  a  free  hand 
to  the  military  authority.  The  latter,  no  less  naturally, 
started  a  series  of  courts-martial,  which  liberally  dis- 
tributed sentences  of  death  and  penal  servitude.  Men 
might  well  have  believed  themselves  under  the  rule  of 
the  Prussian  officers  and  Junkers,  so  true  is  it  that 
authority  always  yields  the  same  fruits:  the  mental 
stupefaction  of  those  who  possess  it,  violence,  and 
injustice. 

In  some  ten  years'  time  the  Irishmen  shot  in  1916 — 
Pearse,  Plunkett,  MacDonagh,  Conolly,  and  others — 
will  have  their  statues  in  Dublin.  Even  now  their 
portraits  are  in  every  house  in  Ireland,  and  a  little 
more  hatred  and  discontent  divides  Ireland  and  England. 

It  seems,  from  the  facts  published  in  the  New  States- 
man, that  the  rebellion  was  provoked  by  the  subter- 
ranean conspiracies  of  Protestant  Conservatives  and 
English  officers.  They  wanted  a  little  blood-letting, 


172          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  give  a  lesson  to  the  Nationalist  Irish  Catholics,  the 
trades  union  workers  (Larkinites),  and  the  intellectual 
Republicans  (Sinn  Feiners).  They  have  had  it,  this 
blood-letting,  not  so  copious  as  they  would  have  wished, 
although  men  were  shot  without  trial.  It  appears 
from  the  depositions  made  before  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry  instituted  by  the  British  Government  that  the 
opposition  to  recruiting  and  compulsory  service  was  an 
important  factor  of  the  increase  of  Sinn  Feiners  among 
the  peasants  and  the  younger  priests.  There  is  here  a 
curious  resemblance  to  the  Vendeean  rebellion  at  the 
time  of  the  great  French  Revolution. 

The  repression  of  this  childish  revolt  displayed  class 
hatred  and  religious  hatred  far  more  than  national 
hatred. 

For  the  impartial  observer  and  investigator  the  true 
and  responsible  author  of  this  pseudo-rebellion  is  Sir 
Edward  Carson,  who,  before  the  war,  had  openly  pre- 
pared for  rebellion  in  Ulster,  for  the  purpose  of  resisting 
Home  Rule.  He  received  cargoes  of  arms  from  Ham- 
burg. The  Nationalist  Home  Rulers,  the  Sinn  Feiner 
Republicans  and  separatists,  and  the  Larkin  Trades 
Unionists,  followed  the  example  given  by  Sir  Edward 
Carson.  The  Government,  having  allowed  the  Car- 
sonites  to  do  as  they  chose,  was  obliged  to  let  others 
do  the  same.  The  result  was  promiscuous  firing,  the 
death  of  some  hundreds  of  men  and  women,  and  the 
destruction  of  property.  In  its  repression,  the  English 
Government  was  far  less  skilful  than  General  Botha  in 
his  repression  of  the  real  rebellion  in  South  Africa. 
Pacification  never  follows  bloody  repression.  The  fire 
burns  under  the  embers.  Fear  never  acts  for  long 
upon  men. 

It  seems  that  the  summary  and  autocratic  procedures 
of  the  military  authorities  revolted  not  only  the  Irish, 
but  the  whole  mass  of  English  Liberals,  while  it  greatly 
embarrassed  the  Conservatives  and  the  Carsonites.  The 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    173 

violent  repression  of  the  revolt  (the  shooting  of  men 
after  the  rebellion  was  crushed)  has  aroused  strong 
feeling  in  America,  especially  among  the  Irish-Ameri- 
cans. It  also  produced  results  unfavourable  to  the 
Allies,  a  fact  immediately  realized  by  the  British 
Government,  which  called  a  halt  to  the  military,  who 
were  supported  by  the  Anglican  clergy,  the  Bishop  of 
Dublin,  for  example,  demanding  the  severest  measures. 
Csesarism  always  infects  the  mind  of  those  who  exercise 
power,  until  they  are  unable  to  perceive  the  profoundly 
illogical  nature  of  their  acts.  Thus  the  British  rulers 
did  not  perceive  the  absurdity  of  their  conduct:  the 
absurdity  of  crushing  the  little  Irish  nation,  while 
they  were  claiming  to  have  entered  the  war  in  defence 
of  the  small  nations ;  the  abandonment  of  power  to  the 
military  authorities,  while  they  claimed  to  have  entered 
the  war  in  order  to  destroy  German  militarism  ! 

The  arrest  of  the  sanguinary  repression  came  too  late : 
the  more  so  as  in  August,  1916,  the  British  Government 
hanged  Sir  Roger  Casement,  who  was  guilty  only  of 
having  had  a  conception  of  patriotism  differing  from 
that  of  Sir  Edward  Carson,  who  became  a  Minister.  All 
this  has  profoundly  increased  the  feeling  of  hatred  in 
the  Irish  mind.  And  in  the  United  Kingdom  everyone 
knows,  says,  and  writes  that  there  are  now  in  Ireland 
more  rebels  than  there  were  in  April,  1916.  There  are 
almost  as  many  rebels  as  Irishmen.  This  situation, 
the  fruit  of  an  authoritative  policy,  has  had  conse- 
quences deplorable  for  the  Western  Allies.  Thus,  the 
British  Government  cannot  establish  compulsory  service 
in  Ireland,  which  deprives  the  Allies  of  300,000  to 
400,000  good  soldiers,  because  it  fears  a  general  rising, 
like  that  of  the  Vendee  in  1793,  and  for  the  same  reasons; 
a  rising,  moreover,  which  would  have  serious  results  in 
Australia,  Canada,  and  the  United  States.  The  British 
Government  is  the  prisoner  of  those  whom  it  is  de- 
priving of  their  liberties  !  The  master  is  the  slave  of 


174          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

his   slaves.      Let   us   note   this   eternal   result   of  the 
authoritative  policy. 

Consider  India.  There  has  been  practically  no 
rebellion  against  England,  although  there  is  a  Nationalist 
Hindu  movement.  Its  leaders  are  familiar  both  with 
Germany  and  her  passive  discipline,  and  England  with 
her  liberties.  And  they  prefer  the  latter.  They  would 
rather  retain  an  endurable  master  than  change  him  for 
a  worse.  Moreover,  they  hope  that  the  loyalty  of  India 
will  open  the  eyes  of  England,  and  that  after  the  war 
a  period  of  autonomy  will  open  for  India.  And  this, 
moreover,  is  what  interest  would  counsel,  for  one  of  the 
lessons  of  the  war  is  this :  that  the  nations  can  be  bound 
together  only  by  the  independence  of  each.  Liberty 
granted  to  the  vanquished,  to  the  conquered,  is  the 
seed  of  love,  while  coercion  is  the  seed  of  disaffection, 
antagonism,  and  hatred.  The  harvest  of  hatred  is  an 
evil  harvest.  Love  only  yields  a  beneficent  harvest, 
and  the  great  sower  of  love  is  liberty. 

***** 

An  examination  of  events  reveals  an  identity  of  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Conservative  parties  in  all  the  bel- 
ligerent and  neutral  countries.  Here  we  have  a  very 
interesting  sociological  phenomenon.  Everywhere  in 
Europe  the  political  parties  whose  tendencies  are 
authoritative  and  anti-democratic  have  sought  to 
utilize  the  period  of  the  war  in  order  to  increase  their 
strength  and  to  sap  that  of  the  parties  with  advanced 
ideas,  whose  tendencies  are  Liberal  and  democratic. 
This  phenomenon  is  observable  in  France,  England, 
Belgium,  Germany,  Switzerland,  Sweden,  and  Holland. 

Everywhere  the  Conservative  elements,  whose  ten- 
dencies are  autocratic,  have  not  for  a  moment  lost 
sight  of  their  class  and  individual  interests.  They 
immediately  thought  of  profiting  by  the  circumstances 
created  by  the  war  in  order  to  enfeeble  their  political 
adversaries,  to  seize  power  where  they  did  not  already 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    175 

possess  it,  to  fortify  their  power  where  they  did  already 
possess  it.  With  a  certain  skill  they  strove  to  exploit 
the  elements  of  idealism  in  the  mentality  of  the  working 
class  and  the  lower  middle  class.  They  used,  for  their 
personal  ends,  the  best  aspects  of  human  nature. 

The  prevailing  atmosphere  of  militarism  favoured  the 
promotion  of  these  autocratic  arid  anti-libertarian 
tendencies.  There  is  always  an  intimate  union  between 
militarism,  Conservatism,  and  reaction.  The  mental 
states  created  by  these  social  systems  are  very  similar. 
There  is  nothing  surprising  in  this,  as  the  foundation 
of  all  these  systems  is  the  same.  All  are  based  on  the 
employment  of  fear  as  a  means  of  human  control. 

The  Conservatives,  as  a  whole,  for  of  course  there 
are  exceptions,  form  a  social  class  already  of  ancient 
standing.  I  mean  that  they  have  possessed  a  class 
consciousness  for  centuries,  while  the  mass  of  the  people 
and  the  lower  middle  class  are  only  beginning  to  acquire 
this  class  consciousness.  It  constitutes  a  class  which  is 
still  in  its  youth.  It  is  a  privilege  of  age  to  think  only 
of  one's  material  interests,  and  a  privilege  of  youth  to 
think  much  more  of  one's  ideals.  The  Conservatives, 
then,  are  narrow  realists,  without  broad  views,  thinking 
of  the  present  moment,  of  their  mean  and  petty  material 
interests.  The  parties  of  advanced  ideas  are  idealists, 
thinking  of  the  future,  of  their  intellectual  and  moral 
interests. 

These  different  conceptions  of  life  explain  the  different 
attitudes  of  the  Conservatives  and  the  parties  of  ad- 
vanced ideas  in  the  present  world-war.  The  spirit  of 
sacrifice  for  the  collectivity,  or  the  spirit  of  sociality, 
has  in  reality  been  more  highly  developed  in  the  masses, 
whose  ideas  are  democratic  and  advanced,  than  in  the 
Conservatives.  The  latter  have  always  regarded  their 
interests  first  of  all  and  above  all.  Their  enrichment 
by  the  manufacture  of  armaments  and  munitions,  their 
attempt  to  restrain  liberties  and  to  increase  the  mili- 


176          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

tarization  of  their  countries,  their  intensive  religious 
propaganda  and  their  anxiety  to  discredit  democratic 
organs,  such  as  Parliaments,  their  disdain  of  authority 
and  the  laws  which  were  opposed  to  them  (you  will 
remember  the  activities  of  the  German  Conservatives 
in  respect  of  the  submarine  war,  of  the  English  Con- 
servatives in  respect  of  compulsory  service,  and  of  the 
French  Conservatives  in  respect  of  the  religious  propa- 
ganda), all  shows  that  their  individual  and  class  interests 
ake  precedence  of  collective  national  interests. 

The  exercise  of  power  leads  gradually  to  prepotency, 
the  more  swiftly  and  openly  when  this  power  is  not 
counterbalanced  by  any  other  social  force.  The  war 
has  everywhere  awarded  the  supremacy  to  military 
methods  of  government,  and  has  more  or  less  sup- 
pressed the  liberties  which  counterbalanced  the  exer- 
cise of  power.  Thus  the  Conservatives  everywhere 
gave  way  to  their  craving  for  authority.  The  Occi- 
dental Conservatives,  while  they  were  the  most  chauvin- 
istic anti-Germans  among  the  Allies,  incessantly  urged 
the  employment  of  Germanic  methods  of  government — 
that  is,  the  methods  of  military  autocracy.  The  con- 
trast is  curious,  and  has  its  origin  in  this  fact :  by  their 
mental  characteristics  the  Conservatives  of  every 
country  have  very  close  affinities  with  the  German 
Government,  which  is  essentially  militarist  and  Con- 
servative; but  in  the  matter  of  material  interest  the 
Occidental  Conservatives  are  the  enemies  of  the  German 
Conservatives.  It  is  in  reality  a  conflict  of  interests, 
in  the  same  class,  between  different  clans.  Everywhere 
the  Conservatives  have  exceeded  the  limits  which  a 
faint  comprehension  of  popular  psychology  must  have 
enabled  them  to  perceive.  And  everywhere  the  nar- 
rowly egoistical  action  of  the  Conservatives  has  aroused, 
in  the  popular  mind,  a  more  or  less  hidden  opposition, 
whose  explosion  will  doubtless  occur  after  the  inter- 
national hostilities  are  brought  to  a  close.  The  Con- 


AUTOCRACY  AND  DEMOCRACY    177 

servatives  and  reactionaries  have  everywhere  committed 
psychological  blunders  like  those  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment. The  latter  misunderstands  the  psychology  of 
the  Western  peoples;  the  Western  peoples  misunder- 
stand the  psychology  of  the  democratic  masses. 

The  international  unification  of  the  conduct  of  the 
Conservative  parties  is  a  flagrant  proof  of  the  existence 
of  a  class  and  caste  mentality  which  is  independent  of 
national  mentality.  Here  is  one  of  the  lessons  which 
we  must  learn  from  the  present  war. 

***** 

A  curious  discovery  is  made  when  we  analyze  the 
development  of  this  war.  We  have  seen  the  military 
forces  of  Germany  doing  their  utmost,  for  months  at  a 
time,  careless  of  their  losses,  to  crush  their  Eastern 
enemy,  Russia,  whose  autocratic  principles  of  govern- 
ment harmonized  well  with  the  principles  of  the  German 
Government.  In  so  doing  Germany  was  exhausting 
herself  without  exhausting  France  and  Great  Britain, 
her  real  political  and  economic  enemies !  We  thus 
witnessed  a  sort  of  auto-destruction  of  the  autocratic 
Powers !  The  principle  of  autocracy  is  undermined 
and  destroyed  by  its  very  defenders  !  This  is  a  result 
of  the  political  stupidity  of  the  militarist  mind,  which 
mentally  stultifies  the  individual  by  depriving  him  of 
all  critical  spirit. 

In  giving  a  respite  to  her  Western  enemies,  in  order 
to  protect  the  properties  of  the  junkers  of  East  Prussia, 
in  August  and  September,  1914,  autocratic  Germany 
was  herself  her  worst  enemy.  The  apparent  and 
immediate  interest  of  the  ruling  caste  made  her  forget 
her  real  and  permanent  interests.  These  last  de- 
manded that  the  Western  enemy  should  be  crushed, 
for  then  the  Eastern  enemy  could  easily  have  been 
induced  to  make  peace.  But  it  must  also  be  observed 
that  the  German  rulers  were  forced  to  act  as  they  did, 
not  only  because  of  the  necessity  of  protecting  the 

12 


ITS          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

property  of  the  Junkers,  but  because  they  had  to  justify, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  proletariat  and  the  middle  classes, 
what  they  had  said  and  reiterated  in  order  to  render 
the  war  popular — namely,  that  it  was  forced  upon  them 
by  Russian  barbarism,  a  prey  to  a  frenzy  of  conquest. 
Autocratic  Germany  had  made  herself  the  prisoner  of 
her  proletariat.  The  weapons  we  use  are  often  two- 
edged.  Thus  this  war,  undertaken  to  maintain  and 
develop  autocratic  principles,  will  end  in  developing 
democratic  principles  and  forces. 

Taking  them  as  a  whole,  indeed,  the  social  and 
political  consequences  of  the  war  are,  up  to  the  present 
moment,  a  diminution  of  the  spirit  of  reaction  and  the 
spirit  of  automatism,  and  an  augmentation  of  the 
democratic  soul  and  the  forces  of  democracy.  The 
development  of  the  war  will  only  accentuate  these  two 
social  phenomena.  The  triumphs  of  the  democracies 
over  the  autocracies  is  certain,  because  they  possess 
moral  force  as  well.  The  democracies  are  the  future: 
the  autocracies  are  the  past.  Those  which  still  subsist 
are  the  survivals  of  former  ages,  endeavouring  to  main- 
tain themselves  by  means  of  such  survivals  as  militarism 
and  war. 

From  this  objective  examination  of  the  political  and 
social  conditions  created  by  the  war,  it  appears  that 
authority  is  the  seed  of  death,  and  liberty  a  ferment 
of  life. 


CHAPTER  VI 

WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS 

The  war  and  Christianity — The  contradictions  of  Christian  practice — 
The  conduct  of  the  official  clergy — The  Catholic  Church  and  the 
attitude  of  the  Catholics  in  different  countries — The  fundamental 
basis  of  the  Catholic  Church  and  Caesarism  is  the  same :  authority — 
The  attitude  of  the  Pope — Judaism — Anti-Semitism  is  undone  by 
the  attitude  of  the  Jews — Mohammedanism — The  bankruptcy  of 
the  holy  war — The  pseudo-religious  Renaissance — Its  causes: 
material  interests  and  the  fear  of  death — Animistic  and  poly- 
theistic superstitions. 

The  war  and  the  internationalism  of  science,  letters,  and  the  arts 
— The  Chauvinism  of  scientists  and  literary  men — An  outburst  of 
hatred — It  is  only  a  passing  manifestation. 

The  war  and  Feminism — The  international  character  of  Femin- 
ism— The  part  of  women  in  the  war — The  social  equality  of  the 
sexes — Violence  is  the  enemy  of  Feminism. 

HUMANITY  has  always  sought  to  increase  the 
amplitude  of  groups  which  unite  with  one  another 
and  form  confederations.  There  is,  as  it  were,  a 
craving  for  universality  in  the  human  mind.  It  is 
this  craving  that  gives  birth  to  the  efforts  of  union 
between  philosophical  and  religious  sects,  between 
professional  groups,  between  classes,  without  recking 
of  the  changing  frontiers  of  fatherlands,  and  inde- 
pendently of  so-called  races.  These  unions  seek  to 
embrace  the  whole  terrestrial  globe,  according  to  the 
affinities  and  particular  interests  of  the  sect,  profession, 
or  class.  In  this  way  were  formed  those  organizations 
which  have  been  called  "  the  Internationals."  The 
war  has,  of  course,  profoundly  disturbed  them. 

Christianity,  if  we  regard  it  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  doctrine  professed  by  Christians,  is  a  true  inter- 
national league.  All  the  world  over,  independently  of 

179 


180          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

all  State  frontiers,  the  religion  of  Christ  is  the  same 
(save  in  details  which  vary  according  to  the  sect),  at 
least  in  its  general  lines. 

The  war  has  shown  that  Christianity  is  deeply  divided 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  ought  to  regard  the  san- 
guinary conflicts  of  mankind.  We  perceive  the  same 
divisions,  the  same  contradictions,  as  those  which  were 
noted  in  the  first  centuries  of  the  Christian  Church. 
All  the  chapters  of  that  famous  book,  The  Law  of  War 
and  of  Peace,  in  which  Grotius,  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  expounded  the  contradictory  opinions  of  the 
Apostles  and  the  Fathers  of  the  Church  concerning  war 
and  the  duty  of  Christians,  have  recovered  an  astonishing 
actuality.  It  is  inevitable  that  war  should  always 
cause  a  revival  of  the  things  of  the  past.  It  is  itself 
a  survival  of  barbarous  habits,  and  it  necessarily 
brings  in  its  retinue  the  things  and  the  ideals  of  bar- 
barous ages. 

The  Bible  was,  in  those  ages,  variously  interpreted; 
it  has  been  variously  interpreted  in  our  times,  according 
to  the  sect  interpreting.  Some  have  maintained  that 
the  duty  of  the  Christian  is  to  defend  his  fatherland, 
even  by  slaying;  others  have  maintained  that  his  duty 
is  not  to  resist  evil  by  violence.  Some  have  maintained 
that  the  duty  of  Christians  is  to  pardon;  others  that 
it  is  to  chastise  without  mercy.  And  words  of  un- 
heard-of violence  have  issued  from  the  mouths  of 
ministers — Lutheran,  Catholic,  Calvinist,  and  others — 
both  German  and  English,  etc.  Texts  have  been  cited 
by  the  doctors  in  support  of  their  contradictory  theses. 
And  this  once  again  proves  the  vanity  of  a  doctrine 
based  on  ancient  writings,  which,  in  the  course  of  the 
years,  have  been  interpolated,  translated,  and  re- 
translated, and  are  thus  altered,  modified,  and  full  of 
contradictions.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  opinions  of 
the  doctors  in  divinity  have  had  very  little  publicity 
beyond  the  various  sects,  and  little  social  influence, 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  181 

even  in  the  British  Isles,  where  the  ideal  of  anti-bellicose 
Christianity  has  permeated  a  certain  minority. 

However,  in  all  the  belligerent  countries  one  saw  the 
official  clergy — Lutheran,  Anglican,  Orthodox — intoning 
the  chants  agreeable  to  God,  and  invoking  Him  in  prayer 
for  the  success  of  their  arms.  Among  these  belligerents 
there  was  one  exception:  France,  for  irreligious  France 
has  no  official  Church.  But  the  Catholics  of  France 
gave  themselves  up  to  the  same  invocations,  that  their 
God  might  favour  them  and  award  them  the  victory. 
Every  Christian  clergy  nationalized  God,  making  Him 
its  own,  forgetting  the  universality  of  the  Christian 
God,  and  unconsciously  returning  to  the  religious 
conceptions  of  polytheism. 

The  ties  which  united  among  themselves  those 
human  beings  who  professed  the  same  religion  were, 
in  fact,  non-existent,  and  we  saw  Catholic  fighting 
against  Catholic,  Lutheran  against  Lutheran,  Calvinist 
against  Calvinist,  Orthodox  Christian  against  Orthodox 
Christian.  According  to  doctrine  they  were  brothers; 
and  they  killed  one  another.  Thus  did  the  faithful, 
the  sheep  of  one  flock,  proving  that  these  religious 
bonds  were  only  appearances,  vanishing  upon  contact 
with  reality.  The  priests,  the  shepherds  of  these  flocks, 
had  no  other  attitude  than  that  of  their  sheep.  This 
sociological  phenomenon  is  above  all  visible  in  the 
Catholic  Church. 

The  Catholic  Church  is  an  international  league,  not 
only  because  it  is  a  part  of  Christianity,  but  also  because 
it  is  a  highly  hierarchical  institution,  which  extends,  as 
its  name  of  Catholic  expresses,  over  the  whole  globe, 
independently  of  class,  caste,  or  nation.  At  the  head 
of  the  ecclesiastical  hierarchy  is  one  single  chief,  the 
Pope.  He  and  all  the  priests  of  divers  degrees  order 
and  rule  the  life  and  the  thoughts  of  millions  of  the 
faithful,  scattered  over  the  whole  earth.  The  faithful, 
if  they  are  good  and  true  Catholics,  are  bound  to  obey. 


182          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

That,  theoretically,  is  what  should  be  the  case;  I  say 
theoretically,  for  in  reality  the  faithful,  and  even  their 
shepherds,  have  neither  unity  of  life  nor  unity  of  con- 
ception. The  present  war  has  revealed  this  truth  in  all 
its  nakedness. 

In  every  nation  the  Catholics,  clerics  or  laymen, 
have  obeyed  the  temporal  power.  They  have  every- 
where become  soldiers,  and  everywhere  they  have  killed 
one  another,  in  conformity  with  the  orders  of  their 
civil  and  military  superiors.  The  French  and  Belgian 
Catholics  were  able  to  argue,  with  great  justice,  that 
they  were  defending  their  invaded  soil,  their  goods, 
and  their  threatened  liberties.  The  German  and 
Hungarian  Catholics  could  not  argue  thus,  for  they 
were  the  aggressors.  Their  leaders  at  least  knew  that 
they  were  such,  for  perhaps  the  ignorant  masses,  de- 
ceived by  the  assertions  of  their  rulers,  believed  that 
they  were  only  defending  their  independence  and  their 
habits,  threatened  by  the  Russian  autocracy. 

In  France  the  clergy  proceeded  to  explain  its  patriot- 
ism. It  did  so  in  a  book,  La  Guerre  Allemande  et  le 
Catholicisme,  published  under  the  direction  of  the 
Director  of  the  Catholic  Institute,  and  under  the 
patronage  of  the  Cardinal  Archbishops  of  Paris  and 
Reims.  The  higher  clergy,  just  as  the  lower  clergy, 
just  as  the  simple  faithful,  are,  in  France,  definitely 
anti-German.  In  Belgium  the  regular  and  secular 
clergy  were  even  persecuted.  Numbers  of  them — 
priests,  monks,  nuns — were  shot  or  massacred.  The 
anti-German  and  patriotic  feeling  of  the  Belgian 
Catholics  revealed  themselves  luminously  in  the  proud 
attitude  of  Cardinal  Mercier,  Archbishop  of  Malines, 
and  other  Belgian  Bishops. 

The  same  attitude,  but  naturally  in  an  opposite  sense, 
was  exhibited  by  the  Catholic  clerics  and  laymen  of  the 
Germanic  countries,  who  affirmed  with  no  less  definite- 
ness  their  Germanic  patriotism.  But  in  so  doing  they 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  188 

revealed  the  real  cause  of  their  attitude.  It  was  by 
no  means  the  moral  and  religious  ideal  which  guided 
them;  it  was  not  the  desire  to  preserve  their  national 
independence,  which  no  one  threatened;  it  was  simply 
their  concern  for  material  and  political  interests.  They 
identified  the  interests  of  the  Catholic  Church  with  those 
of  the  German  Empire,  because,  as  Professor  Karl 
Muth  wrote  in  Hochland,  "  the  soundest  and  most 
conservative  powers  on  earth  are:  the  Papacy  and  the 
Prussian  State." 

For  these  clerics  and  laymen  of  Germany  the  danger 
was  the  constitutionalism  of  Western  Europe,  with  its 
ideal  of  liberty.  And  this  danger  was  embodied  by 
Professor  Martin  Spahn  in  France,  which  "  has  opened 
the  door  so  widely  to  pure  rationalism."  The  war, 
for  these  Catholics,  became  a  holy  war,  for  its  object 
was  the  liberation  of  the  world  from  revolutionary 
powers  and  ideals.  The  enemies  were  democracy  and 
rationalism. 

Catholicism  is  ceasing  to  be  merely  a  doctrine  and 
a  religious  precept;  it  is  becoming  pre-eminently  a 
political  institution,  a  hierarchical  and  Governmental 
power,  based  upon  obedience  to  an  inscrutable  authority. 
The  German  Catholics,  by  this  frank  avowal,  have  been 
more  in  line  with  the  tradition  of  the  Church  than  the 
French  and  Belgian  clerics  and  laymen,  in  whom  national 
feeling  took  precedence  of  the  religious  ideal.  This  is 
so  true  that  we  find  a  Benedictine  monk,  of  French 
birth,  Dom  Germain  Morin,  who  does  not  fear  to  speak 
of  the  "  disgust  "  which  he  had  experienced  on  reading 
the  book  of  the  Rector  of  the  Catholic  Institute  of 
Paris,  "  a  pamphlet  which  exploited  religion  against 
the  Germans,  who  have  given,  and  are  giving  daily, 
proofs  of  an  admirable  devotion  to  the  cause  of  religion." 

Because  of  their  nationalism  the  French,  Belgian, 
and  British  Catholics  are  fighting  against  the  German 
Catholics,  the  invaders  of  their  country.  Because  of 


184          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

their  nationalism,  the  Irish  Catholics  are  divided  into 
two  opposing  factions.  One,  the  more  numerous, 
maintains  that  the  duty  of  the  Irish  is  to  fight  against 
Germany,  to  defend  the  civilization  and  liberty  of  the 
world,  imperilled  by  the  Germanic  desire  for  hegemony. 
The  other  faction,  a  minority,  but  counting  in  its 
midst  such  figures  as  the  Bishop  of  Limerick,  takes  its 
stand  upon  a  rigidly  national  basis,  declaring  that  the 
victory  or  defeat  of  either  belligerents  is  indifferent  to 
Ireland.  The  whole  argument  of  this  minority  would 
have  been  without  foundation  had  England  given 
Ireland  the  autonomy  of  government  which  she  has 
been  demanding  so  long.  The  Home  Rule  Act  has 
existed  in  the  Statute  Book  since  1914,  but  many 
Irishmen  repeat,  with  the  Bishop  of  Limerick:  "  Every 
intelligent  Irishman  will  say  that  this  is  only  a  simu- 
lacrum of  Home  Rule,  which  will  never  be  put  into 
practice."  And  the  result  was  that  the  war,  for  these 
Irishmen,  was  in  no  wise  their  war;  it  was  simply 
England's  war,  France's  war,  and  they  had  no  concern 
with  it.  This  was  at  the  time  when  the  British  military 
authority  wished  to  arrest  the  Bishop  (November,  1915). 

A  narrow  and  petty  nationalism  hid  from  the  eyes  of 
these  Catholic  Irishmen  this  actual  fact:  that  the 
world-war  surpasses  the  individual  interests  of  a  few 
nations,  and  involves  the  general  interests  of  humanity. 
We  should  see  in  these  narrow  conceptions  a  result  of 
the  mischievous  autocratic  policy  of  England  where 
Ireland  is  concerned.  The  absence  of  liberty  diminishes 
the  human  intelligence,  and  prevents  it  from  perceiving 
sociological  phenomena  in  all  their  fulness.  Authority 
is  always  mischievous ;  liberty,  on  the  contrary,  is  always 
beneficent. 

Of  this  minority  of  Irish  Catholics  which  opposed 
the  participation  of  Irishmen  in  the  war,  some  even  said 
"  that  the  victory  of  the  Germans  would  signify  the 
victory  of  the  Catholic  Church."  This  endorsed  the 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  185 

opinion  of  the  German  Catholics,  which  considers  the 
Church  rather  as  a  political  institution  than  as  an 
institution  for  giving  moral  and  religious  education. 
In  these  Irish  Catholics  it  was  not  so  much  Irish  Nation- 
alism which  spoke  as  hatred  for  atheistical  France, 
which  was  represented  as  persecuting  the  Church.  The 
Catholic  and  clerical  ideal — I  do  not  say  the  Christian 
ideal — was  opposed,  in  these  men,  to  the  rationalist 
ideal,  the  ideal  of  equality  and  liberty,  symbolized  by 
France.  In  short,  it  was  not,  properly  speaking,  a 
religious  ideal  which  led  these  men,  but  a  political  ideal. 

We  find  the  same  state  of  mind  in  the  majority  of  the 
Catholics  of  neutral  countries.  Whether  in  Holland, 
in  Spain,  in  German  Switzerland,  in  the  United  States, 
or  even  in  Italy — before  her  entrance  into  the  war — 
we  always  find  the  majority  of  the  Catholics  more  or 
less  anxious  for  the  victory  of  the  Central  Empires. 
They  all  have  a  pro-German  tendency,  because  among 
the  other  belligerents  there  is  France,  and  France  is 
free-thinking,  rationalist,  de-Catholicized,  because  the 
Western  belligerents  represent  democracy  and  liberty, 
principles  which  are  absolutely  opposed  to  the  principles 
of  authority  and  hierarchy,  which  are  the  corner-stones 
on  which  rest  the  foundations  of  the  Catholic  Church, 
and  which  are  represented  by  the  Central  Empires. 

The  attitude  of  the  Catholic  clergy  and  their  faithful 
flocks  is  thus  full  of  contradictions,  which  vary  accord- 
ingly as  they  belong  to  belligerent  or  neutral  nations, 
and  according  to  the  political  condition  of  these  bel- 
ligerents, and  the  degree  of  liberty  enjoyed  by  them. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  unity  of  view  among  these 
clerics  and  laymen.  They  refuse  to  give  their  approval 
to  or  to  obey  the  words  of  the  Bishop  of  Perigueux, 
who  said:  "  In  our  faith,  our  obedience,  and  our  love, 
we  confound  the  Pope  with  Jesus  Christ."  Moreover, 
the  head  of  the  Catholic  Church  was  powerless  to  im- 
pose unity  of  opinion  upon  the  Catholics,  because  he 


186          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

did  not  assume  the  moral  and  doctrinal  point  of  view, 
and  because,  a  prey  to  the  conflict  of  the  contrary 
interests  of  the  Church  as  a  political  institution  and 
the  Church  as  a  teacher,  he  did  not  know  which  side 
to  take.  A  mystic  and  a  man  of  the  people  like  Pius  X. 
would  doubtless  have  decided  in  favour  of  the  moral 
doctrine.  A  political  Pope  and  an  aristocrat,  Benedict 
XV.  hesitated,  not  daring  to  declare  himself  in  favour 
of  the  moral  doctrine,  nor  yet  of  the  material  interests 
at  stake.  As  a  doctor  of  the  Church  he  ought  to  have 
condemned  the  flagrant  and  undeniable  crimes  of  the 
Imperialists,  who  killed,  massacred,  and  violated  women, 
children,  priests,  and  Belgian  nuns.  He  was  careful  not 
to  do  so,  just  as  he  did  not  protest  against  the  destruction 
of  cathedrals  and  the  sacrilege  committed  in  his  churches. 
He  considered  that  "  it  was  useless  to  involve  the 
Pontifical  authority  in  the  disputes  of  the  belligerents." 
Was  this  out  of  a  desire  to  be  impartial  ?  Evidently 
not,  for  impartiality  does  not  mean  absence  of  judg- 
ment. He  abstained  from  judging  because  he  knew 
that  the  weapon  at  his  disposal,  excommunication,  was 
an  obsolete  weapon,  without  any  reach,  and  obeyed 
by  no  one.  He  hoped,  while  abstaining  from  con- 
demnation, that  the  world  would  not  perceive  that  the 
Catholic  Church  is,  as  a  moral  power,  only  an  appear- 
ance, a  mere  facade,  because  religion  is  no  longer,  if  it 
ever  was  in  the  past,  a  factor  determining  human  action. 
It  is  simply,  for  the  human  majority,  a  conglomeration 
of  rites  and  forms  of •  worship,  practised  more  or  less 
mechanically  by  the  faithful. 

If,  as  head  of  the  doctrinal  Church,  the  Pope  ought 
to  have  condemned  the  violators  of  treaties  and  the 
men  who  ordered  the  crimes  of  Louvain  and  elsewhere, 
as  head  of  the  political  Church  the  Pope  ought  to  be 
pro-Germanic  in  tendency.  Germany  and  Austria 
symbolized,  in  fact,  the  principle  of  authority,  of  which 
the  Pope  ought  to  be  the  scrupulous  guardian.  By 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  187 

its  nature  as  a  political  institution,  the  Catholic  Church 
is  obliged  to  support  autocracies  and  to  oppose  demo- 
cracies, the  tendency  of  which,  in  the  long  run,  is  always 
toward  the  disappearance  of  authority.  As  political 
organisms  the  Churches,  whatever  their  doctrine,  have 
always  been  the  faithful  allies  of  militarism.  In  the 
course  of  the  ages  we  always  discover  the  alliance  of 
the  priest  and  the  warrior.  Leaning  the  one  upon  the 
other,  they  live  as  parasites  on  the  labour  of  the  pro- 
ducers. It  is  therefore  logical  that  in  the  dawn  of  the 
twentieth  century  we  should  still  perceive  the  same 
alliance,  for  priests  and  soldiers  are  both  supporters  of 
the  principle  of  authority  and  destroyers  of  the  principle 
of  liberty. 

In  this  world-wide  war  economic,  political,  moral,  and 
intellectual  interests  are  mingled  in  stupendous  collision, 
so  that  it  is  difficult,  even  impossible,  to  determine 
which  of  these  interests  the  majority  of  mankind  obeys. 
Still,  it  seems  that  if  the  war  was  declared  with 
economic  aims  in  view  there  have  been,  in  the  course 
of  time,  such  modifications  that  it  is  probable  that  the 
majority  of  the  combatants  are  now  fighting  for  moral 
and  intellectual  ends.  But  the  Catholic  Church  and 
its  head  do  not  seem  to  have  acted  with  such  ends  in 
view.  The  political  and  economic  interests  appear  to 
have  been  their  guide,  and  the  result  is  that  the 
Catholic  Church  has  appeared  rather  as  a  political 
organism  than  as  a  religious  and  moral  organism.  The 
re-establishment  of  a  species  of  temporal  power  always 
haunts  the  Papacy :  only  the  victory  of  the  Imperialists 
could  re-establish  it.  It  will  therefore  be  understood 
how  anxiety  for  economic  and  political  interests  has 
led  the  Pope  and  the  Church  to  a  pro-Germanism  which 
has,  naturally,  greatly  shocked  the  opinion  of  the 
French,  the  English,  and  still  more  the  Belgians.  Italy 
cannot  permit  of  the  revival  of  the  temporal  power,  to 
which  the  Pope  discreetly  alluded  in  a  consistorial 


188          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

address.  The  result  is  a  diminution  of  the  authority 
of  the  Pope,  and  even  of  the  Church,  among  clerics  and 
laymen  alike. 

Just  as  we  see  that  the  Pope's  sympathies  are  pro- 
German,  so  we  find  that  the  Kaiser  and  his  Junkers 
have  pro-Papal  sympathies.  Their  alliance  is  the  in- 
evitable result  of  the  common  basis  of  their  power: 
authority,  hierarchy,  and  fear. 

Germany's  policy  presents  many  affinities  with  that 
of  the  Society  of  Jesus.  Their  motto  is  the  same:  the 
end  justifies  the  means.  Their  basis  is  the  same: 
passive  obedience,  perinde  ac  cadaver.  Many  events 
have  proved  this  in  the  course  of  the  war.  To  judge 
by  the  attitude  of  the  Jesuits  in  Spain  and  the  United 
States,  it  would  seem  that  the  Black  International,  the 
Society  of  Jesus,  is  everywhere  a  solid  prop  of  pro- 
Germanism.  In  the  United  States  a  writer  has  observed 
this  fact,  which  is  at  least  curious:  the  vessels  of  the 
General  Transatlantic  Company  are  the  only  ones 
which  have  escaped  any  attack  by  submarines,  and  the 
greater  portion  of  the  shares  of  this  company  belong 
to  the  Society  of  Jesus.  Be  this  as  it  may,  from  this 
fact  it  is  certain  that  the  Catholic  Church,  whether 
represented  by  the  Pope  or  by  the  Society  of  Jesus, 
is  pro-German  in  tendency,  and  is,  one  may  say,  the  ally 
of  Kaiserism. 

This  alliance,  whose  object  is  to  obtain  a  peace  agree- 
able to  Teutonic  Junkerism,  is  futile,  because  the  Papal 
power  does  not  exist  save  as  an  empty  show.  France, 
moreover,  democratic  and  without  an  official  religion, 
cannot  permit  of  the  intervention  of  the  hand  of  an 
autocratic  and  political  institutional  Church.  It  would 
be,  indeed,  a  disavowal  of  its  entire  Republican  and 
democratic  policy.  The  thing  is  the  less  possible  in 
that  the  pro-Germanic  attitude  of  the  Pope  has  dis- 
pleased the  Catholics  of  France  and  other  belligerent 
countries  in  the  West.  It  will  take  a  long  time,  for 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  189 

example,  to  re-establish  the  fraternity  between  the 
Belgian  and  German  Catholics,  to  judge  by  the  collec- 
tive letter  of  the  Belgian  Bishops  to  the  German 
episcopate. 

One  of  the  most  obvious  lessons  of  this  war  is  therefore 
the  great  decline  of  autocratic  powers  such  as  those  of 
the  Catholic  Church  and  Kaiserism. 

***** 

Judaism,  like  Christianity,  is  an  international  or- 
ganization, since  the  Jewish  religion  counts  its  adepts 
scattered  over  the  entire  globe.  Some  have  even 
maintained  that  the  religious  ties  uniting  the  Jews 
were  such  that  they  constituted  a  nation  dispersed  in 
the  midst  of  the  other  nations,  while  strictly  preserving 
its  Judaic  nationality.  The  present  war  has  proved 
the  absolutely  mistaken  nature  of  such  a  view.  We 
see,  indeed,  that  the  Jews  are  fighting  one  another, 
for  there  are  Jews  in  all  the  various  armies:  French, 
British,  Russian,  German,  Austrian,  Hungarian.  This 
division  of  the  Jews  according  to  their  belligerent 
nationalities,  and  the  fact  of  their  fighting  among  them- 
selves, absolutely  destroys  the  basis  of  anti-Semitism. 
It  is  a  curious  consequence  of  this  war,  all  the  more 
curious  in  that  those  who  unloosed  the  war,  the  land- 
owners and  professional  soldiers  of  Prussia,  are  rabid 
anti-Semites  !  It  is  to  be  noted  how  the  consequences 
of  this  war  are  almost  all  in  absolute  contradiction  to 
the  aims  pursued  by  those  who  provoked  it. 

Everywhere  the  Jewish  soldiers  have  been  immerged 
in  the  mass  of  other  soldiers;  there  has  been  one  excep- 
tion— an  Israelitish  legion  in  the  British  Army  in  the 
East.  But  that  this  was  so  was  really  because  these 
Jews,  belonging  to  Oriental  nationalities  which  were 
either  neutral  or  allies  of  the  Central  Empires,  could 
only  fight  against  the  latter  by  forming  a  special  corps 
in  order  to  join  the  British  Army.  This  exception 
by  no  means  invalidates  the  bankruptcy  of  the  anti- 


190          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Semite  doctrine,  by  the  very  fact  that  the  Jews  are 
divided  up  among  the  various  enemy  combatants. 

While  the  Occidental  Jews  in  France,  Alsace,  Bel- 
gium, etc.,  were  all  anti-German,  we  find  that  the 
Oriental  Jews  of  Poland,  Galicia,  etc.,  were  mostly 
pro-German. 

The  cause  of  this  was  the  Russian  autocracy,  just  as 
it  was  the  cause  of  the  pro-Germanism  of  many  Scandi- 
navian Jews.  The  memory  of  the  persecutions  and 
pogroms  perpetrated  by  the  Russian  bureaucracy 
prevented  these  Jews  from  remembering  that  France 
was  the  first  European  nation  which  liberated  the  Jews, 
and  that  in  the  Occident  they  were  politically  the  equal 
of  all  other  men.  The  facts  incessantly  lead  us  back 
to  the  mischievous  nature  of  authority. 

As  a  religious  body,  Judaism  appears  to  be  divided 
according  to  the  various  nationalities  of  which  the  Jews 
form  a  part.  It  is  exactly  the  same  as  with  the  Catholic 
Church.  As  a  doctrine,  Judaism  appears,  in  the  course 
of  this  war,  as  a  greatly  diminished  force.  The  Chosen 
People  of  God,  according  to  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  are 
killing  one  another  for  the  Gentiles,  for  unbelievers  I 
If  this  religious  faith  had  been  strong  and  had  taken 
precedence  of  national  and  political  ideals  and  interests, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  Jews  would  have  refused  to  do  so. 
We  must  therefore  record  a  great  diminution  of  the 
religious  faith  of  Judaism. 

The  same  phenomenon  is  true  of  Mohammedanism. 
The  Mussulmans  of  the  British,  French,  and  Russian 
armies  are  fighting  against  the  Mussulmans  of  the 
Turkish  and  Bulgarian  armies,  and  this  for  the  benefit 
of  the  unbelievers.  The  Mussulman  Holy  War  was 
proclaimed  in  vain.  There  were  a  few  attempted 
risings  in  the  West  of  Egypt  and  in  Morocco.  But 
these  were  small  and  unimportant  insurrections.  No 
serious  uprising  occurred  among  the  Mohammedans  of 
Algeria,  Tunis,  Egypt,  India,  or  the  Caucasus.  More, 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  191 

the    Arabian    Mohammedans    have    risen    against    the 
Turkish  Mohammedans.     The  Mohammedan  faith  is  as 
enfeebled  as  the  Judaic  or  the  Christian  faith. 
***** 

The  war  has  thus  enabled  us  to  perceive  on  every 
hand  a  considerable  diminution  of  religious  faith  and 
of  the  power  of  the  various  Churches.  This  fact  was 
already  known  to  the  observant;  the  war  has  made  it 
apparent  to  all  those  who  do  not  refuse  to  see.  It  is 
idle  to  put  forward  as  an  objection  that  sociological 
phenomenon  which  the  French  Catholics  have  described 
as  a  religious  Renaissance,  a  phenomenon  which  has 
occurred  in  all  the  belligerent  countries. 

During  the  first  weeks  of  the  war  it  was  seen  in  France, 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Russia,  that  the  public 
was  attending  the  churches  in  greater  numbers.  There 
seemed  in  these  countries  to  be  a  general  religious 
enthusiasm.  In  reality  the  explanation  was  that  the 
clergy  and  their  faithful,  believing  the  occasion  favour- 
able for  a  revival  of  faith,  devoted  themselves  in  all 
the  belligerent  countries  to  an  intense  propaganda. 
While  in  Catholic  countries  the  soldiers  were  bowed 
down  by  the  weight  of  the  medals  and  scapulars  which 
were  generously  distributed  among  them,  in  Protestant 
countries  they  staggered  under  the  weight  of  Bibles 
no  less  generously  distributed. 

In  Germany,  for  example,  the  booksellers  could  not 
at  first  satisfy  all  the  demands  upon  them.  But  this 
state  of  things  was  quickly  altered,  and  they  were 
assailed  by  letters  from  soldiers  who  begged  them  to 
take  back  their  Bibles  at  half  price.  They  preferred, 
these  unbelievers,  money  to  their  Bibles  1  The  hospitals 
and  ambulances  became  the  favourite  places  for  the 
distribution  of  sacred  amulets.  In  France  millions  of 
medals  and  scapulars  were  distributed.  The  soldiers, 
wounded  or  not,  accepted  them  religiously.  Religious 
ceremonies  were  also  most  assiduously  attended  by  the 


192          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

soldiers.  Men  who  as  civilians  did  not  attend  Mass 
attended  it  punctually  once  they  had  donned  the 
uniform.  I  was  told — and  I  have  every  reason  to 
believe  that  it  was  true — that  Jews  communicated,  and 
that  Mohammedans  were  baptized  repeatedly.  This 
assiduous  attendance  at  Catholic  worship,  this  accept- 
ance of  blessed  medals,  and  all  the  rest,  are  undeniable 
facts,  which  have  been  wrongly  interpreted  by  the 
clergy  and  by  believers.  We  must  not  perceive  in 
these  facts  a  revival  of  faith,  but  simply  the  adaptation 
of  men  to  their  environment,  with  the  object  of  im- 
proving their  immediate  material  conditions;  it  was  a 
matter  of  psychical  mimicry. 

{.  The  French  soldier  promptly  observed  that  many 
officers  and  many  lady  nurses  were  militant  Catholics, 
whether  they  really  were  believers  or  feigned  to  believe 
out  of  class  or  caste  interest.  He  no  less  promptly 
observed  that  the  soldiers  who  were  practising  Catholics 
derived  various  advantages  from  the  fact,  that  Minis- 
terial decrees  and  regulations  favoured — more  or  less 
legally — soldier-priests  and  other  Catholics.  And  then 
the  French  soldier,  indifferent  to  religion,  told  himself 
that  it  was  entirely  to  his  interest  to  make  himself 
agreeable  to  the  distributors  of  the  daily  manna.  To 
escape  a  hard  task,  an  unpleasant  post,  to  receive 
cigarettes,  chocolate,  and  other  sweetmeats,  was  well 
worth  a  Mass,  or  a  medal  of  Our  Lady  of  Lourdes,  or 
a  scapular  of  the  Sacred  Heart  of  Jesus.  It  was  in 
reality  the  same  state  of  mind  as  that  expressed  by 
Sully  when  he  told  Henri  IV. :  "  Sire,  sire,  the  crown 
is  well  worth  a  Mass."  In  short,  a  purely  material 
interest  led  the  bulk  of  the  army  to  appear  religious. 

It  was  more  particularly  by  the  sick  and  wounded 
in  the  hospitals  that  this  religious  pressure  made  itself 
felt,  as  the  majority  of  the  nurses  belonged  to  the 
wealthy  classes.  They  alone  had  the  leisure  and  the 
means  to  fulfil  these  functions  gratuitously.  The 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  193 

women  of  the  working  class  and  the  lower  middle  class 
had  often  to  work  for  their  bread,  replacing  the  mobilized 
husband  or  father. 

Just  as  the  soldiers  performed  the  rites  of  religion 
through  material  interest,  so  the  civilians  of  the  poorer 
classes  did  the  same.  The  war  increased  mutual  aid; 
the  Churches  everywhere  increased  their  charities.  And 
by  a  very  natural  sentiment  the  clergy  and  their  faithful 
offered  their  charities  in  the  service  of  religion.  The 
beneficence  of  the  rich  was  distributed  everywhere, 
especially  among  those  of  the  poor  who  made  a  show 
of  religious  feeling.  There  was,  in  short,  a  buying  of 
consciences.  As  a  result,  the  influence  of  these  Chris- 
tians, instead  of  tending  to  elevate  human  morality, 
has  tended  to  debase  it.  We  see  by  this  how  great  is 
the  part  played  in  human  affairs  by  economic  con- 
ditions. And  we  see,  too,  that  the  disappearance  of 
economic  differences  between  man  and  man — that  is, 
economic  equality — would  modify  social  phenomena 
by  raising  the  level  of  human  morality. 

The  prolongation  of  the  war  has  resulted  in  a  lessening 
of  the  intensity  of  the  efforts  at  relief  made  by  the 
Churches  and  individuals.  People  grow  tired  of  being 
charitable,  if  this  involves  a  notable  decline  from  their 
usual  standard  of  living.  And  then  one  perceived  a 
movement  of  religious  reflux.  The  churches  were  no 
longer  so  well  attended.  Men  imperceptibly  returned 
to  their  pre-war  attitude  of  religious  indifference.  The 
religious  revival  which  was  everywhere  acclaimed  was 
only  an  appearance. 

***** 

Another  cause  of  this  pseudo-religious  revival  was, 
in  many  persons,  to  be  found  in  the  events  of  the  war. 
The  fear  of  death  or  suffering,  for  oneself  or  others, 
which  continually  hung  over  all,  provoked  a  return  to 
the  beliefs  of  infancy,  to  the  superstitions  of  childlike 
peoples.  The  unfamiliarity  of  this  fear  in  times  of  peace 

13 


194          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD- WAR 

increased  its  intensity  when  war  broke  out.  But  as  the 
war  continued  men  grew  accustomed  to  suffering  and 
to  death  in  the  midst  of  life.  Habit  resulted  in  the 
disappearance  of  fear,  and  this  disappearance  involved 
the  cessation  of  religious  practices.  Religious  indiffer- 
ence once  more  prevailed. 

The  pseudo-religious  revival  based  on  the  fear  of 
death  was  naturally  more  extreme  in  people  who  were 
steeped  in  the  militarist  spirit,  and  accustomed  to 
passive  obedience,  under  the  influence  of  fear.  The 
dread  of  temporal  powers  always  brings  in  its  train 
the  fear  of  supernatural  powers,  and  vice  versa  ;  and  the 
religious  revival  which  we  have  lately  witnessed  was  not 
the  awakening  of  a  deistic  and  philosophic  faith,  but  of 
superstitions  analogous  to  those  which  we  encounter 
in  savage  nations — that  is,  the  childlike  nations. 

What  the  individual  sought  was  to  know  his  destiny 
and  that  of  his  dear  ones.  So  the  modern  prophetesses, 
the  extra-lucid  somnambulists,  have  never  made  greater 
profits.  What  the  individual  sought  was  protection 
from  death.  So  incantations,  prayers,  whiffs  of  in- 
cense, the  smoke  of  candles,  and  promises  of  ex-votos 
rose  toward  the  heavens  to  supplicate  the  Saints,  the 
Virgin,  God  the  Father  and  God  the  Son  !  So  millions 
of  medals,  blessed  scapulars,  and  other  amulets  of  every 
species  adorned  the  breasts  and  the  arms  of  the  com- 
batants. Death  must  be  avoided  !  And  these  sacred 
amulets  saved  one  from  a  horrible  death  !  The  amulets 
were  quite  as  varied  as  those  of  our  prehistoric  ancestors. 
Thus,  in  the  pocket  of  a  dead  German  soldier  the  fol- 
lowing letter  was  found: 

"  In  the  name  of  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy 
Ghost  1  Amen ! 

"  To  him  who  shall  bear  this  letter  on  his  person 
no  harm  shall  come,  neither  by  gun-fire,  nor  by  the 
sword,  nor  by  any  other  weapon,  visible  or  invisible. 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  195 

As  true  as  Christ  is  dead  and  gone  up  into  Heaven,  as 
true  as  the  earth  was  shaken,  he  who  carries  this  letter 
cannot  be  touched  by  bullet  nor  by  sabre,  nor  wounded 
in  his  body.  His  flesh  and  his  bowels  shall  be  whole. 
Amen  !  Let  him  who  does  not  believe  this  hang  the 
letter  round  the  neck  of  a  dog  and  fire  upon  the  dog. 
He  will  see  whether  it  is  true  ! 

"  I  pray  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  that  no  bullet  may 
touch  me.  It  may  be  of  lead,  of  gold,  or  of  silver,  but 
God  in  Heaven  will  preserve  me  from  it.  In  the  name 
of  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Ghost !  Amen  ! 

"  This  letter,  sent  from  Heaven,  was  found  in  1721 
in  Holland.  It  was  written  in  letters  of  gold  and 
hovered  above  me.  Whosoever  sought  to  seize  it  was 
reproved,  until,  in  1791,  someone  had  the  idea  of  copy- 
ing it  and  communicating  it  to  the  world." 

And  here,  says  Le  Temps  (July  13,  1915)  is  a  letter 
recommending  the  observance  of  the  Decalogue,  in 
return  for  which  God  will  grant  "  health,  happiness, 
and  peace.  Amen  !" 

"  Whosoever  does  not  believe  in  this  letter  will  be 
forsaken  by  Me  and  will  enjoy  neither  happiness,  nor 
blessing,  nor  aid.  He  who  has  this  letter  and  does  not 
publish  it  is  accursed  by  Me  and  by  the  Holy  Church. 
He  must  have  this  letter  copied  by  one  and  another, 
and  if  he  has  as  many  sins  as  there  are  grains  of  sand 
in  the  sea,  and  leaves  on  the  trees,  his  sins  will  be 
forgiven  him  !  In  the  name  of  the  Father,  the  Son. 
and  the  Holy  Spirit.  Amen  ! 

"  I  tell  you  in  truth  that  Jesus  Christ  wrote  this 
letter.  Respect  My  commandment  which  I  sent  thee 
by  the  angel  Michael.  God  the  Father  is  thy  hope. 
God  the  Son  is  thine  aid. 

"  May  no  bullet  be  able  to  overtake  me,  whether  of 
gold,  or  silver,  or  glass,  or  steel,  or  zinc,  or  lead.  God 


196          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

in  Heaven  will  render  me  invulnerable  against  all  the 
bullets  of  the  enemy.  In  the  name  of  the  Father,  the 
Son,  and  the  Holy  Ghost.  Amen  !" 

Among  the  French  the  "  Sacred  Heart  of  Jesus," 
invocations  to  St.  Genevieve,  and  the  medals  of  Our 
Lady  of  Lourdes;  among  the  Russians,  the  whole  series 
of  blessed  icons,  replace  the  heavenly  letter  of  this 
German  soldier.  These  are  identical  amulets,  symp- 
toms of  identical  animistic  and  polytheistic  super- 
stitions. 

Other  symptoms  of  the  reappearance  of  this  poly- 
theism are  seen  in  the  so-called  miracles  of  the  angels, 
of  St.  Genevieve,  and  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  at  the  time 
of  the  battles  of  Mons  and  the  Marne.  Angels  appeared 
and  protected  the  retreating  British  Army !  The 
French  armies  were  victorious  on  the  Marne,  not  because 
of  their  determination,  their  courage,  and  the  skill  of 
their  leaders,  but  because  God  and  His  Saints  led  them 
and  fought  with  them  !  Numerous  were  those,  among 
the  French  Catholic  clergy,  who  maintained  the  reality 
of  this  miracle,  and  described  it  in  addresses  and  in 
sermons.  Had  not  the  scourge  of  war  fallen  upon 
France  to  punish  her  for  her  sins  ?  Professional 
sold^'-  \-en  general  officers,  did  not  hesitate  to  pro- 
..u.aii,  more  or  less  definitely,  these  same  beliefs,  even 
in  their  official  orders  of  the  day  !  Here  again  is  the 
alliance  of  the  warrior  and  the  priest;  here  again  the 
faith  of  the  soldier,  whom  education  and  professional 
training  have  accustomed  to  obey,  to  fear,  not  to 
reason  and  to  believe. 

Germany  being  the  most  methodically  militarized  of 
all  the  belligerent  countries,  the  most  profoundly  steeped 
in  the  military  spirit,  it  was  logical  that  she  should  be 
most  prominent  of  all  in  this  revival  of  the  super- 
stitions of  the  prehistoric  peoples.  Thus  we  have 
seen  the  reappearance  of  a  modification  of  the  ancient 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  197 

tree-worship,  in  the  huge  wooden  statues  of  von  Hinden- 
burg  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  in  which  their  worshippers 
were  to  bury  iron  nails. 

All  these  animistic  and  polytheistic  customs  arose 
from  the  depths  in  which  the  years  had  gradually 
engulfed  them.  They  emerged  upon  the  surface,  the 
vestiges  of  the  beliefs  of  old,  the  last  flashes  of  a  dying 
fire.  They  reappeared  under  the  influence  of  environ- 
ing conditions  analogous  to  those  which  existed  when 
these  superstitions  flourished,  in  the  ages  of  savagery 
and  barbarism.  There  was  no  revival  of  religious  faith 
in  this. 

Religious  faith  has  not  recovered  its  force  and  vigour 
in  this  world-wide  war.  Far  from  it;  it  may  be  asserted, 
on  the  contrary,  that  it  has  diminished.  It  may  in- 
contestably  be  asserted  that  this  decline  will  become 
more  and  more  marked  as  time  goes  on,  following  a 
curve  parallel  to  that  of  the  weakening  of  the  militarist 
and  warlike  spirit.  The  curves  of  religious  faith  and 
the  militarist  spirit  always  follow  a  rigorous  parallelism. 
In  the  course  of  the  centuries  the  warrior  has  always 
accompanied  the  priest  and  the  priest  the  warrior. 
Their  education  is  the  same  in  its  essentials,  for  its 
basis  is  identical:  fear  and  obedience.  Just  as  this 
war  engenders  a  diminution  of  the  military  spirit,  so  it 
engenders  a  decrease  of  religious  faith. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Just  as  the  influence  of  the  war  has  been  profoundly 
felt  by  the  international  leagues  of  religion,  so  it  has 
affected  the  international  leagues  of  the  sciences,  letters, 
and  the  arts. 

The  very  essence  of  science  is  to  be  international,  or 
even,  to  be  more  precise,  to  be  cosmopolitan.  The 
various  sciences  are  indeed  identical  in  themselves, 
whatever  the  nationality  of  the  scientist.  The  chemistry 
taught  in  the  laboratories  of  Jena  does  not  differ  from 
the  chemistry  taught  in  Paris.  Physiology  at  Bonn 


198          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

is  the  same  as  physiology  at  Oxford.  There  is  not  a 
Japanese  mechanics  and  a  Hungarian  mechanics;  not 
an  Austrian  electricity  and  an  Italian  electricity.  There 
is  not  a  Belgian  sociology  and  a  Polish  sociology.  There 
is  one  physiology,  one  mechanics,  one  sociology,  in- 
dependent of  all  nationalities.  A  national  science  is 
an  absurdity:  the  expression  is  nonsensical.  By  nature 
and  in  essence  the  sciences  are  cosmopolitan. 

By  their  very  nature  letters  and  the  arts  are  national. 
Painting,  sculpture,  architecture,  music,  the  theatre, 
fiction,  and  poetry  are  but  the  expression,  under  various 
forms,  of  modes  of  feeling.  It  will  be  understood, 
then,  that  letters  and  the  arts  are  influenced  by  the 
various  modes  of  feeling,  of  which  certain  determining 
factors  are  the  customs,  language,  and  manners  of 
living  peculiar  to  the  different  peoples. 

Thought  has  no  country,  but  the  expression  of 
thought  varies  according  to  the  country  in  which  it  is 
expressed.  From  the  fact  of  this  nationalism  of  ex- 
pression and  cosmopolitanism  of  thought  results  an 
internationalism  of  letters,  the  arts,  and  the  sciences. 
This  internationalism  arises  from  the  fact  of  the  inter- 
communication and  interpenetration,  without  reference 
to  frontiers,  of  literary  and  artistic  manifestations,  and 
of  scientific  knowledge.  All  these  manifestations  exert 
a  mutual  influence  upon  one  another.  It  is  with 
literatures  and  the  arts  as  it  is  with  the  so-called  races: 
there  is  no  pure  art  or  literature  without  some  foreign 
addition.  This  sociological  phenomenon  has  engendered 
in  the  brains  of  artists,  scientists,  and  men  of  letters 
a  multitude  of  common  customs  and  ideas  and  feelings. 
From  this  results  the  existence  of  a  species  of  inter- 
national organizations  of  those  who  cultivate  the  arts 
and  sciences  and  letters. 

The  present  war  has  violently  shattered  these  inter- 
national formations.  The  bonds  which  united  all  these 
men  and  women  have  been  broken.  And  the  spectator 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  199 

has  witnessed  a  swift  and  astonishing  growth  of  feelings 
of  hatred.  In  all  countries  everyone  who  handles  a 
pen,  brush,  or  pencil  esteems  it  an  honour  to  celebrate 
the  beauty  of  destruction  and  extermination.  Men  of 
the  calibre  of  Maurice  Barres,  Frederic  Masson,  or 
Jean  Richepin  have  found  worthy  emulators  in  Haupt- 
mann  and  Richard  Dehmel.  The  imbecility  and  base 
chauvinism  of  the  one  is  equalled  by  the  pitiful  megalo- 
mania of  the  other.  It  is  in  truth  pitiful  to  see  and 
hear  men  speak  so  unreasonably,  shouting  loudly  for 
the  extermination  and  enslavement  of  thousands  of 
human  beings.  In  this  competition  of  exacerbated 
chauvinists,  in  whom  all  critical  spirit  is  lacking,  the 
Germans  must  be  awarded  the  palm.  The  megalo- 
mania of  which  we  have  given  examples  displays  itself  in 
all  candour  to  such  a  degree  that  one  would  doubt 
one's  senses  were  not  the  proofs  before  one,  signed  by 
an  Ostwald  or  a  Sombart. 

So  virulent  was  the  force  which  afflicted  all  these 
Germans  that  we  saw  artists  and  poets  applauding  the 
destruction  of  the  Cathedral  of  Reims,  the  Library  of 
Louvain,  the  belfry  of  Arras,  the  Cloth  Hall  of  Ypres, 
and  other  gems  of  art !  And  because  the  artists  of 
neutral  countries,  like  the  great  Swiss  poet,  Adolf 
Spitteler,  or  the  musician,  Jaques-Delcroze,  flagellated 
the  destruction  of  these  monuments,  the  artistic  patri- 
mony of  humanity,  they  were  execrated  and  excom- 
municated by  their  German  peers.  One  might  have 
thought  that  a  wind  of  madness  had  blown  upon  the 
world !  We  saw  the  scientists  of  various  countries 
denying  that  their  enemy  colleagues  had  any  scientific 
worth.  The  Academies  expunged  the  names  of  their 
foreign  members,  as  though  the  fact  of  belonging  to  an 
enemy  nation  destroyed  the  whole  scientific  or  artistic 
worth  of  the  artists  or  scientists  affected.  On  the 
banks  of  the  Seine,  the  Thames,  the  Rhine,  the  Danube, 
and  the  Spree,  the  sense  of  dignity  and  respect  which 


200          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

thinkers  should  feel  for  one  another  was  lamentably 
engulfed.  , 

And  when  Romain  Rolland  attempted  to  dam  this 
tide  of  insane  hatred,  and  Bernard  Shaw  sought,  by 
a  few  crude  realities,  to  calm  this  excessive  excite- 
ment, they  were  overwhelmed  by  opprobrium  by  all 
the  belligerents.  The  seed  of  hatred  has  been  scattered 
to  the  winds  on  every  hand,  and  in  profusion.  Will  it 
grow  ?  The  future  alone  will  show,  but  we  doubt  it, 
for  we  are  witnessing  the  mere  efflorescence  of  over- 
excited brains,  overworked  and  intoxicated  by  the 
environing  atmosphere.  When  the  atmosphere  is  trans- 
formed this  efflorescence  will  vanish  as  the  fog  vanishes 
before  the  equinoctial  gales. 

All  these  imprecations,  all  these  appeals  to  murder 
and  revenge,  all  these  longings  to  enslave  others,  all 
these  desires  for  hegemony,  are  so  much  literature. 
They  are  not  life.  And  literature,  whatever  has  been 
said  of  it,  has  little  influence  on  life.  When  the  normal 
course  of  life  resumes  its  course  and  the  stupendous 
blood-letting  suffered  by  humanity  has  cooled  its  fever, 
the  men  of  letters  and  artists  and  scientists  will  resume 
their  international  relations.  They  will  exchange,  as 
of  old,  their  ideas  and  their  knowledge.  They  will  be 
subject,  as  before,  to  the  reciprocal  influences  of  their 
various  modes  of  feeling.  And  a  few  years  later,  when 
they  review  the  insanities  which  they  wrote  during  the 
delirium  of  the  war,  they  will  all  be  astonished  and  will 
ask  if  they  were  indeed  the  men  who  wrote  such  things. 

The  international  formations  of  the  arts  and  sciences 
and  literature  are  not  therefore  destroyed;  one  cannot 
destroy  the  inevitable  results  of  the  modes  of  human 
life,  save  by  destroying  that  life  itself.  These  forma- 
tions are  not  destroyed;  they  are  merely  suffering  an 
eclipse,  while  humanity  is  a  prey  to  the  fever  of  war 
and  the  fever  of  hatred. 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  201 

We  may  say  as  much  of  the  international  league  of 
Feminism.  Before  the  world- war  there  were  ties 
between  the  national  groups  of  women,  whose  social 
and  political  aims  were  identical.  Thus  there  was  an 
international  alliance  for  female  suffrage,  and  an  Inter- 
national Woman's  Council.  The  war  has  not  destroyed 
the  existence  of  these  organisms ;  but  it  has  profoundly 
affected  them.  A  gulf  has  been  opened  between  the 
women  of  the  different  groups  of  belligerents.  In  vain 
have  the  women  of  the  neutral  countries  attempted  to 
fill  this  gulf.  Hatred  has  divided  the  wives,  mothers, 
sisters,  and  fiancees  of  the  combatants  into  hostile 
groups.  Frenchwomen  and  German  women  rival  one 
another,  fulminating  against  one  another  with  the 
greatest  violence,  recommending  the  complete  rupture 
of  all  relations,  glorifying  vengeance,  and  advocating 
an  implacable  attitude  in  the  hour  of  peace.  English- 
women have  been  a  prey  to  less  violent  sentiments,  as 
the  insularity  of  their  country  has  enabled  them  to 
escape  the  sufferings  of  invasion,  and  even,  to  some 
extent,  grief  at  the  loss  of  their  dear  ones.  It  has  not 
been  so  with  the  women  of  France  and  Germany,  who, 
in  the  thirtieth  month  of  the  war,  numbered  more  than 
three  million  dead  and  nearly  two  million  disabled  !  Not 
a  woman  but  has  lost  one  of  her  men-folk.  This  explains 
the  hatred  which  fills  the  women  of  these  countries, 
and  obscures  for  them  the  true  spirit  of  the  British 
and  neutral  feminists.  These  latter  have  striven  in 
vain  to  abate  excessive  passions,  and  to  cool,  by  a 
breath  of  cold  reason,  the  spirits  heated  by  the  war, 
with  its  inevitable  retinue  of  death,  devastation,  and 
suffering. 

Peace  alone  will  restore  the  feminine  mind  to  cold 
reason,  for  it  will  then  be  withdrawn  from  the  fevered  at- 
mosphere of  the  period  of  slaughter,  and  will  be  subjected 
to  the  influences  of  conditions,  economic  and  political, 
which  will  tend  to  become  identical  in  the  different 


202          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

countries  of  Europe.  International  feminism,  griev- 
ously wounded  by  the  war,  will  then  recover  its  full 
health.  Full  of  strength  and  vigour,  it  will  resume  its 
march  onward  to  obtain  the  political  and  economic 
equality  of  the  sexes. 

The  world-war,  by  a  host  of  incidents,  will  give 
potent  assistance  in  the  attainment  of  this  equality. 
This  war  has,  in  fact,  created  economic  and  social 
conditions  which  have  brought  into  great  prominence 
the  importance  of  woman's  role  in  our  modern  society. 

The  diminution  of  male  labour  has  everywhere 
necessitated  the  employment  of  female  labour.  I  am 
not  speaking  only  of  the  work  which  was  commonly 
regarded  as  proper  to  women,  as,  for  example,  the  care 
of  the  sick  and  wounded,  but  of  work  which  had  been 
regarded  as  the  sole  appanage  of  man.  I  will  mention 
here  only  the  manufacture  of  munitions  and  agricultural 
labour.  In  France,  for  example,  despite  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  men,  during  the  first  year  of  the  war  scarcely 
a  thousand  hectares*  of  land  went  out  of  cultivation. 
All  the  vast  amount  of  agricultural  labour  hereby 
involved — ploughing,  sowing,  harrowing,  harvesting, 
etc. — was  entirely  performed  by  women,  men  above 
forty-eight  years  of  age,  and  children.  We  perceive 
by  this  sirqle  example  how  in  the  course  of  this  war 
woman  has  been  called  upon  to  display  her  intelligence, 
her  physical  energy,  and  her  endurance.  Her  moral 
energy  also  has  proved  equal  to  the  situation.  The 
habitual  catch-phrase  about  woman's  weakness  has 
been  reduced  to  dust  by  the  mere  consideration  of 
events.  In  all  the  belligerent  nations  the  women  have 
maintained  the  courage  and  encouraged  the  tenacity 
of  the  men.  The  Serb  woman  and  the  Belgian  woman 
notably  have  proved  admirable  guardians  of  the  sacretl 
fire  of  liberty  and  of  national  independence. 

Women  have  replaced  men  in  their  labours  of  peace, 

*  About  2,240  acres. 


WAR  AND  THE  CREEDS  203 

in  their  task  of  production,  so  that  men  could  devote 
themselves  to  their  work  of  destruction,  to  war.  This 
has  been  in  some  sort  a  return  to  the  ages  of  savagery 
and  barbarism,  when  the  industry  of  vital  production 
was  confided  to  woman.  As  we  see,  the  war  constantly 
compels  the  reappearance  of  survivals  from  barbarous 
ages,  because  it  is  itself  one  of  these  survivals. 

Everywhere  women  have  aided  and  replaced  men, 
and  we  may  say  with  justice  that  the  men  have  been 
unable  to  utilize  all  the  energy,  the  intelligence,  and 
the  good-will  of  the  women.  Bureaucratic  and  govern- 
mental procrastination  and  prejudice  has  on  many 
occasions  annihilated  or  inhibited  their  individual 
efforts,  which  had  freely  united.  Not  only  has  woman 
shown  herself  the  equal  of  man,  by  undertaking  hard 
physical  labour;  she  has  also  displayed  a  courage  similar 
and  equal  to  his.  Several  women  have  fought  and 
faced  death  in  the  trenches;  cases  have  been  cited  in 
Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia,  and  France.  How 
many  have  been  killed  in  accomplishing  the  sisterly 
mission  of  tending  the  wounded  and  comforting  the 
feeble !  How  many  have  been  tried,  sentenced  to 
death,  and  shot,  like  their  male  accomplices,  because 
they  had  acted  the  spy  for  love  of  their  country,  or  for 
gain,  or  because  they  had,  like  Miss  Cavell,  accomplished 
an  act  of  sisterly  charity  ! 

The  social  equality  of  the  man  and  the  woman  has 
been  demonstrated  in  the  eyes  of  all  by  this  terrible 
war.  Men  and  women  are  equal  before  the  courts- 
martial  and  military  law.  Woman  enjoys  no  privilege 
of  sex.  This  the  facts  have  proved.  The  German 
Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Herr 
Zimmermann,  has  loudly  asserted  the  same.  This 
equality  of  sex  is  one  of  the  results  which  the  war  has 
definitely  established.  No  one  can  now  honestly 
deny  it. 

We  might  even  say,  all  things  being  considered,  that 


204          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  tribute  paid  to  war  by  women  is  greater  than  that 
paid  by  men.  If  men  have  suffered  death  on  the  field 
of  battle  and  in  the  trenches,  the  women  of  the  invaded 
countries  have,  in  their  thousands,  suffered  violation 
by  the  invading  soldiers,  enemies,  allies,  or  fellow- 
countrymen.  And  for  long  years  to  come  they  will 
suffer  the  agony  of  this  violation  of  their  being.  How 
many  thousands  of  women,  too,  were  led,  by  sentimental 
or  altruistic  motives,  to  surrender  their  bodies  to  soldiers, 
to  give  them  joy,  it  might  be  a  last  joy,  because  they  were 
going  to  face  death  !  How  many  of  these  will  all  their 
lives  suffer  the  consequences  of  this  act  of  charity  ! 
The  facts  prove  the  increase  of  illegitimate  births,  as 
well  as  the  spread  of  syphilis.  In  truth,  the  retinue  of 
war  is  always  a  retinue  of  sorrows,  which  smite  the 
non-combatants  as  well  as  the  fighters. 

We  may  therefore  derive  yet  another  lesson  from  this 
world- wide  war:  violence  is,  for  woman,  only  the 
mother  of  suffering.  And  it  follows  that  it  is  to  the 
interest  of  woman  to  make  war  upon  war;  to  oppose 
militarism,  the  principal  support  of  war,  and  the  symbol 
of  violence  in  the  world. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS 

The  war  and  the  "  Internationale  " — The  attitude  of  the  German, 
French,  Belgian,  British,  and  Russian  Socialists — The  outbreak  of 
hostilities — Their  mentality — The  attitude  of  the  neutral  Socialists, 
and  its  causes — The  preponderance  of  German  Social  Democracy 
in  international  Socialism — The  different  conceptions  of  Social- 
ism in  France  and  Germany — State  Socialism — The  modifications 
of  the  Socialist  attitude  caused  by  the  duration  of  the  war — The 
conflicts  in  the  midst  of  the  various  Socialist  parties  in  Germany 
and  in  France — The  effect  of  the  centralized  organization  of  the 
parties,  and  of  participation  in  the  Government. 

Socialistic  measures  taken  by  the  Governments  of  all  countries 
— The  lesson  to  be  learned  therefrom — This  war  is,  in  one  of  its 
aspects,  the  conflict  between  two  conceptions  of  Socialism:  cen- 
tralized and  authoritative  Socialism;  federalized  and  libertarian 
Socialism — The  spread  of  the  Socialist  ideal  and  the  growth  of  the 
forces  of  Socialism  under  the  influence  of  the  war. 

THE  present  war  naturally  affected  the  Labour 
and  Socialist  "  International."  This  "  Inter- 
national "  was  not  sufficiently  powerful  to  pre- 
vent the  war,  nor  to  prevent  its  members  from  killing 
one  another.  When  an  ancient  international  organiza- 
tion such  as  Christianity  had  failed,  it  is  not  astonishing 
that  a  youthful  organization  such  as  the  Labour  Inter- 
national, which  counts  barely  fifty  years  of  life,  should 
fail.  The  weakness  of  international  Catholicism  was 
due  to  its  age;  that  of  international  Socialism  to  its 
youth.  The  first  is  in  its  period  of  decline;  the  second 
in  its  period  of  growth. 

At  the  outset  the  various  Socialist  parties  were 
profoundly  surprised  by  the  war.  In  Berlin  as  in  Paris, 
in  Brussels  as  in  London,  all  believed  in  peace.  None 
of  the  Socialists  believed  that  a  group  of  capitalists — 

205 


206          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

landowners,  manufacturers,  and  business  men — would 
be  sufficiently  powerful  and  sufficiently  unintelligent 
to  enforce  a  war.  In  the  eyes  of  all  the  Socialists  the 
material  and  moral  interests  of  all  humanity  rose  like 
an  impregnable  wall  against  the  possibility  of  war. 
So  the  declaration  of  war  surprised  them  all. 

The  Social  Democratic  masses  in  Germany  were  cer- 
tainly deceived  by  their  Government,  and  also  by  some 
of  their  leaders,  who  were  won  over  by  the  militarist 
and  imperialist  spirit.  These  four  millions  of  German 
Socialists  are  lacking  in  the  critical  spirit,  being  so 
accustomed  to  passive  obedience.  The  idea  of  discipline 
has  in  them  replaced  all  other  ideals.  Discipline  has 
for  them  become  an  end  in  itself,  instead  of  remaining, 
as  it  should  be,  a  means  only.  * 

Twenty  years  ago,  in  my  volume  on  Socialism  and 
the  London  Congress,  I  wrote:  "  The  directing  Committee 
is  the  veritable  master  of  German  Social  Democracy; 
it  is,  moreover,  an  organism  perfectly  adapted  to  the 
German  environment,  autocratic  and  militarist.  .  .  . 
The  party  of  reform,  whose  tendencies  are  simply 
radical,  is  highly  authoritative,  and  very  jealous  of  its 
hegemony  over  international  Socialism.  .  .  .  The 
directing  Committee  is  as  a  rule  obeyed  as  a  general  is 
obeyed  by  his  soldiers." 

Such  was  the  situation  of  German  Social  Democracy 
in  1896,  and  such  it  still  was  in  July,  1914,  when  the  war 
was  unleashed  by  the  group  formed  of  the  Junkers  and 
the  industrial  magnates.  The  masses  obeyed  in  a 
bovine  fashion,  without  having  the  slightest  conception 
of  the  lies  told  by  their  Government,  and  by  many  of 
their  own  leaders,  who  were  consciously  following  the 
lead  of  the  capitalist  rulers.  They  professed  to  be 
Marxists — that  is,  adepts  of  the  class  conflict — and  they 
were  acthig  as  supporters  of  the  capitalist  class  in  the 
war  which  was  then  commencing. 

This  attitude  of  the  Socialist  leaders,  who  knew  what 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         207 

they  were  doing,  was  actually  anti-Socialist.  It  was, 
however,  the  inevitable  result  of  the  centralizing, 
State-worshipping  spirit  which  pervaded  the  whole 
body  of  Social  Democracy,  from  the  roots  to  the  summit. 
The  tree  of  authority  always  bears  evil  fruit. 
*  *  *  *  * 

In  France  and  Belgium  the  Socialists  were  confronted 
by  a  situation  which  was  identical  with,  although 
different  from,  that  which  faced  the  German  Socialists. 
They  were,  in  fact,  confronted  by  the  invasion  of  their 
country,  and  the  desire  of  the  German  State  to  do 
violence  to  their  feelings  and  their  customs,  and  more 
or  less  to  diminish  their  liberties  and  their  autonomy. 
The  French  Socialists,  up  to  the  last  moment,  strove 
most  energetically  to  prevent  the  war,  as,  for  that 
matter,  did  the  German  Socialists.  But  the  latter 
were  without  influence  with  their  Government,  which 
was  only  in  appearance  a  Parliamentary  Government. 
Their  opposition  was,  and  could  be,  only  an  academic 
opposition  so  long  as  it  remained  on  the  Parliamentary 
plane.  Matters  could  not  have  been  otherwise,  unless  their 
opposition,  passing  from  the  Parliamentary  environ- 
ment to  the  working-class  masses,  had  manifested  itself 
by  means  of  the  general  strike  and  labour  disturbances. 
We  know  that  the  leaders  of  the  Social  Democratic 
party  were  always  opposed  to  a  propaganda  of  this 
kind,  as  it  would  have  been  dangerous  to  their  undis- 
turbed retention  of  power:  dangerous  in  respect  both  of 
the  Government  and  the  working-class  masses,  who 
would  no  longer  have  been  passively  obedient. 

The  pacific  activities  of  the  German  proletariat  were 
therefore  doomed  to  defeat,  while  those  of  the  French 
proletariat  might  have  been  and  were  effective,  thanks 
to  the  fact  that  the  political  development  of  France 
is  nearly  fifty  years  in  advance  of  that  of  Germany. 
During  the  nerve-racking  hours  of  the  last  days  of  July, 
1914,  the  French  Socialists  brought  such  influence  to 


208          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

bear  upon  the  French  Government  that:  (1)  Along  the 
whole  Eastern  frontier  the  French  troops  left  a  margin 
of  five  or  six  miles  in  front  of  them,  in  order  to  avoid 
"  incidents  ";  (2)  the  French  Government  pledged  itself 
not  to  be  the  first  in  declaring  war  upon  Germany. 

However,  the  German  Army  invaded  the  soil  of 
France  and  Belgium  before  any  act  of  war  on  the  part 
of  the  French,  and  of  course  the  Belgians,  who  were 
neutrals.  There  were,  then,  three  possible  attitudes  for 
the  Socialists  of  France  and  Belgium:  They  could  defend 
their  liberties  by  defending  their  native  soil ;  they  could 
passively  refuse  to  be  soldiers;  or  they  could  start  a 
revolution,  in  order  to  prevent,  or  rather  to  check,  the 
war.  The  last  two  attitudes  could  produce  only  one 
result,  since  the  German  Social  Democrats  were  marching 
against  them  as  disciplined  soldiers,  and  this  result 
would  have  been  the  certain  triumph  of  autocratic 
Germany.  This  would  have  been  absolutely  certain, 
as  the  French  Army  would  have  been  more  or  less 
disorganized  and  quite  incapable  of  resisting  the  stu- 
pendous German  effort.  The  French  Government 
would  promptly  have  been  forced  to  make  peace,  and 
Germany  would  have  been  able  to  turn  back  against 
Russia.  She  would  have  defeated  Russia  in  a  few 
battles.  A  few  months — three  or  four  or  longer — and 
the  war  would  have  ended  in  the  general  victory  of 
Germany,  which  would  have  assured  her  hegemony  on 
the  Continent  while  preparing  the  way  for  her  struggle 
with  Great  Britain,  which  would  take  place  a  few  years 
later.  Much  death  and  devastation  would  have  been 
avoided,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  liberty  would  have 
vanished  from  Continental  Europe. 

For  the  French  Socialists,  as  for  the  Belgian  Socialists, 
who  are  principally  Walloons,  Socialism  implies  liberty. 
They^feel  no  desire  for  a  centralized  State  Socialism. 
In  the  development  of  their  Socialism  the  influence  of 
the  anarchism  of  Proudhon,  Bakunin,  Elisee  Reclus, 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         209 

Kropotkin,  and  others  has  resulted  in  the  development 
of  tendencies  of  an  anti-Statist,  anti-authoritarian 
character,  which  have  been  magnified  by  the  fact  that 
they  correspond  with  the  natural  mentality  of  the 
French  and  the  Walloons.  Thus  the  French  and  Belgian 
Socialists  all  possessed  the  instinct  or  the  knowledge 
that  their  interest  as  free  men  was  to  rise  in  defence  of 
their  autonomy,  their  opinions,  and  their  customs, 
which  were  threatened.  And  they  did  so  rise,  unani- 
mously, from  the  reformers  of  the  extreme  Right  to  the 
anarchists  of  the  extreme  Left. 

It  may  be  asserted  that  the  behaviour  of  the  French 
Socialists  saved  civilization  from  sinking  into  Pan- 
Germanism  ;  so  that  the  sociologist  arrives  at  a  conclusion 
which,  to  the  vulgar  mind,  will  appear  strange  and 
paradoxical:  that  liberty,  in  the  European  world,  has 
been  saved  by  the  spirit  inculcated  in  the  Franco- 
Belgian  proletariat  by  the  propaganda  of  the  anarchists, 
whom  the  ruling  bourgeoisie  persecuted  and  con- 
demned as  criminals  during  the  latter  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  curious  lessons  of  the  war. 
Observe  how  the  consequences  of  human  thought  and 
action  find  their  repercussions  at  a  distance  and  in  many 
directions,  and  then  you  will  see  how  idle  and  how 
foolish  it  is  to  condemn  the  manifestations  of  the  spirit 
of  revolt,  that  salt  of  the  earth. 

***** 

In  Great  Britain  the  Socialists  found  themselves 
confronted  by  a  different  situation.  Their  liberty 
stood  in  no  danger  from  an  invader.  But  this,  in  truth, 
was  more  in  appearance  than  in  reality,  for  the  liberty 
of  British  citizens  was  threatened  quite  as  much  as  that 
of  French  citizens.  A  small  Socialist  minority  in  England 
understood  this,  and  in  August,  1914,  was  ardent  in 
its  support  of  the  participation  of  the  British  Empire 
in  the  war.  But  the  majority  was  evidently  opposed 

14 


210          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  such  participation.  However,  the  English  Socialists 
are  by  no  means  numerous;  their  direct  political  role 
is  of  little  importance.  Their  influence  makes  itself 
felt  only  indirectly,  through  the  trades  unions,  which 
are  very  numerous  and  powerful — more  powerful  than 
the  syndicate  of  France  and  Germany. 

The  Labour  party  in  the  English  Parliament  followed 
the  middle-class  parties  at  the  moment  of  the  declaration 
of  war,  without  having  any  effective  influence  over  the 
conduct  of  the  Government.  Confined  to  its  struggle 
for  the  material  betterment  of  the  proletariat,  taking 
no  interest  in  foreign  policy,  the  Labour  party  was  at 
first  purely  insular,  despite  its  participation  in  the 
international  Labour  organizations.  Its  leaders  had  by 
no  means  sufficient  intellectual  pliability  or  vivacity 
to  permit  of  their  immediately  grasping  the  new  situa- 
tion created  by  the  warlike  action  of  the  Germanic 
rulers. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  evangelical  spirit  has  sunk 
its  roots  deeply  into  a  minority  of  the  English  Socialists. 
For  them  non-resistance  to  evil  by  violence  is  an  irre- 
fragable principle.  Their  duty,  therefore,  was  to  oppose 
Great  Britain's  participation  in  the  war.  For  others, 
to  support  such  participation  was  to  violate  the 
principles  of  Socialism,  for  it  meant  inciting  brother 
Socialists  to  kill  one  another.  Their  duty  was  therefore 
to  oppose  it.  These  Socialists  did  not  understand  that 
the  Socialism  of  which  they  were  partisans  differed 
greatly  in  reality  from  the  Socialism  professed  by  the 
Social  Democratic  majority  in  Germany.  These  Social- 
ists, in  fact,  desire  to  realize  a  non-centralized  Socialist 
world  in  which  each  individual  would  enjoy  his  full 
liberty.  The  Germans  are  upholders  of  a  centralized 
State  system  of  Socialism,  in  which  the  individual  would 
be  an  obedient  machine. 

These  English  Socialists  did  not  perceive  that  the 
Tolstoyan  doctrine  of  non-resistance  to  evil  leads  to  the 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         211 

acceptance  of  evil,  to  submission  to  those  who  commit 
evil.  This  doctrine  encourages  and  maintains  evil. 
In  this  war,  for  example,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxem- 
burg, on  account  of  its  weakness,  did  not  resist  the 
German  invader.  Although  it  has  escaped  the  slaughter 
of  its  citizens,  it  has  not  escaped  the  suppression  of 
liberty  of  thought,  writing,  and  assembly;  it  has  not 
escaped  commercial  and  industrial  ruin,  and  its  in- 
habitants have  been  forced  to  do  that  which  they  did 
not  wish  to  do.  Here  is  a  fact  which  reveals  the  con- 
sequences of  the  Tolstoyan  doctrine  of  non-resistance 
to  evil  by  force. 

The  British  Socialists  did  not  perceive  that  in  opposing 
Great  Britain's  participation  in  the  war  they  were 
playing  the  game  of  the  capitalist  rulers  of  Germany; 
they  were  assisting  them  by  allowing  them  to  crush 
the  French  and  Belgian  democracies,  by  not  assisting 
their  brother  Socialists  of  France  and  Belgium  when 
attacked.  They  did  not  understand  that  the  victory  of 
the  Central  Empires  would  inevitably  mean  a  set-back 
to  Socialism,  because  this  victory  would  involve  a 
territorial  conquest,  a  Germanization  of  the  nations, 
and,  consequently,  the  permanent  revolt  of  these  peoples, 
which  would  involve  the  substitution,  in  the  future,  of 
conflicts  between  nationalities  instead  of  class  conflicts. 

These  Socialists  had  no  real  comprehension  of  the 
Socialist  interest,  which  coincided  with  their  national 
interest  as  Englishmen.  This  is  curious,  but  very 
reasonable,  for  Socialism  is  on  a  par  with  democracy, 
and  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  is  to  be  democratic. 
This  lack  of  comprehension  on  the  part  of  the  Socialist 
leaders  in  England  is  due,  for  the  most  part,  in  our 
opinion,  to  insularity  and  lack  of  intellectuality;  their 
intelligence  is  wanting  in  pliability,  vivacity,  and  width 
of  grasp.  They  do  not  see  all  the  sides  of  a  question,  and 
when  it  is  shown  to  them  they  require  time  to  grasp  it. 


212          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Russian  Socialism  also  was  divided,  but  the  great 
majority  declared  emphatically  for  participation  in 
the  war  against  the  Central  Empires.  The  anarchist 
Kropotkin,  the  revolutionary  Socialists  Bourtzev  and 
Rubanovich,  the  Social  Democrat  Plechanov,  and  many, 
many  more  are  witnesses  of  this  fact.  They  rightly 
considered  that  the  most  powerful  support  of  the 
Russian  autocracy  was  the  German  Empire.  The  de- 
struction of  the  German  Empire  would  be  a  deadly 
blow  at  the  Russian  autocracy.  The  defeat  of  the 
Central  Powers  was,  in  their  opinion,  the  prelude  to  the 
defeat  of  the  Russian  bureaucracy,  so  pervaded  by  the 
Germanic  spirit  and  method:  the  bureaucracy  which 
had  enslaved  all  the  peoples  of  the  Russian  Empire. 

Everywhere  among  the  neutrals  the  Socialists  were 
opposed  to  participation  in  the  war.  In  Italy  they 
were  divided,  but  the  majority  was  incontestably  in 
favour  of  the  maintenance  of  Italian  neutrality. 

In  Sweden  some  notable  Socialists,  such  as  Professor 
Gustav  Steffen,  would  even  have  had  the  Swedes  join 
the  Central  Empires.  This  was  true  only  of  a  small 
minority  of  intellectuals,  for  the  bulk  of  the  Socialist 
forces  was  plainly,  under  the  leadership  of  Hjalmar 
Branting,  in  favour  of  the  Allies,  while  desirous  that 
Sweden  should  keep  out  of  the  conflict.  In  Denmark, 
Holland,  and  Norway  the  Socialists  were  in  favour  of 
strict  neutrality.  Their  attitude  had  even,  sometimes, 
a  slightly  pro-German  tendency.  They  refused  to  see 
that  the  international  cataclysm  had  been  released  by 
a  caste  of  the  German  capitalist  class,  and  they  per- 
sisted in  regarding  the  war  as  merely  the  inevitable 
result  of  the  policy  pursued  for  years  by  the  capitalist 
class  of  all  countries.  Certainly  the  war  was  a  product 
of  this  absurd  policy,  but  it  was  none  the  less  true  that 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  due  to  the  will  of  the  ruling 
class  of  Germany.  Because  a  mine  is  prepared,  it  does 
not  necessarily  follow  that  it  must  explode. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         213 

The  general  attitude  of  the  neutral  Socialists  was  due 
to  various  causes:  the  prestige  enjoyed  by  German 
Social  Democracy;  the  natural  desire  to  keep  oneself 
and  one's  country  out  of  any  conflict;  the  fact  that 
Socialists  and  democrats  did  not  realize  that  it  was  to 
their  own  interest  to  support  the  Western  Powers. 
The  prestige  of  German  Social  Democracy  was  very 
great.  Its  serried  battalions  of  four  million  electors, 
its  wealth,  its  newspapers,  all  impressed  the  Socialists 
of  other  nations,  for  they  did  not  perceive  that  it  was 
a  colossus  with  feet  of  clay.  It  lacked  the  inward  fire 
of  the  revolutionary  tradition,  of  the  spirit  of  revolt 
and  liberty.  Discipline  had  for  it  become  the  end, 
not  a  means.  The  fear  of  Governmental  repression 
was  choking  it. 

The  role  of  German  Socialism  was  preponderant. 
In  the  Socialist  Congresses  all  the  nations  of  the  East 
and  the  North  of  Europe  followed  in  its  train.  The 
defeat  of  France  in  1870  was  felt  even  in  international 
Socialism,  and  prevented  Socialists  from  perceiving  the 
actual  strength — which  was  very  great — of  French 
Socialism. 

The  General  Confederation  of  Labour  and  the  French 
Socialist  party  are  completely  pervaded  by  the  revolu- 
tionary doctrine  of  Blanqui  and  the  anarchism  of 
Bakunin  and  Proudhon.  The  world  of  the  worker  and 
the  petit  bourgeois,  which  forms  the  solid  structure  of 
French  Socialism,  has  been  strongly,  though  often 
indirectly,  influenced  by  the  anarchist  propaganda  of 
those  thinkers  who,  from  1885  to  1898,  gravitated 
about  La  Revolte,  and  then  about  Les  Temps  Nouveaux, 
those  two  newspapers  of  which  Elisee  Reclus,  Peter 
Kropotkin,  and  Jean  Grave  were  the  soul. 

The  French  Socialist,  then,  cannot  really  conceive 
of  Socialism  without  liberty.  It  was  for  this  reason 
that  he  was  always,  in  the  international  Congresses, 
the  opponent  of  the  German  Social  Democrats.  He 


214          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

even  continued  to  be  their  opponent  in  these  Congresses 
after  the  French  syndicate  had  ceased  to  take  part  in 
them,  subsequent  to  the  International  Congress  of 
London  held  in  1896.  German  Social  Democracy, 
"  composed  of  well-disciplined  soldiers,  veritable  auto- 
mata, having  no  conception  of  liberty  either  for  them- 
selves or  for  others,"  as  I  wrote  at  that  period,  fearing 
the  libertarian  spirit  of  the  syndicate,  had  obtained  the 
voting  of  a  Draconian  rule  which  in  practice  excluded 
the  syndicats  from  international  Socialist  Congresses. 

Thus  in  the  international  Socialist  assemblies  the 
first  place  was  always  occupied  by  the  German  Social 
Democrats,  and  this  gave  rise  to  an  illusion  as  to  their 
Socialism  and  their  power.  Their  attitude  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  dispersed  this  illusion,  except  in  the 
case  of  the  neutrals.  The  latter,  indeed,  did  not  under- 
stand that  the  crushing  of  France  would  mean  the 
hegemony  of  Germany  upon  the  Continent;  and  then, 
a  few  years  later,  her  hegemony  in  the  world.  The 
result  of  this  would  be  the  disappearance  of  the  nations 
and  of  democracy,  and,  consequently,  the  intensifica- 
tion conflicts  based  upon  nationality  and  democracy, 
to  the  detriment  of  the  struggle  for  Socialism.  The 
result  of  the  German  hegemony  would  be  a  State 
Socialism,  recalling  in  some  degree  the  Socialism  of 
the  Incas,  the  Socialism  of  the  Jesuits  of  Paraguay: 
a  superior  class  governing  a  human  mass  to  which 
panem  et  circenses  are  given  on  the  condition  that  it 
works  for  its  masters.  The  German  hegemony  would 
turn  the  European  proletariat  into  a  gang  of  men  well 
nourished,  like  the  dog  in  the  fable,  but  with  their 
necks  in  a  collar.  This  is  what  the  majority  of  neutral 
Socialists  have  not  understood;  this  is  what  all  French 
and  Belgian  Socialists  have  very  keenly  felt  and  realized. 
*  *  *  *  * 

The  long  duration  of  the  war  was  bound  to  modify 
the  attitude  of  the  belligerent  Socialists.  Events  did 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         215 

not  correspond  with  the  aspirations  and  opinions  of  the 
Continental  proletariat.  The  wave  of  enthusiasm  which 
had  carried  away  th»  German  Social  Democrats  as  well 
as  the  French  Socialists  was  gradually  dissipated, 
during  the  course  of  the  war,  in  useless  victories,  in  the 
mud  and  wretchedness  of  the  trenches,  in  the  blood  and 
sufferings  of  millions  of  dead  and  disabled  soldiers. 

At  the  outset  the  German  proletariat  flew  to  arms 
in  the  belief  that  it  was  defending  its  native  soil  against 
the  Russian  autocracy,  and  that  it  was  going  to  liberate 
the  Poles  and  Finns  from  the  Muscovite  yoke.  But 
very  soon  the  facts,  if  they  did  not  dissipate  these  most 
tenacious  illusions,  did  at  least  pour  down  upon  them 
a  light  which  diminished  their  intensity.  Some  of  the 
Social  Democratic  leaders  grasped  the  fact  that  the 
German  rulers  had  deceived  them,  and  that  they  were, 
as  a  result,  proceeding  in  the  wrong  direction.  Lieb- 
knecht  at  first,  followed  by  Riihle,  then  by  Haase, 
Kautsky,  and  Bernstein,  began  to  make  protests,  and 
endeavoured  to  do  something  towards  clearing  up  the 
murky  atmosphere  of  untruth  and  ignorance  into  which 
the  entire  nation  had  been  plunged.  However,  these 
leaders  of  the  nascent  opposition  were  only  expressing 
the  new  opinions  which,  in  a  more  or  less  vague  and 
confused  shape,  were  pervading  the  German  masses. 

And  then,  little  by  little,  a  minority,  which  con- 
tinually increased,  sprang  up  in  the  midst  of  the  Social 
Democratic  deputies  in  the  Reichstag.  While  in  August, 
1914,  there  were  fourteen  members  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic group  who,  in  the  heart  of  the  group,  voted 
against  the  war  credits,  although  this  was  not  made 
public,  this  minority  increased  to  seventeen,  then  to 
thirty-two,  then  to  thirty-six,  and  this  publicly.  In 
December,  1915,  twenty  members  dared  to  break  with 
the  party  discipline,  and  to  vote  in  the  Reichstag  against 
the  war  credits. 

The  force  of  circumstances  inevitably  brought  about 


216          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

changes.  On  March  24,  1916,  a  scission  occurred  in 
the  Parliamentary  group  of  Social  Democrats.  It  fol- 
lowed a  speech  delivered  in  the  Reichstag  by  Herr 
Haase,  without  the  authorization  of  the  group.  Eighteen 
members  formed  the  Sozialdemokratische  Arbietsge- 
meinschaft.  They  thereby  freed  themselves  from  the 
majority,  and  were  consequently  able  to  express  their 
opinions  freely.  They  had  broken  the  bonds  of  dis- 
cipline, which  confined  them  as  in  a  prison. 

It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  ruling 
elements  of  the  party  and  the  mass  of  their  party.  It 
must  also  be  noted  that  the  population  includes,  among 
its  young  men,  and  especially  among  the  young  "  in- 
tellectuals," an  active  and  intelligent  element  of 
thinkers,  artists,  and  literary  men  who  are  anarchists, 
anti-militarists,  and  great  admirers  of  the  French 
democrats. 

The  majority  of  the  Social  Democratic  leaders  is 
composed  of  various  elements.  One  portion,  plainly 
Imperialistic,  has  nothing  to  differentiate  it  from  the 
Liberal  or  Conservative  Pan-Germanists  as  far  as  their 
foreign  policy  is  concerned.  Another  faction  supports 
the  Government  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  more  demo- 
cratic policy  and  more  democratic  laws.  Lastly,  a 
third  faction  supports  the  Governmental  policy  in  the 
hope  that  the  Government  would,  after  the  war,  uphold 
the  economic  interests  of  the  syndicates  or  trades 
unions.  Herr  David,  Herr  Scheidemann,  and  Herr 
Legien  are  the  leaders  of  these  factions,  which  comprise 
almost  two-thirds  of  the  Social  Democratic  deputies  in 
the  Reichstag. 

The  minority  of  the  leaders  is  divided  into  two 
portions,  very  unequal  as  to  numbers.  The  more 
extreme,  whose  spirit  is  definitely  revolutionary,  con- 
sists, for  a  beginning,  of  Karl  Liebknecht  and  Riihle. 
The  other  portion  consists  of  eighteen  members,  and  is 
far  less  violent;  its  figure-heads  are  Haase,  Kautsky, 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS        217 

and  Bernstein,  and  it  is  known  as  the  Social  Democratic 
Labour  Union.  In  addition  to  these,  between  the 
majority  and  the  minority,  there  are  fifteen  deputies 
who,  while  remaining  members  of  the  old  Parliamentary 
group,  have  very  strong  tendencies  toward  the  minority. 
To  complete  my  remarks,  I  should  add  that  there  is 
also  a  small  group,  whose  principal  leader  is  Julius 
Borchardt,  and  whose  tendencies  are  strongly  revolu- 
tionary, even  more  so  than  those  of  the  "  Spartacus  " 
(Liebknecht)  group. 

Such  is  the  situation  in  the  midst  of  the  leaders  of 
German  Social  Democracy. 

The  Social  Democratic  party  is  thus  profoundly 
divided,  and  its  unity  is  maintained  only  by  force  of 
habit.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  profound  gulf  divides  the 
two  great  sections  of  the  party,  and  this  gulf  will  grow 
yet  deeper  and  wider  as  events  follow  their  logical  and 
inevitable  course.  The  ruling  oligarchy  is  thus  cut  in 
two,  because  the  mass  of  the  party  is  cut  in  two.  Even 
the  majority  of  this  mass  is  really  on  the  side  of  the 
Parliamentary  minority.  The  deputies  who  in  De- 
cember, 1915,  voted  against  the  war  credits  represented 
more  electors  than  those  who  voted  for  them.  The 
German  proletariat,  thanks  to  its  habit  of  passive 
obedience,  its  pacific  instincts,  and  its  servile  education, 
still  obeys  the  rulers  of  the  Empire  and  the  leaders  of 
its  party.  But  already  one  may  see  the  dawn  of  a 
new  period  looming.  Here  and  there  signs  of  revolt 
flash  out,  isolated  manifestations,  the  premonitory 
symptoms  of  a  change  of  attitude.  Certain  of  the 
Social  Democrats  are  now  venturing  to  declare  that 
the  victory  of  the  Entente  will  liberate  Germany,  the 
source  of  the  world's  woes  being  the  triumphant  mili- 
tarism of  the  Prussian  Junkers. 

It  may  be  that  the  economic  conditions  engendered 
by  the  war  will  in  the  long  run  provoke  a  breakdown 
of  the  bovine  obedience  of  the  German  proletariat. 


218          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Hunger  and  poverty  are  not  always  bad  counsellors. 
Will  there  be  a  revolution  before  peace  is  concluded  ? 
It  would  be  rash  to  affirm  it;  and  as  rash  to  deny  it. 
But  one  thing  is  at  this  moment  plain  to  the  sociologist : 
that  the  political,  economic,  and  social  conditions  of 
Germany  are  eminently  revolutionary. 

So  it  might  very  well  be  that  one  of  the  motives  for 
the  mobilization  of  the  entire  male  civil  population, 
between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  sixty,  for  the  purpose 
of  organizing  war  industries,  was  the  appearance  of 
symptoms  of  revolt  among  the  people.  The  German 
rulers  are,  by  the  nature  of  their  mentality,  addicted  to 
a  belief  in  the  panacea  of  enregimentation.  They 
believe  that  all  these  adults,  grouped  into  battalions 
of  workers,  under  the  eyes  of  their  officers,  will  feel 
their  ardour  of  revolt  cool  within  them,  and  will  be 
transformed  into  sheep-like  masses.  I  think  the  effect 
will  be  other  than  this.  These  agglomerated  medleys 
of  working  men  and  men  of  the  lower  and  middle 
bourgeoisie  will  form  a  perfect  medium  for  the  cultiva- 
tion of  the  spirit  of  revolt.  And  perhaps,  with  the 
help  of  this  grouping  of  the  population,  and  the  atmo- 
sphere of  distress  and  famine,  action  will  follow. 

Just  as  the  unanimity  of  German  Socialism  is  shat- 
tered, so  is  the  unanimity  of  French  Socialism.  There 
has  been  no  scission  in  the  French  Socialist  party,  but 
a  very  powerful  minority  has  grown  up,  which  protests 
against  the  policy  pursued  by  the  majority  of  the  party 
leaders.  Is  it  even  a  minority,  if  we  consider  the  mass 
of  the  working  classes  ?  One  thing  is  certain:  that 
although  the  whole  party,  of  a  common  accord,  desires 
the  crushing  of  international  militarism  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  lasting  peace,  there  is  a  disagreement  as 
to  the  means  by  which  these  ends  are  to  be  attained. 
One  section,  very  small  as  to  numbers,  wishes  for 
immediate  peace.  It  sees  the  death  and  devastation 
and  mutilation  caused  by  the  war,  and  thinks  of  the 


219 

wretchedness  to  come,  without  perceiving  that  a  peace 
concluded  with  German  Imperialism  would  necessarily 
be  a  halting  peace,  permitting  the  perpetuation  of  all 
the  causes  of  national  impoverishment,  notably  parasitic 
militarism. 

An  important  faction  of  the  party  is  ill-pleased  with 
the  ignorance  in  which  it  is  kept,  and  the  authoritative 
manner  in  which  the  leaders  of  the  party  rule  it,  though 
they  should  be  merely  the  servants  of  the  party,  not 
its  masters.  It  complains  of  the  rupture  of  relations 
with  the  Labour  International,  and  that  the  objects  of 
the  war  pursued  by  the  Allied  Governments  are  not 
publicly  and  definitely  stated.  These  two  sections  form 
more  than  a  third  of  the  Socialist  party.  The  pro- 
longation of  the  war  only  increases  this  strength,  because 
the  causes  of  discontent  persist  and  sometimes  increase. 
At  the  National  Congress  of  December,  1915,  a  motion 
of  compromise  was  voted  unanimously.  From  this  we 
cannot  deduce  an  exact  idea  of  the  situation  of  the 
Socialist  party.  Compromise  is  always  a  means  which 
serves  only  to  obscure  a  situation,  and  the  truth  into 
the  bargain.  Moreover,  a  unanimous  vote  upon  a 
motion  of  this  kind  is  obtained  only  by  means  of  strategy 
in  the  lobby  and  tactics  of  obstruction  and  fatigue, 
methods  which  actually  lower  and  degrade  those  who 
employ  them.* 

The  general  history  of  the  French  Socialist  party 
during  the  war  sheds  a  vivid  light  on  various  charac- 
teristics: the  formation  of  clans  which  fight  among 
themselves  to  obtain  various  functions  and  distinctions; 
the  autocratic  tendency  of  these  clans;  the  absence  of 
men  equal  to  the  situation;  the  intellectual  and  moral 
insufficiency  of  the  leaders. 

The  scaffolding  of  the  party  has  become  so  strongly 
constituted,  in  the  course  of  the  years,  thanks  to  the 

*  At  the  National  Congress  of  December,  1916,  the  two  sections 
were  almost  equal. 


220          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Democratic  party  of  Germany,  that  it  is  impossible  for 
any  new-comer  to  appear  under  the  impulse  of  circum- 
stances. He  must  take  his  place  in  the  queue;  must 
enrol  himself  in  one  of  the  clans  which  have  taken 
charge  of  the  party.  And  as  each  individual,  in  each 
clan,  looks  after  the  place  which  he  occupies,  he  takes 
good  care  to  hold  off  any  individual  whom  he  suspects 
organization  of  the  party  on  the  model  of  the  Social 
of  standing  in  his  light,  or  of  being  likely  to  do  so. 
This  is  one  of  the  causes  of  the  mediocrity  of  the  party 
staff.  Men  of  genius  like  Jaures  are  very  rare,  for 
besides  their  political  genius  they  possess  the  oratorical 
genius  which  impresses  their  will  upon  the  masses, 
who  force  them  upon  the  small  oligarchies  which  exploit 
the  masses. 

Every  man  who  fulfils  a  function  or  possesses  power 
tends  to  become  an  autocrat.  It  is  far  easier  to  command 
than  to  obtain  by  persuasion.  Thus  a  Socialist  deputy 
informed  me,  during  the  present  war:  "  We  don't  ask 
them  their  opinion  " — he  was  speaking  of  the  mass  of 
working-class  soldiers — "  we  ask  them  to  obey."  This 
state  of  mind  is  developed  by  the  atmosphere  in  which 
the  elected  representative  lives,  and  by  the  skilful 
manoeuvres  which  bourgeois  Governments  and  leaders 
employ  to  lull  the  susceptibilities  of  the  Socialist  re- 
presentatives. The  phenomenon  became  still  more 
plainly  apparent  upon  the  entrance  of  the  Socialists  into 
the  Ministries.  The  Ministerial  atmosphere  is  deadly 
to  the  Socialist  spirit,  and  insensibly  these  representa- 
tives of  the  proletariat  come  to  see,  feel,  and  judge 
things  as  do  the  representatives  of  capitalism.  Con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  they  betray  those  who 
elected  them,  and  the  ideals  and  interests  which  they 
represented. 

The  circumstances  created  by  the  war  were  revolu- 
tionary, and  a  revolutionary  spirit  sprang  up  in  the 
mass  of  the  proletariat,  asking  only  to  be  set  in  motion 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         221 

by  the  attitude  and  the  actions  of  the  leaders.  But 
nothing  came  of  it.  The  admirable  human  material 
ready  to  hand  was  not  utilized.  Not  one  of  the  Socialist 
leaders  understood,  or  dared  to  understand,  that  the 
situation  was  truly  revolutionary,  and  that  revolutionary 
means  necessarily  matched  a  revolutionary  situation. 
The  rulers,  Ministers  and  others,  let  matters  drift;  they 
were  glad  to  pass  through  the  storm  in  as  much  tranquil- 
lity as  was  possible.  And  in  this  connection  they  are 
largely  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  the  disorder, 
the  lack  of  organization,  the  fraud,  the  illegalities,  the 
ignorance,  and  the  lying  which  reached  so  great  a  develop- 
ment during  this  war  in  the  administration  of  France. 

If  the  leaders  were  not  equal  to  their  task,  no  new  man 
could  make  his  appearance,  because  of  the  strong 
bureaucratic  constitution  of  the  party.  The  party  has 
become  centralized,  which  has  apparently  strengthened, 
but  in  reality  weakened  it.  It  has  weakened  the  party 
because  the  attitude  of  the  leaders  has  not  corresponded 
with  the  desires  of  the  most  active  and  most  militant 
members  of  the  proletariat,  or  even  with  the  desires  of 
the  proletariat  as  a  whole.  A  sullen  discontent  is 
therefore  spreading,  little  by  little  gaining  all  the  circles 
of  Socialism,  for  they  hate  autocracy.  It  may  therefore 
be  foreseen  that  the  war  will  have  an  unfavourable 
influence  over — I  do  not  say  Socialism,  but  the  Socialist 
party,  and  will  give  rise  to  many  resignations,  diverting 
many  men  and  women  toward  a  less  Parliamentary 
Socialism,  probably  toward  Syndicalism.  However, 
there  again  the  possession  of  power  has  betrayed  its 
deleterious  effect;  certain  Syndicalist  officials  have 
rather  forgotten  their  ideals. 

****/« 

In  the  course  of  this  war  the  Governments  of  all 
countries  have  taken  measures  which  were  indubitably 
Socialistic  in  tendency.  The  fixing  of  maximum  prices ; 
the  requisition  of  products  in  the  possession  of  in- 


222          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

dividuals;  the  distribution  of  certain  products,  as  in 
Germany;  the  management  of  the  railways  by  the 
Governments  or  the  military  authorities;  the  chartering 
of  merchant  vessels  by  the  State;  the  control  of  existing 
workshops  and  the  creation  of  State  factories  for 
munitions  and  arms;  the  regulation  of  labour;  the  ad- 
vance of  capital  to  manufacturers;  the  introduction 
of  State  insurance  of  cargoes,  or  State  insurance  against 
the  effects  of  aerial  bombardment,  as  in  England; 
the  purchase  of  merchant  vessels  for  the  transport  of 
provisions  and  other  products;  the  purchase  of  public- 
houses  in  England,  with  a  view  to  diminishing  their 
number;  the  State  control  of  slaughter-houses  and  the 
building  of  dwelling-houses  for  munition-workers,  as 
in  Great  Britain ;  the  moratorium  of  rents,  as  in  France, 
etc.,  are  measures  which,  one  could  hardly  deny,  are 
Socialistic  hi  form  and  in  tendency.  But  it  would  be 
an  error  to  regard  them  as  truly  Socialistic.  It  is, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  impossible  for  truly  Socialistic 
measures  to  exist  in  a  society  which  is  capitalistic  in 
form.  They  are  all,  in  varying  degrees,  vitiated  by 
capitalistic  influences. 

With  the  prolongation  of  the  war  we  have  seen  the 
Socialistic  character  of  the  measures  introduced  in  all 
the  belligerent  countries  accentuated.  It  was  Germany 
who  began  this  process  of  accentuation,  under  the 
stress  of  the  blockade,  which  was  starving  her,  and  of 
her  historical  tendencies  as  a  God-State.  There  were 
travelling  kitchens  to  feed  the  people.  The  tendency 
to  equalize — even  more,  to  unify  and  stereotype — the 
alimentation  of  all  was  plainly  visible.  The  requisition 
of  civilians,  of  all  the  male  civilians  between  the  ages  of 
sixteen  and  sixty  years,  was  made  after  twenty-tnree 
months  of  war,  and  no  doubt  this  requisition  will 
extend,  during  the  course  of  1917,  to  all  the  women. 
This  meant  compulsory  labour  for  all,  and  labour 
according  to  directions  given  by  the  ruling  authorities, 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         223 

with  a  collective,  not  an  individual  aim.  This  forced 
labour,  exercised  under  constraint,  under  the  threat  of 
penalties,  was  hardly  to  be  differentiated  from  the  forced 
labour  imposed  by  the  German  rulers  on  the  peoples 
temporarily  conquered:  the  Belgians,  French,  Poles, 
Lithuanians,  Serbs,  etc.  It  was  slavery  for  the  entire 
male  population,  for  no  one  could  choose  his  work  nor 
his  place  of  work.  These  were  settled  by  the  authorities. 
At  the  same  time  the  population  was  divided  up  in 
respect  of  nourishment,  according  to  the  importance  of 
this  population  in  respect  of  the  war.  Other  measures 
completed  this  system,  which  transformed  Germany 
into  an  immense  camp  in  which  everything  was  done 
according  to  rule,  where  no  one  was  free,  where  con- 
straint and  fear  were  sovereign  rulers. 

We  are  witnessing,  in  the  twentieth  century,  a  revival 
of  the  state  of  affairs  existing  in  Paraguay  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  when  that  country  was  governed  by  the 
Jesuits,  and  in  the  land  of  the  Incas  at  an  earlier 
period.  The  principle  is  the  same:  the  Governmental 
and  administrative  authority  controls  everything;  there 
is  no  liberty,  no  individual  initiative.  Human  beings 
have  become  pawns,  who  are  moved  by  a  few  rulers, 
with  the  help  of  a  well-organized  hierarchy.  Here, 
again,  we  discover  an  affinity  between  the  Germanic 
methods  of  government  and  the  Jesuit  method. 

Under  the  stress  of  circumstances,  and  more  particu- 
larly on  account  of  the  submarine  war,  which  made 
provisions  rather  scarce,  and  the  necessity  of  speeding- 
up  the  production  of  armaments,  the  other  belligerents 
followed,  more  or  less  closely,  the  example  of  Germany. 
But  the  measures  taken  were  less  general  and  less 
vexatious  to  individual  liberty.  All,  however,  were  of 
the  same  Socialistic  character. 

From  all  these  measures,  if  we  analyze  all  their  con- 
sequences, we  may  deduce  a  number  of  lessons.  In  the 
first  place,  they  show  plainly  that  when  the  life  and 


224          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

liberty  of  a  collectivity — that  is  to  say,  its  dearest 
possessions — are  at  stake,  necessity  enforces  the  em- 
ployment of  Socialistic  measures.  Hence  it  follows 
that  the  Socialist  doctrines  are  those  which  are  most 
conducive  to  the  security  and  well-being  of  the  collec- 
tivity. These  measures  obviously  imply  the  negation 
of  individual  property  and  assert  a  right  of  pre-eminence 
on  behalf  of  the  collectivity.  The  regulations  relating 
to  the  restriction  or  prohibition  of  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  alcohol  are  an  open  confession  of  the  fact  that 
certain  private  interests  are  contrary  to  individual 
interests  considered  as  a  whole,  and  to  the  interests  of 
the  collectivity.  The  conditions  of  life  resulting  from 
all  these  measures  of  defence  are  tending  to  make  the 
life  of  the  whole  nation  approximate  to  the  life  of  the 
monastery  or  the  barracks.  Equality  is  tending  to  get 
the  better  of  liberty. 

The  obligation  to  work,  under  the  constraint  of  ex- 
tremely heavy  penalties,  advertises  to  the  whole  world 
the  fact  that  the  social  necessity  of  such  a  step  is  ex- 
treme, and  that  in  consequence  the  idler  is  not  only 
useless,  but  mischievous.  This  measure  is  an  affirma- 
tion of  the  parasitical  nature  of  idlers,  and  more,  of  the 
parasitical  nature  of  those  who  perform  work  which  is 
useless  to  the  collectivity.  We  see  the  extreme  im- 
portance of  the  deductions  arising  from  this  dictatorial 
measure,  which  for  the  conquered  populations  emanated 
from  the  German  military  authorities,  and  for  the  Ger- 
man people  from  the  Reichstag.  This  is,  indeed,  a 
wholly  revolutionary  measure,  in  absolute  opposition 
to  the  principles  and  the  ways  of  life  dear  to  the  up- 
holders of  autocracy  and  capitalism,  which,  from  so 
many  points  of  view,  are  purely  parasitical.  It  is 
curious  to  observe  that  during  this  war  the  actions  of 
the  Imperial  Governments  have  had  consequences 
actually  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  rulers. 

These  measures,  as  they  were  applied  in  all  the  bel- 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         225 

ligerent  countries,  were  more  or  less  related  to  one 
conception  only  of  the  Socialist  doctrine — the  State 
Socialist  conception.  The  Government  resorted  to 
compulsion,  with  penal  sanctions,  which  were  often 
severe.  The  basis  of  these  Socialistic  measures  was  that 
of  all  State  Socialism:  the  authority  imposed  by  con- 
straint based  upon  fear.  Perhaps  we  may  see  in  this 
authoritatism  the  principal  reason  why  these  measures 
have  not  in  some  countries  yielded  all  the  good  results 
which  were  expected  of  them.  If  the  Governments  of 
Great  Britain  and  (more  particularly)  of  France  could 
have  counted  more  fully  on  the  free  will  of  the  pro- 
letariat there  would  have  been  less  disorder  and  less 
deceit.  They  should  have  applied  to  the  Trades  Unions 
and  the  syndicats  and  the  co-operative  societies,  and 
have  requested  them  to  organize  and  execute  all  that 
lay  within  their  jurisdiction.  But  the  Governments, 
actuated  by  the  instinct  of  conservation,  did  not  do 
this.  They  feared,  no  doubt,  that  the  experience  of 
events  would  show  the  world  how  easy  it  would  be  to 
dispense  with  a  number  of  Governmental  functions. 

S|C  %  JjC  Sfc  iff 

When  we  regard  the  present  war  from  a  Socialistic 
point  of  view  we  see  that  it  is  a  conflict  between  two 
conceptions  of  Socialism — that  of  Karl  Marx  and 
Ferdinand  Lassalle,  which  is  an  authoritarian,  cen- 
tralized State  Socialism,  and  that  of  Bakunin,  which  is 
a  libertarian,  federalist  Socialism.  Germany's  victory 
in  1870  gave  preponderance  to  the  Marxist  conception 
of  State  Socialism,  or,  to  be  more  exact,  to  the  concep- 
tion of  his  commentators.  The  defeat  of  the  Imperial 
Powers  will  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  the  authoritative 
conception  of  Socialism,  and  will  give  fresh  vigour  to 
the  conception  based  on  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
federation. 

The  Labour  International  was  broken  up  at  the 
commencement  of  hostilities,  since  there  were  no  longer 

15 


226          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

any  relations  between  the  Socialists  of  the  belligerent 
States;  for  since  July  29, 1914,  the  International  Socialist 
Bureau  has  had  no  further  plenary  sessions,  the  majority 
of  the  French  Socialists  refusing  to  take  part  in  such 
sessions  as  long  as  French  soil  is  occupied  by  German 
invaders.  But  this  state  of  affairs  does  not  imply  the 
death  of  the  International.  It  does  not  even  imply 
its  eclipse,  for  although  official  and  collective  relations 
have  come  to  an  end,  individual  relations  are  still 
existent.  The  Labour  International  is  undergoing  a 
crisis  of  growth  and  change:  that  is  the  truth.  It  is 
undergoing  transformation;  the  influence  of  the  demo- 
cratic peoples  of  the  West  is  increasing,  while  the  in- 
fluence of  the  slavishly  disciplined  peoples  of  Germany 
is  diminishing. 

Everywhere  the  Socialist  parties  are  undergoing  a 
process  of  transformation,  which  explains  the  internal 
conflicts  which  they  reveal  to  the  sociologist.  Every- 
where we  find,  in  these  parties,  a  chauvinistic  wing, 
and  at  the  other  extremity  a  cosmopolitan  wing.  The 
former  sets  the  Nationalist  ideal  before  the  Socialist 
ideal;  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  sets  the  Socialist  ideal 
before  the  Nationalist  ideal.  Between  these  two  wings 
is  a  floating  mass  which  seeks  to  reconcile  the  two 
ideals,  inclining  more  to  one  side  or  the  other  accord- 
ing to  individual  opinions. 

There  seems  to  be  no  doubt,  if  we  regard  matters 
objectively,  that  the  chauvinistic  Socialists  are  far 
more  Nationalist  than  Socialist,  and  that  their  Socialist 
ideal  has  greatly  degenerated.  Under  the  circumstances 
engendered  by  the  war  these  chauvinists  were  the  only 
ones  who  could  take  full  advantage  of  the  little  liberty 
of  expression  or  assembly  which  existed  in  Germany, 
Austria,  and  France.  The  situation  was  rather  different 
in  Great  Britain,  where  these  liberties  were  preserved 
in  a  greater  measure.  The  Conservatives  of  all  countries 
turned  smiling  faces  to  these  prodigal  sons  who  were 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         227 

returning  to  the  fold.  They  naturally  sought  to  widen 
the  gulf  which  was  tending  to  establish  itself  between 
the  Socialist  groups.  The  one  met  with  nothing  but 
flattery,  the  other  with  nothing  but  threats  and  insults. 

The  principle  of  class  conflict  even  seemed  to  be 
abandoned,  for  Socialists  co-operated  with  the  other 
classes  of  society  for  the  defence  of  their  country.  Class 
union  superseded  class  conflict,  to  the  great  joy  of  the 
Conservatives  of  all  shades,  who  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  war  was  a  good  thing,  since  it  brought  about 
such  a  result.  In  reality  this  union  was  only  apparent, 
and  was  maintained  by  the  efforts  of  the  leaders. 

The  class  conflict  is  a  social  fact,  the  result  of  various 
causes,  which  have  always  been  appearing  in  the  history 
of  humanity.  So  long  as  these  causes  exist  the  result 
will  be  the  same.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  the  war 
will  efface  these  causes;  consequently,  the  class  conflict 
will  reappear  as  plainly  as  ever  after  the  war. 

Has  it  even  suffered  an  eclipse  during  the  war  ? 
The  superficial  observer  may  think  so,  but  he  who  is  not 
deceived  by  appearances  knows  very  well  that  this  is  not 
the  case.  If  the  class  conflict  has  been  suspended  for  the 
mass  of  the  proletariat,  this  has  by  no  means  been  the  case 
with  the  capitalist  minority.  We  have  already  hinted 
at  this,  when  showing  that  in  all  the  countries  affected 
by  the  war  the  Conservative  and  reactionary  elements 
have  endeavoured  to  make  the  war  serve  their  class 
and  caste  interests. 

The  crisis  of  the  Socialist  parties  will  probably  result 
in  a  scission  after  the  war.  The  most  advanced  elements, 
those  most  pervaded  by  the  spirit  of  liberty,  those  most 
opposed  to  the  militarization  of  the  nation  and  their 
party,  will  separate  from  the  more  moderate  and  authori- 
tative. This  will  not  weaken  Socialism;  on  the  contrary. 
In  every  centralized  party  the  extreme  Right  always 
weakens  the  force  of  the  propaganda  of  the  thinkers  and 
the  militants  of  the  extreme  Left.  By  seceding  these 


228          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

latter  will  reconquer  their  liberty  and  their  power  of 
action.  It  is,  indeed,  the  thinkers  of  the  vanguard  who 
advance  both  the  parties  and  the  peoples.  Do  not  let 
us  forget  that,  as  Ernest  Renan  said,  "  the  great  things 
accomplished  in  a  nation  are  usually  accomplished  by  a 
minority." 

Socialism  will  not  be  enfeebled  by  these  secessions, 
for  the  section  of  the  extreme  Right  will  retain,  in  spite 
of  all,  Socialistic  tendencies  which  will  influence  Govern- 
mental circles,  while  it  will  itself  be  subjected,  nolens 
volens,  to  the  influence  of  the  extreme  Left.  But  one 
lesson  arises  out  of  this  situation — namely,  the  mischievous 
nature  of  centralization,  and  the  necessity  of  the  con- 
federation of  the  small  parties,  but  with  bonds  so  loose 
that  each  group  can  preserve  its  full  autonomy. 

The  war  has  considerably  augmented  the  strength  of 
Socialism — that  is,  events  have  won  over  to  the  Socialist 
ideal  a  host  of  people  who  were  ignorant  of,  or  indifferent 
to,  Socialism.  All  Socialists  are  propagandists,  because 
all  are  intensely  pervaded  by  an  ideal,  and  they  experi- 
ence an  irresistible  craving  to  make  others  share  this 
ideal.  The  trenches  at  the  front,  and  the  crowds  of 
men  in  the  camps  and  barracks,  are  admirable  media 
for  the  propagation  of  Socialism.  Every  Socialist 
soldier  has  scattered  the  seed  of  Socialism  around  him. 
The  task  was  easy,  for  the  ruin  and  bloodshed  of  the 
war,  the  absurdities  and  crimes  of  military  discipline, 
the  enrichment  of  a  few,  the  restriction  of  liberties,  etc., 
were  all  there  to  serve  as  examples  in  his  propaganda 
against  autocracy,  war,  militarism,  and  capitalism. 

Everybody  has  been  affected  by  the  war,  and  has  been 
more  or  less  injured  by  it.  Death  and  suffering  give 
pause  for  thought.  So  the  world  was  a  soil  well  prepared 
to  receive  the  seed  of  Socialism,  which  every  Socialist 
soldier  and  civilian  threw  to  the  winds  in  everyday 
conversation.  Frenchmen,  Englishmen,  Belgians,  Ger- 
mans, etc.,  have  vied  with  one  another  in  this  work. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SOCIALISTS         229 

Thus  a  neutral,  writing  of  what  he  had  seen  in  Germany, 
was  able  to  say:  "  The  German  soldiers  who  have  come 
back  from  the  front  to  obtain  a  little  rest  during  the 
summer  or  autumn  had,  without  the  aid  of  any  propa- 
ganda, acquired  *  advanced  ideas '  if  they  had  not 
had  such  ideas  before,  or  more  advanced  ideas  if  they 
had  already  had  them."  The  same  phenomenon  is 
apparent  everywhere.  We  shall  be  astonished,  when 
the  war  is  over,  by  the  subterranean  work  which  has 
thus  been  accomplished.  And  the  longer  the  war  lasts 
the  longer  this  work  goes  on.  The  result  of  this  un- 
doubted fact  is  that  from  the  Socialist  point  of  view  the 
continuance  of  the  war  is  advantageous.  The  interest 
of  the  capitalist  and  Conservative  would  be  to  stop  it 
as  soon  as  possible,  for  it  creates  a  Socialistic  and  revolu- 
tionary state  of  mind  and  a  revolutionary  situation. 
But,  curiously  enough,  it  is  the  Socialists  and  the 
democrats  who  wish  to  stop  the  war,  while  the  capitalist 
Conservatives  wish  to  prolong  it.  Here  we  have  a 
very  interesting  reversal  of  roles,  contrary  to  the  actual 
interests  of  the  two  parties.  It  is  obviously  due  to 
the  sentimentalism  of  the  democratic  mass,  and  to  the 
short-sighted  views  of  the  Conservatives,  who  perceive 
only  the  interest  of  the  moment. 

The  war  has  revealed  and  developed  the  influence 
of  Socialism  in  contemporary  society.  The  hour  of 
peace,  whether  near  at  hand  or  remote,  really  depends 
on  the  German  Socialists  and  not  on  the  Kaiser.  Let 
a  breath  of  revolution  blow  through  their  ranks,  let 
them  overthrow  their  militarism,  and  peace  would  be 
immediate,  for  the  Occidental  Socialists  would  refuse 
to  continue  the  war.  The  whole  world  is  so  well  aware 
of  the  enormous  part  played  by  the  Socialists  in  this 
world-conflict  that  the  newspapers  have  never  been 
more  full  of  news  relating  to  Socialism.  Never  have 
Governments  and  capitalists  been  more  uneasy  in  respect 
of  the  decisions  arrived  at  by  the  labour  world.  If  this 


230          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

labour  world  knew  its  own  strength,  if  its  leaders  knew 
it  and  would  utilize  it,  instead  of  under-estimating  it 
and  showing  themselves  indifferent  to  it,  war,  militarism, 
and  autocracy  would  be  ended  for  ever.  The  weakness 
of  the  proletariat  lies  in  its  ignorance  of  its  strength. 

However,  we  can  already  foresee  the  magnitude  of 
the  part  which  international  Socialism  will  play  on 
the  conclusion  of  peace.  Thus,  a  Hungarian  Govern- 
mental organ,  Az  Est,  very  justly  observed  in  1915: 

"  The  destiny  of  the  world  is  slowly  passing  into  the 
hands  of  Socialism.  Militarism  has  finished  its  work 
and  is  on  the  downward  slope.  The  world  has  exhausted 
its  military  strength,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  Socialism 
to  arouse  the  conscience  of  the  world.  Everywhere,  in 
the  belligerent  countries,  the  Socialists  are  beginning 
to  bestir  themselves,  and  we  may  justly  hope  that  the 
sound  of  the  guns  will  soon  be  suppressed  by  the  awaken- 
ing of  the  world's  conscience." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR 

The  relations  between  the  two  groups  of  belligerents,  and  between  the 
various  Allied  Powers — The  difference  of  their  conduct,  and  its 
causes — The  hegemony  of  Germany  over  her  obedient  allies — The 
militarization  of  the  German  mind  is  due  to  education,  not  to  race 
— The  organization  of  the  great  Asiatic  Empires — The  militarist 
education  results  in  the  industry  of  war — Victory  is  necessary  to  the 
maintenance  of  moral  force  in  the  Central  Powers — In  the  Quintuple 
Entente  the  relations  of  the  Allies  are  those  of  equals — The  conse- 
quences which  arise  from  this  fact — The  opposition  of  the  interests 
of  the  various  Allies — How  the  duration  of  the  war  affects  the 
various  Allies — The  influence  of  democratic  government  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war — The  opposition  between  the  democratic 
principle  and  autocratic  methods  of  government — Its  effect  upon 
the  conduct  of  the  war. 

Friction  and  discontent  among  the  Allies — Causes :  mutual  igno- 
rance and  fear  of  the  truth — The  part  played  by  the  various  Allies 
in  the  war — What  might  happen  in  the  hypothetical  case  of  a  re- 
arrangement of  Alliances — The  mutual  indispensability  of  the 
Allies  of  the  Quintuple  Entente — Conservative  Russia  desirous  of  a 
separate  peace. 

The  treaty  of  September  4,  1914,  and  the  separate  peace — The 
advantages  and  inconveniences  of  this  treaty  in  the  case  of  each 
Ally,  and  in  the  case  of  the  whole  group — Italy  and  Germany — 
The  necessity  of  dealing  with  all  the  causes  of  international  conflict 
and  the  free  entente  of  the  Powers  in  question  renders  peace  ex- 
ceedingly difficult — The  Governments  cannot  fix  the  clauses  of  the 
peace  treaty — The  small  nationalities  hope  to  be  liberated — The 
other  questions  to  be  solved. 

A  war  of  exhaustion — Its  many  points  of  similarity  to  the 
American  War  of  Secession — Germany  plays  the  part  of  the  slave 
States — The  blockade  and  its  results — The  end  of  the  war  will  be 
due  to  the  blockade,  to  economic  exhaustion — The  economic, 
social,  and  political  consequences  of  the  war  of  exhaustion  for  all 
the  belligerents. 

THE  present  war  shows  the  States  united  into  two 
belligerent  groups:  on  the  one  hand,  the  Central 
or  Imperial   Powers,   or   Quadruple   Alliance;   on 
the  other  the  Western,  Eastern,  and  Southern  Powers 

of  the  Quintuple  Entente. 

231 


232  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

If  we  consider  the  relations  of  the  Powers  among 
themselves  in  the  interior  of  each  belligerent  group,  we 
make  certain  discoveries  which  will  interest  the  socio- 
logist— discoveries  which  involve  future  consequences, 
if  men  are  wise  enough  to  profit  by  the  lessons  taught 
by  this  world-wide  war. 

In  the  first  place,  a  consideration  of  events  shows  that 
one  of  the  characteristics  visible  to  all  is  the  boldness 
and  decision  of  the  Central  Powers,  while  the  Western 
Powers  display  timidity  and  indecision,  and  this  in 
the  military  province  as  well  as  in  the  diplomatic  field. 

Let  us  look  for  the  causes  of  this  sociological  phenome- 
non. When  we  consider  the  Central  Powers  we  see 
immediately  that  their  relations  are  not  those  of  equals, 
but  those  of  a  master  and  his  servants.  The  master 
is  the  German  Empire;  the  servants  are  the  Allies — 
Austria,  Hungary,  Turkey,  Bulgaria. 

During  the  course  of  this  long  war  the  hegemony 
of  Germany  over  her  Allies  has  gradually  established 
itself,  almost  undisputed.  Germanic  Austria  is  almost 
absorbed  by  the  Teutonic  Empire;  in  Hungary  there  is 
an  opposition,  but  it  is  a  minority,  and  the  Government 
is  in  agreement  with  the  Kaiser.  Turkey  is  passive 
in  the  hands  of  its  rulers:  Enver  Pasha  and  Talaat 
Pasha  are  the  playthings  of  the  German  policy.  As  for 
Bulgaria,  it  is  not  completely  the  vassal  of  the  Kaiser, 
thanks  to  the  cunning  and  astuteness  of  Tsar  Ferdinand, 
who  is  pushing  personal  ends  as  skilfully  as  he  is  able. 

All  these  Allies  are  minors,  who  obey,  almost  without 
grumbling,  the  orders  of  the  military  rulers  of  Germany. 
The  obedience  of  the  Central  Allies  is  based  principally 
on  their  recognition  of  the  right  of  might,  the  great 
principle  of  the  German  policy.  It  is  the  sole  right 
admitted.  There  is  no  longer  any  respect  for  signatures 
or  promises,  if  the  interest  of  the  moment  seems  to  be 
opposed  to  these  signatures  or  promises.  There  is  no 
conception  of  freedom  of  action.  There  is  one  object 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  233 

to  be  attained,  and  this  object  has  been  fixed;  and  all 
means,  without  exception,  are  good  if  they  lead  to  the 
attainment  of  this  object.  In  short,  the  immediate 
result  is  everything.  There  is  a  deliberate  carelessness 
as  to  remote  results;  and  the  multiple  and  indirect 
consequences  of  actions.  Triumph,  however  temporary, 
effaces  the  errors  and  the .  deficiencies  of  this  short- 
sighted policy. 

The  German  Empire  commands  its  Allies,  whose 
function  is  to  obey,  and  only  to  obey.  This  command  is 
exercised  through  its  officers,  and  decisions  are  arrived 
at  without  any  reference  to  the  intentions,  desires,  or 
interests  of  the  other  belligerents.  Everything  is 
considered  with  reference  to  Germany  and  her  individual 
interests,  as  her  rulers  conceive  them. 

This  conduct  of  the  war,  and  of  inter-State  relations, 
show  how  completely  the  German  mind  has  been 
militarized,  even  to  its  profoundest  depths.  The 
essence  of  this  conduct,  with  regard  to  Allies  and 
neutrals,  is  the  same  as  with  regard  to  the  enemy:  it 
consists  of  terrorism  and  fear.  This  intense  militariza- 
tion of  the  German  mind  is  not  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Germans  belong  to  a  race  anthropologically  inferior  to 
the  Western  races.  It  is  simply  due  to  their  militarist 
education,  which  has  retarded  the  political  development 
of  the  nation,  so  that  the  German  people  is  at  least 
half  a  century  in  the  rear  of  the  Western  peoples. 

The  latter  have  liberated  themselves  from  all  belief 
in  the  god  of  State,  which  for  the  German  nation  has 
become  the  object  of  general  adoration.  Education — 
in  the  family,  the  school,  the  University,  and  the  barracks 
— has  gradually  imprinted  upon  every  German  brain  the 
habit  of  obeying  the  orders  and  performing  the  "  duties  " 
imposed  upon  them  by  their  officers  and  rulers.  We 
are  not  speaking  of  the  "  duty  "  which  each  man  can 
and  should  determine  for  himself,  after  a  process  of 
critical  reasoning;  we  are  speaking  of  the  "duty" 


234          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

imposed  by  others  by  means  of  fear.  All  individual 
spontaneity  is  destroyed.  Never,  in  fact,  is  the  child 
accustomed  to  act  for  himself  or  to  think  for  himself; 
so  it  follows  that  the  adult,  who  is  still  never  consulted 
as  to  the  actions  which  he  shall  perform,  continues  to 
obey  passively,  without  reasoning.  The  individual 
becomes  a  cog  in  the  stupendous  machine  of  the  god- 
like State.  The  German  people  has  forgotten  what  one 
of  its  greatest  men — Alexander  von  Humboldt — wrote  at 
the  head  of  one  of  his  works:  "  This  is  written  against 
the  Governmental  mania,  the  most  fatal  malady  of 
modern  Governments." 

German  organization  is  based  on  passive  obedience, 
the  same  principle  of  organization  as  was  the  foundation 
of  all  the  great  Asiatic  and  American  Empires  of  past  ages. 

Now  if  we  consider  these  historic  empires  we  perceive 
that  they  were  very  largely  war-like  and  conquering 
empires.  One  may  positively  assert  that  war  and  con- 
quest by  brute  force  were  their  object,  the  means  by 
which  they  lived,  and  the  reasons  for  which  they  lived. 
It  is  the  same  to-day  with  the  German  Empire,  and  it 
is  so  because  in  the  German  Empire  the  military  mind 
rules  as  sovereign  master.  Science,  commerce,  and 
industry  are  its  servants.  The  German  system  of 
education  was  such  that  warfare  was  its  natural  and 
logical  industry.  The  German  Empire  was  trained  for 
war,  and  by  the  inevitable  course  of  events  it  was 
doomed  to  make  war;  we  see  here  an  unavoidable 
consequence  of  the  militarist  education  based  upon  fear. 

This  militarist  education,  which  has  forced  the  Ger- 
mans into  war,  explains,  on  the  other  hand,  the  early 
successes  of  the  Empire,  and  the  astonishing  length  of 
its  resistance,  although  its  defeat  was  sealed  on  August  4, 
1914,  when  the  British  Empire  declared  war  upon  it. 
It  was  this  military  education  which  engendered  the 
hegemony  of  Germany  over  her  Allies.  It  is  this  passive 
obedience  of  all  which  is  the  origin  of  that  rapidity  of 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  235 

decision,  that  initiative  in  action,  and  that  creation 
of  events  which  force  the  Western  belligerents  to  follow 
them. 

These  phenomena  may  be  observed  in  the  diplomatic 
as  well  as  in  the  military  order.  The  most  recent 
examples  are  the  victorious  campaign  in  Rumania, 
the  formation  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland,  and  the  offer 
of  peace.  The  Entente  Powers  had  taken  insufficient 
precautions  in  favour  of  Rumania  at  the  time  of  her 
entrance  into  the  war.  Then  Russia,  of  whose  rulers 
one  party,  which  was  always  Germanophile,  attempted 
in  those  very  months  of  1916  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace,  went  to  Rumania's  assistance  with  an  ill  will 
whose  consequences  were  the  defeat  of  Rumania 
and  the  seizure  of  half  the  country.  The  Imperial 
Powers  did  not  hesitate.  With  admirable  rapidity 
their  whole  military  effort  was  brought  to  bear  upon 
Rumania,  in  order  to  conquer  the  country,  to  seize 
territories  rich  in  wheat  and  petroleum,  and  to  prove 
to  the  world,  whether  neutral  or  allied  or  enemy,  that 
Germany  was  invincible. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  formation  of  the  kingdom  of 
Poland.  Here  the  German  rulers  grope  and  shuffle 
and  hesitate.  Some  of  them  refuse  to  see  that  it  is 
to  their  interest  to  erect  Poland  into  an  autonomous 
but  vassal  kingdom.  Some  wish  always  and  in  spite 
of  everything  to  resort  to  terrorism  in  order  to  win  the 
love  of  the  peoples.  Then  the  German  Government 
has  to  consider  the  Austrian  Government,  whose  views 
are  different,  as  there  is  a  certain  antagonism  of  interests 
between  them.  The  result  is  a  bastard  solution,  which 
displeases  everybody,  above  all  the  Poles,  who  desire 
the  independence  of  their  country,  united,  not  divided 
into  three  fragments — Prussian,  Austrian,  and  Russian. 
If  the  German  rulers  had  been  skilful  they  would  have 
united  these  three  fragments  in  the  kingdom  which 
they  were  founding.  This  would  have  been  a  terrible 


236          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

moral  blow  to  the  Entente.  But  the  Junkers  opposed 
it.  Once  again  the  observer  may  note  the  opposition 
of  the  Conservatives  to  a  measure  of  progress  which 
would  at  the  same  time  have  been  a  measure  of  justice. 

The  bastard  solution  which  Germany  adopted  was 
inoperative  where  the  Poles  were  concerned.  They 
refused  to  form  an  army  allied  to  those  of  the  Central 
Powers.  On  the  other  hand,  it  influenced  the  conduct 
of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente.  There  was  no  longer  any 
possibility  of  a  separate  peace  between  Russia  and 
Germany;  the  bridges  were  down.  The  Russian  auto- 
cracy, finally  yielding  to  the  pressure  of  its  Western 
Allies,  officially  proclaimed  that  "  its  intentions  include 
the  creation  of  an  undivided  Poland,  comprising  all 
the  Polish  territories,  which  upon  the  termination  of 
the  war  will  enjoy  the  right  to  order  its  national,  in- 
tellectual, and  economic  life  in  freedom  on  the  basis  of 
an  autonomy  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Russian  Sovereigns, 
while  maintaining  the  principle  of  the  unity  of  the 
State."  This  Russian  promise  was  endorsed  by  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  which  offici- 
ally declared:  "We  are  happy  wholly  to  identify  our- 
selves with  the  views  the  realization  of  which  the  Im- 
perial Government  intends  to  guarantee  for  the  benefit  of 
the  noble  Polish  nation."  The  manoeuvre  of  the  German 
Government  had  miscarried,  but  the  initiative  was 
Germany's ;  it  was  she  who  traced  the  path  for  the 
Entente  Powers  to  follow.  And  by  this  initiative 
she  destroyed  in  part  the  moral  effect  which  would  have 
resulted  from  the  declarations  of  Russia,  had  these  been 
made  in  1914  or  1915.  Then  these  declarations  would 
have  been  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  justice,  while  in  1916 
they  were  only  the  result  of  the  moment's  necessities. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  peace  proposals.  Their 
cleverness  is  great,  for  under  any  conditions  they  will 
exert  a  varied  but  more  or  less  powerful  influence  in 
favour  of  the  Central  Empires.  These  proposals  strew 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  237 

the  germs  of  dissension  among  the  Powers  of  the  Entente. 
They  may  produce  division  and  disagreement,  and  there- 
fore a  loss  of  power.  And  in  the  interior  of  each  of 
the  Entente  Powers  they  strew  similar  germs  of  dissen- 
sion among  the  citizens  of  the  country,  whence  the  en- 
feeblement  of  each  individual  Power.  These  propositions, 
therefore,  provoke  a  diminution  of  the  offensive  force 
of  the  Western  Allies.  Moreover,  their  effect  has  been 
to  attract  the  sympathies  of  neutrals  to  the  side  of  the 
Central  Powers,  which  were  fully  disposed  to  terminate 
the  massacre  of  humanity.  If  it  continues,  the  fault 
will  be  that  of  the  Entente.  The  obstinacy  of  the 
Western  Allies  in  continuing  the  war  proves  their 
intention  of  exterminating  Germany,  who  will  be 
obliged  to  resort  to  all  means  of  resistance.  This  means 
the  previous  justification,  in  the  eyes  of  the  whole 
world,  of  the  intensification  of  the  struggle,  and  of  the 
barbarous  methods  which  are  employed.  The  results 
of  these  peace  proposals  reach  yet  farther,  for  they  cast 
upon  the  Western  Allies  the  responsibility  for  the 
continuation  of  the  war,  and  by  this  very  fact  they  are 
forming  a  public  opinion  in  Germany  favourable  to  the 
German  Government  and  German  militarism.  If  the 
population  of  old  men,  women,  and  children  is  suffering 
from  dearth  and  hunger,  the  fault  is  that  of  the  Allies, 
who  desire  the  continuation  of  the.,  war.  It  is  they 
who  should  be  blamed. 

All  these  results  of  the  German  peace  proposals  would 
not  have  occurred  if  the  Governments  of  the  Entente 
Powers  had  stated  their  conditions  of  peace.  They 
should  have  done  so  long  ago.  Why  did  they  not 
officially  declare:  "  We  are  not  making  war  on  the 
German  people,  but  only  on  the  Kaiser  and  German 
militarism.  We  desire  no  territorial  conquests;  we 
do  desire  the  independence  of  national  groups  and  the 
end  of  warfare"  ?  What  a  light  would  have  been  thrown 
on  the  situation  !  How  great  would  have  been  the 


238          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

effect  on  the  German  people  and  the  neutrals  !  But 
the  absence  of  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  Entente 
Powers  deprived  them  of  all  the  advantages  which 
would  have  resulted  from  such  a  course.  Perhaps,  in 
order  to  deprive  the  Germans  of  the  moral  advantages 
which  ensued  from  their  peace  proposals,  the  Western 
Governments  will  retort  by  the  announcement  of  their 
conditions  of  peace.*  Whatever  happens,  the  initiative 
will  have  been  the  appanage  of  the  Central  Empires, 
who  will  thus  have  created  and  provoked  events. 

However,  when  we  analyze  the  reasons  which  lead 
the  German  Government  to  provoke  events,  we  perceive 
that  one  among  other  causes  is  the  necessity  of  maintain- 
ing the  moral  force  of  the  Central  nations  by  means  of 
apparent  victories.  In  reality  these  are  not  victories, 
for  they  only  push  back  the  wall  of  the  cage  in  which 
Teutonic  militarism  and  Kaiserism  are  struggling  as 
prisoners.  But  in  order  to  grasp  this  reality  one  must 
possess  the  spirit  of  criticism  and  reflection;  one  must 
judge  matters  for  oneself,  and  not  according  to  the 
statements  of  a  master.  Now  the  education  based 
upon  fear  has  in  Germany  abolished  the  critical  spirit. 
The  German  cannot  draw  his  moral  force  from  his  own 
self;  it  must  be  given  him  by  his  master,  and  the  master 
can  give  it  him  only  by  deceiving  him  with  illujions. 
The  master  is  obliged  to  do  his  utmost  to  pass  from 
victory  to  victory,  in  order  to  maintain  the  moral 
force  of  the  people.  The  rulers  of  Germany  are  con- 
demned to  compulsory  victory,  and  as  they  cannot 
procure  victory  they  are  forced  to  rely  on  appearances. 
We  see  thus  how  the  militarist  education,  the  education 
based  on  fear,  victimizes  those  who  command  as  well  as 
those  who  obey. 


*  The  intervention  of  President  Wilson  has  resulted  in  the  complete 
failure  of  the  German  manoeuvre.  The  Western  Allies  were  enabled 
to  make  known  their  objects  in  the  war. 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  239 

The  relations  between  the  Powers  of  the  Entente 
are  unlike  those  between  the  Central  Powers.  They 
are,  in  fact,  the  mutual  relations  of  equals.  There  are 
no  masters  and  no  servants.  Each  Power  conducts 
its  war  in  its  own  fashion,  according  to  what  it  believes 
are  its  own  individual  interests.  The  results  of  this 
situation  are  revealed  by  lack  of  decision  in  council 
and  slowness  of  action,  sometimes  even  in  contradictory 
actions,  and  nearly  always  in  compromises  and  shufflings. 
These  Powers  have  thus  been  led  to  follow  the  events 
provoked  by  the  enemy,  instead  of  creating  them. 

In  this  respect  there  has  been  a  real  weakness  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war,  as  much  in  the  military  field  as  in 
the  diplomatic  sphere.  The  origin  of  this  weakness 
may  in  part  be  found  in  the  diversity,  and  often  the 
contradictory  character,  of  the  interests  of  the  Allied 
Powers.  Thus  it  seems  probable  that  on  several 
occasions  during  the  first  few  months  of  1915  Greece 
offered  her  help  to  the  Allies,  proposing  to  march  on 
Constantinople,  with  or  without  the  aid  of  the  Bulgars ; 
then,  afterwards,  with  the  Serbs  and  the  other  Balkan 
peoples  who  would  thereby  have  been  released,  to 
march  on  Budapest.  Nothing  was  done  because  this 
would  have  meant  the  occupation  of  Constantinople 
by  the  Greeks,  which  the  Russian  Government  would 
not  have  had  at  any  cost.  It  was  the  Russian  policy 
of  conquest  and  Pan-Slavism,  in  short,  which  prevented 
Greece  and  Bulgaria  from  joining  the  Entente.  It 
was  this  which  delayed  the  entry  of  the  Rumanians 
into  the  war  as  late  as  August,  1916.  For  the  Balkan 
States  the  neutrality  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Straits 
is  absolutely  necessary.  Consequently,  they  cannot  with 
a  good  grace  watch  the  immense  empire  of  the  Tsars 
lay  hands  upon  Constantinople.  Here  we  may  perceive 
the  harm  done  by  the  spirit  of  conquest,  even  to  the 
Power  which  displays  it,  for  the  abstention  of  the  Balkan 
Powers,  which  maintained  their  neutrality,  prolonged 


240          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

and    is    yet    prolonging    the    war,    without,    however, 
modifying  its  final  result. 

The  German  rulers  decide  and  act  with  promptitude. 
But  let  us  consider  the  conduct  of  the  Entente  in  respect 
of  Greece  !  It  had  every  reason  for  acting,  and  it  re- 
mained inactive  !  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia 
are  the  guarantor  Powers  of  the  Greek  Constitution. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  King  Constantine  has  violated 
this  Constitution,  and  that  he  is  substituting  auto- 
cratic for  Parliamentary  government.  The  Entente 
Powers  are  in  a  position  to  speak  and  act — that  is, 
to  force  the  King  either  to  respect  the  Constitution 
or  to  leave  the  country,  as  did  King  Otto  in  the  last 
century.  They  are  all  the  more  in  a  position  to  speak, 
in  that  they  have  the  support  of  Parliament,  led  by 
Venizelos,  and  a  section  of  public  opinion.  They  remain 
inactive,  leaving  events  to  unfold  themselves  under  the 
German  stimulus.  And  this  ends  in  the  forced  inactivity 
of  the  Eastern  Army,  whose  rear  is  threatened;  in 
risings  in  Greece,  and  massacres  of  the  Venizelists, 
and  so  forth. 

This  inaction  results  from  the  antagonistic  interests 
of  the  Allies.  'It  is  to  the  interest  of  Italy  that  Greece 
should  not  enter  the  war,  but  should  maintain  a  barely 
benevolent  neutrality.  Italy  covets  the  territories  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  which  are  also  coveted  by  Greece — 
justly,  for  that  matter,  as  the  population  is  principally 
Greek.  The  Russian  Government,  and  perhaps  even 
the  British  Government,  have  a  dynastic  interest  in 
protecting  the  Greek  throne,  and  in  not  committing 
acts  which  might  result  in  a  Greek  Republic.  We 
here  perceive  once  more  how  injurious  to  the  Western 
democracies  are  the  appetite  for  conquest  and  the 
private  interests  of  royalties.  The  injury  inflicted  is 
great,  for  the  war  is  prolonged. 

The  prolongation  of  the  war  does  not  affect  the 
Western  belligerents  equally.  The  Russian  Empire, 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  241 

although  invaded,  is  not  affected  as  regards  its  vital 
activities,  as  the  Germans,  although  they  have  pene- 
trated hundreds  of  miles  into  the  Empire,  are  not  yet 
upon  the  territory  inhabited  by  the  Russians.  They 
have  conquered  fragments  of  the  Ukraine,  Poland, 
Lithuania,  and  Courland,  but  not  Great  Russia.  They 
have  conquered  populations  which  speak  Polish, 
Lithuanian,  and  Little  Russian,  but  no  populations 
speaking  Russian.  The  Russian  Empire,  despite  its 
losses  in  men  and  in  territory,  is  still  all  but  intact. 
Its  latent  wealth  is  barely  diminished.  It  can,  if  given 
economic  assistance,  continue  to  fight  for  years  yet. 

Great  Britain  is  in  the  same  position  for  other  reasons. 
Her  insularity  plays  the  same  part  as  the  territorial 
immensity  of  the  Russian  Empire.  One  may  almost 
say  that  Great  Britain  is  indifferent  to  the  duration  of 
the  war,  although  she  feels  it  economically,  and  will 
feel  it  more  and  more.  From  certain  points  of  view 
a  long  war  is  almost  in  her  interest,  for  it  means  the  more 
certain  ruin  of  German  trade  and  industry,  which  may  be, 
and  are,  in  part  replaced  by  her  own  trade  and  industry. 
The  prolongation  of  the  war  is  far  more  injurious  to 
her  Allies — to  France,  for  example — than  to  herself. 
Germany,  in  fact,  is  occupying  an  industrial  region  of 
France,  for  thirty  months  after  the  commencement  of 
the  war  the  Germans  are  still  at  Noyon — that  is,  only 
fifty  miles  from  Paris.  The  trade  and  industry  of 
France  are  suffering  almost  as  badly  as  those  of  Germany, 
on  account  of  the  mobilization  of  men  and  the  general 
straining  of  all  energies  toward  a  single  end :  the  victori- 
ous completion  of  the  war.  From  this  it  follows  that 
the  prolongation  of  the  war  tends  to  result  in  this 
situation:  when  the  end  comes  the  British  Empire 
will  be  the  Power  least  ruined  by  the  loss  of  men  and 
property,  and  the  readiest  to  gather  the  spoils  of  the 
vanquished  in  the  economic  field. 

I  do  not  intend  the  reader  to  deduce  from  the  fore- 

16 


242          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

going  the  conclusion — which  I  do  not  accept — that 
Great  Britain  desires  the  prolongation  of  the  war. 
I  am  convinced  that  only  a  complete  misunderstanding 
of  men  and  events  could  lead  one  to  entertain  such  an 
idea.  I  merely  say  that  the  prolongation  of  the  war 
is  not  as  unfavourable  to  Great  Britain  as  to  France 
and  Belgium. 

The  diversity  and  the  contradictory  nature  of  the 
interests  of  the  allied  belligerents  have  resulted  in  defects 
and  mistakes  in  their  conduct  of  the  war.  A  superficial 
view  of  matters  has  led  some  to  attribute  these  defects 
and  mistakes,  both  political  and  military,  to  the  fact 
that  the  Western  Allies  are  living  under  the  democratic 
regime. 

"  Action  is  everything  in  time  of  war.  Deliberative 
assemblies  are  but  imperfectly  adapted  for  action. 
Democracies  cannot  conduct  wars  as  autocracies  can. 
Parliamentarism  is  unfavourable  to  victory.  In  short, 
the  countries  in  which  public  opinion  governs,  precisely 
because  of  the  contradictory  opinions  which  reveal 
themselves,  are  in  a  condition  of  inferiority  to  those 
States  without  opinion  in  which  a  few  masters  rule." 

This,  in  substance,  is  what  even  the  democrats  have 
written  concerning  the  relative  merits  of  autocracies 
and  democracies  in  time  of  war. 

This  opinion  is  based  on  only  a  superficial  view  of 
things,  a  habit  of  examining  events  without  probing 
their  causes  to  the  very  bottom.  Matters  are  correlated 
as  cause  and  effect  which  in  reality  are  not  related  at 
all,  or  only  very  distantly.  If  there  were  an  intimate 
relation  between  the  autocratic  principle  and  the 
favourable  conduct  of  the  war,  the  Russian  Government, 
which  is  at  least  as  autocratic  as  that  of  Germany, 
would  not  have  witnessed  the  defeat  of  its  armies. 

The  defects  and  errors  displayed  by  the  Western 
Allies  during  the  course  of  this  war  are  undeniable  and 
flagrant;  but  they  are  not  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  243 

democratically  governed.  These  faults  are  due  to  the 
diversity  and,  very  often,  the  contradictory  nature  of 
the  interests  of  the  Allied  States,  and  also  to  the  antago- 
nism existing  in  the  heart  of  each  of  the  Western  nations 
between  the  democratic  spirit  and  the  autocratic 
method  of  government  and  administration. 

This  is  a  very  important  point.  Nowhere,  as  yet, 
are  these  collectivities  completely  governed  and  ad- 
ministered according  to  democratic  principles.  Every- 
where there  is  a  conflict  between  the  democratic  and 
autocratic  tendencies;  and  the  administration  of  affairs 
and  the  government  of  men  are  only  a  compromise  be- 
tween these  two  tendencies.  Everywhere  the  rulers 
tend  to  act  upon  autocratic  principles.  This  they  do  in 
virtue  of  the  law  of  the  least  effort;  it  is  easier  to  com- 
mand than  persuade;  it  is  less  troublesome  to  procure 
passive  obedience  by  means  of  fear  than  to  obtain  the 
free  consent  of  all. 

What  is  the  democratic  principle  ?  Government  by 
the  consent  of  the  governed,  this  consent  being  freely 
given.  None  of  the  Parliamentary  Governments  of 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  or  Belgium  have  sought 
to  obtain  the  free  consent  of  all.  They  endeavour  to 
enforce  it  by  means  of  laws  which  restrain  or  suppress 
acquired  liberties.  In  this  way  antagonisms  are  created 
in  the  heart  of  each  State  which  dimmish  the  national 
strength,  which  can  only  enjoy  its  full  scope  by  the 
unanimous  agreement  of  the  entire  people.  But  the 
people  taken  in  the  mass  possesses  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  and  self-interest  in  such  a  degree  that  it 
naturally  minimizes  these  antagonisms.  Thus,  the 
greatest  evil  arises,  not  from  the  governed,  but  from  the 
governing  minority,  which,  being  invested  with  auto- 
cratic powers,  is  addicted  to  arbitrary  action  and  to  in- 
dolence. A  very  powerful  autocratic  organization  is 
needful  in  order  partly  to  avoid  this  arbitrary  action 
and  this  indolence  at  every  degree  of  the  hierarchy. 


244          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Now  an  autocratic  organization  cannot  be  powerful  in 
countries  whose  spirit  is  democratic  by  reason  of  the 
tendencies  of  the  people. 

This  arbitrary  behaviour  and  indolence  of  the  rulers 
led  to  discontent,  and  above  all  to  the  imperfect 
utilization  of  individuals  and  social  organisms.  The 
Press  made  the  rulers  nervous,  and  instead  of  utilizing 
it  to  obtain  unanimous  agreement,  all  liberty  of  ex- 
pression was  suppressed.  The  rulers,  far  from  resorting 
to  individual  initiative,  were  afraid  of  it,  and  sought  to 
discourage  and  restrain  it.  It  was  necessary  to  main- 
tain the  bureaucratic  dokefar  niente  which  is  so  essential 
a  fruit  of  autocracy. 

These  are  the  real  causes  of  the  relative  weakness 
of  the  Western  Allies  as  regards  their  conduct  of  the 
war.  They  should  have  broken  openly  with  all  auto- 
cratic habits  of  government  and  administration;  they 
should  have  revealed  the  reality  of  things  frankly  to 
the  peoples;  they  should  have  called  upon  the  latter  to 
determine  their  course  of  action  and  so  to  organize 
themselves  as  to  cope  with  this  reality;  they  should 
have  assisted  and  organized  the  free  initiative  of  in- 
dividuals, instead  of  inhibiting  its  action.  Then  the 
contradiction  between  the  aspirations  of  the  peoples 
and  their  administration  would  have  disappeared,  and 
the  maximum  effect  of  their  total  power  might  have  been 
obtained,  both  from  the  military  and  the  diplomatic 
point  of  view.  Democracy,  in  short,  is  not  opposed 
to  defensive  warfare,  but  it  demands  democratic  methods 
of  control  and  administration,  not  more  or  less  auto- 
cratic methods. 

In  criticizing  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  fought  by 
the  Western  Powers  we  must  blame,  not  the  democracy, 
but  the  lack  of  unity  in  the  aims  of  these  Powers.  It  is 
this  which  prevents  unity  in  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
and  from  this  is  derived  the  policy  of  "  wait  and  see." 
This  is  a  defect  inherent  in  all  coalitions,  whether 


245 

autocratic  or  democratic,   when  the  members  of  the 

coalition  are  on  a  footing  of  equality  among  themselves. 

***** 

In  the  case  of  all  the  belligerents  a  certain  discontent 
and  friction  are  to  be  observed  between  allies.  In  the 
case  of  the  Central  Powers  this  is  due  to  the  hegemony 
of  one  Power  over  the  others.  Austrians,  Hungarians, 
Turks,  and  Bulgars  do  not  in  reality  enjoy  feeling  and 
submitting  to  the  Prussian  yoke.  In  the  case  of  the 
Entente  the  friction  between  Allies  arises  from  mutual 
ignorance  of  the  work  performed  by  each  Ally.  Each 
country  considers  and  declares  that  its  task  and  its 
front  is  the  most  important,  and  once  it  begins  this 
sort  of  thing  it  is  soon  tempted  to  think  and  to  say  that 
it  is  the  only  indispensable  member  of  the  Entente. 

This  lack  of  comprehension  and  this  misunderstanding 
of  reality  originate  in  the  nations'  profound  ignorance 
of  one  another  as  regards  their  state  of  mind  and  their 
actual  political  situation.  To  know  a  country  one  must 
live  in  it,  and  be  able  to  observe.  The  reading  of  news- 
papers enlightens  one  but  imperfectly,  for  everything  is 
more  or  less  distorted  in  the  Press.  It  would  seem  as 
though  everybody  is  afraid  of  speaking  the  truth. 
The  Press  agencies,  whether  or  not  in  the  direct  pay  of 
the  Government  or  the  capitalist  interests,  abstain 
from  communicating  certain  news,  or  else  in  communi- 
cating it  they  alter  the  spirit  of  it.  The  newspapers, 
moreover,  according  to  the  politics  and  the  interests 
of  their  proprietors  or  editors,  censor  the  telegrams 
from  the  agencies  and  those  from  their  correspondents. 
The  latter  live  in  a  special  world  of  politicians  and 
financiers,  and,  consciously  or  otherwise,  fail  entirely 
to  reflect  the  mind  of  the  nation  in  their  correspondence. 
It  follows  that  even  without  a  Government  censorship 
the  public  sees  things  only  more  or  less  highly  coloured 
according  to  the  interests  of  the  newspaper  proprietors. 
The  public  is  deceived,  whatever  newspaper  it  reads, 


246          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

for  if  it  escapes  the  danger  of  being  deceived  by  the 
newspapers  in  bondage  to  material  interests  it  does  not 
escape  the  danger  of  being  deceived  by  the  party 
organs,  whose  sectarian  spirit,  however  idealistic  it 
may  be,  minimizes  or  exaggerates — in  short,  distorts 
the  facts. 

If  to  this  obscuring  of  the  truth  we  add  that  which 
has  been  provoked,  during  this  war,  by  the  State 
censorship,  we  shall  understand  the  profound  ignorance 
of  the  peoples  concerning  the  military  task  and  the 
state  of  mind  of  each  allied  belligerent. 

This  ignorance  has  prevented  the  Allies  from  per- 
ceiving the  mutual  indispensability  of  each  country. 
In  Great  Britain,  for  example,  the  importance  of  the 
work  accomplished  by  the  French  was  not  grasped  at 
the  outset.  After  the  lapse  of  some  months  I  believe 
its  full  magnitude  was  understood.  However,  it  seems 
that  general  public  opinion  believes  that  merely  by 
virtue  of  their  navy  the  British  Isles  are  safe  from  any 
invasion.  I  believe  this  view  is  erroneous.  If  we  sup- 
pose, as  a  hypothetical  case,  that  France  had  abandoned 
the  Entente  with  England  in  order  to  ally  herself  with 
Germany,  there  is  no  doubt,  it  seems  to  me,  that  these 
two  Powers  united  would  have  been  invincible,  just 
as  the  Entente  is  now.  By  what  Germany  has  been 
able  to  do  while  more  or  less  effectually  blockaded,  and 
without  communications  by  sea,  we  may  judge  what  she 
could  have  done  in  alliance  with  France,  with  all  the 
ports  of  the  French  coast  in  the  Channel,  the  Atlantic, 
and  the  Mediterranean,  and  those  of  her  colonies,  where 
she  could  have  built  and  sheltered  powerful  fleets. 
British  soil  would  assuredly  not  have  remained  inviolate, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  aerial  campaign,  which  would 
have  been  conducted  from  a  number  of  centres  close 
to  the  English  coast,  instead  of  from  a  few  remote 
centres,  as  now. 

In  France  the  majority  of  the  people  certainly  has 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  247 

no  conception  of  the  immense  importance  of  the  part 
played  by  the  British  Navy.  The  French  people  has 
heard  no  talk  of  great  naval  battles.  It  has  heard  only 
of  the  work  of  the  German  submarines,  for  ever  sinking 
ships.  All  it  knew  was  the  numbers  of  the  British 
troops  on  French  soil,  numbers  which  for  many  months 
were  small  compared  with  the  numbers  of  the  French 
troops.  And  it  did  not  understand  that  without  the 
British  Navy  the  coasts  of  France  would  have  been 
bombarded,  and  closed  to  all  overseas  traffic.  It  did 
not  perceive  that  without  the  British  merchant  marine 
it  would  have  been  impossible  to  obtain  coal,  metals, 
munitions,  arms,  and  provisions.  In  this  case  France 
would  have  been  forced  to  submit  to  the  dominion  of 
Germany,  even  after  the  battles  of  the  Marne  and  the 
Aisne. 

Without  the  British  Empire  France  and  her  ally, 
Russia,  would  inevitably  have  been  doomed  to  defeat. 
France  and  England,  being  allies,  could  not,  on  the  other 
hand,  be  vanquished,  but  they  could  not  themselves 
have  conquered  a  Germany  allied  to  the  Russian 
Empire.  It  is  true  that  the  empire  of  the  seas  would 
have  remained  to  them,  but  Germany  would  have  found 
in  Russia  an  inexhaustible  reservoir  of  men,  provisions, 
and  raw  materials,  which  she  would  methodically  have 
transformed  into  arms  and  munitions.  It  would  have 
been  impossible  to  starve  a  Russo-German  alliance. 
Thus  the  objective  examination  of  the  situation  of  the 
Allies  shows  that  the  Anglo-Franco-Russian  Entente 
was  indispensable  if  the  Central  Empires  were  to  be 
resisted.  Each  of  these  Powers  is  indispensable  to 
the  others.  Their  triumph  is  certain,  and  it  was  certain 
from  the  historic  day,  August  4,  1914,  when  Great 
Britain  joined  France  and  Russia.  The  Germanic 
Governments  understood  this  very  well,  which  is  the 
reason  for  their  attempt  to  steep  the  soul  of  the  German 
people  in  the  hatred  of  England. 


248          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Those  who  love  liberty  must  therefore  congratulate 
themselves  that  the  German  foreign  policy  was  promoted 
in  such  a  way  as  to  provoke  the  alliance  of  France  and 
Russia.  If  this  had  not  been  the  case  Europe  would 
perhaps  have  become  the  prey  of  the  two  autocratic 
Germano-Russian  Empires. 

Russia,  thanks  to  her  autocratic  government,  offered 
a  soil  highly  propitious  to  an  alliance  with  the  German 
Empire.  Even  during  the  present  war,  after  the  capture 
of  Lemberg  in  1915,  two  Russian  Ministers,  Maklokov 
and  Tschezlovitov,  dared  to  submit  to  the  Tsar  a  memo- 
randum showing  that  there  was  no  division  between 
German  and  Russian  interests,  and  that  the  two  Empires 
had  only  one  and  the  same  enemy:  the  Western  de- 
mocracies. Also  a  separate  peace  with  Germany  would 
consolidate  the  Crown.*  Such  a  pro-Germanic  state  of 
mind,  which  was  further  revealed  by  several  instances 
of  treason,  and  by  the  propaganda  of  a  large  section 
of  the  Conservatives — the  Black  Hundreds — proves  that 
Russia  has  been,  and  still  is,  hampered  in  her  endeavour 
to  bring  her  full  effort  to  bear  upon  the  Germans  and 
Austrians.  Nearly  a  million  of  trained  soldiers,  for 
example,  have  for  a  long  time  been  scattered  throughout 
the  Empire,  in  order  to  prevent  popular  disturbances 
due  to  malcontents  who  wish  the  Government  to  become 
a  true  Parliamentary  Government,  capable  of  exerting 
its  full  energies  against  the  enemy. 

The  Italian  Government,  upheld  by  a  portion  of 
the  nation,  wishes  to  seize  the  Austro-Hungarian 
territories  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic.  These  terri- 
tories are  populated  by  a  minority  of  Italians  and  a 
majority  of  Yougoslavs  who  desire  union,  not  with  the 

*  In  the  Duma,  on  November  15, 1916,  M.  Milioukov  openly  accused 
the  President  of  the  Council,  von  Stunner,  of  inclining  toward  a  separate 
peace.  The  leader  of  the  cadets  even  had  the  boldness  to  incriminate 
the  Tsarina  herself  (nee  Princess  Alix  of  Hesse-Darmstadt).  Far 
from  being  prosecuted  as  a  calumniator,  M.  Milioukov  received,  on 
November  18,  the  public  thanks  of  the  Ministers  of  War  and  the 
Navy;  and  von  Stunner  had  to  resign. 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  249 

kingdom  of  Italy,  but  with  the  kingdom  of  Serbia. 
Hence  an  antagonism  of  interests  which  was  powerful 
enough  to  make  Italy  wage  her  war  instead  of  the 
common  war.  And  hence  resulted  the  possibility  of 
the  invasion  and  crushing  of  Serbia  by  the  Germans 
and  Bulgars.  If  we  analyze  the  defects  and  errors  of 
the  Entente  during  these  thirty  months  of  war  we  always 
discover  that  they  may  be  imputed,  not  to  the  demo- 
cratic system,  but  to  the  narrow  views  of  antagonistic 
interests. 

The  relations  of  the  Allies  between  themselves,  in  the 
two  groups  of  belligerents,  have  not  only  given  rise  to 
some  friction,  but  they  have  also  produced  a  mutual 
interpenetration  of  the  peoples  which  the  future  can  only 
develop.  Mutual  assistance  is  everywhere  apparent, 
provoked  by  individual  initiative,  and  often,  unhappily, 
hampered  by  Governmental  regulations.  The  allied 
peoples  have  mutually  supported  one  another,  and  each 
nation  has  supported  those  of  its  own  inhabitants 
whom  the  enemy  has  driven  from  their  homes.  As- 
suredly humanity  has  never  before  witnessed  such  a 
wave  of  mutual  assistance,  mingling  with  such  a  wave 
of  violence  and  bloodshed. 

From  this  glance  at  the  mutual  relations  of  the  groups 
of  belligerents  and  allied  nations  the  wise  man  will 
draw  the  important  lesson  which  we  have  drawn  already 
in  the  course  of  this  study  of  the  war — namely,  that  the 
power  of  a  powerful  State  engenders  more  ill  than  good. 
We  may  also  perceive  from  these  events  how  harmful 
is  ignorance,  and  henceforth  how  important  it  is  that 
knowledge  should  be  diffused  through  the  masses  of 
humanity.  The  truth  should  never  be  concealed: 
such  is  the  final  moral  to  be  deduced  from  the  whole 
of  this  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  facts. 

*  *  *  *  * 

In  the  group  of  the  Entente  each  of  the  principal 
Allies  is  indispensable  to  the  others,  if  they  are  to  achieve 


250          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

a  final  victory.  We  accordingly  understand  the  raison 
d'&tre  of  the  treaty  of  September  5,  1914,  which  united 
Russia,  the  British  Empire,  and  France,  and  forbade 
any  one  of  them  to  conclude  a  separate  peace.  Which 
was  the  original  author  of  this  treaty  ?  Who  first 
conceived  the  idea  of  it  ?  I  do  not  know,  but  I  do 
know  that  this  treaty  was  truly  a  masterly  stroke. 

Obviously  one  of  the  signatories  can  always  ignore 
its  signature,  and  conclude  a  separate  peace  if  it  wishes 
to  do  so.  But  the  treaty  none  the  less  created  a  bond 
which  would  very  considerably  embarrass  a  Govern- 
ment inclined  to  repudiate  its  signature.  It  would 
place  it  in  an  unpleasant  position  with  regard  to  its 
associates  and  the  world  in  general.  It  was  not,  in 
fact,  a  treaty  signed  under  the  constraint  of  the  other 
contracting  parties,  as  is  usually  the  case  with  a  treaty 
of  peace;  it  was  the  result  of  free  consent. 

This  treaty  revealed  in  its  originator  a  keen  prevision 
of  the  future:  it  presupposed  a  lengthy  war.  Moreover, 
it  even  necessitated  a  lengthy  war,  for  if  peace  could  be 
signed  only  by  common  accord  it  would  therefore  be 
rendered  more  difficult  of  conclusion:  for  it  is  more 
difficult  to  content  three  contracting  parties  than  a  single 
party.  This  treaty  bound  Russia  more  particularly, 
for  the  interests  of  her  autocratic  government  were  not 
intimately  merged  in  those  of  the  Western  democratic 
Powers.  It  was  all  the  more  compulsive  upon  Russia 
because  it  did  not,  for  her,  involve  merely  a  signature 
upon  a  sheet  of  paper.  For  the  prolongation  of  the 
war  involved  Russia  in  the  obligation  to  resort  to  the 
financial  assistance  of  her  Allies,  so  that  material 
obligations  combined  with  her  moral  obligations  to 
hold  her  indissolubly  bound  to  her  Western  Allies. 
The  precaution  was  not  unimportant,  having  regard  to 
the  pro-Germanic  influences  existing  in  the  Governmental 
circles  of  Russia. 

This  treaty  gave  Great  Britain  a  preponderance  in 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  251 

the  concert  of  the  Allies,  by  the  very  fact  that  it  pro- 
longed the  war,  for  the  longer  the  war  lasts  the  greater 
will  be  the  relative  strength  of  the  British  Empire,  in 
the  military  as  well  as  in  the  financial  sphere,  as  com- 
pared with  the  strength  of  its  Allies  and  its  enemies. 
Great  Britain  can  continue  the  war  even  if  the  Conti- 
nental Powers  make  peace.  Germany  is  in  no  position 
to  force  England  to  leave  her  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
for  her  commerce.  After  thirty  months  of  war  British 
soil  is  still  untouched  by  any  invasion.  Her  naval  and 
military  forces  are  very* much  stronger  than  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Only  her  economic  forces  have 
been  diminished,  and  that  but  slightly  as  yet,  having 
regard  to  the  wealth  of  the  Empire.  Great  Britain 
has  not  yet  suffered  all  the  losses  in  men  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  property  which  her  Allies  and  enemies  have 
suffered. 

To  the  three  original  signatories  of  the  treaty  for- 
bidding a  separate  peace  were  added  Japan,  on  Octo- 
ber 19,  1915,  and  lastly  Italy,  on  November  30,  1915. 
The  situation  of  this  latter  Power  was  rather  curious, 
for  it  remained  fifteen  months  without  being  officially 
at  war  with  Germany.  The  Kaiser  did  not  declare  war 
upon  Italy,  firstly,  for  economic  reasons,  and,  secondly, 
for  political  reasons.  There  was  in  Italy  more  than 
£100,000,000  owned  by  Germans  and  invested  in  Italian 
industry,  commerce,  and  finance.  There  were  in  the 
Italian  ports  a  number  of  large  German  merchant 
vessels  and  liners.  It  was  therefore  greatly  to  the 
interest  of  Germany  that  all  this  wealth  should  not  be 
seized;  and  let  us,  in  passing,  note  the  influence  of 
economic  forces  on  men's  actions — on  the  actions  of  the 
rulers  of  States  as  well  as  on  those  of  other  men.  The 
political  causes  of  Germany's  action  were  certainly 
secondary:  the  desire  to  retain,  in  the  camp  of  the 
Allies,  a  power  not  officially  hostile,  a  sort  of  bridge  to 
be  employed  in  case  of  negotiations;  and  to  refrain  from 


252          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

alienating  the  Italian  Germanophiles,  who  were  fairly 
numerous.  It  was  doubtless,  too,  the  existence  of  these 
Germanophiles  in  Italy  which  for  a  long  time  prevented 
the  Italian  Government  from  declaring  war  on  Germany. 
I  do  not  think,  however,  that  Italy  could  count  upon 
a  defender  in  Germany  were  the  war  to  turn  out  badly 
for  her. 

Whatever  may  be  the  motives  which  prevented  Italy 
and  Germany  from  officially  making  war  upon  one 
another,  they  were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  partially  at 
war  by  the  very  fact  of  Italy's  adhesion  to  the  pact 
of  September  5,  1914.  She  thereby,  in  reality,  found 
herself  bound  to  the  Western  Powers.  It  is  true  that 
her  economic,  political,  and  moral  interests  are  identical 
with  those  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  for  all  three 
are  democratic  countries  and  the  enemies  of  the  auto- 
cratic principle. 

This  pact  has  the  great  advantage  of  preventing  a 
premature  or  defective  peace,  which  would  be  a  stupen- 
dous mistake.  It  is  most  important,  for  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  future,  that  all  the  questions  arising  out 
of  this  war  shall  be  finally  settled.  The  nations  must 
not  be  allowed  to  repeat  the  mistakes  which  their  rulers 
and  their  diplomatists  have  been  committing  for  cen- 
turies, mistakes  which  have  maintained  the  existence 
of  smouldering  fires,  in  which,  under  the  embers  of  peace, 
the  flames  of  war  were  brooding.  The  pact  of  the 
Entente  has  the  effect  of  preventing  an  inconclusive 
peace.  On  the  other  hand,  it  renders  the  conclusion 
of  peace  more  difficult.  Men's  actions  have,  like  coins, 
an  obverse  and  a  reverse. 

Peace  is  more  difficult  to  conclude  because  it  requires 
the  agreement  of  all  the  Powers  concerned,  freely  ex- 
pressed by  each.  In  France  and  England  numbers  of 
people  have  demanded  that  the  Governments  of  these 
countries  should  make  known  their  conditions  of  peace. 
But  this,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  a  demand  which  cannot 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  253 

possibly  be  satisfied,  for  the  Governments  are  absolutely 
incapable  of  settling  these  conditions,  on  account  of 
the  conflicting  interests  of  the  various  Governments, 
and  on  account  of  the  multitude  of  political  and  economic 
conditions  to  be  taken  into  account.  If  the  relations 
between  the  Western  belligerents  and  the  Central 
Powers  were  the  only  ones  to  be  considered,  the  con- 
ditions of  peace  would  be  comparatively  easy  to  deter- 
mine. But  in  the  East  and  the  South  of  Europe  the 
problems  to  be  solved  present  great  difficulties,  on 
account  of  their  confused  and  involved  nature. 

The  war  has  plunged  the  whole  world  into  activity. 
All  the  small  nationalities,  which  aspire  to  liberty  as 
their  dearest  possession,  are  agitating,  organizing,  and 
hoping  for  the  realization  of  their  desires.  They  hope 
for  this  because  the  Western  Governments  have  affirmed 
that  they  are  fighting  against  the  Germanic  hegemony, 
in  the  interest  of  the  world's  liberty,  in  order  to  preserve 
the  right  of  independent  existence  for  the  small  nation- 
alities. Not  only  have  the  Governments  declared  as 
much  through  the  mouths  of  their  Prime  Ministers,  but 
the  peoples,  through  the  medium  of  various  associations) 
ethical  and  political,  have  followed  suit.  The  Socialist 
parties  of  the  allied  nations  have  declared  that  they 
would  oppose  any  annexation  of  territory  against  the 
will  of  the  inhabitants,  and  that  a  referendum  must  be 
held  so  that  the  peoples  should  be  the  sole  arbiters 
of  their  own  future.  We  can  understand  what  hopes 
were  aroused  in  the  hearts  of  the  Poles,  the  Czechs,  the 
Slovaks,  the  Moravians,  the  Croats,  the  Slovenians,  the 
Serbs  of  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and  Dalmatia,  the  Letts 
and  Lithuanians,  the  Ukrainians,  the  Finns,  the  Danes 
of  Schleswig,  the  Alsatians,  the  Lorrainers,  the  Italians 
of  the  Trentino,  the  Rumanians  of  Transylvania,  and 
others. 

The  policy  of  nationalities,  and  the  policy  of  consulting 
the  peoples  as  to  their  destiny,  are  prevalent  every- 


254  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

where  in  our  Western  democracies.  This  is  an  affirma- 
tion of  real  human  progress.  It  amounts,  in  effect,  to 
the  discovery  that  men  must  respect  the  imperious 
craving  for  independence  experienced  by  other  men. 

Europe  has  now  become  a  vast  caldron,  in  which 
everything  is  in  a  condition  of  confused  ebullition. 
Peace  must  restore  order  to  all  these  national  desires 
and  aspirations,  in  which  we  now  observe,  mingling  and 
overlapping,  opposition  and  alliance.  Remember  that 
many  of  these  peoples,  which  have  been  subjugated  for 
centuries,  but  not  assimilated,  inhabit  provinces  of 
belligerent  Powers,  such  as  Russia,  which  will  be  among 
the  victors,  and  you  will  grasp  the  difficulty  of  dis- 
covering solutions  of  the  problems  at  issue.  The  diffi- 
culty is  all  the  greater  because  efforts  are  constantly 
being  made,  and  will  be  made,  in  the  councils  of  Govern- 
ments and  among  the  peoples,  to  inhibit  this  nationalist 
policy,  and,  above  all,  the  policy  of  consulting  the 
nationalities  themselves.  The  autocratic  method  of 
disposing  of  peoples  without  troubling  about  their 
consent  is  still  to  be  found  in  the  heart  of  the  Western 
Governments.  But  the  only  solution  which  can  give 
a  lasting  peace  is  the  free  consultation  of  the  peoples, 
who  must  be  allowed  in  full  sovereignty  to  determine 
their  own  destinies. 

We  see  how  the  intermingling  of  peoples  which  has 
been  effected  in  the  course  of  history  throughout  the 
whole  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  complicates  the 
problem  to  be  solved.  The  solution  can  only  be  found 
by  resorting  to  the  principle  of  liberty,  by  allowing  each 
group  to  dispose  of  itself.  And  this  can  only  be  done 
if  the  groups  are  small  enough  to  contain  only  one 
nationality  apiece.  It  will  be  necessary  to  imitatt  the 
Swiss  Confederation,  with  its  autonomous  cantons, 
united,  although  speaking  different  languages. 

In  addition  to  all  the  problems  of  the  nations  of 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  there  is  also  the  question 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  255 

of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  coveted  by  the 
over-voracious  Russian  Empire,  the  problems  of  the 
dismemberment  of  Turkey,  the  wealthy  province  of 
Mesopotamia,  Persia,  the  German  colonies  in  Africa, 
Oceania,  and  the  Far  East  of  Asia.  There  is,  lastly, 
the  question  of  the  pecuniary  indemnities  to  be  paid 
for  the  reparation  of  the  devastation  wrought,  and  the 
war  taxes  levied  by  the  belligerents  on  the  enemy. 

From  this  will  be  understood  both  the  magnitude  of 
the  peace  which  will  conclude  this  world-wide  war,  and 
the  impossibility  that  the  Governments  should  indicate 
its  conditions.  The  pact  of  September  5,  1914,  by  pre- 
venting a  premature  peace,  has  at  the  same  time  im- 
posed on  the  peoples  themselves  the  heavy  task  of 
making  peace.  Peace  must  be  the  work,  not  of  the 
impotent  Governments,  but  of  the  peoples  as  a  whole.* 
***** 

This  war  is  a  war  of  exhaustion,  which  presents  the 
greatest  resemblances  to  the  War  of  Secession  in  the 
United  States  (1861-1865).  In  both  wars  we  find 
entrenchments  to  protect  towns,  provinces,  and  the 
armies  in  the  field;  and  in  both  cases  the  prolongation 
of  the  war  was  so  great  that  even  during  the  war  the 
peoples  prepared  for  the  war.  We  see  the  same  slow 
but  continuous  process  of  exhaustion.  We  have 
long-range  Continental  and  maritime  blockades.  At 

*  The  sense  of  this  necessity  seems  to  be  felt  more  or  less  every- 
where. Le  Temps,  on  July  14,  1916,  published  a  letter  which,  it 
stated,  was  found  on  a  German  prisoner.  Is  it  authentic  ?  I  do  not 
know,  but  I  think  so,  for  I  do  not  believe  this  newspaper  would  know- 
ingly publish  a  forged  letter,  especially  as  the  ideas  which  it  expresses 
are  in  violent  opposition  to  the  social  policy  of  Le  Temps.  The  letter 
is  dated  June  22, 1916,  and  comes  from  Hessen.  It  says,  among  other 
things  of  less  moment : 

"  I  think  this  will  end  in  a  nasty  mess.  There  will  certainly  be 
a  winter  campaign,  if  the  starving  population  does  not  dictate  peace, 
for  the  people  cannot  hold  out  much  longer.  //  the  Governments  do 
not  employ  reason  the  people  will  have  to  force  them  to  be  reasonable. 
It  would  be  a  good  thing  if  the  starving  people  were  to  make  an  end 
of  things.  In  spite  of  everything,  this  war  will  never  be  decided  by 
the  armies.  Never  in  this  world  by  the  armies." 


256  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

first  ineffectual,  these  blockades  were  continually 
tightened;  they  did  not  starve  the  Southerners  any 
more  than  they  are  starving  the  Germans,  but  they 
resulted  in  the  disappearance  of  commerce,  and  produced 
a  state  of  dearth  in  the  South,  as  they  have  in  Germany. 
The  position  is  even  more  serious  for  Germany  than  it 
was  for  the  South,  for  the  density  of  population  is 
greater. 

As  in  the  war  against  the  Slave  States,  we  see  the 
same  circulation  of  paper  money  in  unlimited  quantities. 
This  measure  resulted,  after  two  and  a  half  years,  in 
the  bankruptcy  of  the  South.  Here  again  the  situation 
is  far  more  serious  for  Germany  than  it  was  for  the 
Southern  States.  The  latter  were  able  to  create  wealth, 
because  they  possessed  raw  materials,  while  Germany 
depends  on  foreign  trade  for  cotton,  copper,  rubber,  etc. 
The  bankruptcy  of  Germany  is  therefore  almost  certain 
if  the  blockade  continues.  It  is  a  mere  question  of 
time.  We  do  not,  however,  know  how  much  paper 
money  has  been  created:  whether  800,  1,000,  or  1,200 
millions.  We  do  not  know  the  exact  amount  of  the 
German  gold  reserve;  the  figures  published  are  probably 
false.  Only  on  the  conclusion  of  peace  shall  we  really 
know  how  matters  stand,  and  even  were  peace  to  be 
signed  now  the  mark  might  fall  to  zero,  or  to  a  few 
pfennigs,  as  was  the  case  with  the  bank  notes  of  the 
Southern  States  at  the  end  of  1863,  thirty  months  after 
the  opening  of  hostilities.  The  slow  but  continuous 
fall  of  the  mark  is  a  threatening  indication  of  the  fall 
of  the  economic  might  of  Germany. 

The  similarity  between  the  two  wars  extends  even 
farther,  for  while  at  the  outset  voluntary  service  sufficed 
to  provide  the  combatant  armies,  it  was  afterwards 
necessary  to  resort  to  compulsory  service,  as  Great 
Britain  has  eventually  done.  The  age-limit  for  men, 
in  the  Slave  States,  was  raised  to  fifty-five  years,  as  is 
already  said  to  be  the  case  in  Austria,  and  as  it  may  be 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  257 

in  Germany  before  the  end  of  the  war.  We  see  in  these 
two  wars,  therefore,  the  same  slow  consumption  of 
nervous,  moral,  and  material  forces  (men  and  products), 
ending  in  the  same  exhaustion.  In  these  two  wars  the 
belligerents  are  ignorant  of  their  actual  losses,  and  of 
the  actual  strength  of  the  enemy,  and  as  the  Northerners 
grossly  deceived  themselves  as  to  the  forces  of  the 
South,  which  they  always  over-estimated,  so  perhaps 
the  Entente  under- estimate  the  forces  of  the  Central 
Powers. 

The  War  of  Secession  ended  without  any  sanguinary 
triumph  of  arms,  owing  to  the  extreme  exhaustion  of 
the  Slave  States.  It  is  probable  that  the  world-war 
will  end  in  the  same  way.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
victory  will  be  gained  on  the  field  of  battle,  by  a  trium- 
phant penetration  of  the  enemy's  lines,  despite  the 
desires  of  the  professional  soldiers.  This  would  cost 
too  dearly  in  men,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Western 
Governments  will  realize  this.  Victory  will  fall  to  the 
Western  Powers  by  reason  of  the  blockade,  especially 
the  maritime  blockade,  whose  results  are  extremely 
interesting. 

The  mastery  of  the  sea  by  Great  Britain  and  France 
prevents  the  normal  supplies  from  reaching  the  Central 
Powers.  These  are  thereby  driven  to  the  necessity  of 
conquering  fresh  territories,  in  order  to  obtain  supplies 
of  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials,  and  even  of  workers. 
The  same  phenomenon  occurred  a  century  ago,  at  the 
time  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Napoleon  himself  ex- 
perienced the  obligation,  forced  upon  him  by  the  British 
blockade,  of  continually  adding  neighbouring  kingdoms 
to  his  Empire,  in  order  to  increase  his  resources.  If 
Germany  has  not  extended  herself  northward  by  seizing 
Holland  and  Denmark,  it  is  simply  because  these 
Powers  are  more  useful  to  her  as  neutrals  than  as 
subject  States.  But  if  the  war  continues,  and  the 
blockade,  being  tightened,  suppresses  Dutch  and  Danish 

17 


258  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

contraband,  it  is  very  probable  that  these  Powers  will 
find  themselves  absorbed  by  Germany,  who  would 
thereby  gain  fresh  resources  in  the  shape  of  gold,  food- 
stuffs, raw  materials,  and  workers,  which  would  enable 
her  to  continue  the  struggle. 

To  the  blockade  imposed  by  the  British  and  French 
navies,  Germany  responds  by  the  submarine  war  upon 
merchant  vessels.  And  the  result  is  a  scarcity,  greater 
or  less,  of  foodstuffs  (sugar,  grain,  eggs,  meat,  etc.), 
and  all  sorts  of  products  throughout  all  Europe.  All 
the  Powers  of  the  Entente  and  all  the  neutrals  are,  in 
differing  degrees,  affected,  and  obliged  to  restrict  their 
consumption  of  food,  their  industry,  and  their  com- 
merce. Europe  is  slowly  and  surely  approaching  a 
general  state  of  famine.  But  the  Powers  to  be  first 
affected  will  be  the  Central  Powers. 

The  examination  of  this  war  of  exhaustion,  with  its 
similarities — although  there  is  naturally  no  identical 
resemblance — to  the  War  of  Secession,  shows  that 
similar  causes  always  produce  analogous  results,  mutatis 
mutandis,  of  course. 

The  war  of  exhaustion  results  in  the  diminution  of 
the  relative  value  of  human  material  while  it  increases 
the  relative  value  of  economic  material:  raw  materials, 
manufactured  articles,  and  gold.  The  possession  of 
the  empire  of  the  seas  insures  the  possession  of  that 
economic  power  which  will  give  the  victory.  The  war 
of  exhaustion  is  destruction  of  military  power,  and  of 
the  value  of  the  professional  soldier,  for  it  gives  the 
engineer,  the  administrator,  and  the  artisan  precedence 
over  the  soldier. 

The  present  war  of  exhaustion  has  resulted  in  the 
formation,  in  Russia,  of  a  powerful  public  opinion, 
which  counterbalances  the  pro-Germanic  influence  of 
the  Conservative  circles  of  the  Court.  The  same  phe- 
nomenon has  occurred,  but  in  a  less  degree,  because 
there  was  less  need  of  it,  in  the  Western  nations.  Each 


THE  ALLIES  AND  THE  WAR  259 

day  of  warfare  renders  more  difficult  a  peace  concluded 
by  rulers  and  diplomatists,  while  a  peace  concluded  by 
the  peoples  themselves  becomes  more  possible  of  realiza- 
tion. The  war  of  exhaustion  is  serving  the  cause  of 
the  democracies  and  injuring  that  of  the  autocracies. 

The  prolongation  of  the  war  has  permitted  of  the 
creation  of  relations  between  enemies  on  the  fronts. 
At  Christmas,  1914,  there  was  a  truce  between  British 
and  Germans,  French  and  Germans,  established  by  the 
soldiers  themselves.  Since  October,  1915,  there  have 
been  truces  on  certain  sectors  of  the  French  front  con- 
cluded by  the  French  and  German  soldiers,  with  or 
without  the  consent  of  their  officers,  who  are  powerless. 
Tired  of  killing  and  being  killed  to  no  purpose,  they 
agree  among  themselves  that  there  shall  be  no  firing. 
This  fact  should  comfort  the  thinker,  for  it  proves  that, 
in  spite  of  months  and  months  of  slaughter,  hatred  has 
not  yet  invaded  every  human  soul.  This  is  one  of  the 
discoveries  which  the  war  of  exhaustion  has  enabled  us 
to  make. 

This  war  is  inevitably  leading  to  the  exhaustion  of 
the  victors  as  well  as  of  the  vanquished.  Its  duration 
is  heaping  debts  upon  debts,  diminishing  the  number  of 
men,  lowering  the  birth-rate  everywhere,  ruining  trade 
and  industry,  and  is  tending  to  substitute  one  people 
for  another  in  the  production  of  wealth,  and  is,  in  short, 
creating  economic  conditions  which  will  profoundly 
modify  the  social  and  political  conditions  of  the  whole 
world.  The  war  of  exhaustion  is  a  veritable  world- 
wide revolution  in  action:  such  is  the  general  conclusion 
which  emerges  from  an  examination  of  its  effects. 


CHAPTER  IX 

FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE:  REPRISALS 

The  war  and  the  government  of  soldiers  and  lawyers — The  government 
of  the  aged — Wealth  is  of  more  value  than  human  lives — The 
influence  of  geographical,  climatical,  and  geological  conditions  on 
the  war:  insularity;  the  sea,  rivers,  mountains,  and  deserts;  snow, 
rain,  and  wind;  mimetism  in  war;  the  produce  of  the  soil  and 
sub-soil — Mutual  aid — The  sentiment  of  sociality  is  most  highly 
developed  in  the  British — Appearance  of  a  universal  moral  senti- 
ment— The  manifestations  of  hatred  are  merely  literary. 

The  problem  of  reprisals — The  policy  of  "  an  eye  for  an  eye  " — 
Vengeance  is  absurd — Reprisals  are  always  useless — Collective 
responsibility  an  idea  rejected  by  our  codes  and  our  laws — The 
real  objects  of  aerial  raids — War  is  by  nature  a  tissue  of  crimes, 
not  a  sport — There  are  no  non-combatants — War  itself  must  be 
execrated,  not  merely  certain  methods  of  warfare — We  should  not 
condemn  aerial  raids  and  submarine  warfare  and  not  the  other 
manifestations  of  warfare — The  only  criterion  of  the  employ- 
ment of  weapons  in  warfare  is  their  military  utility. 

THE  present  war,  by  the  quantity  of  peoples 
engaged  in  it,  and  by  its  long  duration,  has  really 
become  the  life  of  these  peoples.  It  follows 
that  the  sociologist  may  ana  should  consider  it  from 
many  different  points  of  view.  The  same  events,  the 
same  men,  must  be  examined  under  various  aspects, 
under  different  angles  of  illumination.  It  is  with  social 
phenomena  as  it  is  with  statues :  they  must  be  examined 
by  slowly  moving  lound  them,  in  order  to  see  every  side 
of  them,  and  by  shedding  upon  them  an  illumination  of 
varying  intensity. 

It  is  thus  that  we  should  consider  the  events  of  the 
world-war — from  the  standpoint  of  the  nature  of  the 
various  Governments,  and  their  influence  upon  the 
march  of  events.  We  have  all  been  enabled  to  observe, 

260 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         261 

for  example,  and  I  have  already  spoken  of,  the  differ- 
ences to  be  noted  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  the 
Central  Empires  and  the  Entente.  When  we  look  into 
the  causes  of  these  differences  we  are  led  to  conclude 
that  the  rulers  of  the  belligerent  nations  belong,  as  a 
whole,  to  two  very  different  professions:  to  the  military 
and  the  legal  professions. 

This  professional  diversity  explains  in  part  the 
differences  to  be  observed  in  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
accordingly  as  this  conduct  is  due  to  the  one  profession 
or  the  other.  The  professional  soldier  is  full  of  decision, 
a  man  of  action,  often  incapable  of  reflection.  He 
despises  the  regulations  and  conventions  established 
by  the  jurists.  He  leans  upon  his  sword,  the  symbol 
of  might,  which,  to  his  mind,  stultified  by  the  possession 
of  uncontested  authority,  is  right  and  creates  right. 
Sic  volo,  sic  jubeo.  These  are  the  foundations  of  the 
policy  of  the  soldier,  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Central 
Powers. 

The  jurist  is  slow  to  decide,  slow  to  act;  he  persuades 
and  convinces  more  than  he  commands.  He  reflects 
much  and  acts  little,  precisely  because  he  reflects.  He 
observes  laws  and  regulations,  and  if  his  interest  urges 
him  to  infringe  them,  he  seeks  methods  of  doing  so 
gently  and  without  a  shock.  He  loves  compromises 
and  half-measures,  which,  if  they  do  not  completely 
satisfy  anyone,  are  not  in  violent  opposition  to  men's 
desires.  The  jurist  is  slow  to  act  because  Time  is  a 
great  master,  and  often  undertakes  the  solution  of 
embarrassing  problems. 

The  soldier  cuts  the  Gordian  knot  with  his  sword, 
while  the  jurist  unties  it,  and  takes  his  time  about  it. 
If  we  reflect  we  shall  see  that  the  policy  of  the  jurist 
is  that  which  has  been  pursued  by  the  Entente. 

The  soldier  and  the  jurist  both  possess  the  spirit  of 
tradition,  and  their  actions  in  the  course  of  this  war 
prove  this  abundantly.  The  soldier  is  traditional 


262          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

because  he  lacks  intelligence,  while  the  jurist  is  tra- 
ditional because  he  respects  the  established  forms 
which  constitute  the  foundation  of  his  profession. 
At  the  bottom  of  every  jurist  is  a  Bridoison.  The 
soldier  lacks  the  scientific  spirit,  for  he  lacks  the  critical 
spirit  owing  to  his  education.  The  jurist  also  lacks 
scientific  knowledge.  To  this  we  may  attribute  the 
absence  of  innovations,  except  for  trivial  details,  in 
the  conduct  of  the  war.  Science  and  scientists  are 
utilized,  but  in  a  petty  spirit,  if  I  may  say  so,  for  they 
are  simply  the  servants  of  those  who  rule,  and  those 
who  rule  are  professional  soldiers  and  lawyers.  This 
phenomenon  would  have  been  much  more  conspicuous 
if,  by  force  of  circumstances,  business  men,  manu- 
facturers or  merchants,  and  educationalists  had  not 
taken  part  in  the  administration  of  affairs. 

*  *  *  #  * 

Let  us  now  consider  the  rulers  of  the  nations  concerned 
in  the  world-war  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  age. 
We  shall  find  that  everywhere,  in  the  nations  of  the 
Entente  as  in  the  Central  Empires,  they  are,  as  regards 
the  great  majority,  men  of  advanced  age,  if  not  old  men. 
The  German,  Austrian,  British,  Russian,  French,  and 
Italian  Generals  and  Admirals  have  reached  sixty  years 
of  age  and  upwards.  A  few  only  are  between  fifty-five 
and  sixty.  It  is  the  same  with  the  civilians:  the 
Ministers  are  very  rarely  under  fifty.  They  are  more 
often  from  fifty-five  to  sixty-five  years  of  age  and 
upwards. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  more  or  less  advanced  age 
of  nearly  all  the  leaders  of  the  belligerent  nations 
exerts  a  notable  influence  upon  the  conduct  of  the  war. 
Age,  whether  one  likes  it  or  not,  is  a  diminution  of  human 
vitality.  The  individual  is  wearing  out,  and  all  his 
energies  are  concentrated  upon  the  task  of  enduring,  of 
living.  The  young  man  extends  his  activities  in  all 
directions,  spends  himself  in  a  thousand  ways;  the 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         263 

man  of  ripe  years,  and,  a  fortiori,  the  old  man,  concen- 
trates and  economizes  his  efforts.  Physical  strength 
is  diminished ;  the  need  of  action  is  less  emphatic.  The 
young  man  is  bold  and  temerarious;  the  man  of  ripe 
years  is  circumspect  and  timid  in  action.  Youth  only 
is  creative:  youth  alone  possesses  sufficient  vitality 
to  create.  It  also  tends  to  abandon  the  beaten  track, 
to  introduce  innovations.  How  different  is  the  spirit 
of  the  man  of  riper  years  !  He  loves  to  follow  the 
familiar  path,  because  the  requisite  effort  is  less,  and 
because  he  needs  to  conserve  his  energies  in  order  to 
hold  out  as  long  as  possible,  in  order  to  live.  The  closer 
he  approaches  the  natural  term  of  his  life,  the  more  he 
desires  to  postpone  it,  and  the  more  he  concentrates  all 
his  energies  on  effecting  this  postponement,  which  he 
does  principally  by  economizing  all  his  physical,  moral, 
and  intellectual  forces.  All  his  energies,  moreover,  are 
comprised  in  cerebral  activities  and  transformations. 

When  we  consider  these  essential  differences  between 
youth  and  age,  we  see  plainly  that  the  age  of  the  rulers 
in  general  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  war  is  conducted 
without  boldness  and  without  innovations  as  regards 
armaments  and  strategy  and  policy.  We  perceive  this 
more  plainly  still  if  we  compare  the  ruling  personnel  of 
the  present  period  with  that  of  the  French  Revolution 
of  1789-:1800,  when  France  held  out  against  the  enemies 
of  liberty  at  home  and  abroad  and  triumphed  over  them. 
Indeed,  if  we  make  this  comparison  we  discover  an 
enormous  difference  in  the  age  of  the  rulers  of  these 
two  periods.  The  Revolutionists,  whether  soldiers  or 
civilians,  were  young  men.  The  oldest  were  not  over 
forty;  the  majority  were  about  thirty  years  of  age. 
And  what  audacity  in  decision  and  execution,  what 
novelty  of  creation  in  every  sphere  these  men  displayed  ! 
Here,  certainly,  the  influence  of  age  is  revealed,  for 
these  men  belonged  in  general  to  the  same  professions 
as  the  rulers  of  to-day;  but  they  had  not  been  nearly 


264          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

so  long  in  harness,  since  they  were  young,  and  had  been 
less  subdued  by  professional  influence. 

In  our  period,  the  social  scaffolding  has  not  been 
shattered  by  the  war,  and  it  is  too  powerful  and  too 
restrictive  to  allow  youth  to  attain  the  functions  of 
government.  Such  young  men  as  are  in  the  Parlia- 
ments have  been  excluded  from  the  councils  of  the 
Governments,  and  in  the  military  world  they  are  kept 
in  the  inferior  ranks.  They  have  no  influence  over 
the  march  of  events,  or,  at  most,  their  influence  is  very 
small.  In  short,  the  belligerents  and  the  neutrals — 
that  is,  all  the  nations — are  governed  by  old  men,  or 
men  on  the  downward  path,  men  over  fifty  years  of  age. 

However,  the  prolongation  of  the  war  increases  the 
general  discontent  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  conducted.  The  mischievous  effect  of  old  men  as 
rulers  has  been  perceived  and  admitted,  and  under  the 
pressure  of  circumstances  the  social  framework  has  at 
least  partially  yielded.  Everywhere  there  has  taken 
place  a  certain  rejuvenation  of  the  Governmental 
personnel,  both  military  and  civilian.  Men  of  forty 
years  or  even  less  have  taken  the  place  of  old  men  in 
the  higher  military  commands  and  civil  functions  in 
France,  Great  Britain,  and  Germany.  The  average  age 
of  the  rulers  is  diminishing.  Nevertheless  it  is  still 
far  above  the  average  age  of  the  rulers  of  the  period  of 
the  great  French  Revolution.  The  manner  in  which 
our  rulers  have  governed  the  peoples  and  administered 
affairs  in  this  war  by  no  means  redounds  to  their  credit. 
Military  and  diplomatic  and  political  blunders  are 
everywhere  frequent.  In  fact,  we  cannot,  without 
untruthfulness,  state  that  wisdom  dwells  under  the 
grey  heads  of  these  rulers,  whether  they  be  Wilhelm  II., 
Count  Tisza,  M.  Poincare",  M.  Briand,  M.  Goremkin, 
M.  Sasonov,  Mr.  Asquith,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  Count 
Okuma,  Baron  Sonnino,  Signer  Salandra,  or  Ferdinand 
of  Bulgaria.  And  when  we  consider  objectively  all  that 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         265 

has  happened,  before  and  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
we  are  led  to  believe  that  if  these  already  aged  rulers 
had  been  replaced  by  other  and  younger  men  matters 
could  not  have  turned  out  worse  and  might  perhaps 
have  turned  out  better.  The  wisdom  of  the  young  is 
better  than  the  wisdom  of  the  old,  for  the  latter  is  a 
wisdom  which  is  diminishing  and  expiring,  and  the 
other  a  wisdom  which  is  increasing. 

***** 

We  have  just  considered  the  world  at  war  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  age  and  the  professions  of  the 
rulers;  let  us  now  consider  it  from  the  point  of  view  of 
social  classes.  What  do  we  at  once  discover  ?  The 
importance  of  wealth.  The  value  of  property  takes 
precedence  over  the  value  of  human  life,  in  the  opinion 
of  Governments  and  the  majority  of  human  beings. 
On  the  Continent  all  men  accept  compulsory  service, 
and  none,  save  a  few  Socialists,  demand  the  compulsory 
service  of  property.  Now  what  is  the  compulsory 
service  of  men  but  the  seizure  for  the  profit  of  the  col- 
lectivity of  the  life  and  the  time  of  all  these  men  ? 

This  is  regarded  as  just  and  equitable,  and  no  one 
contemplates  seizing  men's  fortunes  in  order  to  utilize 
them  for  the  profit  of  the  collectivity.  War  loans  are 
negotiated,  because  loans  increase  the  wealth  of  the 
possessors  of  wealth.  War  taxes  are  not  imposed,  or 
if  imposed  they  are  few  and  not  severe,  because  these 
taxes  diminish  the  wealth  of  the  owners  of  property. 
It  was  only  under  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  after 
more  than  two  years  of  war,  that  the  tendency  appeared, 
if  not  to  mobilize  fortunes,  at  least  to  impose  more  or 
less  heavy  charges  upon  them.  Laws  were  passed  which 
suspended  the  liberties  of  the  individual,  and  in  all 
countries,  even  in  the  freest,  as  in  Great  Britain,  men 
were  imprisoned  without  trial,  administratively,  as  they 
were  centuries  ago.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  indeed, 
these  administrative  imprisonments  were  rare,  while 


266          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

in  Germany  they  were  numerous — so  numerous  that  on 
October  28,  1916,  the  Reichstag  dealt  with  the  matter, 
and  all  the  deputies  without  distinction  of  opinions 
protested  against  the  system  of  preventive  arrests  and 
imprisonment,  when  there  was  no  offence  and  no 
motive.  Dictators,  whether  small  or  great,  are  always 
infected  by  tyranny.  Men  are  imprisoned,  but  wealth 
is  not  seized. 

All  this  reveals  to  the  observer  the  fact  that  wealth 
is  better  protected  than  the  life  or  liberty  of  men.  All 
this  shows  that  in  our  modern  international  society  the 
love  of  capital  is  more  powerful  than  the  love  of  men. 

Not  only  do  we  discover  this  phenomenon  in  the 
actions  of  Governments,  but  also  in  the  actions  of  all 
classes  of  the  population.  The  majority,  of  those  who 
have  remained  in  the  regions  invaded  by  the  enemy 
have  remained  to  protect  their  property.  Men  and 
women  have  risked  the  loss  of  their  lives,  women  have 
risked  the  possibility  of  violation,  in  the  hope  that  their 
presence  would  prevent  the  destruction  or  theft  of  their 
possessions!  In  truth  his  possessions  are  more  dear 
to  the  heart  of  man  than  his  own  life  or  liberty  !  This 
is  a  discovery  which  proves  that  man  is  short-sighted^ 
for  his  possessions  are  of  no  value  to  him  unless  he  can 
enjoy  them — that  is,  unless  he  is  alive  and  free.  It  is 
the  living  man  who  gives  value  to  things,  as  much  by 
their  transformation  as  by  their  use.  So  from  these 
facts  we  should  derive  this  lesson :  that  the  lives  of  men 
are  of  far  greater  value  than  all  or  any  things.  It  is 
to  preserve  life  and  to  ameliorate  it  that  all  efforts  and 
all  things  ought  to  be  consecrated. 

He  *  *  *  * 

Our  systems  of  education  accustom  men  to  see  things 
in  separate  compartments,  quite  distinct  from  one 
another.  One  learns  chemistry,  physics,  mechanics, 
geography,  etc.,  and  one  does  not  learn  how  all  these 
sciences  are  connected  one  with  another,  so  much  so 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         267 

that  they  are  only  divided  in  imagination,  not  in  reality. 
After  the  school  or  University  our  custom  of  the  divi- 
sion of  labour  and  specialization  maintains  the  human 
mind  in  this  belief  in  the  separateness  of  things.  From 
this  results  a  highly  mischievous  state  of  mind,  for 
gradually  the  habit  of  regarding  only  one  order  of 
phenomena  stultifies  the  intelligence  and  stupefies  the 
individual,  just  as  the  habit  of  incessantly  repeating 
the  same  series  of  gestures  contributes  to  the  hyper- 
trophy of  one  member  and  the  atrophy  of  the  rest. 
The  intellectual  and  physical  harmony  is  broken  by 
the  separation  of  subjects  in  the  schools,  and  the 
specialization  of  work  in  laboratories,  workshops,  etc. 

The  war,  by  upheaving  our  whole  social  life,  has 
enabled  everyone  to  see  how  all  things  are  intermingled 
and  interpenetrated,  and  that  no  gulf  divides  those 
things  which  seem  most  disparate  and  the  farthest 
removed  one  from  another.  This  war  has  recalled  to 
all  of  us  that  the  foundation  upon  which  everything 
rests  for  us  human  beings  is  the  terraqueous  globe,  a 
planet  moving  in  a  solar  system,  which  itself  is  moving 
in  the  immensity  of  interstellar  space.  And  because  it 
is  the  foundation  of  all  phenomena,  no  matter  what 
they  may  be,  its  astronomical,  meteorological,  climatic, 
physical,  orographical,  hydrographical,  and  geological 
conditions  are  of  considerable  importance. 

Several  times  in  the  foregoing  pages  we  have  seen 
what  an  influence  is  exerted  by  the  insular  position  of 
Great  Britain.  To  this  insularity  the  country  owes 
its  freedom  from  invasion;  because  of  this  insularity  it 
was  enabled,  until  the  twentieth  month  of  the  war,  to 
avoid  compulsory  service,  and  for  this  reason  it  had  time 
to  prepare  for  the  war  with  comparative  deliberation. 
Insularity,  by  provoking  the  splendid  isolation  of  the 
British  citizens,  is  one  of  the  causes  of  their  traditional- 
ism and  their  sluggish  imagination.  To  this  insularity 
is  due  in  great  part  the  power  of  the  United  Kingdom, 


268          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

which  has  been  forced  by  this  geographical  condition 
to  become  the  mistress  of  the  seas.  But  the  mastery 
of  the  seas  has  impelled  the  British  to  become  a  nation 
living  and  enriching  itself  by  exportation.  They  have 
not  been  conscious  of  the  necessity  of  demanding  from 
their  own  soil  the  products  necessary  to  life.  And  thus 
the  territorial  system  of  the  Middle  Ages  has  survived : 
the  system  of  great  estates,  of  hunting,  and  shooting, 
and  field  sports.  But  observe  the  result:  the  British 
Isles  cannot  feed  themselves;  they  need  the  products 
of  the  whole  world.  The  isolation  of  these  islands  is 
only  an  appearance,  an  illusion.  They  are  more  bound 
to  the  rest  of  the  world  than  any  other  territorial  Power, 
and  the  great  tie  which  unites  them  with  the  rest  of 
the  world  is  the  sea.  The  sea  is,  in  fact,  a  link,  a  bond 
of  union  and  reconciliation  between  men.  And  this  in 
part  explains  the  desire  and  intention  of  the  Central 
Powers  to  obtain  access  to  the  outer  seas,  and  not  only 
to  the  inner  seas,  which  are  like  great  lakes,  and  do  not 
permit  of  a  linking-up  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  It 
is  because  the  seas  form  a  link  between  the  peoples 
that  men  have  sought  to  pierce  isthmuses  and  to  cross 
peninsulas  by  means  of  canals.  Consider,  for  example, 
the  importance  of  the  Kiel  and  Suez  Canals  !  Consider 
how  the  canal  from  the  Forth  to  the  Clyde  might  have 
been  utilized,  had  it  existed  !  Think  how  useful  the 
canal  from  Bordeaux  to  the  Mediterranean  would  have 
been,  by  shortening  the  duration  of  the  voyage  from 
England  to  Turkey,  Greece,  and  Italy.  Freights  would 
have  been  lower,  to  say  nothing  of  the  more  rapid 
concentration  of  battle  fleets,  and  much  friction  between 
the  Allies  would  have  been  avoided.  Remember,  too, 
that  in  July,  1914,  the  Kiel  Canal  was  made  navigable 
by  the  largest  Dreadnoughts  !  This,  perhaps,  is  one  of 
the  causes  why  the  world-war  broke  out  at  the  end  of 
July,  1914. 

It  is  the  industry  of  man  which  has  made  the  sea  a 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE    269 

means  of  communication;  for  it  is  obvious  that  in  the 
primitive  ages  it  was  an  almost  impassable  obstacle  to 
the  linking-up  of  the  groups  of  humanity.  Mountains, 
too,  were  then  an  obstacle  to  this  linking-up,  but  a 
less  serious  obstacle.  They  have  remained  an  obstacle, 
far  more  of  an  obstacle  than  the  sea,  for  in  the  present 
war  mountains  have  figured  more  particularly  as  a 
means  of  separation.  The  mountainous  character  of 
the  regions  into  which  Italy  has  carried  the  war  is  the 
cause  of  her  slow  and  restricted  progress.  The  moun- 
tainous character  of  the  terrain  was  also  one  of  the 
causes  of  the  check  suffered  by  the  Dardanelles  offensive, 
of  the  slow  progress  of  the  Russians  in  the  Carpathians, 
and  of  the  extreme  difficulties  encountered,  and  probably 
of  the  great  losses  suffered,  by  the  Austro-German 
forces  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  Everywhere,  in 
short,  mountains  have  proved  an  obstacle  to  the  ad- 
vance of  armies;  they  have  risen,  and  they  rise  now, 
like  a  wall  before  all  offensive  activities.  Mountains 
are  an  organ  of  defence. 

The  facts  of  the  present  throw  a  light  upon  the  facts 
of  the  past.  You  may  perceive,  in  the  part  played  by 
mountains  in  the  present  war,  an  explanation  of  the 
historic  fact  that  mountaineers  have  been  conquered 
rarely  and  with  difficulty ;  that  they  have  almost  always 
remained  free  men,  in  love  with  liberty,  with  their 
hearts  full  of  rebellion  against  any  attempt  to  deprive 
them  of  it.  Far  more  than  rivers,  mountains  are 
defensive  organs.  Yet  rivers,  whether  great  or  small, 
do  to  some  extent  play  the  same  part.  It  was  on  the 
Yser  that  the  Belgians,  English,  and  French  arrested 
the  German  invaders.  Remember  the  role  of  the 
waters  invading  the  plains  of  Flanders  when  the  dykes 
had  been  broken  down:  the  Germans  were  checked  in 
their  march  upon  Calais.  It  was  on  the  Dvina  that 
the  Russians  were  able  to  check  the  Germans  in  their 
march  upon  Riga  and  Petrograd.  Continually,  in  the 


270          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

communiques  relating  the  incidents  of  this  long  war, 
you  will  find  that  rivers  have  served  as  the  base  for 
attacks  or  for  defensive  action.  The  tracts  lying 
between  rivers  are  drenched  with  blood  and  sown  with 
corpses,  for  it  is  there  that  battles  take  place.  Con- 
sider, for  example,  the  Tigris,  serving  as  the  permanent 
support  of  the  British  Army  of  invasion  in  Mesopotamia. 
Battles  bear  the  names  of  rivers,  as  the  Battles  of  the 
Marne,  the  Aisne,  the  Somme,  the  Dnieper,  etc.  Rivers 
are  thus  both  organs  of  attack  and  organs  of  defence. 

Desert  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  seem  to  constitute 
an  organ  of  defence  rather  than  of  attack.  The  desert 
beside  the  Suez  Canal  protects  the  canal,  and  the 
deserts  of  Arabia,  while  they  forced  the  British  Army 
to  confine  its  operations  to  the  land  lying  between  the 
Tigris  and  the  Euphrates,  protected  its  flanks  from  any 
enveloping  movement. 

The  physical  characteristics  of  the  soil  have  thus  a 
considerable  influence  over  the  events  of  human  life 
in  this  world-war.  Conditions  of  climate  are  no  less 
important.  Snow  and  rain  have  increased  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  armies,  both  in  the  plains  and  among  the 
mountains.  Mud  is  a  terrible  obstacle.  One  has  only 
to  recall  the  narratives  of  soldiers  from  the  French  or 
Russian  or  Serbian  fronts.  The  part  played  by  the 
wind  is  no  less  important.  The  storms  of  spring  and 
autumn,  the  equinoctial  gales,  prevent  the  aerial  and 
maritime  fleets  from  putting  out,  or  make  navigation 
difficult.  Zeppelins  require  nights  without  a  moon, 
and  almost  without  wind.  Rain  weighs  them  down, 
and  therefore  lessens  their  destructive  power. 

Human  industry  has  sought  to  annihilate  the  ob- 
stacles arising  from  climatic  and  geographical  con- 
ditions. On  snow-covered  ground  men,  horses,  and 
guns  are  plainly  visible  at  great  distances,  black  specks 
which  stand  out  upon  the  white  carpet  of  the  snow. 
So  men  have  conceived  the  idea  of  covering  their  horses, 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         271 

guns,  waggons,  and  even  themselves,  with  white  cloth, 
which  merges  into  the  surrounding  whiteness. 

When  the  snow  has  disappeared  and  the  leafage  of 
spring  has  displaced  it,  men  hide  their  guns  and  their 
convoys  under  canopies  of  leaves,  in  order  to  conceal 
them  from  the  view  of  aeroplanes.  Man  adopts  the 
mimetism  of  nature.  He  imitates  the  animals,  who,  by 
natural  selection,  have  been  forced  to  don  the  livery 
of  their  environment.  The  necessity  of  resisting  causes 
of  destruction,  the  necessity  of  survival,  has  produced 
in  man  the  same  effect  as  in  the  case  of  the  other 
animals.  But  the  modus  operandi  has  been  different. 
In  man  it  has  been  intentional,  in  the  other  animals  it 
was  accidental. 

You  perceive  here  the  influence  of  conditions  of 
climate  on  the  activities  of  this  war.  Quite  as  great 
has  been  the  influence  of  geological  conditions.  The 
subsoil  of  our  globe  affects  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
just  as  the  surface  conditions  affect  it.  That  trench 
warfare  was  possible  from  the  Swiss  frontier  to  the 
North  Sea,  and  on  the  Eastern  front,  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  subsoil  was  covered  by  loose  movable  soil  to 
a  considerable  depth,  or  the  latter  was  argillaceous  or 
calcareous — that  is,  it  consisted  of  soft  stone  or  clay 
or  gravel.  Where  the  subsoil  has  been  granitic  or 
schistous,  and  consequently  hard,  trench  warfare  has 
been  far  more  difficult — as,  for  example,  in  Gallipoli. 

The  part  played  by  the  products  of  mines  has  been, 
and  is,  very  important.  Thus  the  possession  of  coal  has 
given  Great  Britain  an  enormous  power,  for  nearly  all 
the  neutral  and  belligerent  States  have  need  of  this 
coal.  The  possession  of  the  petroleum  fields  of  Galicia, 
of  the  region  to  the  east  of  the  Tigris,  in  Mesopotamia, 
and  of  Rumania,  is  among  the  causes  which  underlay 
the  bellicose  activities  of  the  Russians,  the  British,  and 
the  Central  Powers. 

The   advance  of  the   Germans,   in   1915,   upon  the 


272          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Pripet,  in  the  direction  of  Kiev,  was  caused  by  the 
desire  to  seize  the  coalmines  of  that  region.  One  of  the 
causes  which  impelled  the  Germans  to  invade  France 
through  Belgium  and  the  North  was  the  desire  to  seize 
the  mineral  wealth  of  these  regions,  and  of  the  Briey 
basin.  It  is  probable  that  one  of  the  causes  of  the  in- 
vasion of  Serbia,  in  1915,  by  the  Germans  and  Austrians, 
was  the  desire  to  seize  Serbia's  copper-mines,  in  order 
to  exploit  them,  for  copper  was  becoming  scarce  in  the 
Central  Empires,  and  might  fail  them  altogether, 
despite  the  systematic  requisition  of  this  metal.  The 
absence  of  mines  of  manganese  and  nickel,  and  of 
quarries  of  nitrates,  etc.,  considerably  hampers  the 
activities  of  the  Central  Powers. 

What  is  true  of  the  products  of  the  subsoil  is  also 
true  of  the  products  of  the  soil.  We  all  know  what 
an  important  part  must  be  attributed  to  wheat,  cattle, 
vegetables,  etc.  It  is  certain  that  the  desire  to  increase 
the  supply  of  alimentary  products  impelled  the  Central 
Empires  to  seize  Poland,  Serbia,  Rumania,  etc.  The 
conquest  of  bread  has  involved  the  conquest  of  terri- 
tories and  of  nations. 

If  we  were  to  analyze  in  detail  all  the  events  which 
have  occurred  in  the  course  of  this  long  war  I  believe 
we  should  find  that  geographical,  climatic,  and  geo- 
logical conditions  have  produced  yet  other  effects. 
These  would  but  confirm  what  I  have  said,  would  only 
confirm  the  proof  of  the  extreme  importance  of  the 
conditions  of  our  terrestrial  environment.  All  this 
demonstrates  incontestably  that  man  is  intimately 
dependent  on  the  climate,  the  soil,  and  the  subsoil 
upon  which  he  lives  with  the  rest  of  his  congeners. 
He  is  dependent  on  them  as  the  plants  and  the  other 
animals  are  dependent.  He  is  dependent  on  all  these 
mesological  conditions — that  is,  there  is  a  solidarity 
between  them.  He  is,  in  fact,  affected  by  them  while 
he  himself  influences  them. 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         273 

This  war  is  therefore  a  striking  manifestation  of  the 
fact  that  everything  in  the  world  works  together, 
everything  is  intermingled  and  interrelated  in  a  thou- 
sand ways.  Everything  is  at  once  a  cause  and  an 
effect.  The  union  of  man  with  his  environment  is 
profound — far  more  comprehensive  and  far  more  power- 
ful than  are  the  elements  of  disunion.  An  intimate 
and  universal  solidarity  is  the  lesson  of  this  war,  which 
at  first  sight  seems  to  teach  a  lesson  of  antisolidarity* 
*  *  *  *  * 

One  of  the  modes  in  which  this  universal  solidarity 
has  manifested  itself  is  that  of  mutual  aid.  Never 
before  this  war  had  it  appeared  so  conspicuously  in  all 
parts  of  the  globe.  Formerly,  in  the  cataclysms 
initiated  by  man  or  by  nature,  solidarity  revealed  itself 
only  in  the  midst  of  small  groups,  either  national  or 
class  groups.  In  this  war  what  a  different  spectacle 
we  have  witnessed  !  Mutual  aid  is  general,  without 
regard  to  classes  or  nations.  Americans,  Asiatics, 
Australians,  Africans,  have  come  to  the  aid  of  Europeans. 
A  mighty  breath  of  altruism  has  passed  over  the  human 
race.  Fraternity  has  realized  itself  tangibly  and  visibly. 
Belgians,  Serbs,  Frenchmen  of  the  North  and  East, 
Prussians,  and  Poles  can  alike  bear  witness  to  this. 
In  the  tempest  of  steel  and  flame,  in  the  midst  of  the 
ruins,  the  heaps  of  corpses,  and  the  rivers  of  blood 
engendered  by  human  cupidity,  we  have  witnessed  the 
development  of  the  greatest  movement  of  solidarity 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Neutrals  and  belligerents 
have  emulated  one  another.  And  side  by  side  with 
the  work  of  death,  so  scientifically  and  intelligently 
performed,  we  see  the  work  of  life,  no  less  scientifically, 
no  less  intelligently  carried  out.  The  organizations 
for  the  relief  of  prisoners,  for  the  care  of  the  wounded, 
for  the  succour  of  those  expelled  from  their  homes, 
and  those  who  have  fled  before  the  invaders,  are  the 
living  witnesses  of  this  wonderful  mutual  aid. 

18 


274          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  Belgians,  the  French  of  the  northern  provinces, 
and  the  Poles  of  the  occupied  territories  are  starving. 
There  is  an  end  of  industry,  for  the  factories  are  emptied 
of  their  machinery  and  their  raw  materials;  moreover, 
fuel  and  lubricating  oils  are  scarce  or  unobtainable. 
There  is  little  agriculture,  for  manure  and  labour  and 
horses  are  lacking.  All  the  products  of  these  countries 
are  requisitioned.  The  result  is  famine. 

This  result  of  war  has  been  countered  by  mutual  aid. 
Private  initiative,  unhindered  by  the  thousand  ties 
of  the  Governments,  was  able  to  attain  its  full  expres- 
sion, and  since  October,  1914,  it  has  been  feeding  and 
supporting  the  populations  of  Belgium  and  the  North  of 
France.  Millions  of  pounds  have  been  collected,  the 
gift  of  private  persons,  and  millions  of  pounds  have  been 
contributed  by  the  French  and  Belgian  Governments 
for  their  compatriots  in  the  invaded  territories;  for  it 
has  been  necessary  to  feed  and  maintain  nine  millions 
of  human  beings  in  the  West  alone.  The  "  American 
Relief  Committee  "  spends  without  counting  the  cost. 
Business  men  are  at  the  head  of  the  organization,  while 
an  army  of  35,000  volunteers  is  toiling  under  their 
orders  to  repair  the  evils  of  the  war.  It  is  an  army  of 
life,  opposed  to  the  army  of  death.  A  fleet  of  trans- 
ports brings  monthly,  from  American  ports  to  Rotter- 
dam, millions  of  tons  of  wheat,  maize,  rice,  haricot 
beans,  peas,  bacon,  and  fats.  And  all  this  is  sold  to 
the  Committee  at  cost  price,  without  profit !  The 
"  American  Relief  Committee  "  wished  to  extend  its 
labours  to  the  Poles,  Serbs,  and  Armenians.  But  it 
encountered  insurmountable  difficulties  in  respect  of 
the  German  Government,  which  would  not  grant  the 
guarantees  which  the  Allied  Governments  demanded, 
so  that  they  might  be  certain  that  none  of  these  food- 
stuffs should  be  requisitioned  by  Germany. 

The  members  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  or  Quakers, 
have  distinguished  themselves  in  this  work  of  relief. 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         275 

Villages  on  the  French  front  which  were  destroyed  by 
shell-fire  and  incendiarism  have  been  rebuilt  by  their 
care.  Hundreds  of  volunteers  have  been  working  there 
without  payment.  The  Swiss  people  has  devoted  itself 
to  the  succour  of  prisoners,  the  wounded,  and  refugees. 
Millions  of  postal  parcels  have  passed  through  Switzer- 
land or  started  thence,  to  nourish  British,  French,  or 
Belgian  prisoners.  The  Swiss  have  even  instituted  a 
special  service  for  the  despatch  of  bread  to  all  prisoners 
of  war,  for  the  alimentary  ration  provided  by  the 
German  Government  was  not  sufficient. 

How  many  other  manifestations  of  mutual  aid  might 
not  be  cited  ?  We  might  mention  the  hospitality 
accorded  to  the  Belgians  in  England;  to  the  Belgians, 
the  French  of  the  northern  departments,  and  the  Serbs 
in  France;  to  the  Belgians  and  Serbs  in  Switzerland; 
and  to  the  East  Prussians  in  Germany.  We  might 
mention  also  all  the  private  hospitals  and  ambulances 
which  sprang  up  on  every  side,  swiftly  and  spontane- 
ously. We  must  not  forget  the  subscription  lists 
opened  by  the  great  newspapers;  nor  the  thousands  of 
young  girls,  women,  and  children  who  on  given  days 
collect  gifts  for  various  organizations,  etc.  In  truth, 
nothing  like  this  mutual  aid  has  ever  been  seen. 

And  a  thing  which  the  sociologist  should  observe, 
and  the  thinker  reflect  upon,  is  that  this  admirable 
mutual  aid  was  the  spontaneous  fruit  of  the  human 
mind,  of  individual  initiative.  While  the  work  of 
death  was  methodically  conducted  by  the  shepherds  of 
the  human  flock,  the  work  of  life  was  no  less  methodically 
conducted  by  the  flock  itself,  without  its  shepherds, 
who  were  absorbed  in  the  other  task. 

Mutual  aid  has  been  conducted  not  only  by  means 
of  money  and  labour,  but  also  at  the  price  of  blood. 
On  the  side  of  the  Western  Allies  men  of  all  nations 
and  all  races  are  fighting,  and  these  men  came  volun- 
tarily and  freely  to  join  the  British  and  the  French  ! 


276          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

One  single  sentiment  of  sociality  has  actuated  these 
Australians,  Canadians,  New  Zealanders,  North  Ameri- 
cans, Russian  Jews,  Italians,  Greeks,  Yougoslavs,  etc. 
No  doubt  in  the  enrolment  of  the  African  negroes,  the 
Hindus,  and  the  Maoris  there  were  other  motives  than 
the  desire  to  fight  side  by  side  with  the  peoples  who 
were  defending  an  ideal  similar  to  their  own.  But  it 
is  none  the  less  true  that  this  warfare  of  men  of  all 
races,  fighting  side  by  side,  displays  a  humanity  which 
possesses  a  greater  solidarity  than  it  did  of  old.  The 
combatants  themselves  are  evidence  of  an  extension  of 
human  solidarity. 

Another  form  of  the  manifestation  of  this  solidarity 
is  revealed  in  the  fact  that  the  individual  disregards 
his  own  burdens  and  sufferings,  and  thinks  only  of  the 
collectivity.  The  individual  labours  and  sacrifices  him- 
self for  the  collectivity.  Such  sacrifices  have  taken 
place  in  all  ages,  but  I  do  not  think  they  have  taken 
place  on  so  great  a  scale  as  in  this  war.  I  know  of 
nothing  finer  in  this  respect  than  the  voluntary  enlist- 
ment of  four  millions  of  British  soldiers,  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Australians,  Canadians,  and  New  Zea- 
landers. They  could  have  refrained  from  enlisting, 
whatever  the  pressure  which  was  directly  or  indirectly 
brought  to  bear  upon  them.  They  could  have  stayed 
at  home,  but  they  left  home,  knowing  very  well — above 
all  if  they  were  among  those  who  enlisted  after  the 
first  two  or  three  months  of  the  war — that  they  were 
risking  death  or  mutilation.  Here  is  a  sociological 
phenomenon  of  extreme  importance,  for  it  reveals  a 
feeling,  a  spirit  of  sociality — that  is  to  say,  of  solidarity 
with  the  rest  of  the  human  group — of  a  highly  developed 
character.  And  in  this  respect  we  may  say  that  the 
citizens  of  the  British  Empire  possessed  this  spirit  of 
sociality  in  a  greater  degree  than  those  of  the  other 
belligerent  nations.  They  have  reached  a  higher  stage 
of  political  and  moral  development  than  the  citizens  of 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         277 

other  countries.  This  is,  we  believe,  a  result  of  their 
free  and  democratic  government,  which  is  freer  and 
more  democratic  than  the  Governments  of  the  other 
Continental  nations,  even  than  those  of  the  Belgians, 
the  French,  and  the  Swiss. 

*  *  *  *  * 

While  mutual  aid  has  been  pervading  the  whole  of 
humanity,  we  have  witnessed  the  dawning  of  a  universal 
moral  sense.  The  war  has  plainly  revealed  the  existence 
of  a  world- wide  public  opinion,  independent  of  nations, 
classes,  and  sects — a  public  opinion  which  asserts  a 
high  morality:  respect  for  the  given  word,  respect  for 
the  liberty  and  independence  of  the  individual  and  the 
group,  disdain  of,  and  resistance,  to  terrorism.  In  all 
the  countries  of  the  world  these  moral  sentiments  have 
been  vigorously  manifested,  and  when  I  say  "  all "  I 
include  the  Central  Empires.  In  these  countries  it  was 
a  small  minority  which  gave  forcible  proof  of  these 
sentiments,  but  this  was  only  because  of  the  atmosphere 
of  terrorism  and  untruth  which  enveloped  these  Powers. 

This  general  mutual  aid,  this  spirit  of  sociality,  this 
high  morality  revealed  by  the  present  war  constitute 
one  of  the  most  valuable  lessons  which  emerge  from  it. 
We  have  here  the  presage  of  a  better  world,  a  world 
really  free  and  really  international. 

There  have,  to  be  sure,  been  manifestations  of  hatred, 
and,  a  priori,  one  might  admit  that  they  impair  this 
presage  of  a  better  world.  This  would  be  a  mistake. 
Between  the  combatants  on  the  various  fronts  there  is 
rarely  hatred,  according  to  the  letters  from  soldiers 
which  we  have  seen,  whether  published  or  private. 
We  know  that  the  soldiers  converse  with  one  another 
from  trench  to  trench,  and  arrange  truces  proprio  motu. 
It  is  more  particularly  in  the  writings  of  literary  men 
and  the  manifestos  of  the  "  intellectuals  "  that  we  find 
manifestations  of  hatred.  Essentially  they  are  nothing 
but  literature,  without  any  social  significance  as  to  the 


278          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

future,  a  phenomenon  only  valid  in  respect  of  the 
present,  and  even  so  merely  the  symptom  of  a  febrile 
condition  which  has  affected  the  overwrought  and  there- 
fore intoxicated  minds  of  a  number  of  "  intellectuals." 
What  might  be  more  serious  than  these  literary  mani- 
festations of  hatred  is  the  desire  expressed  by  many 
manufacturers  and  business  men  to  perpetuate  national 
antagonisms  by  means  of  an  economic  warfare.  But  I 
doubt  if  this  desire  will  be  realized.  The  material 
interests  of  the  human  masses  will  be  more  powerful 
than  the  interests  of  a  few  groups  of  the  capitalist  class. 
Moreover,  the  long  duration  of  the  war,  by  exhausting 
all  the  peoples,  is  creating  economic  conditions  which 
will  compel  the  peoples  to  expand,  unite,  federate,  and 
interpenetrate.  They  will  therefore  be  forced  to  realize 
that  their  welfare  depends,  not  upon  antagonism  and 
conflict,  but  upon  union  and  mutual  assistance. 
***** 

The  war  in  whose  midst  we  are  living  has  stirred  the 
whole  world  to  its  profoundest  depths,  and  the  most 
varied  moral  problems  have  arisen,  and  are  arising, 
daily.  Among  them  is  the  famous  question  of  reprisals, 
which  crops  up  with  greater  emphasis  after  each  sinking 
of  an  Atlantic  liner  by  submarines,  and  after  each 
aeroplane  or  Zeppelin  raid  on  the  British  Isles,  on 
Paris,  or  the  cities  of  Italy.  The  passions  and  opinions 
aroused  by  the  deaths,  wounds,  and  ruins  caused  by 
these  raids  have  prevented  many  persons  from  coldly 
examining  and  sanely  judging  the  problem  which  arises. 
The  more  sensitive  the  person,  the  more  his  altruistic 
feelings  were  outraged  by  the  murders  committed  by 
submarines  and  Zeppelins,  and  the  more  violent  his 
reaction  from  them.  Such  persons  clamoured  for 
reprisals. 

In  reprisals  there  is  always  present  the  idea  of  punish- 
ment. Reprisal  is  the  lex  talionis,  the  policy  of  an  eye 
for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  which  we  see  put  into 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         279 

practice  throughout  the  Old  Testament.  The  man  who 
recommends  reprisals  is,  consciously  or  not,  under  the 
influence  of  the  Old  Testament,  of  the  religious  ideals 
of  Judsea.  He  is  obeying  the  dead,  the  little  barbarous 
peoples  of  thousands  of  years  ago.  This  influence  of 
the  Old  Testament  explains  the  fact  that  we  find  the 
Catholic  peoples  speaking  of  reprisals  far  less  frequently 
than  the  Protestant  peoples.  They  have  not  been 
brought  up  on  the  Bible. 

In  reprisals  the  idea  of  punishment  is  combined  with 
the  idea  of  vengeance,  which  is,  by  the  way,  almost 
always  at  the  root  of  the  idea  of  chastisement.  This 
idea,  and  the  desire  for  vengeance,  constitute  a  very 
serious  danger  from  the  ethical  point  of  view.  Men 
possessed  by  this  idea  and  this  desire  are  upon  a  slippery 
slope,  down  which  they  slide  without  power  to  check 
themselves.  The  vengeance  of  one  side  involves  the 
vengeance  of  the  other,  and  so  on  until  the  end  of 
time.  This  is  mere  stupidity.  Bernard  Shaw,  in  two 
of  his  excellent  Plays  for  Puritans — namely,  "  Caesar 
and  Cleopatra,"  and  "Captain  Brassbound" — has  dis- 
played this  absurdity  in  the  humorous  and  farcical 
manner  which  is  dear  to  him.  One  too  often  forgets  the 
fable  of  the  Horse  who  would  be  Revenged  on  the  Stag  : 

"  Quel  que  soit  le  plaisir  que  cause  la  vengeance, 
C'est  1'acheter  trop  cher,  que  Pacheter  d'un  bien, 
Sans  qui,  les  autres  ne  sont  rien." 
("  Whatever  be  the  pleasure  vengeance  gives, 
'Tis  bought  too  dear  if  bought  at  such  a  price 
As,  being  paid,  all  else  is  nothing  worth.") 

Men  who  recommend  reprisals  should  remember  this 
moral  and  draw  inspiration  from  its  wisdom.  What  is 
reprisal  ?  It  is  man  behaving  as  a  wolf  to  man.  It  is 
the  onset  of  brutalities  and  crimes  without  end.  It  is 
therefore  certain,  as  was  asserted  in  1916  by  an  assembly 
of  Anglican  Bishops,  that  reprisals  tend  to  lower  the 
ethical  standard  of  international  relations,  just  as  in 


280          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  past,  when  they  were  the  rule  between  individuals, 
they  lowered  the  ethical  standard  of  their  relations. 

What  is  the  object  of  reprisals  ?  It  is  to  prevent 
fresh  atrocities  by  sowing  fear  in  the  mind  of  the  people 
which  is  to  suffer  these  reprisals.  Now  is  this  effect 
produced  ?  In  a  general  way  we  may  assert  that  it  is  not. 
It  is  enough  to  note  what  happened  in  Belgium  after 
the  shooting  of  her  inhabitants  and  the  burning  of  their 
homes;  in  England  after  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania, 
and  after  each  visit  of  the  Zeppelins ;  and  in  Paris  after 
each  air  raid,  to  realize  that  the  population  is  not 
terrified.  There  was  anger  and  fury,  but  not  fear.  If 
we  wish  to  be  still  more  exact,  we  may  say  that  the 
element  of  fear,  taking  the  whole  of  the  population,  was 
so  slight  that  it  disappeared,  submerged  in  the  general 
feeling  of  anger.  So  we  may  fairly  say  that  reprisals 
do  not  terrorize  anybody;  consequently  they  are  useless 
and  even  harmful.  This,  moreover,  is  what  an  examina- 
tion of  the  wars  of  all  periods  will  prove.  After  the 
twenty  years  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  when  the  policy 
of  reprisals  was  largely  employed,  Marshal  Marmont 
was  able  to  write:  "  Reprisals  are  always  useless." 
Field-Marshal  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  has  arrived  at  the  same 
conclusion,  for  he  writes  that  the  policy  of  reprisals  is 
based  on  the  ignorance  of  warfare. 

So  the  object  of  reprisals  is  not  attained  by  their 
employment.  On  the  contrary,  their  effect  has  utterly 
immoral  results.  Threats  of,  and  demands  for,  reprisals 
are  made  more  particularly  after  the  murder  of  non- 
combatants,  women  and  children,  who  are  described 
as  the  innocent  victims  of  the  criminal  folly  of  the 
enemy.  The  execution  of  reprisals  would  lead  one  to 
commit  the  same  crime  against  other  innocent  persons. 
And  then  we  arrive  at  the  idea  of  collective  responsi- 
bility, expelled  from  our  codes  and  our  laws  in  the  course 
of  human  progress — that  conception  of  collective  re- 
sponsibility which  was  held  by  our  savage  and  barbarous 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         281 

ancestors,  and  which  is  to-day  upheld  by  German 
militarism  in  its  manual,  Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege. 
This  is  a  step  to  the  rear,  a  return  to  past  ages. 

We  must  consider  such  acts  of  war  as  the  aerial  raids, 
which  injure  women  and  children  as  well  as  men,  from 
other  points  of  view  than  that  of  passion.  The  prin- 
cipal object  of  these  raids  is  certainly  the  destruction 
of  docks,  warehouses,  factories,  warships  or  merchant 
vessels,  camps,  barracks,  railways  and  railway  stations, 
etc.,  in  short,  any  species  of  destruction  that  may  pre- 
judice the  enemy,  their  adventitious  object  being 
terrorism.  Aeroplanes  and  Zeppelins  are  weapons,  and 
to  a  certain  extent  blind  weapons,  just  as  the  gun  is  a 
blind  weapon  which,  at  a  range  of  from  six  to  twelve 
miles,  bombards  a  besieged  city.  Bombs  and  shells  fall 
at  hazard,  sometimes  on  the  intended  target,  more 
often  beside  it,  if  not  very  far  away.  Humanum  est 
errare.  Women  and  children  are  killed  in  these  bom- 
bardments, and  it  cannot  be  otherwise.  The  conclusion 
to  be  drawn  is  not  that  we  should  not  bombard  cities, 
but  that  we  should  not  make  war. 

Let  us  always,  therefore,  bear  in  mind  that  war  is  by 
its  very  definition,  in  its  essence,  a  tissue  of  crimes  and 
horrors.  Let  us  remember  this  phrase  of  Clausewitz: 
"  One  could  not  introduce  a  principle  of  moderation 
into  the  philosophy  of  war  without  committing  an 
absurdity."  That  is  the  truth  concerning  war;  but  not 
concerning  a  war  which  is  an  affair  of  gold  lace,  a  species 
of  sport,  rather  more  exciting  than  war  upon  the  wild 
creatures  of  the  forest,  a  game  with  minute  regulations, 
as  though  it  were  a  tournament  or  an  assault  of  arms. 
Such  a  war  drags  on  as  a  game  drags  on.  But  a  war 
waged  on  real  foundations,  with  its  train  of  horrors,  of 
suffering,  and  devastation,  impels  men  to  make  peace 
and  inclines  them  not  to  make  war  again.  The  con- 
trolling principle  of  every  war  is  that  which  Bismarck 
has  summarized  as  follows:  "  To  render  war  so  terrible 


282          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  the  populations  that  they  themselves  beg  for  the 
conclusion  of  peace."  The  more  terrible  the  war  is, 
the  more  it  postpones  the  succeeding  war,  the  greater 
chance  there  is  that  it  will  be  the  last  war.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  horrors  of  this  war  will  so  far  enlighten 
the  populations  that  any  further  wars  will  be  avoided 
and  prevented  in  the  future. 

We  have  observed,  in  the  course  of  this  war,  that  the 
Allies  have  regarded  aerial  and  submarine  raids,  and 
many  other  acts  of  war,  as  German  cruelties,  while  the 
Germans  have  regarded  the  blockade  of  which  they  have 
been  the  victims  as  an  English  barbarism.  This  is  an 
interesting  psychological  phenomenon,  for  it  shows  the 
complete  absence  of  objectivity  on  the  part  of  all. 
Obviously  these  methods  of  war  are  cruel  and  barbarous, 
but  only  as  all  other  methods  of  war  are  cruel  and 
barbarous.  There  is,  in  reality,  neither  British  bar- 
barism nor  German  cruelty,  but  merely  military  cruelty 
and  barbarism.  The  national  mentality  does  not  affect 
these  modes  of  warfare.  They  are  the  inevitable  result 
of  the  military  mentality,  and  of  the  aim  pursued  by 
any  war.  The  vituperation  and  the  violent  language 
provoked  by  these  cruelties  are  always  addressed  to 
the  wrong  quarter:  they  are  always  addressed  to  the 
nations  instead  of  to  the  military  profession.  Militarism 
always  has  been,  and  always  will  be,  a  school  of  crime. 

Aerial  and  submarine  raids  are  methods  of  warfare 
which  arouse  public  opinion,  because,  it  is  said,  they 
injure  non-combatants.  In  reality  are  there  any  non- 
combatants  ?  The  Bishop  of  Bangor  was  right  when 
he  maintained  that  there  are  not.  Women  and  children 
are  making  munitions,  others  are  working  on  the  land, 
or  caring  for  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  thereby 
preserving  the  lives  of  combatants.  The  merchant 
vessel,  the  ocean  liner  sailing  from  one  port  to  another, 
the  trawler,  the  train  full  of  civilians  travelling  from 
one  town  to  another,  are  organs  of  life  necessary  to  the 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         283 

combatants.  To  strike  at  them  is  to  reach  the  soldier 
in  the  trenches.  Everything  in  life  is  linked  together, 
is  inextricably  intermingled;  separateness  is  merely  a 
product  of  the  human  mind,  which  in  reality  does  not 
exist. 

It  follows  that  men  are  wrong  to  fulminate  against 
certain  methods  of  warfare,  such  as  aerial  or  submarine 
raids.  They  should  logically  protest  against  all  methods 
or  warfare,  against  war  itself.  If  they  protest  against 
some  methods  and  not  against  others,  it  is  because  of 
the  novelty  of  the  former.  The  human  mind  is  slow  to 
admit  new  things  and  new  ideas ;  its  love  of  tradition — 
the  result  of  mental  sluggishness — prevents  it  from 
perceiving  the  horror  of  established  things  and  makes 
it  see  the  horror  of  new  things,  which  in  reality  are  not 
more  horrible  than  the  old.  When  we  consider  things 
in  their  reality  we  perceive  that  aeroplanes,  Zeppelins, 
and  submarines  are  weapons  of  war,  just  as  guns,  rifles, 
sabres,  machine-guns,  and  asphyxiating  gases  are 
weapons  of  war. 

If  we  look  these  realities  in  the  face,  instead  of  permit- 
ting ourselves  to  be  romantic,  we  are,  being  at  war,  led 
to  investigate  the  best  means  of  attack  to  be  employed 
against  the  enemy,  the  best  means  of  resistance  to  be 
opposed  to  his  engines  of  war.  Those  which  are  judged 
to  be  the  best  are  those  which  must  be  employed. 
The  sole  criterion  of  the  employment  of  these  new 
weapons  is  their  utility  in  respect  of  the  end  pursued; 
which  is,  to  compel  the  enemy  to  sue  for  peace.  It  may 
be  useful  to  send  squadrons  of  aeroplanes  or  dirigibles  to 
scatter  bombs  upon  certain  cities,  to  burn  crops,  etc. 
If  so,  a  nation  at  war  must  do  these  things.  It  may  be 
useful  to  sink  merchant-vessels;  if  so,  it  must  be  done. 
It  is  war.  But  these  acts  of  violence  must  not  be  com- 
mitted in  a  spirit  of  reprisal,  for  this  would  engender 
other  similar  acts  of  violence  which  would  be  useless, 
in  respect  of  the  end  pursued.  Reason  condemns  the 


284          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

idea  of  reprisals,  but  not  the  acts  which  are  described 
as  reprisals.  In  a  state  of  war  the  justification  of  acts 
of  war  resides  simply  in  their  utility  in  respect  of  the 
ends  pursued.  Such  is  the  ultimate  conclusion  attained 
by  the  objective  analysis  of  the  question  of  reprisals, 
which  has  arisen  principally  from  the  employment 
of  new  engines  of  warfare. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Moreover,  although  this  is  contrary  to  the  common 
opinion,  which  is  based  upon  romantic  narratives  of 
warfare,  the  conduct  of  war  has  always  and  everywhere 
been  based  upon  utility,   and  only  upon  utility.     Of 
course,  it  may  happen  that  what  is  regarded  as  useful 
may  be  useless  and  even  prejudicial;  but  this  error  of 
judgment  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  judgment 
is  formed.     This  basis  of  the  conduct  of  warfare  has 
led  in  the  past  as  well  as  the  present  to  the  employ- 
ment of  the  most  violent  means  of  warfare.     This  can- 
not be  denied.     The  events  of  the  Assyrian,  Medean, 
Persian,  Egyptian,  Roman,  Mussulman,  and  Christian 
wars  up  to  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  of  the  wars 
fought  by  Europeans   all  over  the  world  from   1452 
down  to  our  own  days,  testify  to  the  general  employ- 
ment of  terrorism  in  warfare.     There  can  be  no  war 
without  terrorism,  because  the  object  of  war  is  to  enforce 
one's    will    by    violence,    and   not    by   argument.     In 
principle  war  is  based  upon  constraint  caused  by  fear. 
Those  who  are   responsible  for  the  conduct  of  war — 
namely,  the  professional  soldiers — are  possessed  by  the 
idea  that  fear  is  the  most  potent  motive  of  human  action. 
This  conception  is  for  them  a  dogma,  which  they  neces- 
sarily put  into  practice.     Never,  then,  in  the  course  of 
time,  shall  we  behold  a  war  unaccompanied  by  the  em- 
ployment  of  terrorism.     Never   has   war   been   waged 
only   by   the   combatants  properly   so   called;    it    has 
always   involved   the   whole   people — soldiers,    women, 
children,  old  men.     We  have  only  to  refer  to  the  facts 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         285 

of  history;  to  consider  the  satirical  drawings  of  Hogarth 
and  Callot;  to  read  the  philosophers  who,  in  the  course 
of  the  ages,  have  spoken  of  war.  Here  are  a  few 
quotations : 

It  is  Laotze's  opinion  that  "  where  the  army  is,  there 
also  is  misery  and  devastation."  Seneca  declares  that 
"  one  cannot  at  the  same  time  behave  as  a  good  General 
and  a  good  man."  Tertullian  asserts  that  "  deceit, 
cruelty,  and  injustice  are  the  appanage  of  war." 
Machiavelli  writes:  "  He  who  follows  war  as  a  profession 
cannot  be  other  than  vicious.  War  makes  thieves, 
and  peace  builds  gibbets  for  them."  For  Voltaire 
"  thieves  and  soldiers  are  synonymous."  Read  Con- 
dorcet,  Kheltchisky,  Burbauld,  Aikings,  etc.,  and 
you  will  find  the  same  opinion.  There  is  nothing  sur- 
prising in  this,  for  it  is  merely  the  expression  of  innumer- 
able observed  facts.  War  is  a  medley  of  crimes  of 
every  nature,  from  assassination  to  mere  deceit,  in- 
cluding theft,  rape,  and  reduction  to  slavery.  Those 
whose  profession  is  warfare — that  is,  professional 
soldiers  —  practise,  in  short,  the  art  of  committing 
crimes.  Enough  of  the  absurdity  that  the  point  of 
honour  is  the  backbone  of  the  conduct  of  professional 
soldiers  !  I  will  not  repeat  here  the  demonstration 
of  the  absolute  falsity  of  the  belief  that  the  army  is 
the  school  of  honour  which  I  included  in  one  of  the 
chapters  of  my  book  on  La  Psychologic  du  Militaire 
Professionnel,  written  in  1893.  However,  the  reader 
may  refer  to  the  memoirs  and  correspondence  of 
European  commanders,  and  the  official  reports  in  the 
Ministerial  archives,  relating  to  the  wars  of  the  nineteenth 
century  alone,  and  he  will  encounter  a  countless  multi- 
tude of  facts  which  prove  that  war  is  merely  a  medley 
of  crimes.  The  professional  soldiers  of  all  nations  have 
been  the  willing  agents  of  these  actions,  of  whose 
criminal  nature,  for  that  matter,  they  were  often  un- 
aware, so  great  was  the  psychical  deformation  which 


286          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

they  had  undergone,  owing  to  their  professional  and 
caste  environment. 

War  is  a  mass  of  crimes,  whether  it  be  offensive  or 
defensive.  This  statement  does  not  at  all  imply  that 
we  must  not  defend  ourselves  by  all  possible  means, 
whether  violent  or  not,  against  attack.  The  criminal 
actions  of  a  collectivity  or  an  individual  often  force 
other  collectivities  or  individuals  to  commit  similar 
criminal  actions.  The  defence  is  to  a  great  extent 
conditioned  by  the  attack.  When  a  war  is  offensive, 
it  consists  of  a  succession  of  crimes  committed  with  the 
intention  of  achieving  a  crime :  the  enslavement,  destruc- 
tion, and  dispossession  of  another  collectivity.  When 
a  war  is  defensive,  it  consists  of  a  series  of  crimes  com- 
mitted in  order  to  prevent  the  realization  of  a  crime — 
that  is,  in  order  to  achieve  a  good  object.  Because  the 
result  of  a  crime  is  good  it  does  not  follow  that  the  crime 
is  non-existent. 

During  the  long  months  through  which  the  scourge 
which  is  ravaging  the  world  has  lasted,  all  have  been 
able  to  prove  by  experience  the  criminal  nature  of  war. 
It  might  have  been  verified  theoretically  merely  by 
reading  the  Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege.  This  book, 
drawn  up  by  the  German  Great  General  Staff,  cannot  be 
too  highly  praised  for  the  masterly  manner  in  which 
it  presents,  as  a  body  of  doctrine,  the  procedures  and 
the  rules  of  the  conduct  of  warfare.  These  procedures 
and  rules  will  be  found  in  use  in  the  course  of  all  wars, 
in  all  ages,  and  in  all  countries.  They  constitute  the 
very  essence  of  warfare,  and  may  be  summed  up  as 
comprising  cunning  and  violence — that  is,  assassination, 
theft,  rape,  deceit,  etc.;  or,  to  put  it  briefly,  crimes  of 
every  nature.  The  Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege  is  in 
effect  nothing  more  than  an  excellent  handbook  of  crime. 
The  great  painter  Veretschagin  relates,  in  his  Memoirs, 
that  Prince  George  of  Saxony  and  the  Crown  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  of  Prussia  once  told  him:  "War  is 


FACTORS  AFFECTING  WARFARE         287 

a  thing  apart,  which  contradicts  the  current  Christian 
morality.  Do  not  touch  your  neighbour's  possessions, 
says  this  morality.  Steal,  pillage,  take  all  the  plunder 
you  can,  preaches  war.  Deceive  no  one,  says  Christian 
morality.  Deceive  and  lay  ambushes,  replies  war,  and 
the  more  you  kill  the  greater  will  be  your  merit  in  this 
world  and  the  next."  Who  can  doubt  the  word  of  judges 
so  competent  as  these  Princes  and  Generals,  who  were 
reared  and  educated  for  war  ? 

If  we  regard  the  realities  of  warfare  in  all  their 
nakedness,  we  cannot  fail  to  perceive  the  essential 
criminality  of  war.  We  are  forced,  if  we  are  logical, 
to  condemn,  not  certain  methods  of  warfare,  not  the  em- 
ployment of  certain  weapons,  but  all  methods  of  warfare 
and  the  employment  of  all  weapons — that  is,  we  must 
condemn  war  in  principle,  in  its  essential  self.  We  must 
condemn  war  because  it  is  more  injurious  than  useful 
to  the  human  species.  The  human  progress  which  at 
times  results  from  war  might  be  achieved  by  pacific 
methods.  In  the  course  of  the  ages  the  greatest  progress 
has  been  effected  peacefully.  However,  war  has  been 
useful  in  bygone  periods  of  human  history,  but  it  is 
00  longer  useful  to-day.  Of  this  fact  the  present  war 
is  a  striking  proof.  As  I  have  demonstrated,  the 
balance-sheet  of  this  war,  despite  the  democratic 
advance  which  will  certainly  be  one  of  the  consequences 
of  the  war,  will  show,  when  completed,  a  large  deficit. 
We  have  passed  the  period  when  the  profits  of  war 
equalled  the  expenses  of  war  in  human  and  other 
material.  It  is  therefore  to  be  desired,  in  the  interest 
of  humanity,  that  the  terrible  experience  of  the  present 
war  may  lead  mankind  to  suppress  any  possibility  of 
its  recurrence. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR 

The  objects  of  the  war — Distinction  between  the  objects  of  the  ruling 
classes  and  those  of  the  popular  masses — Germany  responsible  for 
the  war — The  aims  of  her  ruling  classes — They  are  economic — 
Over-population  and  neo-Malthusianism — The  aims  of  the  popular 
masses — The  desire  for  European  and  world-wide  hegemony — 
The  necessity  of  destroying  the  British  Empire — The  Empire  of 
Central  Europe — The  aims  of  the  British  people — They  are  political 
and  moral — The  aims  of  Austria-Hungary — The  value  of  treaties 
between  States — Their  basis  is  interest,  for  they  have  no  other 
sanction  than  war — Legal  right  has  no  existence  in  itself — Natural 
rights  are  really  natural  necessities — The  aims  of  Japan — The  aims 
of  Italy — The  aims  of  Russia — The  aims  of  Turkey,  Bulgaria, 
Serbia,  and  Rumania — The  aims  of  France  and  Belgium — Pre- 
dominance of  economic  aims  in  the  ruling  classes — The  struggle  for 
the  possession  of  trade  routes — The  aims  of  the  masses  are  pre- 
eminently political  and  moral — The  war  is  a  conflict  between  the 
principles  of  authority  and  liberty — Its  great  importance  in  this 
respect — The  peoples  must  limit  the  powers  of  the  State — The 
great  centralized  States  and  the  federations  of  small  nations — The 
bankruptcy  of  the  ruling  classes  of  Germany. 

IF  we  analyze,  in  the  case  of  each  belligerent,  such 
matters  as  political,  military,  and  economic  events, 
declarations,  and  confessions,  we  perceive  that  not 
only  each  belligerent,  but  each  State  at  war,  is  pursuing 
different  aims.     And  we  are  thus  led  to  distinguish 
between  the  aims  of  the  rulers  and  the  aims  of  the 
popular  masses  which  they  rule.    More  often  than  not 
they  are  very  different. 

We  know  from  the  diplomatic  documents  published 
in  a  series  of  official  books  of  all  colours  that  this  war 
was  incontestably  caused  by  Germany  and  Austro- 
Hungary.  Obviously  all  the  diplomatic  events  which 
preceded  the  war  are  not  yet  known;  and  it  may  be 

288 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  289 

that  those  which  the  future  will  bring  to  light  will  to 
some  extent  modify  the  details  of  the  circumstances 
which  obtained  before  the  war.  But  we  may,  without 
risk  of  error,  assert  that  these  modifications  will  not 
alter  the  fact  that  the  responsibility  for  liberating  the 
war  rests  on  the  Central  Empires.  We  know,  in  fact, 
from  the  revelations  of  statesmen  and  ex-Ministers — 
for  example,  Signer  Giolitti  and  M.  Take-Jonescu — 
that  in  1913  Germany  checked  Austria-Hungary,  who 
wished  even  then  to  lay  hands  upon  Serbia.  In  1914 
Germany  did  not  check  her  ally,  because  she  did  not 
wish  to  do  so.  She  wanted  war,  and  had  long  prepared 
for  it.  A  case  brought  in  America  against  the  director 
of  the  Hamburg  America  Line  furnished  a  fresh  proof 
of  this  fact.  It  showed  that  Germany  had  taken  all 
possible  measures:  thus,  before  the  breaking-off  of 
negotiations  between  Germany  and  the  Powers  of  the 
Entente,  while  Germany  was  assuring  Sir  Edward  Grey 
of  her  pacific  intentions,  she  was  ordering  this  director 
of  a  private  navigation  company,  by  cable,  to  act 
according  to  his  instructions,  and  Dr.  Biinz  acted, 
before  there  had  been  any  declaration  of  war. 

So  ruling  Germany  desired  the  war.  What  were  her 
objects  ?  There  were  several,  but  all  were  funda- 
mentally of  an  economic  order.  We  are  speaking  here 
of  the  aims  of  the  ruling  classes  of  Germany — that  is, 
of  the  landowners  or  Junkers,  and  the  rich  industrial 
and  commercial  middle  classes.  The  landowners,  repre- 
sented in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Conservative  party, 
wanted  to  evade  the  death  duties,  which  were  inevitable 
in  the  event  of  a  prolonged  peace,  and  the  principle  of 
which  had  been  voted  by  the  Reichstag,  for  these  duties 
would  inflict  a  serious  injury  upon  the  interests  and 
privileges  of  the  territorial  nobility.  The  territorial 
nobility  is  a  military  nobility.  War  alone  could  main- 
tain its  prestige,  could  enable  it  to  acquire  rank  and 
wealth.  "  Lastly,"  says  an  official  report  to  the  French 

19 


290          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Government  written  in  1913  and  published  in  the 
Yellow  Book,  "  this  social  class,  which  forms  a  hierarchy 
of  which  the  King  of  Prussia  is  the  supreme  head, 
regards  with  terror  the  democratization  of  Germany  and 
the  increasing  strength  of  the  Socialist  party,  and 
considers  that  its  days  are  numbered."  Its  material 
interests  were  threatened  by  the  movement  against 
agricultural  protectionism,  which  was  reaching  formid- 
able proportions;  and  its  political  representation  in  the 
Reichstag  was  continually  diminishing.  In  the  opinion 
of  the  landowners,  their  economic  interests,  whence 
their  political  interests  were  derived,  called  for  a 
war. 

It  was  the  same  with  a  large  section  of  the  wealthy 
middle  class.  Its  representation  in  the  Reichstag  was 
continually  diminishing;  and  the  great  manufacturers 
believed  that  their  disputes  with  their  workers  were 
due  to  France,  the  revolutionary  centre  of  ideas  of 
emancipation.  "  But  for  France  industry  would  be 
tranquil,"  we  read  in  the  report  published  in  the  Yellow 
Book.  The  manufacturers  of  arms  and  munitions,  the 
great  export  and  import  houses,  and  certain  great 
bankers  wished  to  increase  the  area  of  the  markets  in 
which  they  sold  their  goods,  or  which  yielded  them 
raw  materials  and  capital.  War  would  be  a  good  stroke 
of  business. 

These  capitalists — landowners,  manufacturers,  or 
business  men — who  desired  war  in  order  to  satisfy  their 
economic  and  political  interests,  were  supported  by  a 
host  of  officials  and  University  professors  imbued  with 
warlike  ideology,  but  aiming  at  various  objects:  colonial 
conquests,  resulting  in  a  vast  commercial  expansion; 
an  end  of  the  armed  peace  which  was  so  ruinous,  since 
France  would  be  reduced  to  impotence,  etc.  To  justify 
their  colonial  conquests  the  German  intellectuals  relied 
on  the  very  high  birth-rate  of  the  German  people.  They 
needed  to  spread  themselves  over  the  earth,  because 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  291 

their  population  was  increasing  too  quickly  for  the  area 
of  the  country. 

This  point  merits  our  attention  for  a  moment.  It 
shows,  in  fact,  the  deleterious  effect  of  a  high  birth-rate 
in  a  human  society  as  chaotic  as  our  modern  society.  If 
the  doctrine  of  neo-Malthusianism — that  is,  of  the  volun- 
tary restriction  of  the  birth-rate — had  been  practised, 
Germany  would  have  had  no  need  of  colonial  conquests, 
for  she  would  not  have  been  over-populated.  There 
would  have  been  no  war — that  is,  millions  of  men 
would  not  have  been  killed  or  disabled.  This  over- 
population— we  are  speaking  of  a  relative,  not  of  an 
absolute  over-population — due  to  bad  management  of 
the  soil  and  its  products,  for  there  are  countries  in  which 
the  density  of  population  is  greater — this  over-popula- 
tion, I  say,  has  led  to  war,  one  of  whose  effects  is  to 
diminish,  even  to  suppress,  this  over-population.  The 
application  of  neo-Malthusianism,  while  producing  the 
same  effect,  would  at  least  have  avoided  the  immense 
losses  due  to  the  destruction  of  adult  human  beings, 
representing  an  enormous  quantity  of  labour  and  of 
products  which  were  necessarily  expended  in  order  to 
bring  to  the  adult  state  all  the  men  killed  or  disabled. 
The  practice  of  neo-Malthusianism  would  thus  have 
saved  humanity  much  suffering,  many  burdens,  much 
waste  of  energy.  Here  we  have  one  of  the  lessons 
which  emerge  from  the  world-war,  and  to  which  we 
must  draw  attention  in  passing. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  objects  of  the  war.  At  the 
bottom  of  all  the  warlike  aspirations  of  the  governing 
classes  of  Germany  we  find  an  economic  interest.  But 
for  many  of  the  governed  the  objects  were  political 
and  moral.  There  was,  in  fact,  a  general  belief  among 
the  lower  classes  of  the  German  people  that  the  war 
was  purely  defensive,  for  their  liberties  were  threatened 
by  the  Russian  autocracy.  Thus  in  private  letters  we 
find  enthusiastic  young  people  writing:  "  We  are 


292          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

fighting  for  the  liberty  of  the  world:  we  are  going  to 
deliver  Poland  and  Finland  !"  Assuredly  the  popular 
flock  was  deceived  by  its  shepherds  !  But  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  the  aim  of  the  flock  was  clearly  ideal- 
istic, on  the  moral  and  political  plane,  and  not  on  the 
economic  plane,  as  were  the  aims  of  the  rulers  of  the 
Empire. 

The  economic  aims  pursued  by  the  rulers  cannot  be 
mistaken.  Germany's  offers  to  Great  Britain,  to  induce 
her  to  remain  neutral,  revealed  them  as  clearly  as  possible. 
Germany  was  aiming  at  the  extension  of  her  colonial 
Empire,  at  the  possession  of  territories  which  would 
provide  spheres  of  political,  commercial,  and  industrial 
influence.  Germany  was  aiming  at  the  hegemony  of 
Europe  as  a  first  step,  then  at  the  hegemony  of  the 
world,  and  this  by  economic  interest.  The  great  majority 
of  her  business  men,  manufacturers,  financiers,  and 
merchants  believed  that  business  would  increase  in 
proportion  to  the  Imperialistic  power  of  the  nation. 
This  idea  is  erroneous,  as  is  proved  by  the  great  com- 
mercial and  industrial  expansion  of  little  Belgium  and 
Switzerland.  But  for  them  this  error  was  a  truth, 
which  was  based  on  the  enormous  expansion  of  German 
trade  and  industry  after  the  victorious  war  of  1870. 
This  enormous  expansion,  however,  was  more  apparent 
than  real.  Indeed,  if  we  examine  the  percentages,  per 
head,  of  exports  and  imports,  we  find  that  the  expansion 
of  trade  and  industry  in  Germany  has  been,  for  the 
same  period,  greatly  inferior  to  that  accomplished  by 
Belgium,  and  about  the  same  as  that  effected  in  France 
and  Great  Britain. 

However,  the  development  of  the  war,  in  the  course 
of  its  long  duration,  has  resulted  in  the  doffing  of 
masks.  The  war  has  been  conducted  by  Germany  on 
an  industrial  basis,  the  conquered  countries  being 
exploited  for  manufactured  products,  raw  materials, 
and  money.  As  the  jurist  Charles  Dejong  remarked 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  293 

in  a  study  of  The  War  and  Belgium,  the  war  is  for 
Germany  a  veritable  industry.  This  is  how  the  land- 
owners regard  it,  as  well  as  the  industrial  and  com- 
mercial associations.  Like  every  other  industry,  war 
must  yield  a  profit. 

But  of  what  should  this  profit  consist  ?  Petitions 
made  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor  by  influential  groups 
of  landowners  and  industrial  or  commercial  magnates, 
supported  by  notable  "  intellectuals,"  officials,  and 
University  professors,  answered  this  question  in  May, 
1915.  These  men  desired  the  annexation  of  territories 
in  the  West  and  the  East,  with  the  avowed  object  of 
gaining  possession  of  regions  rich  in  coalmines,  iron- 
mines,  maritime  ports,  etc.  They  meditated  the  dis- 
possession of  the  private  owners  of  factories,  mines, 
agricultural  exploitations,  etc.,  and  the  seizure  of  all 
these  properties  by  the  State,  which  would  distribute 
them  among  its  German  citizens.  The  economic 
interest  of  castes  and  classes  was  openly  confessed; 
the  petitioners,  however,  attempted  to  hide  it  under  the 
cloak  of  the  collective  political  interest,  basing  their 
arguments  on  the  necessities  of  the  Empire's  military 
defences.  A  more  remote  aim  was  the  conquest  of  the 
world-hegemony,  and  a  vast  colonial  Empire.  In  this 
Empire,  which  would  comprise  the  most  varied  races, 
the  German,  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  his  racial 
superiority,  would  reduce  the  white,  yellow,  or  black 
populations  to  slavery.  They  would  work  for  him,  but 
they  would  be  well  cared  for  and  fed  by  him.  Liberty 
alone  would  be  lacking. 

These  objects  of  the  ruling  Teutonic  castes  could  only 
be  realized  if  Germany  could  destroy  the  British  Empire. 
And  this  was  what  she  really  intended,  after  the  defeat 
of  France  and  Russia.  She  hoped  that  England  would 
so  far  fail  to  comprehend  her  interests  as  to  remain 
neutral,  an  impassive  spectator  of  the  crushing  of  France 
and  Russia,  who  would  then  be  forced  to  become  the 


294          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

satellites  of  Germany.  Happily  for  the  liberty  of  the 
world,  Germany  was  deluded,  and  England  entered  the 
furnace  of  the  war. 

This  was  the  cause  of  the  check  suffered  by  the 
armies,  and  of  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  which  will 
continue  until  Germany  categorically  admits  her  defeat. 
The  continuance  of  the  war  led  Germany  to  modify 
her  plans  in  order  to  achieve  her  ends,  and  at  the  same 
time  revealed  to  the  world  the  ultimate  object  of  the 
war:  the  destruction  of  the  British  Empire,  as  a  step 
towards  the  hegemony  of  the  world.  This  became 
plainly  apparent  when,  trench  warfare  having  estab- 
lished an  impassable  barrier  on  the  West  and  East, 
Germany  with  admirable  audacity  pushed  southwards 
and  eastwards,  in  order  to  threaten  India  and  Egypt  by 
way  of  Belgrade,  Nish,  Constantinople,  and  Bagdad. 
The  desire  for  annexation  in  the  West  and  the  East 
was  diminished  or  completely  eliminated.  Indeed, 
the  matter  was  postponed,  while  Germany  contented 
herself  with  political  and  economic  conquests  throughout 
the  whole  of  the  Balkans  and  Asiatic  Turkey. 

Herr  Friedrich  Neumann  undertook  to  establish  the 
theory  of  these  aspirations  in  his  Mittel  Europa.  Ger- 
many was  to  form  a  vast  Empire,  stretching  from  the 
Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea  in  the  east,  the  Adriatic  in  the 
south-west,  and  the  Persian  Gulf  in  the  south.  Under 
the  hegemony  of  Germany  the  regions  peopled  by  the 
Hungarians,  Czechs,  Yougoslavs,  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and 
Turks  would  be  developed  and  exploited  from  the 
industrial  and  commercial  point  of  view.  All  nation- 
alities would  disappear,  absorbed  by  the  Teutonic 
nationality.  And  this  Central  Empire,  bounded  by 
the  famous  trenches  which  run  from  the  North  Sea  to 
the  Alps  and  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,  would 
prepare  for  the  future  conflict  which  should  enable  it 
to  extend  to  the  Atlantic  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  This 
conception  of  an  Empire  based  on  violence,  analogous 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  295 

to  that  of  the  great  Asiatic  conquerors,  the  Assur-bani- 
dpli,  is  directed  only  toward  economic  aims:  the  ac- 
quisition of  wealth  by  means  of  the  acquisition  of  terri- 
tories and  their  methodical  exploitation. 

We  may  therefore  say  with  reason  that  the  aims 
pursued  by  the  governing  classes  of  Germany  in  this 
war  are  almost  exclusively  economic,  for  we  may 
neglect  the  aims  of  the  plebeian  flock,  which  has  no 

voice  in  the  matter. 

***** 

The  British  Empire  entered  the  war  without  being 
directly  attacked;  the  war  was  not,  as  far  as  it  was 
concerned,  a  defensive  war.  At  least,  this  is  seemingly 
the  case.  Apparently  it  was  drawn  into  the  war  to 
defend  a  disregarded  right,  the  threatened  liberty  of 
the  small  nations.  Here,  above  all,  if  we  wish  to  grasp 
the  reality  of  things,  we  must  distinguish  between 
certain  groups  of  rulers  and  the  mass  of  the  people. 
If  we  consider  the  general  population  of  Great  Britain, 
the  working-class  masses  and  the  middle  classes,  we 
must  admit  that  it  was  this  violation  of  the  laws  of 
nations  which  aroused  them.  If  there  had  been  no 
violation  of  Belgian  territory,  it  would  have  been  ex- 
tremely difficult  for  certain  of  the  leaders  of  British 
politics  to  involve  the  people  in  the  war.  Yet  the  vital 
interests  of  the  people,  and  its  interest  in  remaining 
autonomous  and  independent,  plainly  called  for  its 
intervention  in  the  war,  so  that  it  might  fight  in  defence 
of  national  liberty  and  independence  beside  its  Conti- 
nental Allies. 

A  small  section  of  the  ruling  class  of  the  British 
Empire  had  for  a  long  time  been  the  enemy  of  Germany, 
not  for  moral  and  political,  but  for  economic  reasons. 
This  section  had  witnessed  the  rise  of  German  industry 
and  commerce,  which  everywhere  held  in  check,  and 
often  triumphed  over,  British  commerce  and  industry. 
Great  Britain  had,  therefore,  a  certain  material  interest 


296          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

in  entering  the  war  beside  France  and  Russia.  Here, 
then,  we  have  the  spectacle  of  economic  interests  making 
use  of  a  popular  sense  of  justice  in  order  to  launch  the 
nation  into  the  war,  break  with  a  traditional  policy  of 
insular  isolation,  and,  in  so  doing,  serve  the  moral 
interests  of  humanity. 

On  several  occasions  during  the  course  of  the  war  the 
political  and  moral  aims  of  the  British  Government  have 
been  publicly  affirmed.  "  We  shall  not  return  the 
sword  to  the  scabbard,"  said  Mr.  Asquith,  more  than 
once,  "  until  Belgium  has  recovered  her  full  indepen- 
dence and  all  that  she  has  sacrificed,  until  France  is 
adequately  secured  against  any  menace  of  aggression, 
until  the  rights  of  the  smallest  nations  of  Europe  are 
placed  upon  an  unassailable  foundation,  and  the  military 
domination  of  Prussia  has  been  completely  and  finally 
destroyed."  These  words  are  plain  and  categorical. 
They  reveal,  we  shall  remark,  only  political  and  moral 
and  altruistic  aims.  And  these  are,  in  fact,  the  aims  of 
the  mass  of  the  working-class  and  middle-class  people 
of  the  United  Kingdom. 

But  there  are  other  aims  in  addition  to  these,  economic 
aims,  which  are  pursued  by  the  manufacturers  and 
merchants  and  financiers,  who  form  an  important 
section  of  the  ruling  class  of  Great  Britain.  These 
economic  aims  appear  in  the  formation  of  certain  anti- 
Germanic  associations  and  leagues,  and  in  the  open 
discussion  by  a  few  prominent  newspapers  of  tariffs, 
customs  unions,  etc.  Moreover,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
the  Australian  Commonwealth,  Mr.  Hughes,  confessed 
this  economic  object  when  he  declared  that  this  war  was 
a  war  not  for  national  supremacy  alone,  but  also  for 
commercial  supremacy. 

***** 

Austria-Hungary  and  Japan  entered  the  war  only 
from  political  and  economic  motives.  The  murder  of 
the  Archduke  and  his  wife  was  a  pretext;  the  object  of 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  29? 

the  war  was  to  humiliate  Serbia,  in  order  that  she  should 
enter  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence  instead  of  remain- 
ing in  that  of  Russia.  It  was  necessary  that  Serbia 
should  enter  this  sphere  of  influence  in  order  that  she 
might  be  commercially  and  industrially  exploited 
by  the  Austria-Hungarians.  Germany — landowning, 
financial,  and  industrial — urged  Austria-Hungary  toward 
the  Balkans  and  South-Eastern  Europe,  in  or.der  to 
open  up  fresh  outlets  for  her  own  activities  and  products. 
After  analysis,  therefore,  we  find  that  the  political 
aims  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  were  in  reality  pursued  for 
economic  purposes. 

The  case  of  Japan  is  similar.  Obviously  her  treaty 
of  alliance  with  the  British  Empire  obliged  her  to  lend 
assistance  if  the  latter  asked  for  it.  But  one  can  always 
dispute  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty;  let  us  recall  the 
case  of  the  Italian  treaty  with  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  in  1914.  Let  us  also  remember  what  came  of 
the  Graeco-Serb  treaty  in  October,  1915.  One  can 
always  dispute  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty;  and 
between  States,  in  our  days,  a  treaty  has  no  other 
sanction  than  force — that  is,  the  act  of  war. 

Nearly  half  a  century  ago  a  German  jurist,  Professor 
Lasson,  wrote  in  this  connection:  "  There  is  no  law 
between  one  State  and  another.  ...  A  law  is  nothing 
but  a  superior  force.  Between  States,  there  is  only  one 
kind  of  law,  the  law  of  the  strongest.  A  State  cannot 
commit  crimes.  The  fulfilment  of  its  engagements  is 
not,  for  a  State,  a  question  of  law,  but  a  question  of 
interest." 

Some  have  seen  sophistry  in  this,  whereas  there  is 
nothing  but  the  brutal  expression  of  the  simple  un- 
adulterated truth.  If  we  study  the  relations  between 
States  during  the  course  of  the  ages,  we  discover  the 
proof  of  this  at  every  moment.  At  any  moment,  in 
the  life  of  the  nations,  we  find  that  nothing  exists  but 
a  balance  of  forces,  and  that  no  legal  right  exists  unless 


298          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

it  is  sanctioned  by  force.  It  results  from  this,  and  in 
passing  we  must  note  this  further  consequence  of  the 
world- war,  that  justice  has  no  existence  in  itself. 

Rights  are  a  product  of  the  human  imagination. 
A  legal  right  has.  no  existence  unless  it  has  a  sanction, 
and  this  sanction  must  be  imagined  by  men.  Conse- 
quently, it  is  based  upon  human  force.  It  is  not  the 
same  with  the  sanctions  of  natural  rights,  which  are 
really  merely  needs  inherent  in  the  individual.  These 
sanctions  of  the  natural  rights  are  not  left  to  human 
caprice  or  judgment;  they  are  the  logical  reaction  of 
the  violation  of  these  natural  rights — that  is  to  say, 
of  the  non-satisfaction  of  these  natural  cravings. 

It  results  from  these  considerations  that  man  should 
endeavour  to  make  his  legal  justice  coincide  with  his 
natural  rights,  so  that  there  is  no  further  need  of  artifici- 
ally imagined  sanctions,  such,  for  example,  as  the  whole 
series  of  penalties.  It  results  also  that  man  should 
endeavour  to  transform  the  sanctions  based  upon  force — 
upon  war,  the  death  penalty,  flogging,  and  imprison- 
ment— into  sanctious  based  upon  moral  force.  And 
where  the  relations  between  States  are  concerned,  such 
an  international  situation  must  be  created  that  the 
interest  of  each  State  shall  be  never  to  break  the  con- 
ventions which  bind  it  to  another  State  or  States. 
So  long  as  this  international  situation  is  lacking,  the 
affirmations  of  Lasson  will  be  the  expression  of  the  truth. 

For  a  State,  the  execution  of  a  treaty  is  only  a  question 
of  interest.  Thus,  if  Japan  observed  her  treaty  of 
alliance,  it  was  only  because  it  was  to  her  economic 
and  political  interest  to  do  so.  Japan  is  pursuing  a 
policy  of  excluding  the  Occidental  Powers  from  Asia, 
in  order  to  bring  China  into  her  sphere  of  influence, 
and  this  with  aims  analogous  to  those  which  Austria- 
Hungary  entertained  in  respect  of  Serbia.  The  Japanese 
Government  is  autocratic,  with  an  appearance  of  Parlia- 
mentarism; it  is  a  class  Government;  more,  it  is  a  caste 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  299 

and  even  a  clan  Government.  It  is  militarist  in  char- 
acter, for  it  has  really  remained  in  the  Middle  Ages  as 
regards  its  moral  civilization.  Thanks  to  the  insularity 
of  the  country  it  is  extremely  strong,  and  it  skilfully 
seizes  every  opportunity  of  increasing  its  sphere  of 
influence  in  order  to  increase  the  wealth  of  the  ruling 
clans.  And  in  this  connection  we  must  consider  the 
danger  to  the  future  if  the  system  of  armaments 
continues  after  the  war — a  terrific  danger,  for  it  would 
be  in  the  order  of  possibilities  were  this  system  to 
resolve  itself  into  a  war  between  Asia  on  the  one  hand 
and  Europe  with  America  on  the  other.  However, 
in  this  dark  vision  of  the  future  there  is  one  bright 
spot — the  vast  Middle  Empire,  with  ten  times  the 
population  of  Japan,  a  pacific  and  industrious  population, 
which  has  reached  a  stage  of  moral  civilization  far  in 
advance  of  that  of  Japan,  despite  the  European  polish 
of  the  latter. 

***** 

Italy  entered  the  war  ten  months  later  than  her 
present  Allies.  She  entered  the  war  with  aims  which 
were  openly  egoistic,  frankly  admitting,  by  the  long 
series  of  diplomatic  negotiations  which  preceded  the 
rupture  of  relations,  that  she  wished  to  deprive  the 
Austrian  Empire  of  territories  which  were  said  to  be 
populated  by  Italians.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  must 
distinguish  and  analyze  the  desires  and  opinions  which 
led  Italy  to  make  war  upon  her  previous  Allies. 

The  Italian  rulers  understood  that  the  present  war 
might  solve,  perhaps  finally,  and  in  any  case  for  many 
years,  the  burning  questions  of  the  Balkans,  and  of  the 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  territories  at  present  possessed 
by  Turkey.  Now,  it  was  to  the  economic  interest  of 
these  rulers  to  be  concerned  in  this  solution  of  the 
Eastern  and  Balkan  problems.  In  this  solution  the 
development  of  Italian  trade  and  industry  would  find 
what  it  was  looking  for.  It  was  therefore  necessary 


300          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  take  part  in  the  war.  But  for  this  it  was  necessary 
to  create  a  popular  demand  for  war.  It  was  impossible, 
on  account  of  traditional  feeling  and  historical  conditions, 
to  render  popular  a  war  on  the  side  of  the  Imperial 
Powers.  Austria-Hungary  was  still  for  a  part  of  the 
population  the  hereditary  enemy.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  the  bloodthirsty 
brutality  and  the  terrorism  with  which  Germany  was 
conducting  the  war,  aroused  the  feelings  of  justice,  pity, 
and  altruism  which  exist  in  every  human  mind.  It  was 
therefore  easy  to  arouse  and  excite  these  feelings. 
The  "  intellectuals  "  devoted  themselves  to  the  task. 

The  Government  and  the  ruling  classes  gave  them  a 
free  hand,  and  even  encouraged  them,  for  this  was  for 
them  the  only  means  of  releasing  the  forces  of  war, 
and  ranging  themselves  on  the  side  which  was  certain 
to  win.  While  recognizing  Germany's  wonderful  organi- 
zation for  war,  they  rightly  considered  that  the  power  of 
England,  Russia,  and  France  would  exceed  that  of  the 
Central  Empires,  both  in  men  and  in  money.  Moreover, 
in  view  of  the  development  assumed  by  the  war  it  was 
impossible  that  Italy  should  profit  by  any  dealings 
with  Germany  and  Austria.  The  contempt  for  her 
signature  which  Germany  had  displayed  in  respect  of 
Belgium  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  made  it 
impossible  to  rely  on  her  word  or  her  signature.  The 
guarantee  offered  by  Germany  for  the  territorial  con- 
cessions made  by  Austria  was  of  absolutely  no  value. 
The  principle  of  German  policy  is :  Might  is  Right. 

The  Italian  rulers  and  "  intellectuals "  understood 
plainly  that  the  triumph  of  the  Central  Empires  would 
mean  the  more  or  less  sudden  death  of  the  autonomy  and 
independence  of  Italy.  The  economic  interests  of  the 
country  were,  in  fact,  in  opposition  to  those  of  the 
Germans.  The  alliance  of  Italy  with  the  Western 
Powers  imposed  itself  by  means  of  various  economic, 
political,  and  moral  factors.  During  the  course  of  the 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  301 

war  the  economic  interests  have  come  slightly  to  the 
fore.  The  war,  in  short,  was  waged  from  a  purely 
Italian,  and  not  from  a  general  point  of  view ;  there  was 
no  declaration  of  war  against  Germany  until  fifteen 
months  had  elapsed  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
with  Austria -Hungary. 

For  Italy,  as  for  Great  Britain,  the  aims  of  the  war 
were  therefore  a  mixture  of  various  factors:  economic 
and  political  in  the  case  of  the  ruling  classes,  moral 
in  the  case  of  the  "  intellectuals  "  and  the  mass  of  the 
people.  It  was  almost  the  same  in  Russia. 

»  *  *  *  * 

In  1914  the  full  resources  of  the  Russian  Empire 
were  not  prepared  for  the  conflict.  They  were  being 
organized  when  the  war  broke  out.  The  Empire, 
therefore,  was  for  the  moment  pacific.  It  desired  peace, 
but  was  obliged  to  submit  to  war.  It  was  obliged  to 
do  so  in  order  to  prevent  the  crushing  of  Serbia,  so  that 
it  might  retain  this  nation  in  its  sphere  of  political 
influence. 

Russia  was  always  seeking  expansion,  because  ex- 
pansion enabled  the  bureaucracy  and  the  military 
nobility  to  live  and  enrich  themselves.  The  continual 
extension  of  the  Russian  power  was  due  to  the  material 
interests  of  the  ruling  class,  which  is  a  class  of  military 
and  bureaucratic  landowners,  not  of  merchants  and 
manufacturers.  As  for  those  of  the  people  who  did 
more  than  merely  obey  the  orders  of  the  Government, 
their  affinity  to  the  Serbs — an  affinity  of  race  and  lan- 
guage— led  them  to  welcome  the  war  with  enthusiasm. 

At  the  outset  of  the  war  the  ruling  classes  of  Russia 
were  pursuing  political  and  economic  aims,  while  the 
aims  of  the  mass  of  the  people  were  altruistic :  they  wished 
to  defend  their  Slav  brothers  from  attack.  In  the 
course  of  the  war  these  economic  and  political  aims  were 
openly  declared,  among  them  being  the  conquest  of 
Galicia,  of  Constantinople,  etc.  The  hunger  for  territory, 


302          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

which  is  a  hunger  peculiar  to  great  autocratic  empires, 
was   impudently  flaunted   by  the  whole   bureaucratic 
and  religious  clan  which  governed  Russia.     The   pre- 
dominance of  economic  aims  became  apparent. 
*  *  *  *  * 

Let  us  now  consider  Turkey.  She  entered  the  war 
in  obedience  to  Germany,  although  neither  the  people, 
nor  the  commercial  middle  class,  nor  the  military 
nobility  was  consulted,  nor  were  their  feelings  aroused. 
This  was  the  work  of  a  few  men,  a  few  Young  Turks, 
who  certainly  had  not  foreseen  all  the  conditions  of  the 
conflict,  or  they  would  have  seen  that  they  were  making 
for  defeat  and  the  disappearance  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
Germany  flashed  the  lure  of  victory  before  their  eyes, 
and  for  a  few  victory  meant  power,  honours,  and  riches. 
For  others  it  meant  the  reconstitution  of  a  great  Turkish 
Empire  in  Asia  and  Africa.  The  aims  which  impelled 
the  Young  Turkish  clan  to  follow  Germany  into  the 
world-war  were,  therefore,  political  and  economic, 
whether  collective  or  individual.  Germany  drew  Turkey 
into  the  war  in  order  to  facilitate  her  attainment  of 
world-wide  hegemony. 

But  if  Turkey  went  to  war  the  Eastern  Question  was 
bound  to  be  solved,  in  one  sense  or  another,  at  the 
end  of  the  war.  So  it  would  necessarily  follow  that  all 
the  Balkan  Powers  would  sooner  or  later  be  forced  to 
take  part  in  the  struggle.  Of  this  Germany  was  aware, 
but  she  reckoned  on  being  able  to  induce  them  either  to 
range  themselves  on  her  side,  or  to  remain  neutral.  To 
obtain  these  results  she  employed  her  policy  of  terrorism 
and  corruption.  She  had  to  deal  with  the  ruling 
elements  of  these  countries,  for  the  peoples,  by  interest 
and  opinion,  were  pro-Russian  and  pro-French  or  pro- 
English. 

Bulgaria  was  dragged  into  the  war  by  her  King,  who 
dreamed  of  a  great  Bulgarian  Empire.  His  aims  were 
jH>litical  and  economic.  Greece  and  Rumania  at  firs* 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  803 

remained  neutral,  partly  because  they  feared  Germany, 
partly  because  the  Entente  did  not  promise  them  what 
they  asked.  In  each  of  these  countries  there  were, 
moreover,  sections  of  the  ruling  classes  who  would,  from 
economic  interest,  have  joined  either  the  Western  or 
the  Central  Powers.  Thus,  if  in  Rumania  the  class  of 
the  great  landowners  favoured  Germany,  this  was  be- 
cause of  their  material  interests.  And  the  same  phenome- 
non was  observable,  but  this  time  in  favour  of  England, 
in  the  case  of  the  class  of  wealthy  Greek  merchants,  who 
would  be  ruined  by  a  war  against  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 
Rumania  decided  to  take  part  in  the  war  in  August, 
1916,  because  she  found  herself  compelled  by  the  En- 
tente to  take  part  in  it,  and  because  Russia  had  at  last 
decided  to  satisfy  the  Rumanian  demands.  These 
concerned  the  seizure  of  territories  which,  in  the  posses- 
sion of  Austria-Hungary,  are  inhabited  by  a  large 
majority  of  Rumanians:  Transylvania,  the  Banat, 
Bukovina;  and  the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles  to  free 
navigation.  The  aims  of  Rumania  were  therefore  at 
once  economic,  moral,  and  political.  In  the  govern- 
ing circles  economic  aims  predominated;  these  included 
the  possession  of  Transylvania,  whose  mineral  and 
forestal  wealth  would  be  exploited,  and  the  freedom  of 
the  Dardanelles,  permitting  of  ready  exportation  and 
the  creation  of  a  large  merchant  marine.  As  for  the 
governed,  the  aims  of  the  bulk  of  the  lower  classes  of 
the  towns  and  rural  districts  involved  the  realization, 
more  especially,  of  noral  ideals,  such  as  the  liberation 
of  their  brothers  in  Transylvania,  who  were  persecuted 
by  the  Hungarians.  In  this  national  feeling  of  the 
rural  and  urban  masses  we  perceive  the  origin  of  the 
mistake  made  by  the  Rumanian  Government,  when, 
on  the  termination  of  peace,  it  directed  its  military  effort 
against  the  Austro-Germans  in  Transylvania  instead 
of  against  Bulgaria. 

***** 


804          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Serbia  was  forced  into  the  war.  For  her  it  was  a 
defensive  war  in  which  her  national  existence,  her  in- 
dependence, and  her  liberty  were  at  stake.  As  for 
Belgium,  her  situation  was  even  worse;  in  her  case 
there  was  no  show  of  pretext.  In  the  view  of  the  German 
commanders  she  offered  a  short-cut  between  one  point 
and  another,  and  this  was  enough  for  them;  all  her  rights, 
all  her  liberties  were  trampled  underfoot.  With  great 
courage  and  noble  pride,  Belgium  refused  to  accept 
the  destruction  of  her  liberties.  She  fought  for  them, 
and  is  fighting  still. 

The  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  was  subjected  to 
the  same  violation,  but  was  so  small  that  it  could  not 
even  struggle.  It  had  to  bow  before  the  stronger  Power. 
But  here  again  terrorism  has  not  succeeded,  for  many 
Luxemburgers  left  their  country  to  enlist  in  the  French 
Army  in  order  to  fight  against  Germany,  the  violator 
of  their  liberty.  In  short,  for  Serbia,  Belgium,  and  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  the  interest  of  the  war  is 
a  moral  interest — the  defence  of  their  liberty. 

***** 
The  same  is  true  of  France.  The  French  population, 
with  the  exception  of  a  very  small  minority  of  chauvin- 
ists, who  were  not  influential,  was  pacific.  Its  material, 
moral,  and  political  interest  was  to  maintain  peace. 
There  was  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Russia,  a  treaty 
of  which  the  people  was  as  yet  ignorant — for  secret 
diplomacy  insists  upon  governing  by  obsolete  methods, 
which  are  in  opposition  to  the  principles  of  democracy, 
although  they  are  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of 
autocracy.  I  am  convinced  that  if  this  treaty  had  bound 
France  to  an  offensive  war  the  majority  of  the  people 
would  have  refused  to  observe  it.  As  Jaures  said: 
"  If  appeal  is  made  to  a  secret  treaty  with  Russia,  let 
us  appeal  to  the  public  treaty  with  humanity." 

Rather  than  accept  an  offensive  war,  working-class 
and  Socialist  France  would  have  raised  the  standard 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  305 

of  revolution.  The  French  Government  was  aware  of 
this,  and  it  honestly  pursued  a  pacific  policy  in  all  the 
negotiations  which  preceded  the  cataclysm  in  which 
humanity  has  for  more  than  two  years  been  struggling. 
The  whole  French  people  rose  to  defend  its  liberties  and 
its  independence  when  these  were  threatened  by  the 
invader. 

Moral  interests  only  were  at  issue;  in  1914  the  same 
social  phenomenon  was  observable  which  had  occurred 
at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution.  Her  moral 
and  political  interests  were  such  that  even  without 
the  treaty  with  Russia,  even  without  the  violation  of 
her  territory,  France  must  have  fought  Germany,  in 
order  to  prevent  her  hegemony  over  Europe,  and  the 
resulting  suppression  of  her  own  liberties  and  autonomy. 
But  although,  at  the  outset  of  the  war,  the  aims  of  the 
French  were  unanimously  moral  aims,  as  the  war  dragged 
on  economic  aims  made  their  appearance,  pursued  by 
certain  of  the  class  of  industrial,  commercial,  and 
financial  magnates.  Some  dreamed  of  territorial  an- 
nexations, and,  of  course,  like  their  fellows  in  Germany, 
they  made  it  appear  that  these  were  in  the  interest  of 
the  collectivity.  The  greater  number  aimed  at  a  sort 
of  customs  union  of  the  Allies,  which  should  enable  them 
to  seize  the  German  markets. 

It  would  seem  that  in  Portugal,  on  whom  Germany 
declared  war  in  1916,  there  is  a  predominance  of  moral 
over  economic  factors.  Yet  the  initial  factor  of  the 
rupture  of  relations,  the  acquisition  of  merchant  vessels, 
was  an  economic  factor.  However,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  in  this  war  Germany's  attitude  toward  Portugal 
is  different  from  her  attitude  toward  Italy.  She  did 
not  declare  war  upon  Italy;  she  did  declare  war  upon 
Portugal.  This  was  owing  to  the  economic  interests 
involved  in  Germany's  relations  with  Italy,  while  no 
such  interests  existed  in  her  relations  with  Portugal. 
***** 

20 


806          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

As  will  be  seen  by  this  review  of  the  aims  pursued  by 
the  various  belligerents  in  this  war,  it  is  incontestable 
that  the  economic  aims  predominate.  These  aims  are 
those  of  the  governing  classes  of  all  the  countries  in 
question,  and  especially  are  they  those  of  the  men  who 
caused  the  war — the  governing  classes  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  So  we  may  fairly  remark  that 
the  gigantic  social  phenomenon  presented  by  the 
present  conflict  confirms  the  theory  of  historic  material- 
ism, as  Karl  Marx  named  it:  a  theory  which  we  should 
prefer  to  call  that  of  historic  economism. 

In   this   war   there   is   certainly   a   conflict   between 
national  fractions  of  the  capitalist  class  for  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  world.     For  this  exploitation  the  possession 
of  trade  routes  was  necessary:  the  sea  routes,  which  are 
in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  the  land  routes  to  the 
East,  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf  (Hamburg 
to  Bagdad),  etc.     These  routes  are  necessary  for  the 
exploitation  of  the  natural  wealth  of  the  soil — mines, 
oil  wells,  etc.     The  value  of  the  products  of  the  earth 
is  revealed  only  when  they  can  be  exchanged.     And  they 
can  be  exchanged  only  by  means  of  roads,  rivers,  seas, 
and  railways.   It  was  for  the  possession  of  these  routes 
that  the  war  was  started  by  the  magnates  of  the  metal- 
lurgical industry,  allied  with  the  magnates  of  the  soil. 
Thus  in  a  certain  measure  the  war  is  only  a  war  between 
two  sections  of  the  same  social  class.     We  thus  perceive 
the  complexity  of  the  phenomena  of  human  society,  which 
involve  contrary  and  multiple  interests,  individual,  profes- 
sional, religious,  political,  moral,  economic,  and  national. 
Although  among  the  ruling  classes  economic  aims 
are  predominant,  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  mass  of 
the  peoples  at  war.     For  them  the  aims  of  the  war 
are  political  and  moral.     And  as  in  the  Western  Powers 
the  popular  masses  play  a  controlling  part,  it  follows 
that  the  aims  of  these  democracies,  regarded  as  a  whole, 
are  principally  political  and  moral. 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  307 

The  significance  of  the  aims  pursued  by  the  bel- 
ligerents underwent  a  change  of  plane  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war.  At  first,  on  the  declaration  of  hostilities, 
evolving  on  the  economic  plane,  they  were  removed 
to  the  politico-moral  plane  directly  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  was  violated,  directly  the  Belgians  began  to 
defend  their  liberty,  directly  the  Triple  Entente  ap- 
pealed to  the  principle  of  nationalities,  and  demanded 
the  destruction  of  Prussian  militarism.  The  war  ceased 
to  be  a  war  between  enemy  clans  of  the  same  capitalist 
class,  to  become  a  war  of  nations.  It  became  the  con- 
flict of  the  autocracies  against  the  democracies,  of 
liberty  against  authority.  It  has  become  a  struggle 
between  two  principles. 

The  question  which  now  confronts  all  humanity  is 
this:  is  the  individual  to  remain  free  to  develop  himself 
fully  and  freely,  as,  in  differing  degrees,  the  various 
Western  democracies  permit  him  to  do,  or  is  he  to  be 
the  slave  of  the  State,  transformed  by  the  latter  into 
a  tool,  a  machine  ?  Is  the  individual,  is  the  people, 
made  for  the  Government,  or  is  the  Government  made 
for  the  people,  for  the  individual  ?  We  are  witnessing 
the  conflict  between  these  two  conceptions  of  life. 

It  is  idle  to  object  that  the  Russian  autocracy  was 
allied  to  the  Western  democracies.  Circumstances,  in 
provoking  this  alliance,  were  stronger  than  the  interests 
of  caste.  The  Russian  autocracy  was  in  reality  fighting 
against  itself  in  fighting  the  Central  Empires.  Caste 
interest  would  logically  have  demanded  an  alliance  with 
Imperial  Germany.  As  a  result  of  the  proper  com- 
prehension of  this  interest  there  was,  in  the  Govern- 
mental circles  of  Russia,  a  pro-German  party  of  con- 
siderable strength.  This  party  was  the  most  con- 
servative and  reactionary  section  of  the  ruling  caste. 
We  have  seen  Ministers  recommending  a  separate  peace. 
We  have  even  seen  Generals  and  other  officers,  of 
superior  or  subaltern  rank,  betraying  their  country  to 


808          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

bring  about  a  German  victory;  for,  as  they  declared 
before  the  court-martial  which  condemned  them  to 
death  by  hanging,  "  it  is  to  the  interest  of  Russia  to  be 
defeated,  since  she  is  the  ally  of  the  Western  demo- 
cracies; the  defeat  of  Germany  would  mean  the  defeat 
of  autocracy."  This  view  is  absolutely  correct;  and  it 
was  not  one  of  the  least  curious  spectacles  of  this  war  to 
witness  the  two  autocratic  Powers  of  Europe  mutually 
exhausting  and  destroying  one  another,  thereby  op- 
posing the  will  of  their  governing  classes,  by  favouring 
the  spread  and  the  progress  of  democracy. 

***** 
This  conflict  between  the  principles  of  liberty  and 
authority  is  of  extreme  sociological  interest.  Even  in 
those  countries  which  are  fighting  for  liberty,  which 
invoke  the  love  of  liberty,  we  have  observed  Govern- 
mental manoeuvres  of  an  autocratic  tendency,  and 
conservative  attempts  in  restraint  of  liberty.  The 
power  of  the  State  is  seen  to  be  crushingly  great.  The 
individual  has  disappeared  before  the  collectivity.  But 
the  interests  of  the  collectivity  are  not  in  the  hands  of 
the  collectivities  themselves.  They  are  looked  after 
by  delegates  who  tend  to  form  regular  oligarchies,  and 
this  is  the  great  danger  incurred  by  the  democracies, 
whose  foundation  should  be  the  liberty  of  the  individual. 
We  must  therefore  deduce  from  these  facts  the 
following  lesson:  it  is  to  the  interest  of  the  peoples  to 
limit  the  power  of  the  State,  if  they  wish  to  guard  against 
the  danger  of  the  progressive  disappearance  of  their 
liberties.  To  this  end  the  peoples  must  assume  the 
management  of  their  own  affairs,  and  must  settle  them 
for  themselves. 

"  Que  si  quelque  affaire  t'importe 
Ne  la  fais  point  par  procureur." 

"If  an  affair  is  of  importance  to  you,  don't  settle  it 
by  attorney,"  says  the  worthy  La  Fontaine.  This  wise 
moral  is  not  applicable  to  the  great  centralized  States. 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR  809 

These  latter  aspire  to  autocratic  and  bureaucratic 
methods  of  government.  The  result  is  a  policy  of  con- 
quest by  war.  This  process  tends  to  the  formation  of 
a  single  homogeneous  nation,  produced  by  the  absorption 
of  a  crowd  of  small  heterogeneous  nationalities.  In  this 
centralized  whole  there  is  a  tendency  for  its  organiza- 
tion to  be  based  on  the  division  of  labour  and  a  strict 
specialization.  This  organization  is  inevitable,  for  it 
alone  permits  of  the  maintenance  of  great  empires. 
But  this  process  is  accomplished  only  to  the  detriment 
of  individual  liberty,  and  consequently  to  the  detriment 
of  the  collectivities,  which  are  deprived  of  the  many 
beneficent  consequences  of  liberty. 

It  is  to  the  interest  of  individuals,  and  hence  of  the 
peoples,  to  oppose  the  process  of  centralization,  and  to 
replace  it  by  the  process  of  free  federation  of  small 
national  and  ethnical  groups.  The  smaller  a  political 
group,  the  more  readily  may  liberty  maintain  itself  in 
that  group,  and  increase  in  all  its  vigour;  and  the  more 
readily  does  material  and  intellectual  impulse  follow  a 
free  course.  If  men  wish  this  war  to  have  been  of 
some  little  service  to  humanity,  they  must  learn  from 
it  the  great  lesson  of  liberty,  and  must  derive  from  it 
the  determination  to  govern  themselves  as  free  men. 

There  ought,  in  truth,  to  be  no  difficulty  in  learning 
this  lesson,  for  this  war  has  revealed,  even  to  the  eyes 
of  the  most  prejudiced,  the  complete  incapacity  of  the 
ruling  classes  of  whatever  country  to  rule  the  people 
wisely.  They  claim  to  be  the  shepherds  of  the  popular 
flocks,  and  they  have  led  their  flocks  to  death  and 
devastation.  Indeed,  they  either  prepared,  or  were 
incapable  of  avoiding,  the  cataclysm  which  is  ravaging 
the  world.  They  are  truly  bankrupt.  In  fact,  however 
imperfectly  the  human  flocks  might  control  themselves 
without  shepherds,  they  could  hardly  be  more  foolishly 
led  than  they  have  been  by  these  shepherds. 

The  moral  which  naturally  arises  from  these  facts  is 


810          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

this:  that  the  peoples  must  liberate  themselves  from 
the  governing  classes,  in  prder  to  govern  themselves. 
They  must  not  do  this  by  means  of  delegates,  for  these 
delegates  are  more  or  less  liable  to  form  camarillas, 
which  insensibly  end  by  governing  in  their  own  personal 
interest,  or  in  the  interest  of  their  clan.  What  is  needed 
is  that  every  man  shall  take  into  his  own  hands  the 
management  of  his  political  affairs,  just  as  he  manages 
his  personal  affairs.  And  this  is  only  possible  if  the 
imperialistic  system  of  the  great  Empires  is  abandoned 
in  favour  of  the  federalist  system  of  small  groups  and 
small  districts.  This  is  the  only  political  system  which 
permits  of  the  real  liberty  of  the  individual  and  the 
group,  together  with  the  free  co-operation  of  every 
citizen  in  the  increasing  welfare  of  the  collectivity  and 
the  individual. 


CHAPTER  XI 

RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR:  A  NATIONAL  SETTLEMENT 

Biological  conditions — Diminution  of  the  male  population — Mortality 
in  the  civil  population — Falling-off  of  the  birth-rate — Increase  of 
infant  mortality — Humanity  suffers  in  its  biological  qualities — 
The  war  is  an  instrument  of  an  inverse  natural  selection — Nervous 
tension  and  mental  disequilibrium  — Effects  of  overwork :  stupidity 
of  suspending  the  laws  protecting  the  worker — The  effect  upon 
children — The  different  effect  of  the  war  on  the  two  sexes — The 
superiority  of  the  female  sex  from  the  collective  point  of  view — 
The  social  and  legal  consequences  of  the  numerical  predominance 
of  the  female  sex — The  necessity  for  social  amelioration :  hygiene, 
education,  etc. 

Political  conditions — Wars  result  from  the  blunders  of  diploma- 
tists— Peace  must  be  the  work  of  the  peoples — The  victory  of  the 
Quintuple  Alliance  is  inevitable — Annexations  would  be  acts  of 
madness — The  basis  of  political  settlement  should  be  in  accord- 
ance with  the  example  of  liberty  and  equality  set  by  nature — 
The  nature  of  national  groups — Their  essential  basis  is  community 
of  will — The  national  policy — The  State  and  nationality :  their  fun- 
damental opposition — The  foundations  of  nationality  are  liberty 
and  equality — The  referendum — Small  national  groups  make  for 
intensity  of  life  —  Heterogeneity  increases  the  production  of 
individuals. 

The  Polish  problem  is  an  international  problem — The  reconstitu- 
tion  of  an  independent  Poland — The  Jewish  question  also  is  inter- 
national— The  problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Schleswig  and  the 
popular  referendum — The  disappearance  of  the  centralized  and 
militarized  German  Empire — The  free  federation  of  the  Germanic 
groups — The  disappearance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire — 
The  Slav  nationalities  of  the  North:  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Slovachia 
— The  Slav  nationalities  of  the  South:  Croatia,  Slavonia,  Syrmia, 
etc. — Referendum  and  federation — Transylvania  and  a  portion 
of  Banat  should  go  to  Rumania — Independent  Hungary — The 
nationalities  of  the  Ukraine,  Lithuania,  and  Finland,  and  the 
Russian  Empire — Bulgaria — The  problems  of  Macedonia,  Thrace, 
Asia  Minor :  their  solution  on  the  basis  of  liberty  and  equality — 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles  neutralized  and  autonomous 
— The  colonies  of  the  German  Empire  divided  among  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Belgium  on  conditions  to  be  determined. 

The  political  consequences  of  such  a  territorial  settlement  on  the 
basis  of  liberty  and  equality. 

311 


312          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

LIKE  every  phase  of  the  life  of  living  creatures, 
this  war,  whatever  its  duration,  will  have  an  end. 
Let  us,  then,  ask  ourselves  what  will  be  the  bio- 
logical, economic,  and  general  conditions  of  the  world 
at  the  termination  of  the  world- war.     To  begin  with, 
let  us  glance  at  the  biological  conditions. 

Belligerent  humanity,  like  neutral  humanity,  will  be 
poorer  in  human  beings  of  both  sexes.  The  mortality 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  an  important  factor.  After 
two  and  a  half  years  of  war  more  than  seven  and  a  half 
millions  of  human  beings  have  been  killed  or  have  died 
of  sickness — that  is,  a  larger  number  than  the  popula- 
tion of  Greater  London  or  the  whole  of  Belgium.  Nor 
must  we  forget  the  considerable  mortality  among  the 
prisoners  of  war,  especially  in  Germany,  and  the  great 
prevalence  of  sickness  among  them.  This  is  due  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  German  rulers  treat  their 
British,  French,  Russian,  Belgian,  and  Serbian  prisoners. 
Their  food  has  been  insufficient  in  quality  and  quantity ; 
there  has  been  a  lack  of  medical  attention  and  of  medi- 
cines; and  the  punishments  are  barbarous  (see  the 
official  English  report  on  the  camp  at  Wittenberg,  the 
official  report  of  Dr.  Tayler  on  the  Ruhleben  camp, 
etc.).  Let  us  add  to  these  losses  the  deaths  among 
valetudinarians  of  both  sexes  which  have  occurred 
during  the  war;  for  we  find  that  the  death-rate  among 
the  civilian  population  is  higher  than  in  time  of 
peace. 

The  war  causes  physical  suffering  to  the  non-com- 
batants. Whole  populations  have  been  subjected  to 
the  horrors  of  invasion  and  famine,  and  the  epidemics 
which  follow  conquests.  Other  populations  are  forced 
to  limit  their  consumption  of  foodstuffs  by  reason  of 
the  blockade.  Everywhere  it  has  been  necessary  to 
lower  the  usual  standard  of  living,  even  though  salaries 
and  wages  are  high,  because  of  a  scarcity  of  products. 
Thus,  in  England,^the  country^least  affected  of  all  the 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  313 

belligerents,  the  cost  of  living,  as  a  whole,  was  in  April, 
1916,  40  per  cent,  higher  than  it  was  before  the  war. 
And  if  we  consider  foodstuffs  only,  the  increase  in  the 
towns  is  over  70  per  cent.  Everywhere  it  is  the  pro- 
fessional and  lower  middle  classes  that  have  been  forced 
more  particularly  to  reduce  their  standard  of  living; 
for  their  salaries  or  incomes  as  lawyers,  schoolmasters, 
clerks,  tradesmen,  small  investors,  etc.,  have  often  been 
reduced  instead  of  being  augmented. 

The  activities  of  the  submarines,  the  desire  of  the 
governing  classes  to  limit  imports  in  order  to  diminish 
the  export  of  gold,  the  utilization  of  merchant  vessels 
as  transports  of  war,  have  forced  all  Europe  to  limit 
the  consumption  of  food,  for  many  products  have  been 
lacking.  The  rise  of  prices  has  been  general,  in  neutral 
countries  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  the  Allies  of  the 
Entente.  The  position  of  the  Central  Empires  is  still 
more  serious;  famine  is  at  their  door. 

There  are,  therefore,  many  causes  at  work  to  enfeeble 
the  nations.  Moreover,  we  must  add  to  these  the 
pressure  of  events  upon  the  human  mind,  which  is 
causing  a  permanent  nervous  tension  which  tends  to 
destroy  the  weakly  and  those  whose  circulatory  system 
is  imperfect.  The  present  period  is  disastrous  to  all 
persons  with  weak  hearts.  This  explains  the  relative 
increase  of  the  mortality  of  both  sexes  among  the 
civilian  population. 

To  these  losses  we  must  add  a  diminished  birth-rate 
and  a  high  infant  mortality.  This  phenomenon  is 
occurring  in  all  the  countries  at  war,  and  in  neutral 
countries  also.  One  of  the  causes  of  this  diminished 
natality  in  neutral  countries  is  the  departure  of 
foreigners  belonging  to  combatant  nations.  The  males 
return  to  their  native  countries,  and  therefore  cease  to 
exist  as  progenitors  for  the  neutral  countries.  The 
departure  of  the  men  for  the  war  is  not  the  only 
reason  for  the  diminished  number  of  conceptions.  Self- 


314          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

restraint  is  also  a  cause.  This  phenomenon  is  obviously 
occurring  in  those  neutral  countries  in  which  the  births 
are  diminishing,  although  the  males  are  not  called  to 
the  war.  It  would  seem  as  though  men  and  women 
were  refusing  to  provide  fresh  fodder  for  cannon.  In 
all  the  belligerent  countries  the  natality  has  greatly 
diminished.  In  Germany  we  have  to  record  an  average 
decrease  of  20  per  cent,  for  1915.  In  1916  this  per- 
centage increased,  on  account  of  the  increasing  losses 
of  men.  In  Hungary  a  statistician  has  shown  that  the 
same  thing  is  happening  there.  We  may  affirm  with 
certainty  that  it  is  happening  also  in  Great  Britain  and 
in  France.  The  ruling  classes  are  uneasy  about  the 
matter ;  they  have  reared  human  herds  as  stock-breeders 
raise  herds!  of  cattle  or  flocks  of  sheep.  Soldiers  have 
been  given  leave,  so  that  they  might  go  home  in  order 
to  accomplish  their  duties  as  progenitors,  just  as  they 
are  accomplishing  their  duty  as  defenders  in  the  trenches. 
Reproduction  has  become  a  collective  duty,  a  State 
function.  Let  us  note  in  passing  the  tendency  to 
transform  the  individual  into  a  gregarious  beast.  The 
ruling  classes  in  Germany,  for  example,  have  already 
commenced  to  modify  the  laws  concerning  the  sexes, 
in  order  to  check  the  diminution  of  the  birth-rate.  But 
it  does  not  seem  that  this  can  have  any  influence. 

Besides  the  diminution  of  the  birth-rate,  we  find  an 
increase  of  infantile  mortality,  an  increase  of  still-born 
children,  without  speaking  of  conceptions  which  come 
to  nothing.  The  causes  of  these  phenomena  are  various. 
The  prevailing  mental  tension  necessarily  reacts  on  the 
mothers,  has  a  disturbing  effect  on  pregnancy,  and 
produces  natural  abortions.  Let  us  note  also  that  the 
highest  natality  is  found  among  the  poor,  especially 
among  the  thriftless  labouring  classes.  Now  the  women 
of  these  classes  are  all  more  or  less  occupied  in  masculine 
labour,  and  are  even  working  overtime,  owing  to  the 
necessities  of  production  and  the  lack  of  hands.  Under 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  315 

these  conditions  pregnancy  cannot  reach  its  full  term 
without  accident.  The  children,  once  born,  receive  less 
care  than  in  ordinary  times,  and  in  the  countries 
besieged,  such  as  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  or 
devastated  and  invaded,  such  as  Belgium,  Poland, 
Serbia,  and  the  north  of  France,  the  children  do  not 
obtain  sufficient  milk.  For  all  these  reasons  the  in- 
fantile mortality  is  considerable. 

We  shall  therefore  have,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  a 
humanity  diminished  in  numbers.  What  will  this  loss 
amount  to  ?  The  figures  cannot  be  established  with 
certainty,  for  we  do  not  know,  and  doubtless  we  never 
shall  know,  the  number  of  dead  in  the  invaded  countries, 
such  as  Poland,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro,  or  the  number 
of  Armenians  massacred.  But  we  may,  without  ex- 
ceeding the  truth,  estimate  these  numbers  at  about 
thirteen  millions  in  the  early  months  of  1917. 

At  the  end  of  the  war,  humanity  will  therefore  have 
diminished  in  quantity;  but  it  will  also  have  diminished 
in  biological  quality.  It  is  youth  which  will  have  paid 
the  greatest  tribute  to  the  Moloch  of  war.  Now  it  is 
youth  which  possesses  the  greatest  creative  potentiality. 
It  follows  that  the  progenitors  left  alive  will  mostly  be 
more  or  less  aged,  more  or  less  enfeebled  by  the  fatigues 
of  war  or  by  ill-treatment  as  prisoners,  or  even  more 
or  less  infirm.  Among  the  killed  will  certainly  be  the 
most  energetic,  and  often  the  best  from  the  moral  and 
intellectual  point  of  view.  In  fact,  those  who  have  the 
sense  of  sociality  highly  developed  risk  themselves  for 
the  collectivity  to  a  greater  extent  than  those  who 
have  remained  in  a  plane  of  narrow  egoism  and  in- 
dividualistic isolation.  Thus,  of  the  male  progenitors, 
the  war  will  have  caused  the  disappearance  of  the  best. 
It  will  have  caused  a  selection  of  an  inverse  character. 
The  same  thing  is  happening  in  a  less  degree  in  the 
case  of  the  female  genitrix,  on  account  of  excessive  and 
intensive  labour,  the  nervous  tension  caused  by  the 


316          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

anxieties  of  life,  and  the  anguish  due  to  uncertainty  as 
to  the  fate  of  the  male  combatants. 

In  all  the  belligerent  nations,  and  even  in  some 
neutral  countries,  there  is  an  extreme  nervous  tension 
which  results  in  neurasthenia,  and  tends  to  produce 
mental  disequilibrium.  Cases  of  insanity  are  every- 
where becoming  more  frequent,  among  soldiers  as  well 
as  among  civilians  of  both  sexes.  Nervous  hyper- 
excitation  is  general — a  very  unfavourable  condition  for 
progenitors. 

Not  only  does  the  war  cause  a  deterioration  of  the 
biological  qualities  of  the  adult:  it  produces  the  same 
effect  in  children,  thanks  to  the  ignorance  and  heed- 
lessness  of  the  governing  classes,  who  have  everywhere 
suspended  the  laws  prohibiting  child  labour.  Here  is 
a  piece  of  stupidity  so  stupendous  that  the  thinker  is 
at  first  struck  with  amazement.  This  suspension  of 
the  laws  protecting  child  labour  shows  that  the  govern- 
ing classes  have  never  grasped  the  why  and  wherefore 
of  their  existence.  They  have  never  grasped  the  utility 
of  these  laws  to  the  collectivity,  and  this  because  they 
have  not,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  any  knowledge 
of  the  science  of  life,  of  hygiene  or  physiology.  They 
are  soldiers,  lawyers,  very  often  manufacturers,  or 
business  men,  or  landowners — they  are  not  scientists  or 
thinkers.  Humanity  pays  dearly  for  its  stupidity  in 
allowing  the  nations  to  be  governed  by  ignorant  men. 
However  this  may  be,  the  children  of  the  proletariat, 
whether  urban  or  rural,  are  working  in  the  factories 
and  workshops,  or  in  the  fields,  and  the  result  is  the 
physical  enfeeblement,  the  intellectual  and  moral 
impoverishment  of  the  individual  child.  His  time  at 
school  is  short,  hence  a  loss  of  knowledge. 

Children  at  this  moment  are  living  in  an  atmosphere 
of  warlike  violence.  They  think,  naturally,  of  nothing 
but  the  war;  they  read,  speak,  and  hear  of  nothing  but 
the  war — that  is,  of  slaughter.  The  result  is  a  develop- 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  317 

ment  of  the  spirit  of  violence.  This  is  inevitable,  for 
the  most  powerful  element  of  education  is  example. 
Whether  it  be  good  or  bad,  example  is  contagious, 
because  man  is  an  imitative  animal.  The  child  tries 
to  imitate  the  adult;  so  that  in  this  period  of  violence 
we  find  that  the  criminal  offences  committed  by  children 
are  considerably  on  the  increase  everywhere — in  Ger- 
many, France,  and  Great  Britain.  The  diminution  of 
family  supervision  certainly  counts  for  something,  but 
for  much  less  than  the  jurists  would  be  tempted  to 
suppose.  The  principal  cause  is  the  atmosphere  of 
war  which  envelops  the  belligerent  countries.  There 
is  an  actual  cerebral  intoxication  abroad,  which  will 
disappear  with  its  cause:  the  war. 

The  foregoing  analysis  of  the  biological  conditions 
likely  to  prevail  at  the  end  of  the  war  shows  that 
humanity  will  then  be  impoverished  both  in  quantity 
and  in  quality,  as  regards  both  children  and  adults. 
This  deterioration  will  not  equally  affect  the  two  sexes. 
There  will  be,  among  the  dead  and  disabled,  far  more 
men  than  women.  The  women  will  predominate  over 
the  men  in  the  matter  of  numbers.  This  fact  will 
produce  curious  results.  Let  us  regard  the  phenomenon 
from  the  physiological  and  philosophical  point  of  view: 
we  are  led  to  perceive  in  it  an  argument  against  the 
equality  of  the  sexes,  and  an  argument  in  favour  of  the 
superiority  of  the  female  sex. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  fortunate  for  the  human 
collectivity  that  women  are  being  destroyed  in  smaller 
numbers  than  men,  for  this  permits  of  a  more  rapid 
recuperation  of  our  losses.  If  male  humanity,  save  a 
few  specimens,  were  to  disappear,  the  human  race 
would  quickly  re-establish  itself,  thanks  to  an  abundance 
of  the  female  sex.  On  the  other  hand,  if  all  the  men 
survived,  and  all  but  a  few  women  disappeared, 
humanity  would  take  a  very  long  time  to  replenish 
itself,  on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  women.  We  see 


318          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

here  the  importance  of  the  feminine  element  from  the 
collective  point  of  view:  an  importance  greater  than 
that  of  the  masculine  element. 

Various  social  consequences  will  result  from  the 
numerical  predominance  of  women  over  men.  A  larger 
proportion  of  women  will  be  doomed  to  celibacy.  On 
the  one  hand  this  will  result  in  greater  activity  on  the 
part  of  the  feminists,  because  a  number  of  women  will 
expend  their  energies  in  such  activities  who  would,  if 
married  and  mothers,  have  devoted  themselves  to  their 
husbands  and  families.  On  the  other  hand,  it  will 
result  in  a  more  intense  sexual  conflict  for  the  legitimate 
satisfaction  of  physiological  needs,  and  it  might  very 
well  result  in  reforms  of  the  legal  and  social  relations 
between  the  sexes.  No  doubt  either  the  marriage  laws 
or  morality  will  be  modified  in  the  direction  of  greater 
sexual  liberty  for  the  woman,  and  a  more  or  less  com- 
plete disappearance  of  the  legal  differences  between 
legitimate  and  illegitimate  children. 

Humanity  being  impoverished  in  quantity  and 
quality,  it  will  be  of  vital  importance  to  remedy  this 
impoverishment.  Already  some  thinkers  have  turned 
their  attention  to  the  subject.  Thus,  in  Germany  a 
German  Repopulation  Society  has  been  founded.  In 
France,  even  before  the  war,  there  was  a  Depopulation 
Committee.  In  England  the  Press  is  discussing  the 
question. 

The  diminution  of  the  birth-rate  was  general  in  all 
countries  before  the  war;  the  latter  has  only  accentuated 
a  general  tendencj^.  And  one  must  not  reckon  that  the 
birth-rate  of  the  different  nations  will  return  to  what 
it  was  before  tLo  war.  It  is  in  the  lower  classes  that 
the  birth-rate  is  highest.  The  higher  we  ascend  in  the 
scale  of  the  classes,  the  more  we  pemive  a  deliberate 
foresight,  a  voluntary  restriction  of  conception.  This 
restriction  is  everywhere  tending  to  continue  and 
increase.  It  is  a  result  of  the  spread  of  knowledge,  of 


319 

the  conditions  of  well-being  and  the  spirit  of  reflection, 
hence  of  foresight. 

The  war  will  be  a  terrible  lesson,  and  it  will  no  doubt 
stimulate  the  voluntary  limitation  of  births.  To 
remedy  the  impoverishment  of  the  human  race  we  shall 
have  to  resort  to  hygiene;  the  improvement  of  sanitary 
conditions  in  rural  districts,  towns,  factories,  and  houses; 
the  improvement  of  the  alimentary  habits  of  the  race; 
the  care  of  mothers  and  children;  and  the  suppression 
of  alcohol.  In  short,  we  must,  if  men  display  the  least 
wisdom,  seek  to  prolong  life,  to  diminish  the  causes  of 
death  and  sickness.  These  are  the  only  means  by  which 
the  nations  can  in  part  recuperate  from  their  losses  in 
brains  and  arms.  This  aim — the  amelioration  of  the 
conditions  of  life  from  the  physical,  intellectual,  and 
moral  point  of  view — can  only  be  achieved  by  means 
of  a  greater  social  expenditure  than  was  devoted  to  it 
before  the  war.  Here  we  come  to  a  point  of  great 
importance,  for  it  is  intimately  connected  with  the 
economic  conditions  which  will  prevail  after  the  war, 
of  which  we  shall  speak  later. 

***** 
This  long  war  will  come  to  an  end:  consequently  the 
conditions  of  peace  must  be  determined.  The  essential 
element  which  these  conditions  must  present  is  that 
they  must  not  contain  the  seeds  of  future  war.  The 
present  butchery  is  great  enough,  and  ruinous  enough, 
to  awaken  in  the  minds  of  all  the  nations  the  desire 
and  the  determination  that  this  shall  be  the  last 
war.  Well,  if  such  is  the  determination  of  all  the 
belligerents,  the  peace  must  not  be  made  by  the  diplo- 
matists, but  by  the  peoples  themselves.  As  a  famous 
French  historian,  M.  Ernest  Lavisse,  has  written:  "  The 
war  cannot  end  in  a  treaty  of  peace  drawn  up  by  diplo- 
matists, for  this  would  be  a  miserable  ending  to  a  great 
drama." 

The  war  has  revealed  the  vanity  of  treaties  between 


320          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

nations,  and  conventions,  and  international  laws, 
because  these  treaties  and  laws  are  without  sanctions. 
It  is  of  importance,  for  the  future  of  humanity,  that 
the  conventions  which  regulate  the  political  status  of 
the  world  shall  have  sanctions  behind  them,  or,  rather, 
shall  be  established  on  foundations  so  firm  and  so  true 
that  these  very  sanctions  will  be  superfluous. 

It  was  the  diplomatists  who,  during  the  last  two 
centuries,  divided  Europe  into  States,  and  this  in  so 
clumsy  a  fashion  that  they  invariably  increased,  so  to 
speak,  the  motives  and  the  causes  of  conflict.  Not  to 
them,  then,  must  the  peoples  confide  the  task  of  estab- 
lishing the  clauses  of  the  peace  treaty.  This  must  be 
the  task  of  the  sociologists,  geographers,  economists,  poli- 
ticians, and  thinkers  of  all  the  nations  of  earth.  The 
task  is  solemn  enough  to  necessitate  the  employment  of 
the  greatest  human  intelligence  and  the  greatest  human 
knowledge.  If  the  peoples  are  so  ignorant  of  their 
interests  as  to  leave  this  task  of  determining  the  con- 
ditions of  peace  to  the  diplomatists,  or  even  to  the 
jurists,  the  work  will  have  to  be  done  again  in  less  than 
half  a  century. 

There  is  only  one  logical  and  inevitable  end  to  the 
war:  the  victory  of  the  Western  Allies  of  the  Fivefold 
Entente.  However,  as  a  matter  of  objectivity,  let  us 
for  a  moment  admit  the  hypothesis  of  the  victory  of 
the  Central  Powers.  In  this  case  the  conditions  of 
peace  would  be  very  simple:  they  would  entail  the 
creation  of  a  vast  centralized  Empire  with  small  vassal 
kingdoms  gravitating  about  it.  No  nation  would  exist 
save  the  conquering  nation.  It  would  mean  the  crush- 
ing of  all  by  the  stronger  party.  We  will  not  insist  on 
this  hypothesis,  for  the  war  cannot  end  in  the  victory 
of  Germany.  The  victory  will  inevitably  fall  to  the 
Western  Powers.  Peace  will  then  become  a  complex 
thing;  even  extremely  complex.  It  will  be  complex 
because  the  Allied  Governments  have  declared  that 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  321 

they  wish  to  establish  peace  upon  an  absolute  respect 
for  the  small  nationalities,  and  because  the  Western 
peoples  have  expressed  the  same  desire.  Peace  can 
only  be  established  on  the  democratic  foundations  of 
liberty,  and  not  on  autocratic  foundations. 

Annexations  of  territory  in  Europe  would  constitute 
veritable  acts  of  madness.  There  are  those,  however, 
who  recommend  them,  for  Belgium  as  well  as  for  France. 
If  we  inquire  who  they  are,  we  find  they  are  the  con- 
servative, reactionary,  and  anti-democratic  elements. 
In  their  propaganda  in  favour  of  annexation  they  are 
consistent  with  themselves,  for,  being  partisans  of 
militarism  and  international  hatred,  they  naturally 
want  a  peace  which  will  allow  militarism  and  the  causes 
of  international  hatred  to  survive.  Sometimes,  too, 
their  desires  are  related  to  internal  and  political  aims. 
Thus,  the  annexation  to  Belgium  of  the  German  provinces 
of  the  Rhine  would  reinforce  the  Belgian  Catholic  party, 
which  would  make  it  possible  for  that  party  to  main- 
tain the  Catholic  Government  which,  as  we  know,  did 
not  before  the  war  represent  the  majority  of  Belgian 
electors.  The  annexation  of  the  Rhine  provinces  to 
Belgium  and  France  would  be  sheer  madness,  because 
it  would  do  violence  to  the  will  of  the  annexed  peoples, 
who  would  share  neither  the  customs  nor  the  language 
of  the  country  which  annexed  them.  There  would 
therefore  be  lasting  elements  of  disturbance,  friction, 
discontent,  and  hatred,  which  in  the  future  would 
resolve  themselves  into  fresh  conflicts.  But  this  an- 
nexation in  the  West  would  also  present  a  serious 
political  danger,  since  it  would  authorize  similar 
annexations  in  the  East  by  Russia. 

Like  every  autocratic  empire,  the  Russian  Empire  is 
a  vampire  State  which  craves  continually  to  enlarge 
itself  by  absorbing  the  territories  and  peoples.  It  is 
a  menace  to  the  democracies,*  and  these  must  take  care 

*  Written  before  the  Revolution  of  1917. 

21 


822          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  prevent  the  realization  of  its  projects.  It  would  be 
a  stupendous  political  blunder  to  give  autocratic  Russia 
an  appearance  of  justification  in  her  desires  for  annexa- 
tion. This  blunder  must  not  be  committed:  conse- 
quently neither  Great  Britain  nor  France  nor  Belgium 
must  annex  any  of  the  European  territories  of  Germany. 
The  democratic  Powers  must  set  an  example  to  Russia,  for 
she  would  then  find  it  difficult  not  to  follow  their  example, 
difficult  to  demand  annexations.  Let  us  never  forget 
that  example  is  the  most  effective  method  of  teaching. 

We  hope,  then,  that  the  nations  will  refuse  to  make 
annexations,  and  that  they  will  demand  a  peace  built 
upon  a  firm  democratic  foundation,  the  only  foundation 
that  can  give  a  lasting  and  even  final  peace.  What 
shall  be  the  basis  of  this  foundation  ? 

***** 

In  order  to  discover  this  basis,  let  us  consider  a 
moment  the  world  of  nature,  the  formation  of  soils, 
plants,  and  animals.  We  see  that  everything  is  com- 
posed of  individuals — that  is  to  say,  of  plainly  defined 
aggregates  of  cells,  themselves  plainly  defined.  And 
we  perceive  that  each  element  of  the  aggregate  is  free. 
Each  individual  possesses  a  liberty  which  is  limited 
only  by  the  liberties  of  the  neighbouring  individuals, 
all  equal  among  themselves.  Nature  teaches,  to  him 
that  observes  her,  a  lesson  of  equality  and  a  lesson  of 
solidarity  and  fraternity.  The  naturalist  can  find  no 
master  in  nature;  he  finds  only  equal  individuals — 
that  is  to  say,  equivalent  individuals;  we  do  not  say 
identical;  having  various  functions,  and  being  adapted 
to  these  functions.  Nature  teaches  democracy — that 
is,  the  government  of  all  by  all.  It  is  this  teaching 
which  men  should  follow  in  the  establishment  of  their 
conditions  of  peace,  if  they  truly  desire  a  lasting  peace. 
They  can  follow  this  essential  teaching  of  nature, 
because  the  English  and  the  French,  on  the  cessation 
of  hostilities,  will  be  the  real  masters  of  the  situation. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  323 

If  the  autocratic  Russian  Government  wished  to  oppose 
this  policy,  its  opposition  would  quickly  be  annihilated, 
either  by  the  Russian  people  itself,  or  by  the  financial 
power  of  the  Western  peoples. 

For  the  rest,  the  political  remodelling  of  the  globe 
could  not  be  accomplished  unless  the  neutral  nations 
as  a  whole  took  part  in  it.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  the 
Western  nations  to  summon  them  to  take  part  in  it, 
for  they  are  democracies,  and  in  the  establishment  of 
the  conditions  of  peace  their  influence  can  only  be 
exerted  in  a  democratic  sense. 

We  must  therefore  follow  the  teaching  of  nature, 
and  in  the  political  remodelling  of  the  globe  we  must 
take  as  basis  the  individual,  with  his  enjoyment  of 
liberty  and  equality.  Equal  individuals  group  them- 
selves freely  in  free  collectivities  according  to  their 
affinities  and  similitudes,  their  languages,  manners, 
customs,  religion,  and  traditions.  Thus  are  formed 
what  are  known  as  nationalities.  Very  often  the 
dissimilarity  of  habits,  tongues,  and  religions  forms  no 
obstacle  to  the  aggregation  of  individuals  as  free  groups, 
if  their  traditions  and  aspirations  are  in  common.  There 
is  a  Swiss  nationality,  although  there  are  Swiss  whose 
language  and  habits  are  German,  others  whose  language 
and  habits  are  French,  others  whose  language  and 
habits  are  Italian,  while  as  to  religion  there  are  Swiss 
Catholics,  Calvinists,  Lutherans,  etc. 

Thus  the  essential  characteristic  of  a  nationality  is 
riot  community  of  language,  habits,  and  religion.  It 
is  rather  the  community  of  will,  the  community  of  the 
individual  conscience.  I  am  not  speaking  of  race,  for 
anthropologically  speaking  European  humanity  no 
longer  reveals  any  races,  so  intermingled  have  men 
become  in  the  course  of  thousands  of  years.  The 
foundation  of  nationality  is  the  desire  of  individuals 
to  form  themselves  into  a  free,  independent,  and  auto- 
nomous group.  We  shall  encounter  this  desire  in  all 


824          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

individuals  and  in  all  times.  It  existed  from  the  free 
formation  of  the  first  human  groups,  and  in  the  forma- 
tion of  great  autocratic  States  also  this  desire  played 
its  part,  but  a  much  less  important  part  than  in  the 
formation  of  the  free  nations. 

Although  the  idea  of  nationality  dates  back  far  into 
the  past  of  humanity,  the  politics  of  nationality  is  of 
much  more  recent  date.  Only  when  liberty  had  de- 
veloped in  the  world  could  the  politics  of  nationality 
appear  and  flourish.  It  is  with  the  great  French 
Revolution  of  1789,  with  its  motto  of  Liberty,  Equality, 
Fraternity,  or  Solidarity,  that  we  see  it  dawning.  In 
the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  it  evolved  in 
practice  as  well  as  in  doctrine  and  theory.  Gradually 
those  peoples,  whom  the  will  of  potentates  had  divided 
into  scattered  fragments,  and  maintained  in  a  political 
servitude  of  greater  or  less  severity,  recovered  the  con- 
sciousness of  their  national  aspirations,  and  developed 
within  themselves  the  desire  to  form  a  free  and  autono- 
mous nation.  The  ideal  matured,  following  a  curve 
parallel  to  the  curves  of  the  growth  of  the  ideal  of 
liberty  and  democracy. 

Thus,  in  1900,  at  the  time  of  the  great  series  of  Inter- 
national Congresses  in  Paris,  the  intellectuals  of  the 
small  nations — Norwegians,  Czechs,  Georgians,  and 
Lithuanians — conceived  the  idea  of  forming  a  society 
of  small  oppressed  nationalities  and  of  maintaining  an 
organ  in  which  their  claims  would  be  expressed.  They 
thought  of  the  international  review,  L'Humanite 
Nouvelle,  of  which  I  was  then  the  editor,  and  they 
made  me  overtures  accordingly.  I  welcomed  these 
overtures  with  delight,  for  this  was  an  effort  which  could 
but  favour  the  ideals  of  liberty,  equality,  and  solidarity 
which  were  so  dear  to  me.  Circumstances  did  not 
permit  of  the  full  realization  of  this  attempt,  but 
the  facts  show  how  the  idea  of  nationality  had  gradually 
pervaded  the  whole  of  humanity. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  825 

Nationality  is  in  opposition  to  the  State.  The  basis 
of  the  State  is  force  and  constraint.  The  basis  of 
nationality  is  liberty  and  the  free  will  of  individuals. 
The  State  may  contain  a  number  of  nationalities,  as  do 
the  autocratic  States :  the  Russian  Empire,  the  German 
Empire,  and  the  Austrian  Empire.  In  these  States  the 
attempt  to  denationalize  is  conducted  in  a  violent  and 
incessant  manner.  The  nationalities  are  not  assimilated, 
but  subjected.  The  State  is  an  artificial  organism, 
produced  by  the  will  of  a  few  individuals  which  imposes 
itself  on  masses  of  other  individuals.  The  nation  is  a 
natural  organism  resulting  from  the  common  and 
freely  expressed  will  of  the  collectivity  of  individuals. 
The  State  implies  centralization  and  hegemony ;  national- 
ity implies  federation,  and  equality  among  the  nations, 
or  Internationalism.  Switzerland,  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  to  some  extent  the  British  Empire, 
which  are  all  free  federations,  give  us  a  just  idea  of  the 
differences  between  centralized  States,  which  destroy 
nationalities,  and  free  federations,  which  conserve  and 
create  nationalities. 

The  national  policy  inevitably  implies  International- 
ism— that  is,  a  voluntary  understanding,  on  a  basis 
of  equality,  between  the  various  nations.  Just  as  in 
a  human  group  the  individual  can  develop  himself 
completely  only  if  all  the  other  members  of  the  group 
can  develop  themselves  with  like  equality  and  freedom, 
so  it  is  with  a  group  of  nations.  Oppression  always 
hampers  the  development  of  individuals,  whether 
these  individuals  are  plants,  animals,  men,  or  nations. 

The  foundations  of  nationality  are  liberty,  equality, 
and  solidarity.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  deter- 
mination of  nationalities  must  be  effected  by  the 
consultation  of  the  individuals  who  form  them — that 
is,  by  a  referendum.  On  the  other  hand,  it  results 
from  this  that  each  national  group  must  be  independent 
and  autonomous.  The  result  of  these  necessary  con- 


326          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

ditions  is  that  small  national  groups  are  preferable  to 
large  ones.  It  is  easier,  in  fact,  to  obtain  a  community 
of  interests,  habits,  language,  and  will  in  a  small  group 
than  in  one  of  considerable  dimensions.  Democracy 
is  much  easier  of  application  in  small  groups.  Life 
is  far  more  intense  in  a  small  group  than  in  a  large  one. 
It  pervades  the  whole  group,  instead  of  being  centralized 
at  one  point,  as  in  great  States. 

An  inevitable  consequence  of  the  existence  of  small 
national  groups  is  an  increase  in  the  number  of  capitals 
— that  is,  in  the  number  of  centres  of  intellectual  life. 
The  heterogeneous  organization  of  men  tends  to  develop 
the  artistic,  scientific,  and  literary  life;  homogeneity 
restrains  it.  The  great  tentacular  capitals,  such  as 
London,  Paris,  and  Berlin,  in  reality  diminish  the 
productive  power  of  the  human  mind,  because  they  tend 
to  make  it  uniform  instead  of  tending  to  differentiate 
and  diversify.  Never  have  the  great  centralized  Empires 
produced  a  harvest  of  artists,  thinkers,  scientists,  and 
producers  in  every  branch  of  human  activity  comparable 
to  that  of  the  small,  free,  autonomous  cities.  The  pro- 
cess of  centralization  is  a  process  which  makes  for  homo- 
geneity— that  is,  a  process  which  weakens  and  kills 
the  individual.  Great  men  are  born  of  small  nationali- 
ties, of  small  cities,  proud  and  free. 

Each  national  group  must  be  able  to  govern  and 
administer  itself  in  freedom,  and  to  federate  with 
its  neighbours,  in  order  to  add  the  benefits  of  free 
association  to  those  of  individual  liberty.  It  is  obvious, 
in  fact,  that  certain  conditions  of  the  life  of  the  peoples 
reveal  a  community  of  interests  binding  together  remote 
and  neighbouring  nations.  Hence  the  utility,  the  neces- 
sity of  organisms  common  to  the  same  federation  of 
peoples.  Thus  coinage,  post,  telegraphs,  telephones, 
laws  relating  to  copyright,  etc.,  may  to  great  advantage 
be  unified  into  a  larger  and  larger  body  of  federations. 
In  short,  it  is  possible  and  even  easy,  if  humanity  desires 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  327 

it,  to  profit  at  once  by  the  advantages  of  small  nationali- 
ties and  those  of  great  States.  We  can  and  should  com- 
bine, on  a  solid  foundation  of  liberty  and  equality,  the 
process  which  makes  for  heterogeneity  and  that  which 
makes  for  homogeneity. 

These  ideals,  and  the  principle  of  nationality,  should 
form  the  basis  of  territorial  settlement  on  the  conclusion 

of  peace. 

***** 

The  crux  of  the  problem  which  is  to  be  solved  is  not 
to  be  found  in  the  West,  nor  even  in  the  Balkans; 
but  in  the  East,  on  the  confines  of  the  three  Empires — 
Russian,  German,  and  Austrian.  It  is  Poland.  A 
century  ago  Napoleon  I.  used  to  say:  "  The  keystone 
of  the  European  problem  is  Poland."  To-day  it  is 
truer  than  ever. 

The  Polish  nationality,  divided  up  between  these 
Empires,  has  not  been  destroyed.  It  is  deep-rooted 
and  robust,  having  victoriously  resisted  the  Russification 
and  the  Germanization  which  its  masters  have  sought 
to  impose  upon  it.  It  is  important,  for  the  sake  of  the 
future  tranquillity  of  the  world,  that  the  Polish  national- 
ity shall  recover  its  liberty  and  independence.  The  point 
in  question  is  not  the  reconstitution  of  the  ancient 
kingdom  of  Poland,  for  this  kingdom  contained  con- 
quered populations  in  Lithuania  and  the  Ukraine; 
but  the  formation  of  the  Polish  nation  as  a  new  organism , 
freely  established  by  the  consent  of  all  the  Poles — 
that  is,  by  popular  referendum.  But  the  formation 
of  this  new  Poland  implies  the  amputation  of  portions 
of  these  Empires — the  Russian,  German,  and  Austrian 
Empires.  One  of  the  Allied  States — one  of  the  victors 
— will  be  obliged  to  consent  to  this  amputation  of 
territory  and  population,  which  it  holds  by  right  of 
conquest — that  is,  by  right  of  theft,  the  right  of  the 
stronger.  Here,  obviously,  is  a  delicate  situation, 
the  more  so  as  the  Russian  Government  is  infected  with 


328          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

officialism.  It  rules  not  in  the  interest  of  the  nation, 
but  in  the  interest  of  a  caste.  It  is  therefore  unable 
to  understand  how  far  the  reconstitution  of  the  Polish 
nation  in  full  autonomy  and  independence  would 
liberate  the  Russian  nation.  It  seems  that  the  Russian 
people,  to  judge  by  the  Imperial  Duma  and  the  Zemstvos, 
does  understand  this.  Consequently,  the  bureaucratic 
Government  may  be  deprived  of  Russian  Poland, 
either  by  the  will  of  the  delegates  elected  by  the  Russian 
people  itself,  or  by  the  will  of  other  nations. 

The  Polish  problem  is  not  a  Russo-Germanic  problem ; 
it  is  international.  It  is  the  part  of  the  other  nations — 
that  is,  of  the  British  Empire,  France,  and  Italy — to 
demand  the  solution  of  this  problem  on  lines  which  shall 
be  in  conformity  with  the  principles  which  they  have 
declared  they  are  upholding — that  is,  in  conformity 
with  the  principle  of  nationality.  In  this  way  a  Polish 
nation  would  be  formed  of  some  twenty-four  millions 
of  inhabitants,  which  would  completely  separate  the 
Russian  Empire  from  the  German  populations,  for 
Poland,  including  Dantzig,  would  extend  to  the  Baltic 
Sea.  We  must  not  have  an  autonomous  Poland  under 
the  aegis  of  the  Russian  Government,  but  a  fully  inde- 
pendent Poland;  for  if  Poland  and  Russia  were  bound 
together  as  superior  and  inferior,  their  relations  would 
be  a  source  of  continually  recurring  difficulties.  This 
would  be  the  maggot  in  the  fruit.* 

The  complete  and  actual  independence  of  Poland  is 
the  condition  sine  qua  non  of  a  final  peace.  Poland, 
being  fully  independent,  could  federate  herself  with 
the  other  national  groups  of  Slavs  which  will  necessarily 

*  I  expressed  these  ideas  to  my  auditors  at  Birkbeck  College  on 
March  4,  1916.  In  October,  1916,  the  Governments  of  Germany  and 
Austria  had  confirmed  the  principle  of  these  ideas  by  constituting 
their  kingdom  of  Poland.  The  international  nature  of  the  Polish 
problem  became  apparent  to  all  when  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy 
took  note  of  the  promise  of  the  Russian  Government.  I  have  nothing 
to  withdraw  of  what  I  said  in  March,  1916.  The  entire  independence 
of  Poland  is  the  only  solution  which  will  completely  liberate  Russia. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  329 

arise  from  this  war.  But  the  concert  of  the  world's 
Powers  must  demand  and  guarantee  the  independence 
of  Poland.  At  the  same  time  it  should  require  of  the 
Polish  people  guarantees  for  the  non-Polish  minorities 
residing  upon  the  territory  of  the  new  nation.  Thus, 
for  example,  the  Jewish  problem  is  quite  as  international 
as  the  Polish  question.  To  make  an  end  of  all  subjects 
of  dispute  or  conflict,  the  political  liberty  and  equality 
of  the  Jews  must  be  guaranteed,  no  matter  what  nation 

they  dwell  among. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  reconstitution  of  Poland  will  mutilate  the  German 
Empire  a"nd  the  kingdom  of  Prussia.  The  conditions 
of  peace,  however,  cannot  permit  the  Empire  to  continue 
upon  its  present  foundations  of  centralization  and  mili- 
tarism. There  are  in  this  Empire  countries  and  popula- 
tions which  have  been  forcibly  wrested  from  other  States. 
I  am  speaking  of  Schleswig  and  Alsace-Lorraine. 
These  populations  cannot  remain  German  if  they  do 
not  wish  to  do  so.  They  must  be  consulted  by  means 
of  the  referendum. 

In  France  there  are  very  many — perhaps  they  are 
even  the  majority — who  refuse  this  popular  consultation. 
They  argue  that  violence  does  not  create  a  right,  and 
that  Alsace-Lorraine,  forcibly  wrested  from  France 
in  1870,  reverts  in  justice  to  France.  The  conclusion 
of  this  argument  by  no  means  follows  from  the  premises. 
The  administration  of  a  country  by  a  conquering  Power 
might  be  so  excellent  that  the  inhabitants  would  prefer 
to  remain  under  their  new  rulers. 

The  only  safe  principle  which  will  insure  that  the 
will  of  the  inhabitants  is  not  outraged  is  that  of  popular 
consultation.  France  was  vividly  aware  of  this  when 
Nice  and  Savoy  were  consulted  in  order  to  discover 
whether  they  would  accept  union  with  France.  It  is 
important  that  the  same  procedure  should  be  followed 
with  regard  to  Schleswig  and  Alsace-Lorraine.  This 


330          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

consultation  of  the  people  obviously  involves  certain 
difficulties ;  will  immigrants  and  the  sons  of  immigrants 
be  included  in  it  ?  This  is  a  detail  which  can  assuredly 
be  settled  once  the  principle  of  the  popular  referendum 
is  admitted.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  the  French 
democracy  to  employ  the  referendum  in  the  case  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  for  it  will  thereby  establish  a  principle 
of  liberty  which  will  force  the  Allies  of  France,  and  Russia 
in  particular,  to  follow  the  example  set  them.  The 
France  of  the  great  Revolution  owes  it  to  herself  to 
see  that  the  principles  included  in  her  glorious  device — 
Liberty,  Equality,  Solidarity — become  part  of  the 
political  morality  of  international  relations. 

The  consultation  of  the  populations  of  Schleswig, 
Poland,  and  Alsace-Lorraine  will  inevitably  result  in 
the  breaking-up  of  the  German  Empire.  It  does  not 
follow  that  Germany  must  be  divided  into  a  multitude 
of  little  groups,  which  must  be  prevented  from  feder- 
ating. This  would  be  to  do  violence  to  the  will  of  the 
Germans,  and,  in  consequence,  to  foster  among  them 
the  seeG.s  of  hatred,  which  would  germinate  and,  at 
a  later  date,  result  in  a  harvest  of  bloodshed.  It  will 
simply  be  necessary  to  shatter  the  hegemony  of  the 
Prussian  State,  which  was  imposed  by  force  of  arms 
in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  to 
leave  the  peoples  of  Germany  to  federate  themselves 
in  freedom  and  according  to  their  needs.  The  Revolu- 
tion of  1848,  which  miscarried,  thanks  to  Prussia, 
must  be  continued  and  consummated.  The  disappear- 
ance of  Imperial  centralization  would  give  renewed  life 
to  the  many  small  centres  of  intellectual  life.  Science, 
art,  letters,  and  philosophy  would  flourish  and  expand 
as  they  have  not  done  for  half  a  century.  The  line  of 
the  great  thinkers  and  artists,  which  was  interrupted  by 
the  Empire — which  created  only  great  specialists- 
would  reappear,  the  inevitable  fruit  of  the  liberty  which 
is  lacking  to  the  Germany  of  to-day. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  331 

If  humanity  wishes  to  prevent  wars  in  the  future, 
it  must  not  degrade  and  diminish  the  German  people, 
but  must  liberate  it  from  the  yoke  of  its  masters.  We 
must  never  forget  that  men,  whether  they  will  or  not, 
are,  all  the  world  over,  bound  together  by  the  ties  of 
solidarity,  and  that  to  abase  one's  neighbour  is  to 
abase  and  diminish  oneself. 

*  *  *  #  # 

The  Empire  of  Austria-Hungary  is  a  State  which  is 
absolutely  artificial  in  formation :  an  aggregate  of  various 
nationalities,  which  are  not  only  not  merged  into  one 
another,  but  are  still  antagonistic.  This  Empire  will 
inevitably  be  broken  up  if,  according  to  reason,  the 
principles  of  nationality  and  the  popular  referendum 
are  applied.  The  subjugated  nationalities  will  recover 
their  liberty  with  delight,  and  already  we  find  them 
conducting  a  propaganda  of  independence  in  France, 
England,  Switzerland,  America,  etc. 

There  is,  to  begin  with,  a  Slav  group  in  the  north- 
east— the  Czechs,  Moravians,  and  Slovaks;  a  portion 
of  this  group — quite  a  small  portion,  certainly — in- 
habits Prussian  Silesia.  There  is  here  a  population 
of  some  twelve  millions  inhabiting  an  area  of  46,000 
square  miles.  But  one  factor  somewhat  complicates 
the  situation.  This  is  the  presence  of  some  three  and 
a  half  millions  of  Germans,  who  are  scattered  amid 
the  eight  and  a  half  million  Czechs  who  inhabit  Bohemia, 
Moravia,  Silesia,  and  Slovenia.  Consultation  of  the 
population  would  give  a  majority  of  nearly  three  to  one 
in  favour  of  the  Czech  nationality.  The  new  nation  must 
be  independent;  but,  as  in  the  case  of  Poland,  the 
World  Concert  of  Nations  which  will  preside  over  the 
birth  of  this  nation  will  demand  guarantees  that  the 
German  minority  shall  enjoy  the  same  rights  and  liber- 
ties as  the  Slav  majority.  Here,  again,  the  principles  of 
liberty  and  equality  are  imperative.  They  will  be  all 
the  more  readily  applicable  in  that  the  basis  of  the 


332         LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

new  nation  will  be  federative,  with  Bohemia,  Moravia, 
and  Slovenia  forming  autonomous  groups.  The  forma- 
tion of  such  a  nation  does  not  present  such  difficulties 
as  might  a  priori  be  supposed.  It  would  be  sufficient 
to  follow  the  Swiss  or  Canadian  model. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  Yougoslav  groups, 
in  the  south-west  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  There  are 
nearly  twenty  millions  of  Serbs  living  in  Slavonia, 
Croatia,  Syrmia,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Dalmatia,  Serbia, 
and  Banat.  This  Slav  population  wishes  to  amalgamate 
itself  with  the  independent  kingdom  of  Serbia.  Un- 
fortunately, in  the  course  of  history,  as  much  as  a  result 
of  economic  conditions  as  of  conquest,  these  popu- 
lations have  become  excessively  intermingled  here  with 
Italians  and  Germans,  there  with  Magyars,  elsewhere 
with  Rumanians.  This  intermingling  greatly  compli- 
cates the  problem  to  be  solved,  the  more  so  as  differences 
of  religion — Catholicism,  Greek  Orthodoxy,  Mohamme- 
danism, etc. — must  be  added  to  differences  of  language. 
Certain  towns  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  contain 
Italian  majorities,  while  the  hinterland  is  largely 
populated  by  Slavs.  In  Banat,  the  eastern  portion  is 
chiefly  Rumanian;  Transylvania  is  wholly  Rumanian, 
with  islands  of  Magyar  or  German  inhabitants. 

The  interpenetration  and  admixture  of  the  peoples 
is  such  that  the  formation  of  a  Yougoslav  kingdom 
would  certainly  lead  to  the  oppression  of  the  German, 
Magyar,  Rumanian,  and  Italian  minorities,  unless  cer- 
tain precautions  were  taken.  The  foundations  of  these 
precautions  can  only  consist  of  liberty  and  equality, 
if  we  wish  the  new  nation  to  be  solidly  established. 
Each  group — Croat,  Slavonic,  etc. — must  be  autono- 
mous and  independent,  with  equal  social  and  political 
rights  for  all  citizens,  without  distinction  of  language 
or  religion,  under  the  guarantee  of  the  other  nations 
of  the  world.  A  federation  would  bind  all  these  Yougo- 
slav elements  together.  We  must  not  permit  of  the 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  833 

creation  of  a  centralized  Slav  Empire,  for  this,  in  the 
near  or  remote  future,  would  tend  to  enslave  the 
allogenous  minorities.  Only  a  free  federation  would 
permit  of  the  progressive  development  of  all  without 
friction  and  without  shock,  for  among  the  groups  there 
are  differences  of  culture.  The  northern  and  north- 
western groups  possess  a  more  highly  developed  culture 
— scientific,  literary,  and  artistic — than  the  southern 
and  south-eastern  groups  (Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Mon- 
tenegro, and  Serbia).  This  Yougoslav  federation 
would  have  its  ports  on  the  Adriatic  as  Poland  would 
have  them  on  the  Baltic.  The  Trentino  and  the 
Gorizia  district  are  populated  chiefly  by  Italians.  A 
popular  referendum  would  reveal  their  desire  for  unifica- 
tion with  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  Transylvania,  which 
is  wholly  Rumanian,  and  the  east  jf  Banat,  which  is 
also  Rumanian,  must  be  free  to  unite  themselves  with 
the  kingdom  of  Rumania.  It  is  desirable  that  Bess- 
arabia, inhabited  also  by  a  majority  of  Rumanians, 
should  be  restored  by  Russia  to  Rumania.  This  would 
be  to  the  interest  of  Russia  no  less  than  to  the  interest 
of  Rumania.  But  this  desire  cannot  be  realized  so 
long  as  the  bureaucratic  autocracy  governs  Russia. 

Hungary  should  be  free  and  independent,  while  the 
Germanic  region  of  Austria,  the  Viennese  region, 
becoming  autonomous,  would  be  free  to  federate  with 
all  the  rest  of  the  German  groups.  This  would  mean 
the  complete  disappearance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  that  artificial  aggregate,  without  reality,  of 
inimical  nationalities.  We  should  thus  have  a  free 
Germanic  federation,  a  federation  of  the  Northern  Slavs, 
a  federation  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  a  reconstituted 
Poland,  and  an  aggrandized  Rumania.  There  would 
be  still  other  questions  to  be  solved,  but  they  would 
pertain  to  Russia  rather  than  to  the  nations  as  a  whole. 
I  am  referring  to  the  problems  of  Finland,  Lithuania, 
and  the  Ukraine,  or  White  Russia.  During  the  whole 


334          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

of  the  nineteenth  century  Finland  was  absolutely 
autonomous  under  the  protectorate  of  the  Tsar — the 
Grand  Duke  of  Finland.  It  was  by  a  violation  of  his 
formal  promise  that  this  autonomy  disappeared  in  the 
last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  We  know  how 
injurious  this  ill-treatment  of  Finland  has  been  to 
Russia  and  to  the  Allies  in  the  course  of  this  war,  since 
it  is  the  cause  of  the  hostility  displayed,  only  too  obvi- 
ously at  times,  by  neutral  Sweden. 

So  long  as  there  are  in  the  world  peoples  who  are 
enslaved,  subjected  against  their  will  to  a  rule  which 
they  abhor,  there  will  remain  in  the  world  causes  of 
conflict  and  destruction.  How  much  more  advan- 
tageous to  the  whole  of  humanity,  and  therefore  to  the 
Russian  people,  were  Finland  to  recover  her  autonomy, 
were  Lithuania  and  White  Russia — whose  manner, 
language,  religion,  and  traditions  differ  from  those  of 
Great  Russia — to  be  autonomous  under  the  Muscovite 
aegis.  Is  it  not  possible  for  the  Russian  Empire  to 
establish  itself  on  the  federative  model  of  the  British 
Empire  ?  It  is  obviously  possible,  but  the  power  of 
the  bureaucracy  must  first  be  shattered.  Perhaps — 
and  it  is  greatly  to  be  desired — this  will  be  one  of  the 
results  of  the  world- war. 


As  for  the  Balkan  region,  the  difficulties  of  a  solution 
are  really  even  greater  than  those  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking.  This  arises  from  the  fact  that  the 
consultation  of  the  people  is  rendered  difficult  by  their 
lack  of  culture,  by  their  low  plane  of  civilization.  It 
is  obvious  that  the  Bulgarian  people  ought  to  remain 
free  and  independent,  for  any  other  arrangement  would 
constitute  a  ferment  of  hatred  and  disturbance.  But 
there  is  Thrace,  and  Macedonia  !  Statistics  according 
to  nationality  are  more  or  less  misleading;  and  accord- 
ing to  the  opinions  or  the  nationality  of  the  statistician 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  335 

the  figures  vary  completely.  It  would  be  necessary, 
we  think,  for  an  international  commission  of  geo- 
graphers, ethnologists,  economists,  and  politicians  to 
effect  the  partition  of  these  territories,  according  to  the 
majority  of  the  populations,  among  Bulgaria,  Greece, 
and  Serbia,  always  making  the  liberty  and  equality  of 
the  minorities  a  basis  of  action,  and  establishing  a  con- 
stitutional statute  guaranteed  by  the  world-concert  of 
Powers. 

Perhaps  the  best  solution  would  be  the  autonomy 
and  independence  of  Macedonia,  instead  of  its  partition. 
Each  linguistic  group  enjoying  equal  rights,  a  new 
nationality  would  gradually  be  formed,  founded  on 
liberty,  as  Switzerland  has  been  formed  during  the 
course  of  the  last  five  centuries.  For  Albania,  too,  the 
solution  is  obviously  independence,  with  guarantees 
that  the  minorities  will  enjoy  political  and  social  rights 
equal  to  those  of  the  majority. 

The  same  situation  obtains  in  Asia  Minor,  bathed  by 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean.  For  certain 
islands  the  population  may,  and  should,  be  consulted. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  consult  the  Continental  popula- 
tion— Greek,  Jewish,  Turkish,  Armenian,  etc. — mixed 
as  it  is,  and  often  so  imperfectly  civilized.  It  would  be 
necessary,  for  these  regions,  to  follow  the  example  set 
by  the  United  States  of  America  in  Cuba  and  the 
Philippines — that  is  to  say,  Armenia,  Syria,  Meso- 
potamia, etc.,  should  be  entrusted  to  such  countries, 
for  instance,  as  England,  France,  Russia,  Italy.  It 
would  be  their  duty  to  administrate  and  develop  these 
countries  under  a  regime  of  autonomy  and  liberty  for 
a  determined  period,  say  of  twenty,  thirty,  or  forty 
years,  after  which  these  regions  would  become  inde- 
pendent. The  world  as  a  whole  would  guarantee  the 
execution  of  the  conventions  relating  to  these  countries. 
Neither  the  peoples  nor  the  territories  would  become 
the  possession  of  the  ruling  Powers.  The  latter  would 


336  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

merely  have  a  function  to  fulfil,  a  mission  to  accomplish, 
for  the  good  of  the  peoples  under  their  rule. 

This  system,  based  upon  liberty  and  equality,  is  the 
only  one  which  would  suppress  all  causes  of  discontent 
and  rebellion  among  the  peoples.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
these  territories  and  populations  were  distributed 
among  the  victorious  belligerents,  the  dominated  peoples 
would  inevitably  suffer  injury  and  annoyance,  and  the 
result  would  be  countless  centres  of  hatred  and  revolt. 
Each  ethnical  group  must  be  allowed  to  preserve  its 
language,  its  customs,  and  its  religion;  only  their  social 
and  economic  conditions  must  so  work  upon  them  as  to 
modify  them,  and  the  individual  must  suffer  no  con- 
straint. 

All  these  regions  are,  by  force  of  circumstances,  in 
a  backward  stage  of  civilization,  whether  as  regards 
industry,  or  trade,  or  culture,  as  compared  with  the 
Western  countries.  The  best  means  of  developing 
them  from  every  point  of  view  is  to  open  means  of 
communication — roads,  railways,  and  canals — to  exploit 
the  mineral  wealth  of  the  country,  and  finally  to  in- 
dustrialize it.  These  economic  changes  would  neces- 
sarily, after  the  lapse  of  a  little  time,  bring  about  political 
and  social  modifications  which  would  very  greatly 
consolidate  the  autonomy  of  the  linguistic  groups,  and 
would  lead  them  to  federate  among  themselves,  as  the 
States  of  North  America  are  federated. 

As  for  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  they  must 
be  internationalized.  Their  possession  by  Russia  would 
be  prejudicial  to  Rumania  and  Bulgaria,  who  might  be 
bottled  up  in  the  Black  Sea,  just  as  Russia  is  now. 
Constantinople  in  the  hands  of  the  Greeks  or  Bulgars 
would  present  the  same  objections.  What  Russia, 
Rumania,  Bulgaria,  and  all  the  countries  of  the  world 
require  is  the  free  navigation  of  the  Straits,  so  that 
their  merchant  fleets  may  pass  freely  from  the  Black 
Sea  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  only  means  of  realizing 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  337 

this  universal  desideratum  is  to  insure  that  Constanti- 
nople and  the  Dardanelles  shall  not  belong  to  any 
great  Power,  but  shall  be  free  and  autonomous,  under 
the  guarantee  of  the  World  Concert  of  Powers.* 

The  German  Empire  possessed  colonies  in  Africa,  the 
Far  East,  and  Oceania;  these  it  has  lost.  When  peace 
is  concluded,  are  these  colonies  to  be  restored  ?  We 
think  not :  in  the  first  place  because  the  German  Empire 
will  have  ceased  to  exist  as  a  centralized  Empire.  But 
if  these  colonies  are  not  restored  to  the  German  Empire, 
the  German  people  must  at  least  have  free  access  to 
them;  free  trade  must  be  the  rule  there,  and,  in  a  word, 
the  Germans  must  be  able  to  enter  or  trade  with  these 
countries  on  the  same  conditions  as  any  other  nation. 
Here  we  are  dealing  principally  with  economic  condi- 
tions, of  which  we  shall  speak  again  later.  These  ex- 
colonies  of  Germany  should  be  divided  among  the 
nations  possessing  colonies  bordering  upon  them,  but 
according  to  a  statute  established  by  an  international 
commission  of  business  men,  geographers,  and  politi- 
cians, guaranteeing  liberty  and  equality  of  treatment 
and  of  rights  for  all  persons,  no  matter  what  their 

*  Nine  months  after  I  spoke  these  words  in  the  University  of  London 
the  Russian  Prime  Minister,  M.  Trepov,  made  public  the  understanding 
between  the  Allies  on  the  subject  of  Constantinople.     The  city  is  to 
be  Russian.     But  nothing  assures  us  that  the  British,  French,  and 
Italian  Parliaments  will  ratify  these  secret  conventions  of  the  diplo- 
matists, conventions  which  are  valid  only  after  ratification  by  Parlia- 
ment.    Despite  all  the  engagements  which  Russia  may  have  concluded 
in  order  to  guarantee  the  free  navigation  of  the  Dardanelles  by  merchant 
vessels  to  Rumania  and  other  nations,  I  regard  this  solution  of  the 
question  as  a  bad   one.      Constantinople  is  not  a  city  peopled  by 
Russians,  nor  even  by  Slavs.     It  is  not  the  Russian  people  which 
demands  Constantinople,  but  the  Russian  autocracy  and  bureaucracy. 
Always  the  craving  for  territory,  in  order  to  create  posts  for  officials  ! 
Moreover,  besides  Constantinople,  there  is  its  hinterland.     M.  Trepov's 
statement  does  not  reveal  its  fate.     Constantinople  in  the  hands  of 
Russia  would  be  an  element  of  discord  among  the  nations  of  Europe; 
it  would  imperil  the  peace   of  the  world.     Constantinople  free  and 
autonomous  would  assure  the  peace  of  the  world.     If  the  Western 
nations  are  wise  they   will  not  assist  in  the  aggrandizement  of  the 
Muscovite  Empire,  which  is  already  too  large. 

22 


338          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

nationality  or  religion,  and  for  all  products,  whatever 

their  origin. 

*  *  *  *  * 

If  the  territorial  settlement  is  effected  on  the  bases 
of  which  I  have  given  the  outline,  all  causes  of  war  in 
the  future  will  have  been  eliminated.  More,  whole 
countries  will  be  thrown  open  to  an  intensive  economic 
exploitation,  while  the  populations  will  be  invited  to 
enjoy  the  benefits  of  political  equality  and  liberty. 
Such  a  political  settlement,  on  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
would  for  ever  shatter  the  obsolete  power  of  secret 
diplomacy.  Secret  diplomacy  would  cease  to  be, 
because  the  reasons  for  its  existence  will  have  dis- 
appeared. Diplomacy  exists  because  external  political 
conflicts  have  to  be  prevented  or  provoked.  As  the 
settlement  which  we  have  outlined  would  suppress  the 
possibility  of  these  conflicts,  since  it  would  rest  on  the 
corner-stones  of  liberty,  equality,  and  solidarity,  there 
would  be  no  further  need  of  secret  diplomacy. 

Is  it  possible  to  effect  such  a  territorial  settlement  ? 
Assuredly  yes.  It  is  all  the  more  possible  in  that  all 
nationalities  are  profoundly  stirred,  and  are  directing 
their  activities  toward  this  goal.  \It  will  suffice  to  co- 
ordinate the  rather  chaotic  confusion  of  individual  and 
national  initiative.  The  democratic  elements  of  the 
whole  world  will  uphold  and  assist  in  a  settlement  based 
on  liberty  and  equality.  All  the  progressive  and 
intelligent  forces  of  belligerents  and  neutrals  are  tending 
toward  the  realization  of  this  solution,  which  would 
bring  final  peace  to  a  world  bled  white  by  years  of 
slaughter.  Of  course,  this  territorial  settlement  must 
be  completed  by  a  settlement  of  economic  conditions 
and  a  system  of  disarmament,  which  we  shall  examine 
later  on. 

The  conditions  which  the  war  has  created  in  respect 
of  the  relations  of  the  national  groups  are  working 
vigorously  for  some  such  solution  as  that  we  have  just 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  839 

been  describing.  No  doubt  the  conservative  and 
reactionary  forces,  which  are  still  so  vigorous  every- 
where, will  tend  to  react  against  these  tendencies,  and 
to  maintain  the  artificial  States  which  do  violence  to 
the  will  of  the  human  collectivities.  But  we  hope  that 
these  conservative  forces  will  be  reduced  to  impotence 
by  the  peoples,  as  the  latter  become  conscious  of  their 
needs  and  their  ability  to  realize  them.  We  believe 
that  the  peace  which  will  follow  this  war  will  establish 
a  territorial  system  in  conformity  with  the  policy  of  the 
nationalities,  and  that  it  will  therefore  be  a  final  peace, 
reposing  on  the  three  corner-stones  of  every  solid  human 
structure — liberty,  equality,  and  solidarity. 

Any  other  peace  would  be  merely  a  truce. 

If  peace  between  the  nations  is  established  on  these 
principles  it  would  seem  that  these  principles  must 
more  or  less  promptly  and  extensively  be  applied  in  the 
interior  of  each  State.  It  is  probable  that  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  centralized  Central  Empires  will 
react  on  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  British  Empire, 
impelling  the  former  to  introduce  measures  of  liberalism 
and  democracy,  and  the  latter  to  become  a  simple 
federal  Empire.  The  autonomy  of  India  cannot  be 
long  delayed.  As  for  Irish  Home  Rule,  it  must  be 
realized  without  delay.  Very  probably  from  the  British 
point  of  view  we  are  witnessing  two  processes  which  are 
apparently  contradictory  and  in  reality  complementary : 
a  tightening  of  the  federative  bond,  and  an  increasing 
autonomy  of  the  federated  units.  The  Dominions  will 
no  doubt  participate  more  effectively  and  more  directly 
in  the  control  of  the  federation  than  is  at  present  the 
case.* 

*  In  June,  1916,  three  months  after  I  spoke  these  words  at  the 
Birkbeck  College,  the  British  Prime  Minister  invited  the  Irish  to  accept 
the  immediate  realization  of  Home  Rule  for  all  Ireland,  save  the  six 
counties  of  Ulster,  which  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  He  added 
that  after  the  war  a  Federal  Parliament,  including  representatives 
from  England,  Scotland,  Wales,  Ireland,  and  all  the  Dominions, 


340  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

It  seems,  then,  that  the  world,  and  especially  Europe, 
considered  as  a  whole,  will  see,  after  the  war,  an  ex- 
tension of  political  liberty  and  of  democracy.  It  will 
reveal  itself  by  a  new  political  division  of  the  map  of 
Europe,  based  on  the  principle  of  nationality.  And 
thus  the  artificial  States  of  to-day  will  be  replaced  by 
organic  nations,  endowed  with  a  real  and  intense  life. 
We  believe,  then,  that  this  frightful  war  will  play  an 
enormous  part  in  the  history  of  the  world's  civilization. 
We  believe  a  great  blessing  will  spring  from  a  great 
evil.  But  do  not  let  us  forget  that  this  great  blessing 
would  have  been  attained  as  surely,  and  at  a  much 
smaller  cost,  although  more  slowly,  if  peace  had  never 
been  broken.  The  whole  world,  indeed,  is  progressing 
toward  a  constant  increase  of  liberty  and  equality,  and 
nothing  can  stop  its  progress.  The  war  will  only  have 
accelerated  it. 


would  determine  the  political  constitution  of  the  Empire  and  its 
federated  units.  Home  Rule  for  Ireland  miscarried  yet  again,  on 
account  of  the  division  of  Ireland  into  two  parts;  but  it  is  possible, 
and  even  probable,  that  before  the  end  of  the  war  Home  Rule  will  at 
last  be  realized  in  Ireland,  and  this  to  the  great  advantage  of  England, 
Scotland,  and  Wales. 


CHAPTER  XII 

AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS 

Economic  conditions — State  indebtedness  will  be  doubled  or  trebled — 
The  results  of  war  loans  in  place  of  taxation — War  indemnities — 
Germany  cannot  pay  an  indemnity,  save  to  Belgium — The  budgets 
of  the  nations  will  be  doubled  or  trebled — Changes  of  assessment  for 
taxation — Income  tax— States  must  economize. 

Most  people  will  be  poorer — A  few  will  be  richer — Displacement 
of  wealth — The  industrial  and  commercial  effort — The  economic 
conflict — The  policy  of  customs  unions  would  continue  the  war — 
Its  international  and  national  results,  political  and  social — The 
development  of  machinery — The  need  of  capital :  the  increase  of  the 
rate  of  interest — The  dearth  of  labour  and  its  deterioration  as  to 
quality — Female  labour — The  economic  intersexual  conflict — The 
way  to  remedy  the  deficiency  of  labour :  the  consequences — Intensi- 
fication of  the  class  conflict — The  demobilization  of  the  armies — 
How  will  it  be  effected? — The  psychological  effects  of  the  war  and 
of  military  life — The  modifications  of  mentality  to  be  looked  for — 
A  revolutionary  state  of  mind  will  coincide  with  revolutionary 
economic  conditions — The  results — The  idea  of  revolutionary 
movements  after  the  war  is  general — How  to  avoid  them. 

The  condition  of  science,  letters,  and  the  arts — The  scientific 
"  boom  " — The  tendency  of  art  toward  realism — The  public  is 
surfeited  with  the  war — In  the  near  future  art  will  be  humorous 
and  cheerful,  not  tragic — International  relations  and  artists. 

PERHAPS  many  readers  will  be  tempted  to  regard 
as  Utopian  the  political  conditions  which  I  have 
examined  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Evidently 
there  is  no  certainty  that  the  territorial  system  of 
Europe  will  be  established  on  the  basis  of  nationality 
and  the  free  consent  of  the  peoples.  But  one  thing  is 
certain,  without  any  possibility  of  dispute.  It  is  this: 
that  if  the  settlement  is  not  effected  on  this  basis  there 
will  remain  in  the  world  the  seeds  of  national  hatreds, 
which,  sooner  or  later,  will  yield  a  harvest  of  fratricidal 
conflict,  like  that  which  has  for  nearly  three  years  been 

ravaging  humanity. 

341 


342          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

It  is,  however,  highly  probable  that  the  new  political 
division  of  Europe  will  be  established  on  the  basis  of 
the  popular  referendum,  the  principle  of  nationalities, 
and  respect  for  the  rights  of  minorities,  for  only  this 
method  of  division  will  satisfy  the  unanimous  desire 
of  the  peoples  to  avoid  future  conflicts.  The  results 
of  this  war  are  so  disastrous  from  every  point  of  view 
that  the  whole  of  humanity  is  demanding  that  this  shall 
be  the  last  war. 

If  we  envisage  the  conditions  which  will  obtain  after 
the  war  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  we  shall 
immediately  perceive  an  immense  increase  of  State 
indebtedness.  Each  of  the  five  great  belligerent 
nations  will  have  increased  its  indebtedness  by  about 
£4,000,000,000,  merely  in  order  to  cover  the  expenses 
of  the  war,  without  reckoning  the  indemnities  for 
property  destroyed,  and  the  pensions  for  the  widows 
and  orphans  and  disabled  soldiers. 

It  would  have  been  possible  to  avoid  increasing  these 
State  debts  to  such  a  degree.  The  Governments  might 
simply  have  resorted  to  the  taxation  of  wealth,  instead 
of  raising  loans  at  long  or  short  terms.  But  they  pre- 
ferred loans,  because  these  would  mask  the  devastation 
created  by  the  war.  The  truth  was  concealed.  The 
peoples  did  not  realize  the  cost  of  the  war.  They  did 
not  perceive  the  gulf  into  which  the  Imperialistic  folly 
of  the  few  was  dragging  them,  and  it  was  consequently 
impossible  that  the  determination  should  be  born  in 
them  to  arrest  this  frantic  rush  toward  the  abyss. 
However,  I  must  record  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  did 
partly  adopt  a  financial  policy  of  taxation,  raising  the 
tax  on  income  and  imposing  new  taxes.  France,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  third  year  of  war,  seemed  inclined 
to  follow  suit,  but  very  timidly.  I  may  observe,  in 
passing,  that  it  was  the  most  democratic  of  all  the  belli- 
gerents which  employed  this  system,  the  only  one  which 
enables  the  people  to  realize  more  or  less  where  it  stands. 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS     343 

To  the  cost  of  the  war  properly  so-called  we  must 
add  the  indemnities  for  the  properties,  factories,  and 
products  seized  or  destroyed  by  the  enemy.  I  am  not 
speaking  of  the  possible  indemnities  which  in  justice 
should  be  paid  to  all  those  whom  the  war  has  more  or 
less  completely  ruined,  whom  it  has  thrown  out  of  their 
situations,  thereby  casting  them  down — them  and  theirs 
—into  poverty  and  destitution.  I  doubt  whether  this 
host  will  ever  be  indemnified;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
property  destroyed  or  seized  by  the  enemy  will  give  rise 
to  indemnities. 

Will  a  defeated  Germany  pay  these  indemnities  ? 
Their  total  will  exceed  £2,000,000,000,  for  we  must  not 
forget  that  the  regions  invaded,  despoiled,  and  ruined 
by  Germany  are  Belgium  and  the  industrial  districts 
of  France  and  Poland — all  very  wealthy  because  highly 
productive.  In  all  equity  it  is  Germany  that  should  pay 
these  indemnities,  for  it  was  her  ruling  classes  who 
loosed  the  scourge  of  war  upon  the  world.  But  could 
she  pay  them  ?  Considering  everything,  I  fear  not. 

When  peace  closes  the  era  of  battles,  Germany  will 
be  burdened  by  a  new  debt  of  at  least  £4,000,000,000. 
She  will  have  to  pay  pensions  to  some  millions  of 
widows,  orphans,  and  disabled  soldiers.  Her  annual 
budget  will  be  increased  by  more  than  £280,000,000. 
In  short,  she  will  be  completely  exhausted,  on  the  brink 
of  bankruptcy.  The  financial  world  is  well  aware  of 
this,  and  a  proof  may  be  found  in  the  continual  decrease 
of  the  value  of  the  mark.  Germany,  therefore,  will  be 
in  no  position  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  £1,000,000,000 
to  £2,000,000,000  to  cover  the  destruction  and  the  ruin 
which  she  has  accomplished.  Some  say  that  the  Allies 
might  force  her  to  pay  it  by  controlling  her  customs, 
by  seizing  her  railways  and  her  mines.  True,  but  this 
would  be  of  no  use  unless  commerce  and  industry  were 
vigorously  resumed — that  is,  unless  Germany  were 
able  to  trade  freely  with  the  whole  world.  If  the  security 


344          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

in  the  hands  of  the  Allies  is  to  be  of  any  value,  the  policy 
of  free  trade  and  the  open  door  must  be  allowed  full 
play.  Moreover,  the  control  exercised  by  the  Allies 
must  be  only  a  very  limited  control,  or  the  German  people 
would  be  so  completely  impoverished  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  security  would  be  valueless,  while,  on  the  other, 
the  seeds  of  hatred  would  linger  in  the  German  people 
and  would  eventually  germinate  and  grow  to  maturity. 

Each  nation,  therefore — excepting,  of  course,  Belgium 
— must  herself  repair  the  losses  which  the  war  has 
inflicted  upon  it.  Each  nation,  therefore,  will  see  its 
annual  budget  increased  by  at  least  £240,000,000. 
For  many  generations  European  humanity  will  be 
burdened  with  the  consequences  of  this  absurd  and 
insane  war. 

Each  year  the  peoples  will  have  to  pay  budgets 
which  will  have  been  doubled,  tripled,  or  even  worse, 
according  to  the  duration  of  the  war.  A  huge  budget 
means  enormous  taxes.  Everywhere  the  assessment 
of  taxation  will  perforce  undergo  more  or  less  consider- 
able modifications.  It  is  obvious  to  everybody  that 
excessive  indirect  taxation  levied  on  alimentary  products 
is  impossible.  It  will  be  necessary,  therefore,  to  rely 
upon  the  various  forms  of  income-tax.  Given  the  size 
of  the  budgets,  a  proportional  and  progressive  income- 
tax  will  be  required.  If  the  budgetary  expenditure 
is  to  be  met  by  this  expedient  this  tax  will  soon  reach 
an  average  of  40  per  cent,  to  50  per  cent.,  and  even  more. 
No  doubt  the  death  duties  will  also  be  considerably 
increased. 

However,  these  duties  and  taxes  will  react  on  the  life 
of  the  individual  and  the  family;  they  will  have  to 
reduce  their  ordinary  standard  of  living.  Economical 
habits  will  be  a  matter  of  necessity.  But  the  poorer 
folk — working  men,  peasants,  small  shopkeepers,  petty 
officials — cannot  reduce  their  standard  of  living,  for 
it  is  already  only  too  modest,  more  often  than  not  inferior 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  345 

to  that  demanded  by  a  healthy  life,  considered  from  the 
material,  intellectual,  and  moral  points  of  view.  It  is 
the  rich,  then,  who  must  assume  the  burden  of  com- 
pulsory economy,  for  they  alone  can  reduce  their  standard 
of  living  without  diminishing  their  welfare  below  the 
level  of  the  normal.  They  possess  a  surplus,  and  it  is 
this  surplus  which  must  be  taxed. 

Before  the  war,  on  the  average,  not  more  than  a  sixth 
of  the  mean  income  of  each  bread-winner  was  applied 
to  meeting  the  expenditure  of  the  collectivity.  After 
the  war  half  these  incomes  will  have  to  be  thus  applied, 
and,  as  I  was  remarking,  this  is  only  possible  if  the 
incomes  are  large  and  permit  of  a  standard  of  life  above 
the  normal  type. 

In  such  a  condition  of  the  budget  it  will  follow  that 
economy  will  be  as  incumbent  on  the  State  as  on  the 
individual.  The  State  will  be  forced  to  decrease  its 
expenditure.  It  cannot  reduce  the  payment  of  interest 
on  its  loans ;  it  cannot  reduce  its  war  pensions ;  it  cannot 
perceptibly  economize  in  the  matter  of  political  adminis- 
tration. It  will  have  to  save  money  in  other  directions. 
How  ?  In  respect  of  education,  social  hygiene,  social 
legislation,  the  armies  and  the  fleets  ?  We  shall  con- 
sider these  possibilities  in  the  following  chapter.  But 
however  these  necessary  economies  may  be  affected,  we 
are  confronted  by  an  economic  situation  which  borders 
on  exhaustion  and  general  ruin.  All  the  States  of  Europe 
are  terribly  impoverished,  and  it  will  require  years 
to  efface  the  last  traces  of  this  general  ruin.  If  the  war 
lasts  or  exceeds  three  years,  the  burdens  will  be  so  great 
that  we  may  reasonably  doubt  whether  the  peoples  will 
be  able  to  fulfil  them.  It  may  very  well  be  that  the 
situation  will  end  in  a  general  liquidation. 

#  *  *  *  * 

The  world-war,  then,  is  more  or  less  effectually  ruin- 
ing the  belligerent  States,  all  of  whose  debts  will  be 
doubled  or  trebled;  but  still  more  is  it  ruining  individuals, 


346          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

although  a  few  of  them  are  growing  wealthy.  The  long 
duration  of  the  war  has  rendered  more  perceptible 
this  progressive  impoverishment  of  manufacturers, 
merchants  clerks,  and  working  men,  and  members  of 
the  Liberal  profession.  It  is  only  a  small  minority 
which  is  enriching  itself  in  any  extreme  degree.  Thus 
we  find  that  in  England,  for  example,  certain  steamship 
companies,  foundries,  iron  works,  munition  works, 
and  frozen  meat  companies  increased  their  profits  in 
1915,  after  deducting  war  taxes,  in  proportions  varying 
from  twofold  to  sixfold,  as  the  following  table  shows: 

1914.  1915. 

£  £ 

Smithfield  and  Argentine  Meat  Co.  25,732  142,055 


Waring  and  Gillow  . . 

Projectile  Co. 

Lanarkshire  Steel 

Frederick  Ley  land  Steamship  Co. 

Sutherland  Steamship  Co. 


35,217  100,885 

30,739  194,136 

22,144  45,985 

337,188  1,196,683 

94,600  295,200 


In  all  countries  the  same  phenomenon  may  be  noted. 
It  has  been  observed  in  France,  Germany,  and  Russia. 
Consequently  there  is  a  displacement  of  wealth  and  a 
diminution  in  the  number  of  large  fortunes.  Germany 
is  certainly  the  country  most  impoverished,  for  her  com- 
mercial traffic  has  been  enormously  reduced. 

This  general  phenomenon  of  the  impoverishment  of 
the  greater  number  and  the  enrichment  of  a  small 
number  shows  how  impossible  it  is  to  obtain  justice  in 
a  society  based  upon  individual  wealth.  Some  allow 
themselves  to  be  killed  at  the  front ;  others  are  enriching 
themselves  !  This  fact  proves  once  again  that  there  can 
be  no  justice  in  a  society  if  there  is  no  economic  equality 
between  the  individuals  who  compose  it. 

But  this  displacement  of  wealth  results  in  the  im- 
poverishment of  a  number  of  persons  who  are  naturally 
discontented,  and  their  discontent  is  increased  by  the 
fact  that  they  see  others  enriching  themselves,  not  on 
account  of  their  efforts  or  their  intelligence,  but  because 
of  the  circumstances  of  the  war. 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  347 

In  the  course  of  this  war  vast  quantities  of  things  will 
have  been  destroyed  or  consumed.  They  will,  of  course, 
have  to  be  replaced.  The  need  will  be  great  and  im- 
mediate. Therefore,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  there  will 
certainly  be  a  considerable  industrial  and  commercial 
"  boom."  All  the  factories  and  workshops  which  have 
been  producing  the  engines  of  death  will  without  delay 
be  transformed  so  as  to  produce  the  instruments  of  life. 
This  transformation  will  probably  be  effected  without 
difficulty.  The  industries  will  rapidly  adapt  themselves 
to  the  new  requirements,  just  as  they  adapted  themselves 
to  the  requirements  of  the  war,  and  all  over  the  world 
there  will  be  a  general  competition  to  resume  the  ordinary 
tasks  of  life  as  it  was  before  the  war — that  is,  we  shall 
witness,  as  always,  a  struggle  between  groups  of  capital- 
ists to  monopolize  the  markets. 

Already,  in  the  midst  of  war,  the  world  of  finance, 
industry,  and  commerce  is  preparing,  in  every  country, 
for  this  economic  conflict.  The  capitalistic  aims  of  the 
war  are  thus  plainly  revealed.  Those  who  are  under- 
taking a  propaganda  in  favour  of  schemes  of  customs 
unions  between  the  Central  Powers  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  Western  Powers  on  the  other,  care  nothing  what- 
ever about  liberating  the  world  from  the  yoke  of  mili- 
tarism, or  permitting  the  small  nations  to  live  in  in- 
dependence. For  them  only  commercial  and  industrial 
interests  exist. 

In  all  countries  a  campaign  is  being  skilfully  conducted 
with  the  object  of  convincing  the  peoples  of  the  value  of 
a  customs  union  between  the  Allies.  The  Chambers 
of  Commerce,  the  heads  of  the  great  industrial  firms, 
and  the  professors  of  political  economy  are  celebrating 
the  advantages  of  a  policy  of  protection.  In  the  news- 
papers there  are  whispers  to  the  effect  that  Germany — 
which  seems  improbable  and  almost  impossible — is 
accumulating  stocks  of  merchandise  with  which  to 
inundate  the  world  when  peace  is  concluded,  and  that 


848          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  only  way  to  parry  this  blow  is  to  raise  a  wall  of 
prohibitive  customs  duties  between  the  Central  Powers 
and  all  the  Allies,  in  order  to  prevent  imports  of  German 
origin.  In  short,  they  recommend  the  continuation  of 
the  struggle  against  Germany  once  peace  is  signed. 
Instead  of  righting  with  guns  and  rifles  we  should  fight 
with  tariffs.  It  would  still  be  war,  but  under  a  different 
form — a  war  without  end. 

Let  us  examine  for  a  moment  the  consequences  of 
such  a  protectionist  policy.  From  the  industrial  and 
scientific  point  of  view,  protectionism  results  in  a 
stabilization  of  industry  and  a  check  on  progress. 
The  leaders  of  industry  no  longer  need  to  improve  their 
material  and  their  products,  for  they  are  protected 
from  competition  by  import  duties.  Commerical  supe- 
riority is  no  longer  due  to  superiority  of  equipment 
and  of  products,  but  to  the  tariff.  With  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  element  of  liberty  the  vital  principle  of 
emulation  disappears.  Protectionism  is  a  malady  of 
industry  and  commerce  which  ends,  sooner  or  later, 
in  death. 

From  the  political  point  of  view  protectionism,  so 
ardently  defended  by  the  industrial  and  commercial 
magnates,  would  divide  the  world  into  two  parties 
permanently  in  conflict.  The  neutrals  would  be  forced 
to  take  sides,  ranging  themselves  on  one  hand  or  the 
other,  entering  one  of  the  two  customs  unions.  In- 
evitably the  United  States  of  America  would,  with  more 
or  less  vigour,  take  the  part  of  the  Central  Empires, 
which  would  thus  be  strengthened  instead  of  weakened 
by  this  economic  war.  In  the  case  of  a  customs  union 
the  States  of  North  and  South  America  could  not  enter 
the  union  of  the  Allies,  for  then  the  protection  of 
British  and  French  industry,  trade,  and  agriculture 
would  be  non-existent.  Protection  can  exist  only  if 
America  remains  outside  the  protective  tariff.  The 
situation  would  be  otherwise  in  the  case  of  the  Central 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  349 

Powers,  which  would  thus  be  impelled  to  draw  closer 
their  economic  bonds  with  North  and  South  America. 

Such  an  economic  policy  would  reconstitute  a  German 
Empire  on  a  very  strong  foundation,  both  economic 
and  moral.  The  permanent  commercial  and  industrial 
antagonism  would  react  upon  the  life  of  the  peoples, 
would  maintain  and  increase  misunderstanding  and 
hatred.  Violent  and  bloodthirsty  national  conflicts 
would  be  inevitable.  The  only  possibility  of  future  peace 
would  reside  in  the  increasing  strength  of  the  Socialist 
parties.  But  given  the  differences  in  the  conceptions 
of  Socialism,  according  as  it  is  centralizing  or  federative, 
and  the  maintenance  of  national  antagonisms,  this 
future  peace  would  be  dispelled  to  a  very  remote  future. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  internal  conditions  of 
each  State,  the  protectionist  policy  would  have  con- 
sequences no  less  disastrous.  The  cost  of  manufactured 
articles  and  of  the  products  of  the  soil  would  everywhere 
increase.  Life  would  become  dearer,  and  naturally  a 
desire  for  an  increase  of  wages  would  follow.  The 
workers  everywhere  would  feel  the  need  of  increased 
earnings,  and  the  result  would  be  an  intensification  of 
the  conflicts  with  employers,  who  for  their  part  would 
do  their  utmost  not  to  increase  wages,  in  order  to  keep 
for  themselves  the  benefits  of  the  protective  tariff. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  protectionist  policy  tends  to 
increase  the  autocratic  regime  of  each  country,  because 
this  policy  is  adopted  to  favour  a  minority  of  producers 
against  the  majority  of  the  people,  the  consumers. 
Protectionism  is  essentially  anti-democratic.  Therefore, 
if  the  nations  at  war  allow  their  rulers  to  establish 
these  customs  unions,  they  will  allow  them  to  forge  chains 
which  will  keep  them  in  servitude. 

However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  a  policy  of 
fiscal  union,  dividing  the  world  into  two  groups  of 
competing  nations,  would  constitute  an  improvement 
over  the  protectionist  systems  of  separate  nations. 


350          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

In  fact,  there  would  not  only  be  an  opposition  of  interests ; 
there  would  also  be  a  union  of  interests  in  the  heart  of 
each  of  the  two  groups.  And  then  an  understanding 
between  the  two  groups  would  be  more  easily  obtained 
than  by  the  protectionist  policy  applied  by  separate 
nations.  This  sociological  phenomenon  would  be  all 
the  more  pronounced  if  the  two  antagonistic  groups 
were  not  centralized  Empires,  but  freely  confederated 
States.  The  aim  of  Imperialism  is  to  dominate,  and 
its  means  are  force  and  violence.  The  aim  of  federalism 
is  to  diminish  the  intensity  of  the  conflict  in  the  midst  of 
the  federated  nations,  and  to  increase  their  mutual 
aid;  its  means  are  reason  and  demonstration. 

However,  a  policy  of  customs  unions  between  two 
hostile  groups  would  be  of  less  advantage  than  a  policy 
of  free  exchange  for  all.  It  would  weaken  the  demo- 
cratic and  reinforce  the  autocratic  elements;  it  would 
diminish  the  average  standard  of  popular  welfare, 
and  would  increase  the  wealth  of  a  small  minority  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  masses.  It  would  sow  hatred 
between  the  nations,  and  would  therefore  be  destructive 
of  life,  for  only  love  is  productive  of  life.  For  the 
future  of  humanity  and  for  the  good  of  the  individual 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  mankind  will  not  commit  the  folly 
of  raising  a  wall  of  more  or  less  prohibitive  tariffs 
between  the  peoples.  If  we  wish  this  war  to  be  the 
last  war  we  must  suppress  national  hatreds,  and  we  can 
only  do  this  by  suppressing  the  motives  of  hatred. 
One  of  these  is  economic  antagonism.  Let  us  suppress 
it  by  a  system  of  free  and  equalitarian  exchange. 
Human  progress  can  be  established  upon  one  basis  only: 
the  liberty  and  equality  of  individuals  and  of  groups. 
***** 

Whatever  economic  policy  the  nations  may  be  wise  or 
foolish  enough  to  pursue,  we  shall  witness  an  extra- 
ordinary industrial  and  commercial  activity  in  all 
countries  as  soon  as  the  war  is  over,  and  as  labour  will 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  351 

everywhere  be  scarcer  and  less  skilful — for  more  than 
13,000,000  men  will  be  either  dead  or  unfit  for  industrial 
production — it  will  be  necessary  to  develop  the  use  of 
machinery.  The  workshops  will  have  to  be  transformed, 
with  more  powerful  and  more  perfect  machinery. 

From  this  necessity,  resulting  from  the  need  of 
production,  a  very  important  consequence  will  emerge — 
a  great  need  of  capital.  On  every  side  there  will  be 
an  urgent  appeal  for  capital — money — with  which  to 
reconstruct  all  that  has  been  destroyed,  and  to  exploit 
the  countries  of  the  East  and  the  Balkans,  which  will 
be  open  to  capitalistic  enterprise.  There  will  be  a 
veritable  rush  for  mines,  railways,  commercial  and 
agricultural  exploitations,  etc.  Now  the  war  will  have 
resulted  in  a  scarcity  of  European  capital,  to  the  profit 
of  American  capital,  which  will  find  itself  in  such  a 
position  as  it  has  never  before  attained. 

Even  during  the  course  of  the  war  the  need  of  capital 
is  making  itself  felt.  Thus  in  Germany  we  see  the  forma- 
tion of  industrial  unions,  trusts,  or  syndicates,  their 
aim  being  to  obtain  an  increase  of  capital.  The  mining 
companies  are  combining  with  navigation  companies; 
the  electrical  industries  of  the  two  Central  Empires  are 
federating  themselves.  This  is  a  continuation  of  the 
process  of  capitalistic  concentration  which  existed 
before  the  war.  It  is  a  sign  that  after  the  war  economic 
competition  will  be  intensified,  and  that  the  war  of  classes 
will  be  resumed  with  vigour. 

The  need  of  capital  after  the  war  will  probably 
exceed  the  offer;  the  result  will  be  an  increase  of  the 
rate  of  interest  paid  on  money,  whence  will  result  a 
tendency  to  raise  the  price  of  products.  The  need  for 
labour  will  also  be  greater  than  the  offer,  which  will 
contribute  to  produce  the  same  results. 

The  dearth  of  labour  will  be  considerable,  as  a  result 
of  the  deaths 'caused  by  the  war  (at  least  eight  millions), 
and  the  number  of  men  disabled  (at  least  five  millions), 


352  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

and  the  decrease  or  increase  of  emigration.  Thus  it 
is  certain  that  after  the  war  there  will  be  fewer  Belgians 
and  Italians  emigrating  to  France  for  seasonal  labour. 
The  same  will  be  true  of  the  Slavs.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  seems  probable  that  with  the  increase  of  fiscal  burdens 
throughout  Europe  large  numbers  of  young  men  will 
emigrate  overseas,  to  America  or  Australia  or  Africa. 
This  seems  all  the  more  probable  in  that  two  or  three 
years  of  military  life  will  evoke  a  thirst  for  liberty  and 
an  open-air  life,  which  cannot  be  satisfied  in  the  work- 
shops, factories,  and  offices.  The  for  life  emigration 
of  the  agriculturist  and  the  shepherd  will  therefore 
increase  when  the  war  is  over.  In  this  way  the  supply 
of  male  labour  after  the  war  will  be  greatly  diminished. 
The  diminished  quality  of  labour  will  be  no  less  con- 
spicuous, partly  because  many  skilled  men  will  have  been 
lost,  and  partly  because  the  manual  and  intellectual 
skill  of  the  survivors  will  be  lessened  by  long  want  of 
practice. 

To  compensate  for  the  dearth  of  male  workers  there 
will  obviously  be  female  workers.  During  the  war, 
as  we  know,  women  have  in  many  trades  replaced  the 
men  called  to  arms.  The  habit  of  work  in  the  factory 
and  office  has  thus  been  developed  in  the  female  sex. 
This  fact  has  reacted  upon  domestic  labour,  which  has 
become  more  difficult  to  obtain.  After  the  war  the 
economic  conflict  between  the  two  sexes  will  increase, 
the  more  so  as  the  employers  are  endeavouring  to  pay 
lower  wages  to  the  women.  This  economic  and  sexual 
conflict  may,  and  assuredly  will,  become  very  acute  if 
the  women  fail  to  grasp  the  utility  of  trades  unionism 
or  syndicalism,  and  the  importance  of  professional 
solidarity  and  mass  action,  and  if  the  men  refuse,  through 
an  injurious  exclusiveness,  to  receive  the  women  into 
their  unions.  Just  as  the  unions  unite  the  workers 
independently  of  their  national  origin  or  religious  beliefs, 
so  they  should  unite  them  independently  of  sex.  Pro- 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  353 

fessional  and  class  interests  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  question  of  sex. 

Instead  of  a  proletarian  conflict  between  the  sexes 
we  must  have  an  understanding  between  the  sexes, 
otherwise  the  capitalist  class  will  profit  by  this  sexual 
conflict.  Here,  again,  we  perceive  the  harmful  nature 
of  conflict  and  the  beneficial  nature  of  understanding. 

Whether  there  be  conflict  or  understanding  between 
the  sexes  as  regards  the  conditions  of  labour,  we  shall 
find,  after  the  war,  that  the  supply  of  labour  will  still 
be  insufficient  for  the  needs  of  production.  It  is  possible, 
to  judge  by  tendencies  which  have  revealed  them- 
selves during  the  war,  that  the  employers  will  attempt 
to  make  up  for  this  dearth  of  labour  by  a  partial  repeal 
of  the  laws  protecting  labour  (laws  respecting  the  hours 
of  work,  and  the  labour  of  children  and  women),  and 
also  by  resorting  to  Asiatic  and  African  labour.  These 
two  systems  of  replacing  the  missing  workers  will  lead 
to  an  increased  antagonism  between  employers  and 
employed.  And  this  antagonism  will  result  in  strikes 
to  maintain  the  laws  protecting  labour,  to  decrease 
the  hours  of  work  or  to  prevent  their  increase,  to 
obtain  higher  wages,  and  to  prevent  the  introduction  of 
coloured  labour. 

It  will  be  to  the  interest  of  the  human  collectivity  to 
maintain  and  improve  the  laws  protecting  labour, 
which  are  the  only  means  of  preventing  the  degeneration 
of  the  human  species  by  overwork  and  bad  workshop 
conditions,  etc.  It  will  also  be  to  the  interest  of  the 
collectivity,  not  to  refrain  from  resorting  to  Asiatic 
or  African  labour,  but  to  give  these  workers  wages  equal 
to  those  of  European  workers.  This  is  the  only  means, 
in  fact,  of  preventing  racial  hatred,  which  would  result, 
sooner  or  later,  in  sanguinary  conflicts. 

We  may  therefore  assert  that  after  the  war  we  shall 
be  confronted  by  economic  conditions,  and  conditions 
of  labour,  which  will  tend  to  intensify  the  conflict 

23 


354          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

between  the  classes.  Mankind  will  not  be  wise  enough 
to  dimmish  this  conflict  or  to  cause  its  disappearance 
by  acquiescing  in  the  economic  equality  of  all  men. 

This  class  conflict  will  even  reach  the  acuteness  of 
a  revolutionary  situation,  as  may  be  foreseen  if  we  study 
the  economic,  moral,  and  intellectual  conditions  which 
will  obtain  after  the  war. 

*  *  *  *  * 

A  serious  problem  will  present  itself  on  the  cessation 
of  hostilities:  that  of  demobilizing  the  armies  and  the 
munition  factories — that  is,  of  returning  the  able-bodied 
soldiers  and  the  workers  to  their  homes.  If  it  is  done 
suddenly  some  millions  of  men  will  all  at  once  be  thrown 
into  the  labour  market,  whence  a  profound  disturbance 
and  a  tendency  toward  lower  wages,  while  the  cost  of 
living  would  tend  to  increase.  If  we  wish  to  avoid 
trouble  we  must  restore  the  men  to  their  homes  pro- 
gressively, a  few  at  a  time,  and  not  too  quickly,  lest 
there  shall  at  first  be  a  plethora  of  labour  and  a  dearth 
of  employment.  The  organization  of  the  work  of  finding 
places  for  the  workmen  and  clerks  returned  from  the 
war  might  be  greatly  facilitated  by  the  trades  unions,  if 
these  were  enabled  to  treat  with  the  employers  and  to 
furnish  them  with  the  necessary  workers.  Unfortu- 
nately, on  the  one  hand,  the  employers  prefer  to  main- 
tain individual  and  not  collective  relations  with  their 
employees;  on  the  other  hand,  many  workers  entertain 
a  dislike  of  the  collective  activity  of  the  unions,  failing 
to  understand  their  real  interests,  so  that  there  will 
be  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  organization  of  the  work 
of  placing  the  released  men  by  the  unions.  The  result 
will  be  that  the  work  of  demobilizing  the  armies  and 
munition  factories  will  be  made  more  difficult  and  more 
lengthy. 

However,  the  trades  unions  will,  by  the  force  of  things, 
be  called  upon  to  assist  in  the  new  organization.  Their 
participation  in  this  task  will  be  all  the  greater  where 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  355 

the  unions  are  powerful — that  is,  where  the  working  class 
is  most  strongly  organized;  and  this  factor  will  vary 
in  different  countries,  according  to  their  degree  of  demo- 
cratic progress.  In  Great  Britain,  where  the  trades 
unions  are  extremely  powerful,  they  will  play  a  highly 
important  part,  and  will  thereby  prevent  social  dis- 
turbances. 

But  whatever  the  facts  may  be  as  to  the  co-operation 
of  the  labour  organizations,  it  is  most  important,  for 
the  peace  of  society,  that  the  Governments  shall  not 
release  the  soldiers  and  workers  without  continuing, 
and  for  some  time,  the  payment  to  them  and  their 
families  of  the  allowances  without  which  they  will  not 
be  able  to  live.  On  their  return  to  their  homes  the 
workers  in  factories  and  on  the  land,  and  the  shop- 
assistants,  clerks,  etc.,  must  not  find  themselves  without 
work  and  without  bread  at  the  same  time.  They  and 
their  families  must  live  while  they  are  waiting  for  work. 
Otherwise  we  should  be  confronted  by  a  serious — a 
very  serious — situation. 

In  Great  Britain  the  question  has  already  occupied 
the  thoughts  of  the  world  of  workers  and  manu- 
facturers. A  committee  has  been  appointed,  and  after 
investigating  the  matter  has  concluded  that  the  de- 
mobilization of  six  to  eight  millions  of  workmen  and 
soldiers — nearly  half  the  wage-earners  of  the  country — 
will  occupy  at  least  two  years.  It  demanded  that  the 
workers  must,  as  I  suggested,  be  paid  indemnities  and 
allowances  for  a  given  term  while  finding  another  place. 
*  *  *  *  * 

The  war  has  reversed  the  customary  moral  value 
of  men's  actions.  Life  in  the  midst  of  violence  and 
slaughter  develops  in  man  an  appetite  for  violence 
and  accustoms  him  to  the  idea  of  resorting  to  violence 
in  order  to  obtain  the  realization  of  his  desires  and  re- 
quirements. The  life  of  war  educates  men  for  war, 
not  for  peace.  It  will  have  given  the  proletarian 


356          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

masses  a  conception  of  the  strength  of  the  masses, 
and  will  have  made  them  understand  the  power  of  direct 
action.  The  period  of  the  war  will  therefore  have 
developed  the  spirit  of  violence  in  these  men. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  military  life  is  a  life  of  com- 
parative idleness.  At  moments  an  extraordinary  effort 
is  demanded  of  the  men,  and  then,  for  some  time,  their 
labours  are  lessened  and  the  effort  demanded  is  mediocre. 
It  is  not  the  continuous  labour  of  the  workshop  or  the 
office. 

From  this  results  an  abatement  of  the  love  of 
work,  and  also  the  discovery  that  one  can  very  well 
live  without  productive  work;  and  then,  inevitably,  the 
man  is  led  to  appropriate  the  goods  produced  by  others. 
It  is  this  which  explains  the  "prigging"  general  among 
the  soldiers  of  all  armies.  Only  in  appearance  does 
discipline  tend  to  prevent  it.  Moreover,  discipline  is 
perforce  relaxed  on  account  of  the  circumstances  of 
the  war  and  its  duration.  The  respect  for  property  is 
diminished. 

Open-air  life  will  have  created  a  new  appetite  for 
independence,  increased  by  the  reaction  natural  to 
men  who  have  for  months  been  subjected  to  military 
servitude.  Men  will  find  it  less  easy  to  endure  the 
domination  of  other  men.  A  phenomenon  will  occur 
in  the  human  brain  comparable  to  that  which  occurs 
in  a  boiler  when  the  steam  cannot  escape.  The  pressure 
increases,  and  finally,  when  it  has  passed  the  point  of 
resistance,  an  explosion  occurs.  Similarly  the  incessant 
vexations  of  passive  obedience  which  are  endured  by 
inferiors  in  military  uniform  accumulate  and  engender 
a  state  of  irritability  which  will  inevitably  explode 
when  peace  enforces  the  return  of  every  soldier  to 
civil  life. 

The  continual  spectacle  which  the  soldier  has  had 
before  his  eyes  for  months  and  years  is  so  full  of  horrors 
that  the  human  being  has  been  gradually  becoming 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS    357 

insensitive.  He  no  longer  pities  the  sufferings  of  others, 
and  he  feels  his  own  less  keenly.  This  explains  how  men 
can  march  for  hours  even  when  atrociously  wounded. 
They  acquire  a  contempt  for  death  and  suffering.  This 
explains  many  acts  of  violence  towards  women  of  the 
same  nationality  as  the  violator.  This  explains  the 
increasing  anxiety  which  the  soldier  displays  in  respect 
of  his  own  possessions  and  his  own  life.  The  human 
being  reverts  to  primitive  animality;  a  narrow  egoism 
is  on  the  increase,  despite  what  has  been  said  and  written, 
in  ignorance  or  from  interest,  by  those  who  regard  the 
war  as  "  romanticists  "  and  not  as  psychologists. 

"  The  war  is  a  school  of  anarchy,"  I  heard  a  peasant 
soldier  remark  one  day.  It  is  perfectly  true.  The  daily 
experience  of  these  years  of  warfare  has  revealed  to  all 
the  incapacity  of  our  leaders,  the  fraud  and  confusion 
which  they  maintain;  and  from  this  results  a  contempt  for 
authority.  Everybody  in  France  is  repeating  the  words 
of  a  deputy:  "  France  has  been  saved  by  her  soldiers,  in 
spite  of  her  leaders."  Moreover,  the  dangers  incurred 
and  the  constant  presence  of  death  have  accustomed  men 
to  be  unafraid.  They  are  less  fearful  than  of  old,  so  that 
constraint  is  no  longer  effective.  Men  are  becoming 
freer,  more  their  own  masters.  The  longer  the  war  lasts 
the  more  these  phenomena  become  accentuated. 

In  uniform  a  man's  food  is  assured.  He  has  no  need 
to  think  about  it,  and  it  is  no  longer  directly  dependent 
on  his  daily  labour.  Moreover,  he  does  not  know  whether 
he  will  be  alive  to-morrow.  From  this  results  a  more  or 
less  absolute  indifference  as  to  the  morrow;  an  indiffer- 
ence as  to  what  may  happen,  whether  the  future  holds 
death  or  wounds  in  store.  So  men  are  inclined  to  apply 
the  maxim:  a  short  life  and  a  merry  one.  They  lose 
their  sense  of  the  value  of  money,  and  think  of  nothing 
but  enjoying  life.  And  their  conception  of  enjoyment 
is  very  mean,  very  low ;  and  this  is  an  effect  of  the  evils 
of  the  war.  To-morrow,  perhaps,  they  will  be  dead. 


858          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

So  the  spirit  of  economy  takes  flight,  giving  place  to 
the  spirit  of  adventure,  even  in  the  most  timorous  and 
domestic. 

In  the  military  life  there  is,  from  certain  points  of 
view,  more  equality  than  in  civilian  life,  especially  in 
time  of  war.  Men  are  often  better  fed,  better  clothed 
than  in  civilian  life.  They  live  side  by  side,  intimately 
mingled — peasants,  artisans,  clerks,  employers  large 
and  small,  and  "  intellectuals  "  of  all  sorts.  They  see 
into  one  another's  minds,  they  come  to  know  one  another 
better,  both  as  to  their  aspirations  and  their  needs. 
Their  minds  are  opened  to  new  horizons.  This  process 
often  proceeds  unconsciously,  and  will  become  apparent 
only  after  the  war,  when  peace  has  caused  a  return  of 
mental  tranquillity. 

There  is  a  mutual  exchange  of  ideas  among  the  men 
in  the  trenches,  the  camps,  and  the  barracks.  The 
malcontents,  the  Socialists  and  Syndicalists  and  union 
men,  discuss  and  explain  and  instruct.  Thus  the 
French  prisoners  in  the  camp  of  Altengrabow  publish 
a  sort  of  newspaper.  It  is  entitled  Les  Pensees  Libres. 
An  immense  amount  of  underground  propaganda  is 
incessantly  carried  on,  and  the  longer  the  war  lasts,  the 
more  its  power  increases,  under  the  influence  of  the 
suffering  and  boredom  and  fatigue  and  enervation 
produced  by  the  war  itself. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  frequent  instances  of  inequality 
and  injustice  which  occur  in  every  human  collectivity 
which  is  not  founded  on  equality  are  easily  and  even 
acutely  perceived  by  all,  for  all  live  in  the  greatest 
promiscuity,  instead  of  on  different  planes,  as  is  the  case 
with  rich  and  poor  in  the  civilian  world. 

From  the  above  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  life  in 
war-time  it  follows  that  the  mentality  of  the  men  who 
return  from  military  service  will  have  undergone  certain 
modifications.  The  intellect  will  be  principally  influ- 
enced by  the  conditions  of  warfare,  because  the  men  will 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  359 

have  learned  what  they  did  not  know  before.  Their 
character,  too,  is  undergoing  modification,  but  much 
more  slowly,  so  that  even  though  it  may  appear  to  be 
changed  as  a  result  of  the  conditions  of  warfare  and  the 
general  state  of  fever  which  is  invading  humanity, 
in  reality  the  human  character  will  not  display  any 
permanent  modification.  Only  long  years  after  the 
war  will  men  be  able  to  establish  certain  psychological 
effects  of  the  conflict. 

However,  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  period  immedi- 
ately after  the  war  men  will  be  impatient  of  the  yoke; 
they  will  conceive  a  distaste  for  the  domestic  life;  they 
will  entertain  vague  aspirations  toward  equality,  and 
views  a  little  broader  than  of  old;  they  will  display 
an  adventurous  habit  of  mind,  and  an  inclination  to 
resort  to  violence  in  order  to  satisfy  their  needs,  a 
tendency  to  work  less,  and  a  desire  to  enjoy  life,  careless 
of  the  morrow.  These  are  the  elements  which  constitute 
the  revolutionary  spirit. 

In  such  a  spirit  these  men  will  return  to  their  homes, 
where  they  will  find  the  taxes  doubled,  if  not  trebled, 
while  the  material  difficulties  of  life  will  be  considerable, 
although  they  will  see  other  men  who  have  enriched 
themselves,  and  will  meet  others  who  are  more  or  less 
completely  ruined  or  impoverished;  they  will  encounter 
women  who  will  compete  with  them  in  the  labour 
market,  women  who  will  themselves  be  discontented 
with  their  social  inequality.  They  will  discover  that 
none  of  those  ideals  have  been  realized  which  the  ruling 
classes  dangled  in  front  of  the  popular  masses,  in  order 
to  secure  the  more  or  less  voluntary  sacrifice  of  their 
lives.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  ideals  are 
increased  comfort,  the  maintenance  and  increase  of 
liberties,  and  the  spirit  of  patriotism — that  is,  in  short, 
the  spirit  of  solidarity,  hence  of  equality,  etc. ;  and  the 
discontents  of  all  and  the  aspirations  of  all  will  combine 
with  a  view  to  obtaining  an  increase  of  well-being  and 


360          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

an  abatement  of  injustice.  Mental  bitterness  and  irrita- 
tion will  be  prevalent.  A  revolutionary  state  of  mind 
will  come  into  being,  together  with  revolutionary 
economic  conditions. 

Everybody  will  be  affected — the  urban  populations 
and  the  rural  populations,  the  lower  middle  classes, 
and  even  many  of  the  wealthier  middle  class:  investors 
whose  dividends  will  be  diminished  by  the  increased 
prices  of  products  and  the  weight  of  taxation.  This 
revolutionary  mental  situation  may  not  result  in  revolu- 
tionary disturbances  if  the  capitalist  and  conservative 
elements  are  in  their  own  interest  wise  enough  to  realize 
the  gravity  of  the  situation.  But,  unhappily,  this  does 
not  seem  to  be  likely,  for  we  see  them,  even  during  the 
war,  attempting  to  prevent  the  application  of  every 
measure  which  would  distribute  the  burden  of  the  war 
more  equitably;  to  curb  liberties;  to  destroy  the  con- 
quests made  by  the  working-class  proletariat  during  the 
last  fifty  years;  and  to  construct  an  economic,  social, 
and  political  world  pervaded  by  the  spirit  of  authority 
and  founded,  like  the  German  autocracy,  on  fear  and 
militarism. 

Everything,  therefore,  seems  to  be  working  together 
for  the  development  of  a  revolutionary  situation  and 
a  revolutionary  mentality.  It  seems,  in  consequence, 
highly  probable  that  after  the  war  there  will  be  revolu- 
tionary movements  everywhere,  in  neutral  as  well  as 
in  belligerent  countries.  Will  they  be  serious  or  wide- 
spread ?  Will  they  triumph  or  miscarry  ?  No  one 
can  foretell  with  certainty.  It  is  probable  that  the 
triumphs  and  the  failures  will  be  relative,  and  will 
balance  one  another.  When  the  balance-sheet  is  drawn 
up  after  the  period  of  social  conflict  which  will  follow 
the  present  period  of  international  conflict,  it  will 
doubtless  be  discovered  that  there  has  been  a  social 
amelioration  in  the  direction  of  an  increase  of  liberty, 
and  perhaps  of  equality.  This  will  be  so  because  the 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS    361 

aspirations  toward  liberty  and  equality  are  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  human  majority,  and  because  the  course  of 
history  shows  a  continual  progress  of  humanity  toward 
a  greater  liberty  and  greater  equality. 

If  these  probable  revolutionary  movements  do  take 
place  the  world  will  be  the  spectator  of  a  situation 
analogous,  although  in  an  inverse  sense,  to  that  of  the 
French  Revolution  of  1789.  Economic  and  political 
conditions  in  the  interior  of  France  led  Frenchmen  to 
revolt,  and  their  revolution  became  transformed  into 
a  series  of  foreign  wars,  and  thus,  in  a  sense,  it  sowed 
the  seed  of  revolution  in  the  world.  To-day  a  plexus 
of  national  wars  is  probably  destined  to  end  in  a  series 
of  revolutionary  social  disturbances  throughout  the 
world. 

The  impression  that  the  situation  after  the  war  will 
be  revolutionary  seems  already  very  general.  It  has 
been  expressed  more  or  less  definitely  in  the  German 
Reichstag  and  the  Prussian  Landtag  and  the  English 
House  of  Lords.  The  deputy  Karl  Liebknecht,  in  March, 
1916,  went  so  far  as  openly  to  invite  the  masses  to 
revolt:  "  The  workers  must  settle  their  affairs  themselves. 
The  troops  must  not  merely  fight  in  the  trenches;  they 
must  lower  their  arms  and  turn  them  against  the  common 
enemy."  In  certain  newspapers  in  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  even  Germany,  allusions,  which  sometimes 
are  by  no  means  discreet,  and  menaces  have  frequently 
appeared  during  the  last  few  months.  Conversations 
and  letters  in  proletarian  circles,  both  at  the  front  and 
in  the  rear,  constantly  reveal  an  intense  desire  to  change 
the  existing  state  of  affairs  for  one  better  and  less 
unjust.  This  class  is  beginning  to  be  haunted  by  the 
phantom  of  revolution.  The  longer  the  war  lasts, 
the  more  general  the  spirit  of  revolution  becomes,  the 
more  it  pervades  men's  minds,  the  more  probable  it 
becomes  that  the  end  will  be  revolution. 

To  prevent  violent  revolution  the  ruling  classes  must 


362          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

be  wise  enough  to  give  ground — that  is,  they  must 
impose  the  burden  of  taxation  on  inheritances  and  the 
incomes  of  the  rich,  instead  of  seeking  to  let  them  fall 
on  the  mass  of  the  poor.  A  movement  of  equalization 
between  the  life  of  the  rich  and  that  of  the  poor  must  be 
established;  hence  a  lowering  of  the  standard  of  living 
in  the  one  case,  and  an  improvement  of  it  in  the  other. 
Various  forms  of  nationalizing  or  communalizing  the 
land  should  be  introduced,  and  applied  also  to  certain 
industries — to  railways,  canals,  the  manufacture  of 
sugar  and  rice,  merchant  vessels,  mines,  etc.  The  thing 
is  quite  feasible,  without  shocks  to  the  proprietors,  by 
means  of  very  heavy  death  duties  and  heavy  income- 
taxes,  payable  not  in  money,  but  in  land  and  industrial 
shares,  which  would  become  the  national  or  communal 
property,  and  inalienable.  This  procedure  would  obviate 
revolutionary  disturbances,  which  always  involve  more 
or  less  bloodshed  and  destruction  of  property.  We  hope 
that  mankind  will  be  reasonable  enough  to  realize  this 
method  of  human  progress,  but  truly  the  sight  of  the  past 
makes  us  doubtful  of  the  possibility  of  such  wisdom. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  trench  war  on  the  Western  front  has  lasted  more 
than  two  years,  with  the  result  that  from  the  North  Sea 
to  the  Swiss  frontier  the  fields,  meadows,  and  wood- 
lands have  all  been  ploughed  by  the  shells.  Nothing 
is  left  of  what  existed  before  the  war :  neither  cultivable 
soil  nor  boundaries.  For  the  soil  itself  has  disappeared, 
so  intermingled  is  it  with  the  earths  excavated  from  the 
subsoil  by  the  shells.  The  villages  are  shapeless  heaps 
of  rubble,  often  with  human  corpses  and  fragments 
buried  beneath  them.  In  many  places  the  grass  has 
grown,  and  there  is  no  longer  anything  to  show  that  in 
July,  1914,  there  stood  a  flourishing  village,  a  fine  farm- 
house, or  perhaps  a  magnificent  chateau.  The  destruc- 
tion of  the  villages  has  resulted  in  the  destruction  of 
the  registers,  which  were  at  the  communal  offices. 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS    363 

The  lawyers'  offices,  in  the  market  towns,  the  capitals 
of  cantons,  have  not  escaped  the  common  lot,  and  have 
often  been  set  on  fire  by  shells  or  bombs.  No  boundaries, 
no  property  register,  no  title-deeds  are  left ! 

Consequently  the  following  problem  presents  itself: 
How,  after  the  war,  can  this  property  be  reconstituted 
and  restored  to  the  hands  of  its  owners  ?  The  in- 
dividualistic solution  would  be  difficult  or  impossible. 
Families  will  have  disappeared,  completely  or  in  part; 
young  children  will  be  left  alone.  It  will  be  necessary 
to  trust  to  human  testimony.  But  how  fallible  this  is, 
even  when  it  is  given  in  good  faith  !  What  will  it  be 
if  given  in  bad  faith,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  rood  more 
soil  than  before  the  war  ?  And  there  will  be  no  material 
proof,  no  certain  point  of  departure  which  will  afford 
a  basis  for  the  determination  of  boundaries.  The 
tribunals  will  be  confronted  by  contradictory  affirma- 
tions, and  it  will  be  impossible  to  prove  the  truth  of 
these  and  the  falsity  of  those,  or  the  falsity  of  all. 
There  is  one  neat  and  simple  method  of  solving  this 
difficult  problem,  but  who  will  have  the  courage  to 
adopt  it  ?  It  would  be  to  give  an  indemnity  to  the 
proprietors  for  the  complete  loss  of  their  property, 
certified  to  exist  by  human  testimony;  then  all  the  land 
in  all  the  communes  thus  destroyed  would  be  declared 
inalienable  common  property.  This  system  would 
obviate  all  discussion  as  to  the  boundaries  of  properties, 
their  situation,  and  their  precise  extent.  Justice  and 
equity  would  be  satisfied,  as  the  proprietors  would 
have  been  indemnified  for  the  loss  of  their  property. 
Apart  from  this  system  of  communalizing  agrarian 
property,  I  see  no  means  of  equitably  solving  the 
problem  presented  by  the  complete  destruction  of  the 
boundaries,  registers,  and  title-deeds  of  millions  of 
acres  of  land,  and  thousands  of  villages  destroyed  or 
ploughed  up  by  shells. 


364          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Economic  and  social  conditions  will  undergo  many 
changes  during  the  period  after  the  war.  But  this 
will  not  be  the  case  with  the  conditions  of  the  arts, 
letters,  and  the  sciences.  The  international  relations 
between  men  of  science  will  no  doubt  be  resumed  almost 
immediately.  Science  is  on  a  plane  far  above  the  national 
plane;  it  is  essentially  human  and  cosmopolitan.  When 
the  mantle  of  lead  and  iron  thrown  over  the  world  by 
victorious  militarism  is  raised,  science  will  once  more 
become  resplendent;  and  scientific  ideas  will  be  ex- 
changed all  the  world  over,  as  before  the  war.  There 
will  have  been  a  brief  eclipse  in  scientific  life,  that  is  all. 
No  doubt  there  will  be  a  scientific  "  boom,"  due  to  the 
necessity  of  replacing  labour  by  mechanical,  physical, 
and  chemical  processes.  Applied  science  will  play  its 
part  in  the  inevitable  commercial  and  industrial 
"  boom  "  of  which  I  have  spoken.  But  applied  science 
always  promotes  pure  and  abstract  science,  which  in 
its  turn  promotes  applied  science.  Scientific  theories 
and  researches  are  inextricably  scientific  applications. 
So  that  science,  as  a  whole,  in  all  its  branches,  under 
the  impulse  of  the  needs  of  the  period  following  the 
war,  will  visibly  assume  its  place  in  the  world,  perhaps 
a  higher  place  than  before  the  war,  above  all  in  Great 
Britain,  where  scientific  education  was  rather  neglected. 

As  for  the  arts  and  letters,  it  seems  to  me  probable 
that  they  will  tend  to  become  more  realistic  and  less 
sentimental  than  before  the  war.  People  are  already 
saturated  in  the  war,  in  its  heroic  actions  as  well  as  in 
its  base  and  criminal  actions;  they  will  be  even  more 
So  in  six  months',  a  year's,  or  two  years'  time,  when 
peace  is  concluded.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  tradi- 
tional songs  of  the  heroism  of  battle,  the  traditional 
descriptions  of  military  splendour,  will  be  laid  aside, 
and  will  give  place  to  realistic  works  like  Tolstoy's 
masterpiece,  War  and  Peace.  It  seems,  even,  that  people 
will  soon  cease  to  speak  of  the  war,  for  the  public  is 


AFTER  THE  WAR:  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  365 

already  tired  of  it,  and  will  become  more  and  more  so. 
For  instance,  we  perceive  already  that  classic  military 
dramas  are  losing  their  vogue.  Soldiers  are  living  the 
war,  and  do  not  care  to  see  it  or  read  of  it  in  a  false 
and  idealistic  shape.  Civilians  want  to  see  it  as  it  is 
in  reality. 

The  physical  and  moral  sufferings  of  the  period  of 
the  war  is  reacting  upon  humanity,  evoking  in  it  the 
desire  to  amuse  itself,  to  procure  pleasant  and  cheerful 
sensations,  not  melancholy  ones.  Every  period  of 
depression  provokes  a  period  of  gaiety:  it  is  the  natural 
reaction.  So  it  is  probable  that  the  public  will  demand 
a  gay,  cheerful  literature,  with  no  dramatic  or  tragic 
elements.  Comedy,  light  opera,  and  vaudeville  will 
no  doubt  triumph  on  the  stage.  These  will  be  restful 
after  the  dramas  of  real  life  witnessed  during  the  war. 

As  for  the  international  relations  between  artists, 
literary  men,  and  dramatists,  they  will  promptly  be 
resumed,  for  art  lives  by  the  mutual  contributions  of 
all  its  manifestations.  An  art  shut  in  between  national 
walls  is  an  art  frozen  into  one  or  several  formulae, 
condemned  to  a  sickly  existence  and  to  death. 

The  vital  force  of  art,  whatever  its  form,  is  above 
national  antagonisms,  and  it  will  therefore  insure  that 
artists  will  rapidly  resume  the  international  relations 
broken  off  by  the  social  malady  of  warfare — for  every 
war  is  a  social  malady.  The  words  of  hatred  and  the 
partial  judgments  pronounced  in  the  heat  of  the  con- 
flict will  soon  be  forgotten;  and  after  the  war  life  will 
quickly  resume  its  normal  and  pacific  course. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT 

The  necessity  of  budgetary  economy — Impossible  to  economize  on 
hygiene  or  social  legislation — To  economize  on  education  is  mad- 
ness— We  must  economize  on  our  armies,  fleets,  and  armaments — 
The  result  of  not  disarming — The  results  of  partial  disarmament — 
Complete  disarmament  is  the  keystone  of  a  final  peace — The  advan- 
tages of  disarmament :  budgetary  economy,  increased  production, 
disappearance  of  military  parasitism,  disappearancce  of  the  mili- 
tary spirit — Political  results:  international  juridical  relations,  the 
weakening  of  autocracies,  the  strengthening  of  democracies — The 
armaments  of  neutrals  are  due  to  the  fever  of  armaments  from 
which  the  belligerents  have  been  suffering — Naval  disarmament — 
The  opponents  of  disarmament  are  the  professional  soldiers  and  the 
conservative  elements — The  whole  of  humanity  longs  for  the  end 
of  wars  and  armaments — The  realization  of  disarmament  depends 
on  the  will  of  the  democracies — The  conditions  resulting  from  dis- 
armament: the  suppression  of  arsenals  and  munition  factories;  an 
indemnity  to  the  proprietors;  international  tribunals  or  courts; 
the  Amphictyonic  Council  of  the  nations — Excommunication  as  a 
sanction — The  police  force  of  the  nations — The  police  army — 
The  federation  of  the  nations — This  sociological  process  continues 
a  process  which  has  been  unfolding  since  the  dawn  of  time — The 
need  of  union,  disturbed  by  the  German  mentality,  which  is 
poisoned  by  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  authority,  has  engendered 
the  war — The  ruling  classes  of  Germany  were  the  conscious  or  un- 
conscious agents  of  the  universal  determinism — The  ultimate  end 
of  the  war  must  be  disarmament — The  final  result  of  all  the  econo- 
mic, political,  and  moral  conditions ;  it  is  no  Utopia,  but  a  necessity. 

ALL  the  belligerents  will  emerge  from  the  world- 
war  drained  of  men  and  of  money.     All  the  nations 
will  be  ruined,  and  consequently  they  will  have  to 
reduce  their  annual  budgets.     In  what  department  of 
the  budget  must  these  economies  be  made  ?     Let  us 
look  into  this  matter  a  little. 

The  States  will  not  be  able  to  economize  on  the 
dividends  on  loans,  nor  on  pensions,  nor  on  the  general 
expenses  of  the  political  administration  of  the  country. 

366 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT    367 

The  portions  of  the  budget  which  are  compressible  are 
those  relating  to  the  creation  and  upkeep  of  ways  of 
communication,  and  the  expenditure  on  social  hygiene, 
social  legislation  and  relief,  education,  and,  lastly,  on 
the  army  and  navy. 

Economies  made  in  respect  of  these  various  portions 
of  the  budget,  with  the  exception  of  the  last  (that 
relating  to  the  army  and  navy),  can  only  be  made  to 
the  detriment  of  the  nation.  The  economic  power  of 
each  nation  depends  on  its  means  of  communication 
and  the  excellence  of  its  social  hygiene.  Any  diminu- 
tion of  such  expenditure  would  impoverish  the  whole 
nation.  The  internal  peace  of  a  nation  depends  in 
part  on  measures  of  social  legislation  and  systems  of 
relief;  to  suspend  these,  to  weaken  them,  even  to 
refrain  from  increasing  them,  would  result  in  a  rupture 
of  the  internal  peace,  and  the  moral  deterioration  of 
each  country.  It  would  seem  that  there  is,  at  least  in 
certain  States — for  example,  in  the  British  Empire — 
a  tendency  to  economize  on  the  expenditure  devoted 
to  education.  To  diminish  the  annual  expenditure  on 
libraries,  laboratories  of  scientific  research,  and  the 
primary  and  secondary  schools,  seems  to  some  minds 
an  entirely  reasonable  measure.  But  if  we  reflect  ever 
so  little  we  see  that  it  would  be  the  worst  of  follies. 

The  interests  of  the  human  species,  those  of  the 
national  collectivity  and  those  of  the  individual,  all 
agree  in  showing  that  every  effort  must  -be  made  to 
uplift  the  individual  ever  more  and  more.  And  this 
uplifting  can  only  be  effected  by  an  ever  greater  and 
greater  spread  of  human  knowledge.  Any  increase  of 
knowledge  is  a  human  conquest  which  aids  in  a  further 
conquest.  The  larger  the  number  of  men  possessing 
such  knowledge,  the  greater  the  possibility  of  its  further 
increase.  The  higher  the  quality  of  the  knowledge 
possessed  by  men,  the  greater  this  same  possibility  of 
the  further  increase  of  knowledge. 


368         LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  well-being  of  the  world,  and  of  each  individual 
in  particular,  depends  on  the  increase  of  knowledge. 
All  scientific  discoveries,  all  inventions,  all  the  applica- 
tions of  science  are  the  work  of  human  brains  developed 
by  a  scientific  culture.  And  the  greater  the  number 
of  cultivated  minds,  the  greater  the  possibility  of 
increased  well-being,  for  there  is  then  an  incessant 
achievement  of  knowledge  and  of  progress. 

If,  in  the  course  of  thousands  of  years,  man  had  not 
acquired  a  brain  which  was  continually  undergoing 
improvement,  he  would  still  be  what  he  was  in  pre- 
historic times,  when  he  lived  in  nudity,  sheltering  him- 
self in  caves  and  the  trunks  of  trees,  living  on  berries, 
roots,  and  small  game  captured  by  running  it  down. 
To  make  brains  is  therefore  the  most  useful  task  which 
the  collectivity  can  undertake.  Far  from  limiting  the 
expenditure  which  this  making  of  brains  requires,  it 
must  be  increased.  Every  thousand  pounds  spent  on 
education  is  in  reality  an  economy,  a  saving  of  life  and 
a  saving  of  time  effected  by  humanity  in  its  unflagging 
and  continuous  progress  toward  an  increase  of  material, 
intellectual,  and  moral  well-being. 

Therefore,  if  men  are  guided  by  reason,  far  from 
economizing  on  the  expenditure  allotted  to  education, 
they  will,  in  the  interest  of  the  species,  the  collectivity, 
and  the  individual,  progressively  and  continuously 
increase  it.  The  only  department  of  the  budget  in 
which  the  necessary  and  indispensable  economies  could 
be  made  is  the  department  concerned  with  military  and 
naval  expenditure.  We  are  thus  led  to  the  problem  of 
permanent  armies  and  disarmament. 

***** 

Three  solutions  are  possible:  (1)  No  disarmament; 
(2)  a  partial  general  disarmament;  (3)  a  total  general 
disarmament.  In  the  first  case,  matters  would  continue 
after  the  war  as  they  were  before  the  war.  The  nations 
would  still  compete  in  the  matter  of  armaments  and 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT     369 

enormous  armies.  This  would  mean  the  survival  of 
the  ruinous  policy  of  armed  peace,  with  all  its  disastrous 
consequences:  a  stupendous  expenditure  of  wealth  in 
heaping  up  arms  and  munitions,  with  millions  of  men 
in  the  barracks,  unproductive  consumers;  it  would 
result  in  crushing  taxation  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  militarist  mentality — that  is  to  say,  the  mentality 
of  autocracy  and  slavish  obedience,  with  the  employ- 
ment of  violence  and  terrorism — the  maintenance  of  the 
spirit  of  conquest.  In  short,  it  would  mean  the 
certainty  that  in  the  near  or  remote  future  fresh  wars 
would  break  out,  more  terrible  than  this  war,  because 
warfare  would  be  further  perfected.  It  would  mean 
an  inevitable  return  to  barbarism,  unless,  in  the  course 
of  the  years,  the  forces  of  peace  and  reason  were  to 
become  sufficiently  powerful  to  obtain  disarmament 
before  the  occurrence  of  further  conflicts.  But  this 
would  be  to  revert,  after  many  years'  delay — that  is, 
after  loss  of  time — to  the  second  or  the  third  solution.  It 
would  be  wiser  not  to  wait,  but  to  solve  the  problem  now. 
Partial  disarmament  would  permit  of  the  continuance 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  present  errors  and  misdeeds.  If 
the  number  of  men  under  arms  were  diminished,  arma- 
ments would  be  maintained  at  the  same  level,  so  that  the 
expenditure  would  be  but  slightly  decreased.  Instead 
of  a  strong  standing  army  as  before  the  war,  there 
would  be  a  militia  consisting  of  the  whole  nation,  and 
a  comparatively  small  permanent  army,  an  army  of 
Praetorians.  The  military  mentality,  whose  foundations 
are  autocracy,  servile  obedience,  and  fear,  would  con- 
tinue to  exist.  And  it  would  necessarily  engender  its 
natural  and  logical  product — an  appetite  for  conquest 
and  a  tendency  to  resort  to  warfare.  Moreover,  the 
natural  tendency  of  the  Praetorian  army  would  result 
in  its  attempting  to  reduce  the  rest  of  the  nation  to 
slavery,  without  speaking  of  its  inevitable  employment 
in  social  conflicts  between  employers  and  employed. 

24 


870  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Partial  disarmament  implies  the  maintenance  of 
armies  whose  strength  and  number  would  obviously  be 
in  proportion  to  the  populations  of  the  different  States. 
Hence  this  consequence  arises:  by  the  mere  demo- 
graphical  action  of  natality  and  mortality,  Some  States 
increase  more  quickly  than  others.  And  the  less  civilized 
they  are,  the  more  rapid  is  their  growth;  for  as  civiliza- 
tion increases  the  relative  natality  diminishes,  as  a  result 
of  the  voluntary  control  of  conception.  Thus  Germany, 
in  a  quarter  of  a  century,  would  possess  a  population 
of  crushing  dimensions  compared  with  that  of  France, 
and  her  army,  although  reduced,  would  be  much  stronger 
in  numbers  than  that  of  France.  The  same  phenomenon 
would  occur  in  Russia,  whose  population  and  army 
would  greatly  exceed  those  of  Germany.  The  inevitable 
consequence  would  be  the  continuance  of  offensive  and 
defensive  alliances  between  States — that  is,  the  balance 
of  power.  And  the  result  of  this  would  be  further  wars, 
as  though  there  had  been  no  disarmament  at  all. 

No  doubt  a  certain  amount  of  time  would  elapse 
before  the  outbreak  of  these  new  wars,  and  perhaps  by 
then  the  spirit  of  reason  and  of  peace  would  have 
become  sufficiently  powerful  to  secure,  before  the  out- 
break, a  total  disarmament,  the  certain  pledge  of  a 
policy  of  peace.  But  why  wait  ?  Why  not  be  wise 
now,  and  procure  a  general  and  complete  disarmament  ? 


General  and  complete  disarmament  is  the  only 
remedy  which  would  permit  of  the  necessary  economies, 
and  which  would  suppress  all  causes  and  all  possibilities 
of  war.  Where  there  are  neither  weapons  nor  armies 
no  one  can  make  war,  however  much  they  desire  to 
do  so.  General  and  complete  disarmament  is  the 
keystone  of  a  lasting  peace.  Without  it  we  shall  have 
truces  only. 

Let  us   examine  the  consequences   of  a  total   dis- 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT    871 

armament.  They  are  many,  and  of  various  kinds. 
They  present  many  advantages  and  no  disadvantages. 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  fact  that  the  States  would 
no  longer  require  to  purchase  and  store  munitions, 
arms,  Dreadnoughts,  Zeppelins,  etc.,  a  budgetary 
economy  would  result  which  in  the  case  of  each  great 
Power  would  result  in  an  annual  saving  of  tens  of 
millions  of  pounds.  This  economy  would  react  very 
favourably  on  the  other  economic  conditions  of  the 
world.  The  munitions  factories  and  arsenals  would 
make  way  for  factories  producing  the  products  of  con- 
sumption for  peaceful  usages.  The  workers  who  were 
employed  in  death-dealing  labours  would  be  employed 
in  life-giving  labours.  All  the  areas  covered  by  forts, 
fortifications,  barracks,  military  magazines,  etc.,  would 
be  restored  to  purposes  useful  to  the  human  race — 
agriculture,  schools,  workshops,  etc. 

The  budgetary  economy  in  respect  of  the  material 
of  war  would  involve  many  other  economies  in  respect 
of  the  productive  utilization  of  men  and  things. 

Disarmament,  by  causing  the  disappearance  of 
armies,  would  effect  a  budgetary  economy  which  would 
amount  to  tens  of  millions  of  pounds  for  each  State. 
But  despite  its  positive  importance,  this  economy  would 
appear  negligible  when  compared  with  the  enormous 
social  economy  which  would  result  from  it:  for  soldiers 
are  consumers,  but  not  producers.  When  they  are 
employed  on  their  proper  task — that  is,  in  time  of  war — 
they  are  not  only  consumers,  but  destroyers.  Never 
at  any  time  is  the  soldier  as  a  soldier  a  producer.  The 
soldier  is  a  social  parasite. 

The  suppression  of  armies  would  mean  the  suppression 
of  this  parasitism.  Consequently  the  men,  instead  of 
living  in  barracks,  would  be  in  workshops,  laboratories, 
offices,  or  the  fields,  where  they  would  labour  physically 
and  intellectually.  Agricultural,  industrial,  commercial, 
scientific,  and  artistic  production  would  increase. 


872          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Disarmament  would  throw  into  the  productive 
torrent  of  humanity  a  host  of  forces  of  an  unproductive 
nature,  or  even  inhibitive  of  production.  This  would  be 
an  enormous  gain:  so  great  that  we  cannot  estimate  it. 

Complete  disarmament,  by  suppressing  armies,  would 
produce  very  considerable  psychological  ameliorations, 
by  effecting  the  progressive  enfeeblement,  and  at  last 
the  disappearance,  of  the  military  spirit.  Twenty-four 
years  ago,  in  a  scientific  work  which  scandalized  a  great 
many  people,  La  Psychologic  du  Militaire  Professionnel, 
I  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  militarism  is  a  school 
of  crime.  This  war  has  unhappily  afforded  abundant 
proof  that  my  deductions  were  correct.  Statements 
which  in  1893-94  were  disgraceful,  the  words  of  an 
ignorant  anarchist,  which  evoked  the  thunders  of  the 
avenging  law,  are  to-day  pronounced  by  official  per- 
sonages— for  instance,  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  Mr.  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  short,  in  a  speech 
delivered  in  June,  1916,  declared  that  "  Militarism  is 
a  state  of  mind  and  an  object.  The  object  is  the  em- 
ployment of  armies  for  purposes  of  aggression.  The 
soldier's  state  of  mind  is  opposed  to  that  of  the  civilian. 
In  a  country  where  militarism  prevails  the  soldier  looks 
down  on  the  civilian.  He  regards  him  as  his  inferior: 
he  considers  that  the  civilian  is  created  to  be  of  use 
and  assistance  to  the  soldier." 

War  is  by  nature  a  succession  of  crimes.  It  is  not  a 
sport.  Chivalry,  in  warfare,  is  a  romantic  idea  which 
has  existed  in  the  minds  and  the  statements  of  men 
rather  than  in  the  reality  of  facts.  "  The  religion  of 
the  armies,"  as  Charles  de  Lameth  stated  in  1790  in 
the  National  Assembly,  "is  to  know  neither  kinsfolk, 
nor  friends,  nor  fathers:  it  is  to  understand  only  how 
to  obey."  Armies  are  deaf,  blind,  unconscious  brute 
forces  in  the  hands  of  their  leaders.  For  the  latter, 
war  is  a  means  which  makes  for  a  practical  object. 
It  is  not  a  game.  The  plain  statement  of  this,  the  true 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT    373 

conception  of  war,  is  of  considerable  service  to  humanity, 
for  thereby  men  are  enlightened  as  to  the  actual  and 
criminal  nature  of  war,  and  are  enabled  to  perceive  that 
it  is  an  inadequate  means  of  attaining  the  aim  pursued. 
To  realize  that  war  is  a  mode  of  obtaining  wealth  and 
increasing  power  instead  of  a  chivalrous  sport  is  to 
decree  the  death  of  war.  We  are  obliged,  in  fact,  to 
record  the  fact  that  war  does  not  achieve  its  object: 
it  no  longer  enriches,  it  no  longer  increases  power;  on 
the  contrary,  it  impoverishes  and  diminishes  power. 
Complete  disarmament  is  therefore  the  logical  conse- 
quence of  the  inefficiency  of  the  war  as  a  means  of 
obtaining  wealth  and  power. 

With  disarmament  there  will  be  no  more  soldiers — 
that  is,  men  preparing  for  war,  or,  to  speak  more  frankly, 
preparing  to  commit  crimes.  The  soldier  has  always 
been,  and  will  always  be,  as  Horace  represented  him, 
when  he  wrote  of  Achilles  in  his  Epistola  ad  Pisones  : 

"  Impiger,  viacundus,  inexorabilis,  acer 

Jura  neget  sibi  nata,  nihil  non  arroget  armis:" 

a  savage  warrior,  pretending  that  the  laws  and  justice 
are  not  meant  for  him,  and  that  everything  must  give 
way  before  the  might  of  his  arms. 

Disarmament  would  mean  the  suppression  of  this 
state  of  mind,  and  would  therefore  lead  to  a 
notable  improvement  of  the  human  mentality.  We 
should  mention,  however,  having  objective  scruples, 
that  the  suppression  of  armies  would  involve  a  slight 
inconvenience.  Men  would  not  be  so  often  uprooted 
from  their  place  of  origin;  they  would  mix  less  with  one 
another.  And  this  uprooting  of  men  is  in  general  an 
important  element,  as  regards  the  species  and  the 
individual,  because  it  tends  to  an  increase  of  knowledge. 
I  am  thinking,  in  particular,  of  peasants  and  agricultural 
labourers,  for  many  of  whom  the  call  to  the  barracks 
means  a  widening  of  the  horizon,  because  they  undergo 


374  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

a  change  of  environment,  and  are  brought  into  contact 
with  men  belonging  to  other  environments  than  their 
own.  This  sole  benefit  of  the  military  life  would  dis- 
appear, but  compared  with  all  the  bad  effects  of  mili- 
tarism it  is  so  small  that  we  may  regard  it  as  negligible. 
Moreover,  it  is  possible,  and  even  probable,  that  the 
phenomena  of  uprooting  and  intermingling  will  occur 
just  the  same  under  the  impulse  of  economic  and 
intellectual  conditions.  We  may  therefore  say  of  dis- 
armament that  it  would  produce  nothing  but  psycho- 
logical improvement. 

The  political  ameliorations  which  would  follow  dis- 
armament are  very  considerable.  Thus,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  resort  to  armed  force,  as  this  would  not 
exist,  in  order  to  modify  international  relations  or  to 
change  the  boundaries  of  States.  There  would  there- 
fore be  a  certain  fixity  in  the  political  distribution  of 
the  world,  which  will  be  established  at  the  end  of  the 
war.  This  territorial  distribution  could  not  be  further 
modified  save  by  the  popular  will  expressed  by  a  refer- 
endum. Treaties  between  nations  could  no  longer  be 
regarded  as  mere  scraps  of  paper,  as  is  the  general 
custom  under  the  system  of  armaments.  This  new  state 
of  international  relations  would  have  an  interesting 
juridical  and  moral  reaction:  the  compulsory  regard  of 
justice  and  equity  in  establishing  international  con- 
ventions. 

In  this  way  the  independent  life  of  the  small  nations 
would  be  assured,  without  the  necessity  of  the  tutelage 
of  the  great  nations — relatively  great,  that  is,  for  in 
the  near  future  the  Slav  peoples  will  greatly  predominate 
over  the  Western  peoples  in  point  of  numbers,  while 
the  yellow  races  will  predominate  over  the  Slavs. 

Disarmament  would  assure  the  political  life  of  all  the 
nations,  and  their  free  normal  development,  while  the 
maintenance  of  armies  would  necessarily  lead,  sooner 
or  later,  first  to  an  exterminating  conflict  between  the 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT     375 

Slavs  and  the  Western  peoples,  and  then  to  a  similar 
conflict  between  the  yellow  races  and  the  Slavs. 

Another  beneficent  result  of  disarmament  would  be 
the  assistance  thereby  lent  to  the  democratization  of  the 
world.  Militarism  is  the  prop  of  autocracies.  Wherever 
militarism  triumphs,  autocracy  tends  to  prevail  and 
democracy  to  diminish.  The  present  war  has  proved 
this  in  characteristic  fashion,  by  the  events  whose 
theatre  was  a  neutral  country,  Switzerland;  yet  for 
centuries  Switzerland  has  been  a  democracy. 

On  the  day  when  militarism  ceased  to  be  the  auto- 
cracies would  lose  their  most  solid  support.  And  then 
they  would  crumble  swiftly  to  pieces,  and  would  dis- 
appear, making  way  for  democracies.  The  suppression 
of  militarism  would  educate  the  world  for  peace;  and 
only  in  a  world  so  educated  could  peace  prevail. 

Everything  being  considered,  we  can  perceive  nothing 
but  advantages  in  disarmament — economic,  psycho- 
logical, moral,  and  political  advantages.  For  that 
matter,  few  people  dare  deny  these  advantages,  but 
in  defending  the  policy  of  armaments  they  take  refuge 
behind  this  assertion:  that  disarmament  is  Utopian,  the 
proof  being  that  even  democratic  and  thoroughly  un- 
warlike  peoples,  as  are  many  of  the  neutrals,  are  con- 
tinuing to  arm  themselves.  The  statement  is  correct, 
but  the  deduction  drawn  from  it  is  erroneous.  The 
armaments  of  neutral  countries  are  a  consequence  of 
the  armaments  of  the  other  nations.  Each  counts  upon 
its  powers  of  violence,  its  armed  forces,  to  make  its 
independence  respected.  Consequently,  each  nation  arms 
itself,  and  unceasingly  continues  to  arm  itself.  The 
military  fever  is  general  and  endemic.  This  does 
not  prove  that  disarmament  is  a  Utopia  or  a  dream, 
in  opposition  to  the  natural  tendency  of  the  nations. 

If  one  lives  in  the  midst  of  assassins,  one  is  of  course 
obliged  to  arm  oneself  in  order  to  protect  one's  life 
against  these  assassins.  But  if  one  lives  in  the  midst 


376          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

of  peaceful,  unarmed  folk,  one  has  no  need  to  arm 
oneself  in  order  to  protect  one's  life.  Such,  in  reality 
is  the  situation  of  the  peoples  of  Scandinavia,  Switzer- 
land, Holland,  the  United  States,  etc.  All  these 
nations  will  be  delighted  when  the  day  comes  for  the 
great  nations  to  disarm,  for  the  burden  of  militarism  is 
very  heavy  for  the  majority  of  these  peoples. 

The  disarmament  which  we  are  considering  is  a 
complete  disarmament,  including  naval  disarmament  as 
well  as  the  disarming  of  the  land  armies.  Reliance  on 
great  navies  must  cease  with  militarism.  This  is  a 
necessary  step,  in  conformity  with  justice  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  interest  of  each  individual  nation  on  the 
other  hand.  Battle  fleets  are  no  more  necessary  than 
are  land  armies  or  aerial  battle  fleets.  Battle  fleets  and 
aerial  fleets  are  designed  either  for  defence  or  for  offence 
and  conquest.  Now  complete  disarmament  will  prevent 
conquest  and  render  defence  pointless. 

Armed  peace  must  cease  to  exist,  as  regards 
terrestrial  as  well  as  aerial  and  naval  armaments.  If 
disarmament  were  practised  in  respect  of  only  one  of 
these  arms,  and  not  the  others,  we  should  have  the 
inconveniences  of  partial  disarmament;  there  would  be 
no  economies,  and  peace  would  be  merely  a  truce. 

General  and  complete  disarmament  will  certainly  find 
opponents  when  the  moment  comes,  after  the  war,  to 
form  a  decision.  But  we  may  be  assured  that  they  will 
not  be  very  numerous.  Everything  proves  that  they 
will  belong  to  the  caste  of  landowners  and  professional 
soldiers,  and  to  the  most  conservative  and  reactionary 
political  groups.  It  is  natural  that  these  men  should 
regard  with  discontent  and  regret  the  disappearance  of 
their  raison  d'etre,  the  social  organism  which  is  the 
strongest  prop  of  the  system  of  government  which 
satisfies  their  ideal.  Perhaps,  too,  among  the  opponents 
we  shall  find  the  makers  of  arms  and  munitions.  But 
it  would  be  easy  to  destroy  their  opposition  by  in- 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT    377 

demnifying  them.  Everything  considered,  however, 
these  classes  would  represent  only  a  small  minority, 
even  in  militarist  Germany.  Everywhere  the  world  of 
peasants,  working  men,  employees,  officials,  and  "  in- 
tellectuals " — with  a  few  rare  exceptions — are  restive 
under  the  burden  of  terrestrial  and  naval  militarism. 
Everywhere  the  world  of  commerce,  industry,  and 
finance  knows  by  experience  and  with  certainty  that 
war  does  not  pay,  and  that  as  militarism  is  useful  only 
for  purposes  of  war  it  would  be  better  to  get  rid  of  it. 
So  true  is  this  that  a  little  while  ago  one  might  have 
read,  in  the  Vossische  Zeitung,  a  plea  in  favour  of  total 
disarmament  from  the  pen  of  Herr  Ballin  !  This  is 
characteristic,  for  Herr  Ballin  was  one  of  the  capitalists 
who  urged  Governmental  Germany  to  go  to  war. 
Again,  Count  Okuma,  the  Japanese  Prime  Minister,  in 
an  interview,  recommended  disarmament.  On  this 
subject  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  are  mutually 
agreed,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  forces  of  capital 
are  of  the  same  way  of  thinking.  None  of  the  ecclesi- 
astics of  any  of  the  Churches  will  dare  to  defend  such 
a  massacre  and  a  heaping  up  of  ruins  as  we  behold  in 
this  war.  If  we  reflect,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  very 
great  majority  of  people  are  in  favour  of  disarmament. 
It  will  be  enough  for  the  British,  French,  Belgian,  and 
other  democracies  to  resolve  that  it  shall  be  accom. 
plished,  and  it  must  be. 

The  economic  conditions  determined  by  the  war  have 
rung  the  knell  of  the  system  of  armed  peace.  And  as 
this  system  must  cease  to  be,  it  must  necessarily  make 
way  for  a  political  State  based,  not  on  violence  and 
armed  force,  but  on  free  and  mutual  consent.  And  the 
consequence  of  this  economic  necessity  is  general  and 
complete  disarmament.  This  is  the  corner-stone  on 
which  rests  the  whole  edifice  of  final  peace,  of  peace 
which  is  something  more  than  a  truce.  And  as  the 
whole  of  humanity  is  crying  aloud  for  a  final  peace, 


378  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

we  must  suppose  that  humanity  will  be  sufficiently 
wise  and  intelligent  to  disarm.  From  this  disarma- 
ment will  arise  a  certain  number  of  necessary  conditions 
which  we.  will  now  examine. 

***** 

Disarmament  will  inevitably  involve  the  suppression 
of  arsenals  and  munition  factories.  If  there  is  no 
more  consumption  there  will  be  no  further  manufacture. 
The  disappearance  of  these  manufactures,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  will  not  be  complete,  since,  as  we  have  just  ob- 
served, we  must  still  have  armed  police  forces.  Neither 
can  the  manufacture  of  sporting  weapons  be  discon- 
tinued. But  the  need  of  arms  and  munitions  will  be 
enormously  reduced  in  comparison  with  the  needs  of 
the  period  before  the  war,  with  its  policy  of  armed 
peace. 

Most  of  the  workshops  and  factories  for  the  output 
of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  must  therefore  disappear, 
or  be  transformed  into  workshops  and  factories  produc- 
ing implements  and  products  capable  of  maintaining 
life  and  of  overcoming  ihe  powers  of  nature. 

Given  the  capitalistic  basis  of  human  society,  it  is 
equitable  that  the  proprietors  of  the  workshops  and 
factories  thus  affected  shall  receive  an  indemnity 
equivalent  to  their  losses.  It  is  perfectly  just  that  the 
collectivity  should  indemnify  individuals  for  losses 
suffered  in  the  interests  of  the  collectivity.  The  in- 
demnification of  the  makers  of  arms  and  munitions  will 
have  the  great  advantage  of  suppressing  all  reason 
for  the  opposition  which  they  may  offer  to  the  adoption 
of  disarmament.  This  opposition  may  be  very  powerful, 
for  the  wealth  of  these  manufacturers  is  very  great. 
And  in  our  capitalist  society  the  possession  of  wealth  is 
one  of  the  most  important  factors  of  Governmental 
power. 

Disarmament,  as  we  have  shown,  permanently  assures 
the  autonomy  of  each  national  group,  and  the  fixity 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT     379 

of  the  territorial  divisions  established  at  the  end  of  this 
war.  No  nation  will  again  be  enabled  to  attempt  to 
enslave  others,  or  to  seize  their  wealth  or  their  territory. 
One  cannot  make  war  without  weapons,  without 
munitions,  and  without  armies.  But  from  this  impos- 
sibility of  conflict  between  national  groups  it  does  not 
follow  that  there  will  be  no  further  differences  between 
these  national  collectivities.  It  therefore  becomes  most 
necessary  to  settle  these  differences.  How  ?  To  answer 
this  we  must  regard  the  collectivities  as  so  many  in- 
dividuttls,  and  we  must  deal  with  these  individual 
collectivities  as  we  should  deal  with  private  individuals 
in  the  heart  of  one  of  these  collectivities,  in  order  to 
settle  any  differences  which  might  arise  between  them. 

These  differences,  in  the  case  of  individuals,  are  settled 
by  means  of  tribunals,  by  permanent  magistrates  or 
juries,  who  deliver  their  verdicts  or  sentences.  These 
are  executed  by  the  power  of  the  national  collectivity, 
in  some  cases  after  resort  to  the  various  courts  of  appeal 
which  have  been  created  in  order  that  we  may,  as  far 
as  possible,  obtain  justice,  or,  if  you  prefer,  in  order  to 
diminish  the  injustice  involved  in  any  human  judgment. 
Such  are  the  relations  between  individual  men,  and  such 
should  be  the  relations  between  national  collectivities. 

General  disarmament,  then,  will  necessitate  the 
creation  of  international  courts  and  tribunals,  which 
will  legislate  on  the  causes  of  dispute  which  may  arise 
between  the  nations.  The  incessant  exercise  of  a 
function  determines  a  special  mentality,  which  produces, 
in  the  end,  a  deformation  of  the  ordinary  vision  of  things. 
Therefore  the  establishment  of  permanent  international 
judges  would  end,  in  course  of  time,  in  the  creation  of 
individuals  living  outside  the  life  of  the  nations  and 
incapable  of  understanding  the  conditions  of  life  of 
these  nations,  with  their  sentiments  and  opinions,  and 
their  manifold  and  complex  interests.  We  must  steer 
clear  of  this  rock,  and  it  is  easy  to  do  so  if  we  follow 


380  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

the  example  of  what  has  been  done  in  the  case  of  the 
courts  which  judge  the  causes  of  dispute  between 
individuals.  We  must  have  recourse  to  the  jury,  not 
only  in  the  first  instance,  but  also  in  the  court  of  appeal, 
with  its  final  decree.  We  will  not  here  enter  into  the 
details  of  the  constitution  of  these  courts  and  tribunals ; 
I  will  only  remark  that  they  must  include  permanent 
members  or  judges,  to  maintain  a  regular  procedure, 
and  occasional  members,  as  jurors,  to  deliver  judgment. 
Judges  and  jurors,  chosen  and  elected  by  the  governing 
political  body  of  each  nation. 

Sentences  have  no  meaning  if  they  have  no  sanction. 
The  sanction  may  be  moral  and  material,  or  moral  only, 
or  material  only;  but  a  sanction  there  must  be. 
How  shall  this  sanction  be  applied,  and  by  whom  shall 
it  be  applied,  to  infractions  of  agreements  between 
nations,  and  to  matters  of  dispute  ? 

This  sanction  must  be  applied  by  an  administrative 
council  of  the  nations:  an  Amphictyonic  Council,  if  I 
may  call  it  so.  Composed  of  delegates  appointed  by 
all  the  nations,  for  a  short  term  only,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  formation  of  a  Governmental  caste,  it  would  have 
to  apply  the  sanctions  established  by  international  con- 
ventions, and  keep  watch  in  order  that  no  nation  should 
violate  these  conventions.  In  short,  there  would  be  the 
same  task  to  fulfil,  in  respect  of  the  nations,  which  the 
police  administration  fulfils  in  respect  of  the  individuals 
in  each  State.  As  sanctions,  fines  would  be  largely 
sufficient.  If  a  nation  refused  to  obey  these  sanctions, 
it  would  assuredly  be  neither  necessary  nor  even  useful 
to  resort  to  violence,  by  means  of  the  international 
police  army,  in  order  to  compel  obedience  to  conven- 
tions entered  into  by  free  consent. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  the  epoch  of  Christian  faith, 
excommunication  was  a  terrible  weapon.  It  may  still 
be  employed.  The  nations  would  excommunicate  the 
offending  nation  until  the  latter  gave  proof  of  repentance. 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT     381 

Excommunication  would  mean  complete  isolation  from 
international  life  !  There  would  no  longer  be  anything 
in  common  between  the  offending  nation  and  the  others 
— no  railway  communication,  no  communication  by  sea 
or  river,  no  post,  no  telegraphs,  no  telephone,  no 
balloons,  no  aeroplanes.  Complete  isolation  would  be 
strictly  maintained  until  the  moment  when  the  offending 
people  accepted  its  sentence. 

In  short,  the  same  treatment  would  be  meted  out  to 
the  individual  nation  as  is  now  meted  out  to  the  in- 
dividual man. 

The  administrative  role  of  the  Amphictyonic  Council 
of  the  nations  would  be  pre-eminently  one  of  surveillance 
in  the  case  of  each  country — to  prevent,  for  example,  the 
manufacture  or  collection  of  secret  armaments.  An 
international  police,  the  international  army,  would  be 
under  the  orders  of  this  council  of  the  nations — not  only 
a  territorial  army,  but  a  navy,  a  fleet  entrusted  with 
the  policing  of  the  seas.  Each  nation  possessing 
colonies  might  maintain  in  these  colonies  a  small  army 
of  colonial  police,  or  these  colonial  armies  might  form 
part  of  the  international  army  amenable  to  the  Amphic- 
tyonic Council.  In  any  case,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
formation  of  a  Praetorian  army  with  a  military  mentality 
it  would  be  indispensable  that  the  time  of  service 
should  be  short  for  all,  officers  and  men  alike.  But 
these  are  matters  of  detail  which  do  not  affect  the  great 
principle — a  council  of  delegates  from  the  nations 
administering  international  relations,  and  supervising 
the  execution  of  international  conventions,  and  for  this 
purpose  having  under  its  orders  a  police  and  a  police 
army. 

If  this  war  is  to  be  the  last  of  wars,  it  absolutely 
must  be  terminated  by  a  general  and  complete  dis- 
armament. This  is  the  only  means  of  terminating  the 
barbarous  era  of  brutal  and  violent  conflicts  between 
men.  When  a  child  has  a  toy  he  amuses  himself  with 


382          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

that  toy.  When  a  man  has  a  weapon  he  makes 
use  of  it.  When  rulers  possess  armies  they  employ 
them.  Deprive  the  man  of  his  weapon,  the  Govern- 
ments of  their  armies,  and  you  will  have  no  more  wars. 
As  long  as  you  leave  matters  as  they  are,  humanity 
may  enjoy  truces,  but  never  peace. 

Disarmament  will  necessitate  the  creation  of  a  juri- 
dical system  embracing  collectivities  as  our  existing 
juridical  system  embraces  individuals.  An  embryo  of 
federation  will  come  into  being  among  the  nations  of 
the  entire  globe;  each  nation  will  continue  to  live  and 
to  evolve  in  full  autonomy  and  liberty.  The  socio- 
logical process  which  we  have  indicated  is  not  merely 
a  mental  vision,  a  baseless  imagination.  It  is  merely 
the  continuation  of  the  sociological  process  which  has 
created  the  present  social  world. 

In  the  dawn  of  humanity  the  single  man,  or  the  man 
mated  to  his  woman,  contended  violently  with  his 
neighbouring  couple.  Then  mutual  aid  was  born,  and 
associations  were  formed,  and  warlike  strife  broke  out 
between  small  clans  and  small  tribes.  In  the  course 
of  the  ages  the  clans  and  tribes  grew  larger,  embracing 
more  and  more  numerous  collectivities,  and  wars  ceased 
in  the  interior  of  the  collectivities,  but  continued 
between  collectivities  which  were  strangers  to  one  an- 
other, and  therefore  enemies.  Great  empires  were 
founded,  which  enjoyed  internal  peace;  but  they  still 
waged  external  war.  And  these  great  empires  fell  to 
pieces,  because  the  base  on  which  they  were  founded 
was  constraint  and  fear,  never  free  will  and  love. 

From  the  fragments  of  these  great  empires  arose 
kingdoms,  principalities,  duchies,  and  counties,  and 
there  were  endless  alliances  and  wars  between  them  all. 
But  understandings,  on  the  other  hand,  tended  more 
and  more  to  embrace  groups  and  individuals,  owing  to 
the  spread  of  common  interests  and  their  interpenetra- 
tion.  Wars  diminished  in  numbers  while  embracing 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT     383 

greater  numbers  of  men.  The  need  of  union  and  under- 
standing influenced  men  because  they  were  conscious 
that  their  union  favoured  their  interests;  but  men  still 
sought  to  effect  this  union  upon  the  basis  of  constraint 
and  fear.  They  confounded  union  with  unification. 

The  continuation  of  this  same  process  leads  us  to  the 
world-war,  in  which  we  perceive  a  maximum  of  conflict 
and  a  maximum  of  union.  The  logical  continuation  of 
this  process  is  the  general  union  of  the  nations,  of  the 
peoples  of  the  globe,  no  longer  in  an  Imperial  and 
centralized  organization  based  on  constraint  and  fear, 
but  in  a  federative  organism  based  on  liberty  and  love. 
*  *  *  *  * 

The  need  of  union  is  so  strongly  felt  by  humanity 
that  it  is  an  unconscious  cause  of  this  frightful  war. 
The  desire  of  intellectual  and  Governmental  Germany 
for  hegemony,  which  started  the  war,  was  in  certain 
respects  merely  the  manifestation,  in  the  Germanic 
mind,  of  the  need  of  union  and  understanding  between 
men.  But  the  Germanic  mind  was  poisoned  by  the 
spirit  of  obedience  and  the  spirit  of  authority.  Its 
mode  of  action  consisted  of  constraint  and  fear.  The 
result  was  that  the  need  of  union  and  understanding 
was  manifested  among  the  Germans  by  a  desire  to 
enslave  other  peoples,  in  order  to  unify  them  and  endow 
them  with  a  superior  civilization.  The  Germanic  mind, 
thus  poisoned  in  its  depths,  did  not  understand  that 
the  life  of  the  world  is  based  on  its  diversity  and  variety, 
and  that  a  unified  world  would  be  a  monstrous  world, 
doomed  to  a  speedy  death.  Nature  tends  always  to 
develop  heterogeneity.  The  need  of  union  is  a  natural 
force  of  such  power  that  we  see  its  effects  even  in 
war,  which  would  seem  to  be  essentially  a  dividing 
force.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  are  witnessing,  not  a 
war  between  two  peoples,  but  war  between  combina- 
tions of  peoples.  On  the  one  side  are  ten  nations,* 
*  Written  in  1916. 


384          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

counting  as  a  single  nation  all  the  peoples  of  the  British 
federation,  which  is  not  scientifically  correct,  and  on 
the  other  side  are  four.  One  of  the  lessons  of  this 
war  is  that  the  power  of  union  is  greater  than  the  power 
of  disunion. 

But  it  is  important  never  to  confound  union,  unifica- 
tion, and  fusion.  The  conceptions  are  very  different,  just 
as  are  their  effects.  Man  should  assist  the  work  of 
nature,  not  oppose  it.  To  oppose  it  would  only  provoke 
a  rupture  of  equilibrium,  and  therefore  disorder.  Men 
should  therefore  strive  incessantly  to  develop  the  desire 
for  union  which  is  in  them.  But  they  cannot  har- 
monize this  need  of  union  with  the  natural  process 
which  makes  for  heterogeneity  save  by  establishing 
union  on  the  foundation  of  liberty  and  love.  This  is 
the  only  basis  which  permits  both  the  independent 
development  of  groups  and  individuals,  and  the  forma- 
tion of  free  and  varied  groups. 

The  process  of  the  world-wide  federation  of  the 
nations  has  been  proceeding  since  the  dawn  of  the 
world.  Its  realization  was  only  a  question  of  time. 
The  present  war,  it  seems,  has  precipitated  this  realiza- 
tion, the  inevitable  result  of  the  manifold  sociological 
components  which  have  accumulated  during  the  ages. 
The  world-war  is  only  an  effect  of  this  universal  deter- 
minism. The  German  rulers  who  unleashed  it  are  its 
unconscious  agents.  And  all  these  conditions  being 
given,  it  was  not  possible  for  them  to  do  otherwise. 
They  were  like  an  avalanche  rolling  down  the  slope  of 
a  mountain,  pushing  and  dragging  down  trees  and 
houses  in  its  passage.  And  just  as  men  feel  no  hatred 
for  the  avalanche,  so  they  should  feel  no  hatred  for  the 
Germans,  those  unconscious  authors  of  the  butchery 
which  for  two  and  a  half  years  has  drenched  the  world 
in  blood.  They  could  not  do  otherwise  than  they  have 
done,  all  the  conditions  being  what  they  have  been. 

The  ultimate  end  of  this  world-war  must  be  universal 


DISARMAMENT  THE  ONLY  SETTLEMENT    385 

and  total  disarmament.  Everything  calls  for  it — 
economic  conditions,  political  conditions,  and  moral 
conditions. 

It  is  not  a  Utopia,  but  were  it  a  Utopia  that  would 
not  prevent  its  realization.  The  Utopia  of  to-day  is 
the  reality  of  to-morrow.  "  The  history  of  the  human 
spirit,"  as  Ernest  Renan  wrote,  "  shows  us  all  ideas 
coming  to  birth  outside  the  law  and  growing  up  sur- 
reptitiously. Go  back  to  the  origin  of  all  reforms: 
they  one  and  all  seem  unrealizable."  Total  and  uni- 
versal disarmament  will  certainly  seem  unrealizable  to 
many.  It  is  none  the  less  the  goal  toward  which 
humanity  is  marching,  with  a  slow  but  sure  step.  And 
everything  gives  us  reason  to  believe  that  this  goal  will 
be  attained  at  the  end  of  this  war.  It  is  for  men  to 
attain  it,  and,  above  all,  for  those  who  are  politically 
most  advanced:  the  Western  peoples — France,  Great 
Britain,  Belgium,  the  United  States,  etc.  If  they  will, 
it  is  in  their  power  to  close  the  era  of  war  between  men, 
which  will  enable  humanity  the  better  to  utilize  their 
physical  and  intellectual  forces  in  order  to  fight  and 
prevail  over  the  forces  of  nature. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

CONCLUDING  REMARKS 

The  Russian  Revolution — The  United  States  enters  the  war — The 
victory  of  the  Entente  postponed — The  influence  of  American 
capitalism — Public  opinion  is  stirred  in  support  of  Mr.  Wilson — 
The  Central  Powers  refuse  to  divulge  their  aims — Mr.  Wilson's 
Message — The  predominance  of  altruistic  aims — The  submarine 
war  intensified — America  drawn  into  the  war — The  Tsar  deposed — 
Mr.  Wilson's  declaration — The  Irish  question — Results  of  America's 
intervention — Anarchy  in  Russia — The  war  becomes  a  war  of  de- 
mocratization: a  revolution — Peace  will  be  based  on  justice, 
liberty,  and  equality — The  war  will  result  in  the  general  demo- 
cratic progress  of  the  peoples. 

DURING  the  five  months  which  have  elapsed  since 
the  date  when  I  completed  the  revision  of  the  fore- 
going pages,  a  multitude  of  events  has  occurred, 
some  unimportant  and  others  of  a  serious  nature.     Two 
of  them,  the  Russian  Revolution  and  the  entrance  of 
the  United  States  into  the  fiery  furnace  of  the  war,  are 
so  important  that  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  all  their 
consequences.     But  important  or  trivial,  few  of  these 
events  have  invalidated  the  lessons  which  we  have  derived 
from  the  war. 

The  semi-immobility  of  the  European  fronts;  the  open 
fighting  in  the  basin  of  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris, 
with  the  capture  of  Bagdad  and  the  junction  of  the 
British  and  Russian  troops;  the  campaign  for  the 
conquest  of  Palestine;  the  blockade  of  the  Central 
Powers  by  the  Western  Powers,  and  the  attempted 
blockade  of  the  latter  by  the  submarines  of  the  former; 
the  intensification  of  the  submarine  war;  the  methodical 
destruction  of  the  region  between  the  fronts  in  the 
West;  the  deportations  and  forcible  employment  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  invaded  districts;  the  intervention  of 

386 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  387 

the  United  States  by  means  of  the  President's  Note  to 
the  belligerents,  by  his  Message  to  the  Senate,  by  the 
rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Imperial  Powers, 
and  finally  by  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  war  against 
the  Central  Powers;  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations 
by    the    Chinese,    Brazilian,    Bolivian,    Haytian,    and 
Liberian  Republics,  and  by  Honduras  and  Nicaragua; 
the    entry   into   the   war   of   the    Republics    of    Cuba 
and    Guatemala;     the    Russian    Revolution,    with    its 
astonishing  collapse  into  anarchy  and  the  signs  of  an 
approaching  recovery;  the  occurrences  in  Greece;  the 
diplomatic  attacks  upon  the  United  States  delivered  by 
the  German  Government  in  Mexico  and  in  Central  and 
South   America;    the   events   which   have   occurred   in 
Ireland,  Spain,  and  Rumania;  the  brutal  and  insolent 
policy  of  the  Germans,  with  the  reprobation  and  hatred 
which  it  entails;  the  policy  of  postponement  and  in- 
decision followed  by  the  Western  Powers,  which   has 
had  the  effect  of  delaying  the  conclusion  of  the  war;  the 
continued  waste  of  lives  and  of  wealth;  the  continued 
expense  of  the  war;  the  scarcity  of  food-stuffs,  resulting 
in  higher  prices,  and  the  regulation  of  distribution  and 
consumption  in  belligerent  and  neutral  countries;  the 
increasing  desire   of  the  peoples   for  peace,  while  the 
Governments  find  it  impossible  to  conclude  peace;  the 
continued    increase    on    every    hand   of  the    minority 
Socialist  parties ;  the  dread,  openly  expressed,  of  revolu- 
tionary movements  at  no  distant  date,  and  in  every 
country;  the  hunger  riots  in  Germany  and  Sweden;  the 
refusal  of  the  German  Socialists  to  vote  on  the  Budget; 
the  Socialist  scission  in  Germany;  the  peace  agitation 
conducted  by  Socialists  in  the  neutral  and  belligerent 
countries;  and  yet  other  events  which  I  do  not  for  the 
moment  call  to  mind — all  these  confirm  the  lessons  which 
I  expounded  sixteen  months  ago  to  my  audience  at  the 
University  Extension  Lectures  which  I  delivered  in  the 
University  of  London. 


388          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Once  more  the  observer  will  note: 

The  influence  of  climatic,  orographical,  meteorological, 
hydrographical,  geological,  and  physical  conditions;  the 
violent  and  terrifying  manner  of  waging  war,   which 
confirms  the  check  inflicted  upon  the  regulation  of  war- 
fare; the  fact  that  warfare  and  militarism  are  schools  of 
crime;  the  bankruptcy  of  militarism,  which  is  unable  to 
obtain  a  decision;  the  superiority  of  voluntary  discipline 
to  the   discipline  based   on   constraint   and  fear;    the 
systematic  employment  of  constraint  and  fear  by  the 
Imperial  Powers;  the  increasing  hatred  of  militarism 
and  warfare;   the  increasing  influence  of  the  engineer 
and  the  administrator,  an  undeniable  proof  that  economic 
power  is  taking  the  place  of  military  power;  the  fact  that 
militarism  is  the  prop  of  autocracy,  and  vice  versa  ;  the 
mental  deformation  resulting  from  the   military  pro- 
fession and  military  training,   consequences   of  which 
are    the    psychological    blunders    committed    by    the 
diplomacy  of  the  Imperial  Powers,  the  failure  of  the 
Dardanelles  campaign,  and  the  dearth  of  big  guns  in 
France;  the  utility,   even  the  indispensability,   of  the 
spirit  of  revolt  as  an  element  of  life;  the  confirmation  of 
the  fact  that  the  present  war  is  a  war  of  exhaustion ;  the 
enormous  increase  of  war  expenditure,  making  indemni- 
ties impossible;  the  scarcity  of  raw  materials  and  food- 
stuffs, and  the  resulting  slow  but  certain  approach  of 
dearth  and  famine;  the  enormous  importance  of  the 
produce   of    the   soil   and    subsoil;    the    indispensable 
character  of  industrial  and  agricultural  workers,  miners, 
and    laboratory    experts;     the    useless    and    harmful 
character    of   non-workers    and    social    parasites;    the 
increasing    augmentation    of   the    cost    of   living;    the 
increase  of  Socialistic  measures  relating  to  production, 
distribution,  and  consumption;  the  accentuation  of  the 
revolutionary   nature   of  the   economic   situation;   the 
predominance  of  economic  aims  among  the  factors  which 
are  inducing  nations  to  enter  the  war;  the  fact  that 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  389 

property  and  wealth  are  more  highly  valued  than  human 
lives ;  the  solidarity  existing  between  all  the  peoples  of  the 
earth,  between  individuals,  and  between  individuals  and 
their  environment ;  the  development  of  the  consequences 
of    acts    committed    long   previously;    the   importance 
of  the  freedom  of  maritime  highways,  and  accordingly 
of  the  part  played  by  the  submarine;  the  atmosphere  of 
obscurity  and  ignorance  fostered  by  all  Governments, 
democratic  or  autocratic  (excepting  that  of  the  United 
States),  by  means  of  censorships,  resulting  in  defects 
and  mistakes  and  material  losses  of  various  kinds;  the 
power  of  active  minorities ;  the  antagonism  between  the 
democratic  habits  of  the  French  and  English  and  their 
Governments,  whose  tendencies  are  autocratic;  the  pro- 
Germanism  of  the  Catholic  and  Conservative  elements 
in  neutral  countries;  the  similarity  of  the  psychological 
blunders  of  the  Conservative  and  reactionary  elements 
to   those   of  the  German   governing   classes;    the  dis- 
crepancy between  the  ends  pursued  by  the  reactionary 
and  Conservative  governing  classes  and  the  results  of 
their  actions;  the  prejudicial  character  of  royalty;  the 
useless  and  injurious  nature  of  punishment  and  violent 
repression;  the  fact  that  the  long  duration  of  the  war 
is  prejudicial  to  autocracies,  but  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
of  service  to  democracies;  the  growth  of  democracies 
and  the   diminution  of  autocracies;  the   rejuvenation 
of  the  governmental,  civil,  and  military  personnel  in 
Russia,    Great    Britain,    and    France;     the  value    of 
audacity;  the  increasing  longing  for  peace  on  the  part  of 
the  peoples,  who  must  themselves  conclude  peace;  the 
increase  of  feminism;  the  increase  of  Socialism  and  its 
social   influence;    the    increasing   enfeeblement   of   the 
peoples,  especially  in  Europe,  both  in  quantity  and  in 
quality,  as  the  result  of  the  increased  death-rate  and 
the  increasing  prevalence  of  sickness ;  the  fact  that  the 
present  war  is  at  the  same  time  a  conflict  of  interests 
between  the  capitalistic  clans,  and  a  conflict  between 


890          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

two  principles — authority  and  liberty — and  between  two 
systems  —  autocracy  and  democracy  —  centralism  and 
federalism. 

The  analysis  of  events  and  their  causes  led  me  many 
times,  in  the  course  of  my  lectures  at  Birkbeck  College, 
to  forecast  future  events.  Founded  upon  logic,  most 
of  my  forecasts  have  since  then  been  realized.  Thus, 
on  November  20,  1915,  stating  that  the  end  of  the 
war  was  not  then  in  sight  (Chapter  II.),  I  foretold  that 
other  peoples  would  join  the  belligerents.  Eighteen 
months  have  gone  by  since  then,  and  the  war  still 
continues,  while  four  or  five  more  States  have  joined 
the  belligerents.  And  others  yet  will  take  part  in  the 
conflict  if  the  war  continues  until  the  end  of  1918, 
which  seems  to  me  to  be  the  final  date  beyond  which 
the  war  cannot  be  protracted.  The  defeat  of  the 
Imperial  Powers,  which  to  many  seemed  doubtful  before 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  appeared  to  me  to 
be  a  certainty  as  far  back  as  the  aforesaid  month  of 
November  (Chapter  III.).  To  me  it  seemed  so  in- 
evitably the  consequence  of  the  facts  that  I  repeated 
my  forecast  the  following  month  (Chapters  IV.  and  X.). 
In  my  lecture  on  December  4,  1915,  I  showed 
that  the  prolongation  of  the  war  is  resulting  in  the 
creation  of  a  veritably  revolutionary  situation.  The 
Russian  Revolution,  the  disturbances  caused  by  dearth 
and  famine  in  Sweden  and  in  Germany,  and  the  general 
dread  of  a  revolution,  publicly  expressed  in  the  neutral 
journals,  notably  those  of  Switzerland,  prove  the  correct- 
ness of  this  forecast  (Chapters  IV.  and  XII.). 

According  to  my  deductions,  the  war  was  bound  to 
advance  the  cause  of  feminism  (Chapters  III.  and  VI.), 
and  it  is  now  announced  that  women  are  to  have  the 
vote  in  Great  Britain  and  in  Russia,  and  in  France  they 
now  have  the  right  to  enter  the  School  of  Arts  and 
Manufactures — that  is,  to  become  engineers. 

The  logic  of  the  facts  led  me  to  declare,  in  February, 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  391 

1916,  that  the  present  war  of  exhaustion  is  a  veritable 
world-wide  revolution  (Chapter  VIII.).  And  we  are 
now  beginning  to  read  this  here  and  there  in  the  Swiss, 
English,  and  American  newspapers.  It  will  soon  be  a 
commonplace  of  conversation  and  the  Press. 

In  such  times  as  ours  events  rush  by  us,  pressing  on 
the  skirts  of  those  before  them.  Those  that  follow  make 
us  forget  those  that  preceded  them.  It  therefore  seems 
fitting  that  I  should,  in  a  few  lines,  recall  the  correctness 
of  forecasts  made  months  beforehand.  This  I  have 
done,  not  in  a  spirit  of  prophetic  vanity,  but  in  order  to 
show  that  a  close  and  exact  analysis  of  events  and  their 
causes  enables  us  to  reveal  an  inevitable  concatenation 
in  life,  which  permits  us  approximately  to  foretell  the 
lines  along  which  the  future  will  develop.  All  is  rigidly 
conditioned  and  determined  by  the  multitude  of  causes — 
themselves  effects — which  precede  the  effects — them- 
selves causes — to  be  discovered  at  a  given  moment. 

Two  events  of  great  importance  have  occurred  during 
the  first  six  months  of  the  present  year  (1917).  I  refer  to 
the  Russian  Revolution  and  the  entry  into  the  war,  on 
the  side  of  the  Entente,  of  the  great  Republic  of  the 
United  States.  The  consequences  of  these  events  extend 
so  far  in  time  and  in  space,  and  so  closely  touch  the 
whole  of  humanity,  that  it  seems  only  proper  to  analyze 
them  and  inquire  into  the  lessons  to  be  derived  from 
them,  which,  for  that  matter,  will  only  confirm  those 
expounded  in  the  foregoing  pages. 

The  world-wide  character  of  the  present  conflict  has 
been  emphasized  by  the  addition  to  the  ranks  of  the 
belligerents  of  the  United  States,  promptly  followed  by 
the  Republics  of  Cuba  and  Guatemala,  and  soon  to  be 
followed  by  the  Republics  of  Brazil,  China,  and  others. 
The  intervention  of  the  American  Republics  has  made 
manifest  to  all  the  fact  which  I  mentioned  to  my 
auditors  as  far  long  ago  as  November  and  December, 
1915 — namely,  that  the  present  conflict  is  in  reality 


392          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

a  conflict  between  two  principles,  two  moralities: 
liberty  and  authority;  between  two  systems  of  govern- 
ment: democracy  and  autocracy.  Now  no  one  doubts 
this,  for  the  Russian  Revolution,  by  transforming  the 
Tsar's  Empire  into  a  federalist  Republic  of  a  more  or 
less  Socialistic  nature,  has  suppressed  the  last  argument 
of  those  who  sought  to  regard  the  war  merely  as  a 
conflict  between  Powers  pursuing  economic  ends. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  since  the  day  when  the  German 
Army  invaded  Belgium  the  war  has  changed  its  character. 
It  was  then  a  war  of  national  liberation.  But,  as  one 
of  the  results  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  it  is  now  by 
way  of  becoming  a  class  war,  which  proves  that  I  was 
justified  in  stating  (in  Chapter  VIII.)  that  "  this  war  of 
exhaustion  is  in  truth  a  world-wide  revolution." 

An  analysis  of  the  motives  which  have  led  the  United 
States  to  enter  the  war  reveals,  as  in  the  case  of  other 
countries,  a  considerable  diversity.  As  everywhere,  we 
discover  economic,  intellectual,  and  moral  motives. 
Considering  the  matter  thoroughly,  we  find  that  the 
first  order  of  motives  appear  to  have  made  it  possible 
for  the  American  nation  to  enter  the  war;  but  these 
motives  do  not  appear  to  be  predominant.  The 
American  industrial  magnates  have,  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  been  the  great  purveyors  to  the  Entente  of 
arms,  munitions,  machinery,  tools,  raw  materials,  means 
of  transport,  food-stuffs,  etc.  Under  this  head  they 
have  banked  more  than  £500,000,000,  the  greater  part 
of  which  has  been  lent  to  the  various  Governments  of  the 
Entente  by  American  financiers.  Indeed,  the  bankers, 
even  those  of  German  origin,  who  are  more  or  less 
Russophobe,  all  participated  in  these  loans.  They  had, 
so  to  speak,  banked  on  the  victory  of  the  Entente.  They 
were  forced  to  do  so  by  the  fact  that  as  soon  as  the  war 
broke  out  American  industry  as  a  whole  equipped  itself 
for  the  production  of  munitions  of  war.  The  suspension 
of  their  contracts  would  have  resulted  in  an  economic 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  393 

crisis,  and  a  labour  crisis  of  a  very  serious  character, 
which  would  have  expressed  itself  by  strikes,  lock-outs, 
and  wholesale  bankruptcies.  Thus  it  became  necessary 
to  issue  loans  to  the  Powers  of  the  Entente,  guaranteed 
by  the  paper  of  the  various  States. 

But  as  the  war  lingered  on  the  victory  of  the  Entente 
was  postponed  to  a  distant  date,  and  the  expenses  of 
the  war  continually  increased,  so  that  loans  and  debts 
followed  the  same  ascending  curve.  As  a  consequence, 
it  became  improbable  that  war  indemnities  could  ever 
be  paid  to  the  victors.  In  short,  the  economic  and 
financial  situation  of  the  States  of  the  Entente  was 
bound  to  become  increasingly  gloomy  as  the  war  lasted 
longer  and  longer.  On  the  other  hand,  the  belligerents 
had  little  by  little  organized  their  own  war  industries. 
More  and  more  they  were  tending  to  limit  their  imports 
to  mere  supplies  of  raw  materials.  An  industrial  crisis 
was  in  process  of  formation.  The  capitalists  perceived 
this,  and  were  all  the  more  disquieted  thereby,  because, 
despite  high  wages  and  abundant  and  intensified  labour, 
there  was  a  certain  amount  of  disorder  due  to  poverty, 
owing  to  the  rise  of  prices  of  food- stuffs  and  other 
products,  which  exceeded  the  increase  of  wages.  The 
capitalist  world  of  North  America  was  thus  led  to  desire 
a  modification  of  the  international  situation:  either 
peace,  or  the  rupture  of  neutrality  and  the  participation 
of  the  United  States  in  the  war.  The  realization  of  this 
latter  alternative  maintained  the  whole  series  of  war 
industries,  while  at  the  same  time  it  gave  the  trusts  and 
the  industrial  magnates  a  thoroughly  safe  client:  the 
American  State.  This  client  would  take  the  place  of  the 
European  States,  which  were  suffering  from  fatigue, 
and  on  the  brink  of  ruin.  The  speculation  would  be  a 
fortunate  one,  for  the  harvest  of  gold  would  continue. 
The  financiers  and  industrial  magnates  combined  used 
the  Press  to  influence  public  opinion  in  such  a  way  as  to 
impel  President  Wilson  to  intervene  in  the  conflict. 


894          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

In  these  various  sociological  phenomena  we  note  the 
considerable  influence  of  economic  interests  over  human 
conduct,  and  the  power  of  action  which  a  powerful 
minority  derives  from  its  economic  and  financial  strength. 
Lastly,  we  observe  the  completest  solidarity  between 
individuals  and  events,  the  decision  of  the  capitalist 
magnates  being  dependent  upon  the  decisions  of  the 
proletarian  crowd,  and  vice  versa.  All  things  are  inter- 
connected, are  inextricably  entangled. 

This  is  so  true  that  the  capitalist  magnates,  in  order  to 
set  up  a  current  of  public  opinion,  were  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  the  world  of  University  professors,  clergy, 
lawyers,  men  of  letters,  scientists,  journalists,  etc.;  in 
short,  to  that  intellectual  minority  which,  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  had  been  influencing  public  opinion 
in  the  direction  of  the  intervention  of  the  United  States, 
in  the  interest  of  democratic  and  moral  ideals.  The 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  of  the  so-called  rules 
of  warfare  by  the  German  Government,  which  had 
ratified  those  rules,  and  the  treaty  of  neutrality,  and  the 
long  duration  of  the  war,  with  its  crimes  and  its  devasta- 
tion, had  quite  naturally  aroused  the  conscience  and 
the  rational  judgment  of  the  "  intellectuals"  of  North 
America.  Little  by  little  the  anti-Germanic  wave  crept 
forward,  in  the  name  of  morality  and  democracy. 
Puritans  and  ideologists  agreed  with  the  trusts  and  the 
financiers;  they  were,  although  for  different  reasons,  of 
one  and  the  same  mind.  The  mass  of  the  public  was 
roused  by  the  phraseology  of  democracy,  just  as  the 
mass  of  the  European  public  was  roused  in  the  year  1914. 
The  directing  elements  of  the  country,  seeking  the 
realization  of  economic  aims,  were  obliged  to  resort  to 
the  assistance  of  the  "  intellectuals,"  who  were  eagerly 
seeking  the  realization  of  ideological  aims,  in  order  to 
influence  the  mass  of  the  people,  who,  being  actuated  by 
sentiment,  serve  ideals  fp.r  more  readily  than  interests. 
What  had  happened  in  Europe  happened  again  in 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  395 

America.  The  task  of  arousing  public  opinion  was  all  the 
more  easy,  as  the  German  Government  afforded  notable 
assistance  in  the  shape  of  its  submarine  campaign. 
All  citizens  of  the  United  States  felt  the  effects  of  this 
campaign  and  perceived  its  dangers.  The  freedom  of 
the  seas  ceased  to  exist  with  the  advent  of  the  submarine, 
employed  as  it  was  in  an  utterly  unscrupulous  manner. 

Public  opinion  having  been  thus  aroused  and  directed, 
Mr.  Wilson  was  able  to  intervene  in  the  conflict,  knowing 
that  the  whole  people  would  be  with  him.  We  know 
how  he  did  intervene.  First,  in  his  Note  of  December, 
1916,  he  requested  the  belligerents  to  state  their  war 
aims.  He  was  on  the  eve  of  taking  a  decisive  step;  so 
that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  the  aims  of  the 
belligerents  should  be  made  public,  in  order  that  the 
American  people  should  approve  of  his  decision.  And 
the  world  witnessed  the  commencement  of  a  public 
diplomacy.  A  Democrat,  Mr.  Wilson  rejected  the 
obsolete  methods  of  secret  diplomacy. 

The  Central  Powers,  the  prisoners  of  their  govern- 
mental methods,  which  are  based  upon  "  bluff  "  and 
untruthfulness,  held  fast  on  the  one  hand  by  Pan- 
Germanism,  and  on  the  other  by  Social  Democracy,  were 
obliged  to  refrain  from  revealing  their  war  aims.  The 
Powers  of  the  Entente,  embarrassed  by  the  territorial 
cravings  of  Italy,  the  British  Empire,  and,  above  all, 
Russia,  were  forced  to  modify  their  declarations  as 
supporters  of  the  nationalist  policy.  Here  again  we 
perceive  the  harmful  nature  of  autocracies  and  of  the 
Imperialistic  policy  of  the  reactionary  and  conservative 
element.  On  the  other  hand,  we  perceive  also  the 
influence  of  the  democratic  elements,  which  in  the 
Western  Powers  is  sufficiently  powerful  to  call  for  an 
affirmation  of  the  nationalist  policy,  but  not  sufficiently 
powerful  to  compel  the  Governments  to  assert  the  right 
of  the  referendum,  the  right  of  the  peoples  to  dispose 
in  freedom  of  their  own  destinies. 


396          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  absence  of  a  reply  on  the  part  of  the  Central 
Powers,  and  the  reply  of  the  Entente,  was  enough  to 
enlighten  public  opinion,  so  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  able 
to  define  his  position  by  his  magnificent  Message  of 
January  22, 1917.  With  an  admirable  largeness  of  ideas, 
a  concision  and  lucidity  beyond  praise,  Mr.  Wilson  laid 
down  the  general  outlines  of  the  conditions  of  a  just  and 
stable  peace.  In  passing,  the  reader  will  permit  me  to 
observe  that  these  general  outlines  are  those  which  I 
myself  set  forth  in  March,  1916,  at  the  Birkbeck  College 
(Chapters  XI.  and  XIII.).  A  true  monument  of  inter- 
national politics,  this  Message  is  permeated  by  the 
spirit  of  justice  and  wisdom.  It  breathes  the  love  of 
liberty  and  equality.  It  continues  the  work  of  the 
French  Constituent  Assembly,  for  it  is  the  declaration 
of  the  Rights  of  the  Peoples. 

If  we  consider  this  Message,  we  discover : 

1.  The  assertion  that  the  New  World  is  entering  the 
Concert  of  the  Nations,  and  entering  it  with  its  political 
faith,  its  morality,  its  rules  of  conduct,  and  the  firm 
intention  of  concluding  peace  in  its  own  fashion. 

2.  The  affirmation  of  the  conditions  of  a  stable  peace, 
which  are:  (a)  The  creation  of  a  force  which  should 
guarantee  conventions;  and  this  force  will  not  consist 
of  armies,  nor  of  militarism,  but  of  organized  humanity, 
the  League  of  Nations,  the  Society  of  Nations,     (b)  A 
peace  without  rivalry,  without  conditions  imposed  on 
the  peoples  by  the  conquerors — that  is,  a  peace  without 
victory,  concluded  between  free  and  equal  peoples. 

8.  The  permanent  distinction  between  the  govern- 
ments and  the  governed. 

In  short,  Mr.  Wilson  bases  the  monument  of  stable 
peace  on  three  columns:  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Co- 
operation (solidarity  or  fraternity).  And  in  order  to 
make  the  world  clearly  understand  the  immense  signifi- 
cance of  his  proposal,  Mr.  Wilson  gave  the  concrete 
example  of  Poland,  and  hinted  at  that  of  Constantinople 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  397 

and  the  Dardanelles.  A  logician,  he  drew  the  inferences 
contained  in  his  premises,  without  caring  whose  interests 
they  clashed  with.  On  the  one  hand,  the  right  of  the 
peoples  to  dispose  of  themselves  was  affirmed,  and  also 
the  peoples'  need  of  mutual  aid.  At  the  same  time,  he 
denied  the  occupant's  right  of  territorial  ownership 
when  he  asserted  that  access  to  the  sea  is  a  necessary 
right  to  be  enjoyed  by  every  nation.  The  consequences 
of  this  declaration  involved  the  whole  world,  entailing 
the  neutralization  of  the  Rhine  for  Switzerland,  of  the 
Danube  for  Germany  and  Hungary,  of  the  roads  to 
the  Amazon  and  the  Pacific  for  Bolivia,  and  of  the 
Dardanelles,  etc.  The  freedom  of  the  seas  is  a  need  of 
the  peoples,  and  no  one  has  the  right  to  suppress  it. 
Thus  the  Message  demonstrated  the  solidarity  of  the 
world,  embracing  the  whole  world  even  in  the  midst  of 
this  gigantic  war  between  the  nations. 

The  position  publicly  assumed  by  Mr.  Wilson 
established  the  predominance  of  ideological  and  altruistic 
aims  over  the  economic  aims  of  the  capitalist  classes  of 
all  countries.  How  far  removed  is  this  grandson  of  an 
Irish  emigrant,  this  University  professor,  nourished  on 
ideology,  and  now  the  President  of  a  mighty  Republic, 
from  the  rulers  of  the  European  democracies  !  None  of 
these  latter  has  had  the  intelligence  nor  the  courageous 
honesty  to  break  definitely  with  the  Imperialistic  aims 
of  the  capitalist  clans,  to  announce,  categorically,  the 
ideological  aims  which  lay,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  at  the 
back  of  the  mind  of  every  democrat  in  Europe.  So 
true  was  this  that  the  rulers,  the  sworn  vassals  of 
economic  aims,  felt  the  necessity  of  veiling  these  by  a 
vague  democratic  phraseology. 

The  ideology  of  Kant,  expressed  by  the  voice  of  Mr. 
Wilson,  prevailed  over  the  economic  aims  of  the  trusts 
and  the  financiers.  These  latter  were  about  to  help 
toward  the  realization  of  the  League  of  Nations,  of 
the  republicanization  of  the  world.  Everywhere  the 


398          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

capitalist,  conservative,  reactionary  elements  perceived 
this  fact  more  or  less  plainly,  and  everywhere  they 
rebelled  against  it,  endeavouring  to  discredit  the 
democratic  and  pacific  ideals  of  Mr.  Wilson.  This 
reaction  would  have  assumed  an  even  greater  scope  had 
not  the  Governments  of  the  European  democracies,  in  the 
national  interest,  demanded  a  little  circumspection. 
The  autocratic  Governments  of  the  Central  Powers  and 
Russia  gave  little  heed  to  this  circumspection;  and  the 
Press  of  these  countries  definitely  assumed  a  position 
opposed  to  the  ideals  of  Mr.  Wilson,  which  it  contemptu- 
ously described  as  Utopian.  And  this  is  logical,  for  in 
desiring  a  stable  peace,  in  claiming  that  the  peoples 
have  the  right  to  dispose  of  their  own  destinies,  Mr. 
Wilson  was  opposing  the  designs  of  the  Imperial 
Governments.  He  was  sapping  the  principle  of  auto- 
cracy; he  was  in  favour  of  destroying  militarism  and  the 
standing  army,  those  props  of  autocracy. 

In  short,  the  Message  to  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  (January  22,  1917)  was  a  declaration  of  war  upon 
autocratic  procedures  and  systems  of  government,  such 
as  those  which  obtained  in  the  Central  Empires  and  in 
the  Russia  of  that  date.  The  German  rulers  were  not 
mistaken.  They  saw  that  the  participation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  establishment  of  peace  was  inevit- 
able; and  for  months  their  Press  had  been  protesting 
against  this  participation,  the  result  of  which  would  be 
a  democratic  peace,  a  peace  of  the  nations,  based  on 
principles,  and  not  an  Imperialistic,  autocratic  peace, 
consisting  of  compromises.  They  saw  themselves 
definitely  defeated.  They  then  resorted  to  the  employ- 
ment of  their  favourite  weapon,  terrorism,  in  the  vague 
hope  of  inducing  their  adversaries  to  consent  to  a 
settlement.  They  intensified  the  submarine  campaign, 
in  order,  if  possible,  to  effect  the  blockade  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Italy. 

The  intensification  of  the  submarine  campaign  injured 


CO    CLUDING  REMARKS  399 

the  neutrals  more  than  it  injured  the  belligerents. 
Without  warning,  without  previous  discussion,  the 
German  Government  broke  through  the  understanding 
in  respect  of  submarines  which  it  had  concluded  with 
the  United  States  in  April  and  May,  1916. 

Events  bear  man  forward  in  the  logical  and  inevitable 
development  of  their  consequences.  Effects  in  their 
turn  become  causes,  and  so  on  in  unending  concatenation. 
To  the  rupture  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1916,  Mr. 
Wilson  retorted  by  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations. 
But  he  did  not  stop  there.  Deeply  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  a  League  of  Nations,  he  invited  all  neutral 
countries  to  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States — 
that  is,  to  place  Germany  under  the  ban  of  the  nations. 
The  terrorist  policy  of  the  German  Junkers  was 
increasing  the  number  of  Germany's  enemies,  and 
slowly  but  surely  was  compassing  her  ruin.  Once 
again  we  perceive  the  harmful  effects  of  the  militarist 
education  and  the  ruling  of  men  by  fear. 

The  neutrals  did  not  respond  to  President  Wilson's 
appeal  by  excommunicating  the  Imperial  Powers.  The 
immediate  neighbours  of  the  German  Empire  felt  them- 
selves too  weak  to  dare  to  protest  against  the  Germanic 
reign  of  terror.  From  this  fear,  which,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  is  very  natural,  we  may  derive  this  lesson:  the 
necessity  of  disarmament,  for  with  nations,  as  with 
individuals,  there  is  no  true  liberty  save  between  equals. 
Now  the  nations  can  only  be  equal  among  themselves 
provided  none  of  them  possesses  armaments  which 
can  be  employed  to  crush  the  others.  The  neutral 
nations  which  did  not  border  upon  the  Central  Powers 
did  not  feel  that  they  were  attacked.  They  did  not 
perceive  the  inevitable  solidarity  of  the  nations. 
German  Kaiserism  and  Junkerism  quickly  undeceived 
them  by  the  activities  of  their  diplomatists  and  their 
submarines.  The  revelation  of  the  secret  activities  of 
Germany,  of  her  attempts  to  intervene  in  American 


400          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

affairs,  by  launching  Mexico,  aided  by  Japan,  against 
the  United  States,  and  fomenting  disturbances  in 
Central  and  South  America,  made  it  obvious  to  all  that 
an  international  solidarity  exists,  whether  the  nations 
desire  it  or  no.  These  attempts  also  proved  once  more 
that  the  rulers  of  the  autocratic  countries  were  absolutely 
ignorant  of  the  psychology  of  the  free  peoples.  Here 
again  is  one  of  the  fruits  of  the  militarist  education 
based  on  fear. 

As  time  went  on,  and  the  United  States  were  slowly 
moving  in  the  direction  of  war,  an  event  occurred  which 
accelerated  their  progress.     The   Russian   Revolution, 
by  suppressing  Tsarism,  banished  awhile  the  fear  that 
the  defeat  of  the  Central  Powers  would  serve  to  reinforce 
the  Russian  autocracy.     This  fear,   which  was  fairly 
general  in  democratic  countries,  prevented  many  demo- 
crats from  recommending  union  with  the  adversaries  of 
the  Central  Powers.     Very  soon  the  facts  showed  that 
the  Russian  Revolution  might  really  prove  to  be  a  great 
liberating  force,  which  would  free  the  nations.     Equal 
rights  were  conferred  upon  all  Russian  citizens,  without 
distinction  of  race,  religion,  or   nationality.     And  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  whether  they  were  poor 
artisans     or    rich    financiers,    suddenly    ceased   to    be 
Germanophile,  to  become  Russophile.     The  hatred  of 
Russian  Tsarism   gave  way  to  love  for  the  Russian 
Republic.       Lithuanians,     Letts,     Poles,     Armenians, 
Georgians,  Finns,  and  other  allogeneous  peoples  who  had 
emigrated  to  America  in  order  to  escape  the  autocratic 
yoke   of   the   Tsar   were   instantaneously   transformed 
into  ardent  Russophiles.     From  this   resulted   an   in- 
creased tendency  to  support  the  Entente  and  to  oppose 
the    Central    Powers.     The    seed    of    autocracy    and 
terrorism  was  yielding  its  fruit  of  hatred.     Once  again 
the  thinker  was  able  to  perceive  that  liberty  is  the  seed 
of    love,   the    parent    of   well-doing,   while    authority, 
based  on  fear  and  constraint,  is  the  seed  of  hatred,  the 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  401 

parent  of  crime.  Let  us  note  that  these  social  phe- 
nomena demonstrate  what  we  have  already  stated 
concerning  the  remote  repercussion  of  men's  acts  in 
time  and  space,  and  the  unbreakable  ties  which  unite 
men,  though  seas  and  mountains  divide  them. 

Thus  when  on  April  3,  1917,  Mr.  Wilson  declared 
"  that  the  Imperial  German  Government  was  making 
war  upon  the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States,"  and  "  counselled  Congress  to  signify  its  formal 
acceptance  of  the  state  of  war  which  was  forced  upon 
it,"  he  had  behind  him,  approving  of  his  action,  almost 
the  entire  American  people,  without  distinction  of  origin 
or  religion. 

For  the  first  time  in  history  the  world  beheld  a  great 
State  responding  to  a  war  of  attack  by  a  war  of  offence 
without  formally  declaring  war.  There  was  here  a  break- 
ing away  from  the  traditional  methods  of  diplomacy, 
deliberately  effected,  in  order  to  assert  the  absolute 
desire  of  the  American  people  to  refrain  from  going  to 
war.  The  symbolic  value  of  this  absence  of  any  declara- 
tion of  war  is  considerable.  This  is  what  it  means: 
"  We  are  attacked,  and  we  are  defending  ourselves  by 
all  the  means  in  our  power ;  but  we  have  no  love  of  war, 
and  we  do  not  make  war  under  any  conditions  whatever. 
By  principle  the  Democrat  is  a  pacifist,  and  the  pacifist 
does  not  make  war.  But  to  be  a  pacifist  does  not  by 
any  means  imply  that  one  should  submit  to  any  act  of 
violence,  to  any  attack  upon  one's  liberty,  without 
protesting,  without  reacting,  without  defending  oneself, 
even  by  violence.  The  pacifist  is  not  necessarily  a 
Tolstoyan." 

The  United  States  are  participating  in  the  war  against 
the  Imperial  Powers  without  forming  an  alliance  with 
the  Powers  of  the  Entente,  and  without  signing  the 
Pact  of  London  (September  5,  1914).  This  attitude, 
unique  among  the  belligerents,  is  explained  by  the 
distrust  of  the  Imperialistic  aims  pursued  by  certain 

26 


402          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

of  these  belligerents.  These  aims  are  undoubtedly 
Imperialistic  as  well  as  secret.  But  it  was  not  in  order 
to  promote  such  ends  that  the  United  States  intervened. 
Mr.  Wilson  warned  the  world  of  this  fact  in  his  Declara- 
tion of  April  3 : 

"  Peace  must  be  based  upon  the  tried  foundations  of 
political  liberty.  We  have  no  selfish  aim  to  serve.  We 
desire  no  conquest;  we  seek  no  indemnity  for  ourselves, 
no  material  sacrifices  for  the  sacrifices  to  which  we 
shall  freely  consent ;  we  are  merely  the  upholders  of  the 
rights  of  humanity.  We  shall  be  satisfied  when  these 
rights  have  been  assured." 

With  such  altruistic  aims  it  was  impossible  to  form 
alliances  with  governments  which  were  aiming  at  the 
satisfaction  of  narrow  and  selfish  interests.  Another 
important  consequence  of  this  absence  of  alliances  is  this : 
Mr.  Wilson  is  free  to  act  as  he  chooses;  he  can  continue 
the  war  or  terminate  it  without  reference  to  the  other 
belligerents.  These  latter  depend  upon  him,  but  he 
does  not  depend  upon  them.  He  thus  becomes  the 
arbiter  of  the  conflict,  for  accordingly  as  he  continues 
or  terminates  it  he  forces  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  to 
continue  or  terminate  it.  He  is  the  arbiter  of  the 
conflict,  because  he  has  behind  him  the  whole  gigantic 
financial,  economic,  and  human  power  of  the  United 
States.  The  complete  liberty  which  Mr.  Wilson  has 
assured  for  himself  is  a  certain  guarantee  that  the  peace 
which  is  concluded  will  be  a  just  and  stable  peace, 
without  victors  or  vanquished,  based  on  the  liberty  of 
the  peoples  to  dispose  of  their  own  destinies. 

The  ideology  of  the  war  aims  of  Mr.  Wilson,  combined 
with  the  entire  liberty  of  action  which  he  has  skilfully 
reserved  for  himself,  has  forced  him,  and  is  forcing  him, 
to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Powers  of  the  Entente 
and  on  the  neutrals  in  the  direction  of  realizing  his 
ideal  aims.  Thus  he  is  influencing  the  British  Govern- 
ment with  a  view  to  impelling  it  to  solve  the  Irish 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  408 

problem  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  national 
freedom,  the  principles  which  the  British  Government 
claimed  to  be  defending  when  it  declared  war  on  Germany. 
The  Irish  problem,  from  being  particular  to  Great 
Britain,  has  become  Imperial,  and  even  international. 
The  Dominions,  which  took  part  in  the  war,  suffered, 
like  the  other  Allies  of  the  Entente,  the  consequences 
of  the  enmity  which  prevailed  between  Irish  and  English : 
the  absence  of  compulsory  service,  etc.  Peopled 
partially  by  Irishmen  (the  Prime  Ministers  of  certain 
Dominions  were  Irish),  and  bound  to  Great  Britain  only 
by  the  ties  of  free  consent,  the  Dominions  naturally  felt 
the  necessity  of  bringing  all  their  influence  to  bear,  in 
the  Council  of  Empire  which  the  needs  of  the  war  had 
forced  upon  the  British  Government,  with  a  view  to 
effecting  the  liberation  of  Ireland.  In  so  doing  they 
seconded  the  pressure  exerted  by  Mr.  Wilson,  who  was 
himself  acting  under  the  impulse  of  the  purely  logical 
principles  which  had  led  him  to  intervene  in  the  war, 
and  influence  of  the  political  and  economic  power  of  the 
American  Irish.  To  the  pressure  exerted  by  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  Canada,  South  Africa,  and  North  America, 
was  added  that  resulting  from  the  example  of  the 
Russian  Revolution,  which  declared  Poland  independent, 
Finland  autonomous,  etc.,  and  officially  declared  the 
right  of  national  groups  to  dispose  in  freedom  of  their 
own  destinies.  The  British  Government  understood 
that  it  must  solve  the  Irish  Question,  and  that  it  could 
no  longer  obey  the  small,  wealthy,  Conservative  minority 
of  Ulster,  led  by  the  Minister,  Sir  Edward  Carson.  Let 
us  once  more,  in  passing,  note  the  influence  of  active 
minorities,  and  the  continual  attempts  of  the  elements 
of  conservation  and  regression  to  check  the  onward 
progress  of  the  world.  The  present  British  Govern- 
ment is  democratic  and  Parliamentary  only  in  appear- 
ance: this  is  a  point  of  great  interest  to  the  sociologist, 
to  which  we  shall  return  again.  It  is  actually  autocratic, 


404          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

and   is   directed   by   the   Conservatives.     Moreover,   it 
attempted  to  satisfy  the  Conservative  Ulstermen,  by 
separating  them  from  the  rest  of   Ireland,   to  which 
Home  Rule  was  granted.      The  reason   given  for  this 
partitioning   of   Ireland  was  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment refused,  by  any  means  whatever,  to  force  a  law 
upon  a  minority  which  did  not  accept  it.     Let  us  note, 
moreover,  that   this   reason    belongs   to   the   doctrine 
elaborated  by  the  Anarchist  thinkers,   who  maintain 
that  the  right  of  a  minority  is  as  worthy  of  respect  as 
the  right  of  a  majority,  and,  therefore,  that  a  govern- 
ment must  never  be  imposed  by  force,  but  must,  by 
persuasion,  insure  its  voluntary  acceptance.      It  was  a 
strange  scruple  in  a  Government  which  had  imposed 
compulsory  service  on  a  small  minority  of  "  conscientious 
objectors  "  who  did  not  accept  it.     Moreover,  when  we 
examine  the  manner  in  which  democratic  Governments 
perform  their  functions   in  the  present   state   of  our 
civilization  we  see  that  they  always  depend  on  the 
submission  of  the  opposition  minority  to  the  decisions 
imposed  by  the    majority,  or  what    seems   to  be  the 
majority.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  reason  given  by  the 
British  Government  was  only  a  pretext,  an  apparent 
reason,  designed  to  conceal  the  actual  motive :  obedience 
to  Conservative  and  capitalist  influence.     But  the  time 
had  gone  by  when  this  influence,  however  powerfully 
exerted,  could  check  the  inevitable  course  of  events. 
The  partitioning  of  Ireland  was  impossible,  the  more 
so  as  the  Protestant  clergy  combined  in  part  with  the 
Catholic  clergy  to  protest  against  it.     Moreover,  since 
the  revolt  of  the  Sinn  Feiners  the  situation  which  we 
outlined  in  Chapter  V.  had  been  confirmed:  the  spirit  of 
rebellion  had  gained  the  whole  island,  and  each  Parlia- 
mentary election  recorded  a  victory  for  the  republican 
Sinn  Feiners  over  the  Home  Rulers  pure  and  simple. 
The  British  Government  was  gathering  the  fruit  of  the 
seed  it  had  planted  during  the  course  of  the  last  century; 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  405 

and  the  fruits   of  authoritative  rule  are  always  bitter 
and  unwholesome. 

The  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  proposed 
Home  Rule  with  the  exclusion  of  the  six  counties  of 
Ulster,  and,  if  this  was  refused,  the  convocation  of  an 
Irish  Convention,  in  which  all  classes  and  all  interests 
should  be  represented,  which  should  discuss  and  examine 
all  sorts  of  ideas,  formulate  conclusions,  and  finally 
arrive  at  a  settlement,  with  all  guarantees  for  the 
autonomous  government  of  Ireland.  Naturally  the 
Irish  Nationalists  in  the  House  of  Commons  were  in 
favour  of  the  Convention,  while  the  Ulster  representa- 
tives preferred  partition,  and  joined  the  Convention 
only  with  reservations.  Eventually  the  Convention 
was  decided  upon.  What  will  it  yield  ?  This  we 
cannot  foresee  in  detail,  for  the  result  will  be  a 
compromise,  whose  nature  will  depend  on  the  respective 
tenacity  and  strength  of  the  opposing  parties.  How- 
ever this  may  be,  the  self-government  of  Ireland  is  now 
assured,  excepting  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period  of  delay. 
Before  the  cessation  of  hostilities  Ireland  will  have 
conquered  her  liberty,  and  thus,  as  Lord  Curzon  stated 
in  the  House  of  Lords,  "  the  reconciliation  of  Ireland 
with  Great  Britain  will  assure  to  the  latter  the  sympathy 
and  collaboration  of  all  sections  of  public  opinion  in 
America,  and  will  give  her  an  enormous  advantage  at 
the  Peace  Conference."  This  admission  on  the  part  of 
the  Conservative  English  Government  shows  that  the 
international  nature  of  the  Irish  problem  is  recognized, 
as  well  as  the  power  of  principles  in  the  government  of 
democracies,  and  the  solidarity  which  binds  all  peoples 
and  all  men  together.  The  pressure  which  the  Dominions 
and  the  United  States  have  exerted  upon  the  British 
Government  is  also  manifested  by  the  measures  of  self- 
government  which  were  granted  in  India.  These  do 
not  yet  amount  to  the  realization  of  the  desires  of  the 
Hindu  Nationalists,  but  they  constitute  an  advance 


406  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

toward  their  complete  realization.  The  present  war  will 
have  contributed  toward  the  liberation  of  India :  a  fresh 
proof  of  the  influence  of  active  minorities,  of  the  increas- 
ing democratization  of  the  world,  and  of  the  solidarity 
of  mankind,  notwithstanding  seas  and  continents. 

Compelled  by  his  pacific  ideology  to  enter  the  turmoil 
of  the  war,  Mr.  Wilson  is  further  constrained  thereby  to 
exert  pressure  upon  the  neutrals  of  Europe,  America, 
and  Asia,  in  order  to  induce  them,  if  not  to  enter  the 
conflict,  at  all  events  to  break  off  all  relations  with  the 
Imperial  Powers.  And  he  must  so  exert  this  pressure 
as  to  create,  during  the  course  of  the  war  itself,  that 
League  of  Nations  of  which  Kant  dreamed,  and  which 
he  wishes  to  realize.  Another  effect  of  the  rupture  of 
relations  between  the  neutrals  and  the  Central  Powers 
is  the  impossibility,  when  peace  is  concluded,  of  a 
Protectionist  policy  shared  by  a  group  of  nations.  The 
entry  into  the  war  of  the  Republics  of  the  United  States, 
Cuba,  Guatemala,  and  to-morrow  of  Brazil,  etc.,  insures 
that  when  peace  is  concluded  no  Protectionist  policy 
can  be  established  for  the  group  of  Western  belligerents, 
as  it  would  include  all  America,  all  Asia,  all  Africa,  and 
all  Australia — in  short,  the  whole  world.  By  the  very 
size  of  the  group  the  Protectionist  ties  which  might  in 
some  extraordinary  way  be  created  would  lose  their 
Protectionist  character.  So  the  thinking  reader  may 
note  this  as  a  certain  consequence  of  the  intervention 
of  the  United  States:  A  policy  of  free  exchange  is 
obligatory  on  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Attempts  at 
economic  warfare,  in  the  form  of  Protectionism,  are 
doomed  to  certain  failure.  The  democratization  of  the 
world  promoted  by  this  war,  which  was  entered  upon  for 
the  sake  of  autocratic  aims,  is  in  process  of  accomplish- 
ment, politically  as  well  as  economically  speaking. 

Among  the  neutrals  figured  the  Chinese  Republic. 
Its  rulers  very  clearly  comprehended  that  it  was  to  the 
national  interest  to  yield  to  American  pressure.  Diplo- 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  407 

matic  relations  with  the  Central  Powers  were  therefore 
broken  off.  By  this  act  the  Chinese  Republic  entered 
the  world-concert  of  nations:  it  inscribed  itself  a 
member  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  became  the  equal 
of  the  Powers  of  Europe  and  America.  This  act  had 
yet  another  important  repercussion,  for  it  meant,  where 
Japan  was  concerned,  an  understanding  between  China 
and  the  United  States,  and  the  end  of  Japan's  pre- 
tentions  to  hegemony  over  Chinese  Asia.  This  was  a 
terrible  blow  to  the  Imperialist  policy  of  Japan;  all  the 
more  terrible  in  that  the  Russian  Revolution  had 
rendered  obsolete  the  convention  concluded  during 
the  war,  between  the  Japanese  and  Russian  Empires, 
by  which  the  Chinese  Republic  was  divided  into  spheres 
of  influence.  The  Russian  Revolution,  democratic  and 
Socialist,  repudiated  all  those  aims  of  conquest  which 
are  the  inevitable  product  of  autocratic  empires. 
Imperialistic  Japan,  of  course,  disconcerted  by  the 
American  intervention,  and  even  more  disappointed  by 
the  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  appeared  likely 
to  react  by  exciting  the  military  reaction  which  is  taking 
place  at  the  moment  of  writing  these  lines.  What  will 
come  of  this  ?  Possibly  disturbances  which  will  spread 
through  the  whole  of  Central  and  Eastern  Asia,  and 
which  will  last  for  many  months;  but  they  will  not 
succeed  in  re-establishing  the  situation  which  obtained 
before  the  war,  or  the  hegemony  of  Imperial  Japan. 
This  hegemony  received  a  serious  blow  in  January- 
April,  1917,  from  the  Russian  Revolution,  and  above 
all  from  the  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  the 
war. 

The  pressure  which  the  United  States  are  exerting  on 
the  neutrals  of  Europe  is  more  economic  than  political. 
The  group  of  Entente  Powers  is  tending  more  and  more 
to  increase  the  stringency  of  the  blockade  of  the  Central 
Powers,  and  this  it  can  do  only  by  limiting  the  intro- 
duction of  products  into  neutral  countries.  A  closer 


408          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

blockade  is  called  for  by  the  check  suffered  by  military 
action  in  the  Western  front.  To  pierce  the  defensive 
line  of  trenches  running  from  Switzerland  to  the  North 
Sea  is  impossible,  save  by  sacrificing  millions  of  men — 
that  is  to  say,  by  completely  exhausting  the  supply  of 
human  material.  The  last  offensives  have  proved  this. 
And  from  this  we  derive  this  lesson:  that  in  our  age, 
with  our  ways  and  means  of  warfare,  military  action 
and  the  use  of  armed  force  yield  no  useful  result.  No 
decision  can  be  obtained  by  force  of  arms.  The  economic 
power  is  replacing  the  power  of  armaments. 

This  war,  in  fact,  constitutes  the  bankruptcy  of  French 
and  English  militarism,  which  are  incapable  of  piercing 
the  Hindenburg  line,  and  of  German  militarism,  which 
is  incapable  of  forcing  its  enemies  to  treat  for  peace. 
The  decision  in  the  world-war  will  be  given  by  the 
economic  forces.  Humanity  has  passed  the  period  of 
armed  force,  which  belonged  to  the  age  of  barbarism. 

The  limitation  of  the  introduction  of  food-stuffs  and 
raw  materials  into  the  neutral  countries  results  in 
increasing  the  difficulties  of  living.  The  rise  of  prices, 
the  growing  scarcity  of  food  and  raw  materials,  and  the 
dearth  of  labour  in  the  workshops  and  factories  are, 
in  the  neutral  countries  of  Europe,  the  consequences  of 
a  tightening  of  the  blockade.  These  consequences  find 
their  repercussion  in  the  Central  Powers,  as  the  neutrals 
are  forced  to  limit  their  exports  to  those  countries, 
however  sorely  they  may  need  to  make  such  exports 
in  order  that  they  may,  in  exchange,  obtain  coal  and 
steel. 

The  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  the  world- war 
is  producing  economic  effects  of  no  less  importance  in 
the  Western  nations  of  the  Entente.  The  calling-up, 
for  military  service,  of  nearly  two  million  men  inevitably 
reduces  the  available  supply  of  labour,  and  thereby 
diminishes  production.  The  result  will  be  an  increase 
of  the  prices  of  food-stuffs  and  other  products  all  the 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  409 

world  over,  and  the  necessity  of  rationing,  of  a  methodical 
and  ordered  distribution  of  products,  according  to  the 
needs  of  the  consumers.  This  situation  can  only  become 
yet  further  aggravated  if  other  neutral  American  nations 
take  part  in  the  conflict,  for  everywhere  men  will  be 
removed  from  production  in  order  that  they  may  be 
employed  as  soldiers — that  is,  as  destroyers  of  the  things 
produced.  Militarism  is  the  parent  of  famine,  since  it 
diminishes  the  number  of  producers.  Everywhere  there 
will  be  an  intensification  of  the  Socialistic  measures  to 
which  the  Governments  have  been  compelled  to  resort 
during  the  war.  The  process  of  Socializing  the  world 
appears  also  to  be  on  the  way  to  realization,  and  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  this  is  happening  under  capitalist 
Governments  whose  principles  are  absolutely  opposed  to 
the  measures  which  they  are  proposing  and  applying. 
Once  more  we  perceive  that  men  are  controlled  by  events, 
and  that  the  logic  of  events  compels  men  to  do  that 
which  they  would  not  wish  to  do.  The  conditioning  of 
men  and  things  is  universal  and  absolute. 

While  a  system  of  rationing  is  imposing  itself  upon 
all  the  European  belligerents  and  neutral  countries  of 
Europe,  it  is  becoming  necessary  to  control  the  export 
of  products  to  Europe  in  a  more  methodical  manner, 
owing  to  the  diminished  tonnage  available  for  purposes 
of  transport,  due  to  the  activities  of  the  submarines. 
The  export  of  raw  materials  has  therefore  been  diminished 
in  favour  of  the  export  of  manufactured  goods.  In  this 
way  the  transport  of  materials  which  would  be  lost  in 
the  workshops,  in  the  process  of  manufacture,  is  avoided. 
But  the  consequence  of  this  is  that  the  industrial 
workers,  in  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Germany,  are 
being  dismissed,  the  men  to  barracks  and  the  front,  and 
the  v/omen  to  their  own  homes.  The  result  is  intense 
discontent.  On  the  one  hand,  the  workers  are  ceasing 
to  draw  high  wages;  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  cast 
back  into  the  turmoil  of  the  conflict,  with  all  its  dangers. 


410          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

Each  worker  thus  remobilized  as  a  soldier  is  an  actual 
element  of  dissociation  and  revolution  in  the  midst  of 
other  soldiers  who  are  already  filled  with  discontent  as 
a  result  of  three  years  of  continuous  fighting.  Here  is 
one  of  the  consequences  of  the  submarine  war  under- 
taken at  the  desire  of  the  Pan-Germanist  Junkers  and 
manufacturers. 

In  this  way  a  genuinely  revolutionary  situation  is 
arising,  persisting,  and  undergoing  development.  It  is 
creating  a  revolutionary  mentality,  the  effect  of  which 
will  inevitably  make  itself  felt  either  after  the  war  or  in 
the  course  of  the  war;  for  it  seems  highly  probable  that 
this  situation  and  mentality  are  the  consequences  of 
the  activities  of  the  policy  pursued  by  the  world's 
capitalists,  and  more  especially  by  the  Junkers  and 
industrial  magnates  of  Germany.  They  are  digging 
with  their  own  hands  the  tomb  in  which  they  are  about 
to  bury  themselves.  Yet  they  were  aware  of  the 
possibility  of  these  consequences.  The  British  Foreign 
Minister,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  had  warned  them  of  it  in 
his  telegram  of  July  23, 1914,  to  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen, 
the  British  Ambassador  in  Vienna.  He  said,  in  effect: 

"  If  as  many  as  four  great  Powers  of  Europe — let  us 
say  Austria,  France,  Russia,  and  Germany — were  engaged 
in  war,  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  must  involve  the  expendi- 
ture of  so  vast  a  sum  of  money,  and  such  an  interference 
with  trade,  that  a  war  would  be  accompanied  or  folio  ved 
by  a  complete  collapse  of  European  credit  and  industry. 
In  these  days,  in  great  industrial  States,  this  would  mean 
a  state  of  things  worse  than  that  of  1848,  and,  irrespective 
of  who  were  victors  in  the  war,  many  things  might  be 
completely  swept  away." 

The  acts  of  men  have  remote  consequences,  often 
very  different  from  those  which  they  desired.  This 
revolutionary  situation  and  state  of  mind,  whose 
beginnings  might  be  perceived  as  early  as  August,  1914, 
as  we  have  stated  on  several  occasions  in  the  course  of 


411 

the  foregoing  chapters,  have  been  intensified  as  well  as 
more  widely  propagated  by  the  example  of  the  Russian 
Revolution.  The  educative  force  of  example  is  consider- 
able, because  man  is  naturally  imitative;  and  for  this 
reason  revolutions,  like  reactions,  are  contagious.  The 
same  conditions  naturally  engender  the  same  effects. 
Already  we  have  seen  that  the  events  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  were  one  of  the  factors  of  the  disturb- 
ances and  strikes  in  Germany  in  April  last,  in  Sweden, 
in  Spain,  in  France,  and  in  Great  Britain.  The  Govern- 
ments checked  these  disturbances  either  by  yielding  to  all 
the  demands  of  the  strikers  (as  in  France  and  England), 
or  by  yielding  with  threats  (as  in  Germany,  Sweden,  and 
Spain).  At  the  same  time,  the  Governments  realized  that 
they  would  be  obliged  to  satisfy  some  of  the  demands 
of  the  popular  masses.  In  Great  Britain  they  have 
done  this  by  introducing  universal  suffrage,  and  by 
granting  six  million  women  the  right  to  vote;  in 
Rumania,  by  introducing  universal  suffrage,  dividing 
the  soil  among  the  peasants,  and  establishing  equality 
of  rights  irrespective  of  religious  distinctions;  in  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary,  by  promising  democratic 
reform  after  the  war.  These  are  the  fruits  of  the 
Russian  Revolution,  whose  effects  are  felt  beyond  the 
Russian  frontiers;  for  the  nations  possess  a  mutual 
solidarity,  even  when  they  are  divided  by  the  trenches 
of  the  fronts  on  which  men  are  killing  one  another. 
Solidarity  is,  in  reality,  far  stronger  and  of  more  effect 
in  the  world  than  the  forces  of  conflict.  Mutual  aid 
prevails  over  mutual  conflict. 

The  pressure  of  events  is  bringing  about  the  demo- 
cratization of  the  peoples;  and  according  to  circum- 
stances this  is  occurring  slowly,  and  by  successive  stages, 
or  in  a  speedier  fashion.  It  is  enough  for  some  chance 
incident — the  scarcity  of  provisions,  a  slight  dearth  of 
bread — to  anger  the  crowds,  and  movements  of  revolt 
are  unleashed  which  are  quickly  transformed  into 


412          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

revolutions.  Hunger  is  the  greatest  maker  of  revolu- 
tions that  has  ever  existed.  Thus  was  born  the  Russian 
Revolution.  The  Germanophile  bureaucracy  of  Russia 
took  measures  to  cause  a  famine,  in  order  to  provoke 
disturbances,  that  they  might  repress  these,  and  so 
demonstrate  to  Russia's  Western  Allies  the  fact  that  she 
must  needs  conclude  peace  in  order  to  prevent  an 
internal  revolution.  Tsarism  could  not  agree  to  the 
democratic  formulae  of  President  Wilson's  Message,  for 
to  do  so  would  have  been  to  sign  its  own  death  warrant. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  break  with  its  Western 
Allies.  Riot  and  insurrection  were  the  best  pretext. 
Unfortunately,  the  Russian  bureaucracy  forgot  that  it 
is  easier  to  unloose  the  forces  of  the  populace  than  to 
check  them  once  they  are  unchained.  It  is  with  them 
as  with  a  torrent  that  has  burst  its  banks.  The  Tsar's 
Government  could  not  repress  the  rioting,  which  became 
a  revolution,  whose  course  is  only  beginning,  so  that  the 
world  has  as  yet  felt  only  some  of  its  effects. 

The  rioting  was  transformed  into  a  revolution  because 
the  army,  on  which  the  Government  was  relying,  joined 
the  rioters.  The  army  had  ceased  to  be  a  professional 
army,  commanded  by  professional  officers:  it  had 
become  a  nation  in  arms,  an  army  of  citizens,  commanded 
by  other  citizens.  The  simple  consideration  of  this 
phenomenon  would  have  shown  the  Russian  rulers  that 
they  could  not  count  on  the  army  to  recall  the  crowds 
to  obedience.  But  they  could  not  realize  this  change, 
because  of  their  military  and  autocratic  mentality, 
which  prevented  them  from  perceiving  the  reality,  dis- 
torted facts,  and  concealed  their  inevitable  consequences. 
This  transformation  of  the  professional  army  into  an 
army  of  citizens  has  occurred  everywhere  during  the 
course  of  this  war.  It  renders  illusory  any  possibility 
of  repressing  revolution  when  the  unknown  hour 
strikes  in  each  country.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
hour  will  strike,  for  everywhere,  in  the  neutral  as  in  the 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  413 

belligerent  countries,  everyone  is  haunted  by  the  idea 
of  revolution.  The  poorer  classes  of  the  towns  and 
rural  districts  speak  of  it  as  an  inevitable  event.  In 
the  newspapers,  the  Parliaments,  the  Socialist  and 
Trade  Union  Congresses,  the  threat  of  revolution  looms 
ahead.  Rulers  and  ruled  are  agreed  on  this  point, 
although  the  former  often  refuse  to  admit  the  fact.  Men 
like  to  close  their  eyes  to  the  precipice  toward  which 
they  are  hastening,  fancying  that  they  thereby  suppress 
its  existence.  This  haunting  fear  of  revolution  is  a 
curious  psychological  and  sociological  phenomenon,  and 
as  such  must  be  recorded. 

Moreover,  this  fear  of  revolution  is  provoked  by  many 
factors,  well  known    though    not  publicly  mentioned, 
and  often  exaggerated  by  the  very  existence  of  the 
veil  in  which  the  Governments  and  their  censors  seek  to 
envelop   them.     Among  the  soldiers  at  the  front  and 
in  the  rear  there  are  frequent  instances  of  insubordina- 
tion, of  refusal  to  enter  the  trenches,  of  threats  to  march 
against  the  Government,  of  appeals  to  peace.     The  red 
flag  which  flew  at  the  head  of  the  revolutionary  Russian 
soldiers  has  many  times  been  raised  by  the  soldiers  on 
the   Western   front.      The    famous    hymn,    the    Inter- 
nationale,  is   heard  everywhere  on  the  fronts.     Com- 
mittees of  soldiers  and  workmen  are  spontaneously  being 
created,  like  those  which  cover  Russia  with  a  close  and 
powerful  network.    Everywhere  demands  of  a  democratic 
and  libertarian  nature  are  being  made;   the  discipline 
based  on  fear   has  completely  disappeared.     Will   the 
discipline   based   on  reason    and  the  consciousness   of 
collective    interests   replace    it  ?     This    is    the  terrible 
problem  of  the  hour.     And  its  solution  is  rendered  more 
difficult  by  the  atmosphere  of  ignorance  and  obscurity 
which  covers  everything,  thanks  to  the  censorship  and 
the  policy  of  untruthfulness  and  silence  adopted  by  the 
Governments.     The  gravity  of  the  present  situation,  the 


414          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

noxious  character  of  such  a  policy,  and  of  the  obsolete 
methods  of  controlling  the  peoples  by  means  of  untruth 
and  ignorance,  and  the  dangers  of  foolish  shepherds, 
appear  strangely  obvious. 

Chaos  is  everywhere,  and  the  co-ordination  of  indi- 
vidual and  collective  efforts  is  almost  impossible,  for  the 
Press  is  stifled  by  the  censorship ;  free  speech  is  rendered 
dumb  by  the  violence  of  the  autocratic  laws  passed  at 
the  commencement  of  the  war,  which  have  not  yet  been 
abrogated.  From  this  seething  chaos,  which  is  swelled 
by  amplified  and  often  falsified  news,  which  circulates 
with  incredible  rapidity,  what  will  result  ?  No  one  can 
say  with  certainty,  except  that  revolutionary  move- 
ments are  sure  to  occur,  for  fear  no  longer  exists  in  the 
minds  of  the  combatants. 

*  *  *  *  si- 

All  are  longing  eagerly  for  peace,  and  under  present 
conditions  no  nation  can  make  peace.  Generally 
speaking,  the  public  has  supposed  that  the  intervention 
of  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  republics,  and 
the  Russian  Revolution,  would  shorten  the  duration  of 
this  lengthy  war.  This  is  an  obvious  error.  The  more 
the  number  of  belligerents  increases  the  more  complex 
becomes  the  problem  of  concluding  peace.  Moreover, 
it  is  all  the  more  difficult  to  make  peace  if  it  is  to  be 
established  on  ideological  rather  than  on  material  and 
economic  foundations.  An  understanding  may  be 
entered  into  by  enemy  States  as  regards  the  cession  of 
territories  and  populations,  and  the  payment  of  war 
contributions;  a  compromise  based  on  mutual  conces- 
sions is  always  possible  in  such  a  case.  But  things  are 
otherwise  when  ideological  principles  are  involved.  All 
compromise  is  impossible,  as  being  the  very  negation  of 
the  ideal  principle  for  whose  realization  men  are  fighting. 
It  is  impossible  for  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
Governments  to  accept  a  peace  based  on  the  principle 
that  the  peoples  shall  be  free  to  dispose  of  their  own 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  415 

destinies,  a  principle  which  is  the  condition  sine  qua  non 
of  the  peace  desired  by  Mr.  Wilson,  and  by  the  Pro- 
visional Government  of  Russia  in  revolution.  Kaiserism 
and  Junkerism,  German  and  Hungarian,  cannot  agree  to 
such  a  condition,  for  they  would  be  signing  their  own 
death  warrant:  it  would  be  suicide. 

The  Russian  people  revolted  in  order  to  obtain  peace, 
and  expelled  a  Government  which  was  on  the  eve  of 
concluding  the  peace  which  the  people  so  desired  !  Here 
we  have  yet  another  proof  of  the  fact  that  events  are 
stronger  than  men,  and  that  this  logic  draws  men  far 
away  from  the  immediate  aims  which  they  proposed  to 
attain,  toward  the  realization  of  remote  aims  which  are 
unknown  to  the  majority,  but  are  perceived  by  a  few 
thinkers.  It  was  in  the  logic  of  things  that  the  Russian 
revolutionaries  should  be  forced  to  assume  a  bellicose 
attitude,  for  a  peace  without  the  realization  of  their  ideals 
might  be  the  death  sentence  of  their  revolution.  A  re- 
action would  be  inevitable,  and  it  would  lead  Russia  to 
a  Parliamentary  or  Monarchical  or  Republican  form  of 
Government,  which  would  have  nothing  Socialistic  about 
it.  The  Russian  Socialists  were  prepared  to  continue 
the  war  until  the  day  when  the  German  people  should 
force  its  rulers  to  accept  the  ideological  conditions  of  the 
democratic  peace  laid  down  by  themselves  and  by  Mr. 
Wilson.  A  logical  result  of  the  Russian  Revolution  and 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States  and  other  neutral 
republics  was  the  transformation  of  the  war  of  material 
conquest  initiated  in  August,  1914,  into  a  war  of  demo- 
cratic and  moral  conquests;  in  short,  a  revolution. 

This  transformation  of  the  war,  perceptible  now  to 
all,  explains  how  it  was  that  the  more  perspicacious  of  the 
Conservative  elements  among  the  Western  belligerents 
looked  askance  at  both  the  Russian  Revolution  and  the 
intervention  of  Mr.  Wilson.  The  comments  of  those 
newspapers  which  are  the  organs  of  the  capitalist  and 
Conservative  clans  afford  a  proof  of  this. 


416          LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

There  is  no  doubt  that,  contrary  to  the  will  and  the 
aspirations  of  the  Western  peoples,  the  Governments  of 
these   peoples,  acting  in  the  interest  of  the  capitalist 
groups,   have   passed   secret  treaties,   partitioning  the 
peoples — mere  human  cattle — and  the  territories  which, 
however,  had  first  to  be  conquered  by  the  gold  and  the 
blood  of  the  peoples.     Officially,  they  replied  to  Mr. 
Wilson  that  they  repudiated  all  conquests,  and  secretly 
they   were   distributing  their  future   conquests  !     The 
fact  is  certain.     On  seizing  the  power  of  the  State  the 
Russian  revolutionaries  became  aware  of  these  secret 
treaties,   these  revelations  of  the  capitalistic  megalo- 
mania of  the  West,  as  harmful  as  the  Pan-Germanist 
megalomania   of  the   Central   capitalists.      Of   course, 
this   policy  of  deceit   and   untruth,   practised   by  the 
autocratic  rulers  of  the  Western  democracies,  bears  fruit 
and   produces  its  natural  consequences,  one   of  which 
is  the  absence  of  confidence  between  the  Allied  nations. 
How  should  the  Russian  revolutionists  have  believed  in 
the  word  of  Governments  whose  duplicity  was  known  to 
them?     From  these  facts  we  derive  these  lessons:  the 
politics  of  autocracy,  based  on  duplicity  and  the  use  of 
the  lie,  engenders  death,  suffering,  and  devastation;  the 
consequences  of  action  always  develop,  though  it  may  be 
late  or  soon;  they  are  inevitable.     Only  a  politics  based 
on  the  franchise,  on  honesty,  on  the  truth,  yields  results 
whose  effects,  whether  immediate  or  remote,  are  good 
and  useful. 

When  we  consider  the  proved  existence  of  secret 
treaties,  dividing  territories  and  peoples,  for  the  sake  of 
capitalistic  ends,  we  understand  the  demand  of  the 
revolutionary  Russian  Government  for  a  plain,  unam- 
biguous declaration  of  war  objectives. 

We  understand  also  that  the  Western  Governments 
must  perforce  repudiate  these  political  methods,  and 
plainly  declare  their  war  aims.  The  necessity  of  so 
doing  explains  the  reply  of  the  French  and  British 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  417 

Governments  to  their  Russian  Allies:  "  We  are  ready  to 
revise  and  affirm  by  common  agreement  the  objects  of 
the  war." 

This  change  of  policy  is  certain  to  come.  We  have 
another  manifestation  of  the  change  in  the  action  under- 
taken against  Greece,  or  rather  against  King  Con- 
stantine.  Governmental  Italy  protected  him,  for  Italy 
has  need  of  a  divided  Greece,  in  order  that  she  may 
accomplish  her  aims  of  conquest  in  the  archipelago  and 
in  Asia  Minor.  However,  Italy  was  forced  to  yield  to 
her  Allies,  for  Italian  public  opinion,  desiring  peace, 
is  opposed  to  an  Imperialistic  policy,  considering  the  fact 
that  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  the  United  States, 
acting  in  agreement,  would  have  been  all-powerful.  To 
be  sure,  the  Italian  leaders  did  not  completely  yield, 
since  they  contrived  to  insure  the  maintenance  of  the 
monarchy  in  Greece.  Events  have  their  logic,  which 
is  stronger  than  human  desires;  and  the  abdication  of 
Constantine  in  favour  of  his  second  son  is  only  the  first 
step  on  the  road  which  is  inevitably  leading  to  a  free 
Greece,  republican,  and  completely  united. 

The  dishonest  and  really  clumsy  policy  of  the  Western 
Governments,  which  publicly  act  in  one  manner  and 
secretly  in  another,  is  one  of  the  factors  which  caused  the 
Russian  Socialists  to  insist  so  strongly  on  a  Congress  of 
the  "  International "  at  Stockholm.  They  wished,  at  this 
congress,  to  call  upon  the  peoples  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  their  Governments 
with  a  view  to  forcing  them  to  act  publicly,  with  complete 
candour  and  honesty.  They  wished  the  Governments 
publicly  to  repudiate  all  annexations  and  all  war 
contributions,  and  to  demand  the  realization  of  the 
principle  that  the  nations  shall  freely  dispose  of  their 
own  destinies.  In  this  respect  the  revolutionary  Russian 
Government  was  in  agreement  with  the  war  aims  so 
clearly  and  precisely  denned  by  Mr.  Wilson,  and  also 
with  the  Socialist  parties  of  the  Western  Allies. 

27 


418  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

The  change  from   servitude  to  liberty,   when   it   is 
sudden,   is   necessarily   accompanied   by   disorder   and 
violence  and  bloodshed,  and  by  the  varied  manifesta- 
tions   of    diverse    and    contradictory   ideologies.     The 
Russian  people  by  no  means  escaped  these  inevitable 
consequences  of  such  crises  of  social  transformation. 
And  when  all  is  considered,  we  should  rather  be  astonished 
that  these  disorders  began  so  late,  that  violence  and 
bloodshed  were  at  first  so  rare.     The  causes  of  these 
sociological  phenomena  appear  to  be  the  state  of  rotten- 
ness into  which  Tsarism  and  its  bureaucracy  had  fallen; 
the  temporary  absence  of  alcoholic  drinks ;  and  the  gentle 
and  kindly  nature  of  the  Russian  people.     Varied  and 
contradictory  ideologies  ran  their  course  unchecked,  in 
a  veritable  fury  of  free  propaganda — a  natural  effect  of 
reaction  from  the  old  fettering  of  thought.     The  mystic 
quality  of  the  Revolution  and  the  literal  doctrinairism 
of  the   Socialists   led   many   "  intellectuals,"    however 
intelligent,    into   a   complete   incomprehension   of  the 
international  situation,  and  of  the  national  and  revolu- 
tionary situation  of  Russia.     Perhaps  we  should  regard 
this  fact  as  the  effect  of  a  certain  mental  disequilibrium, 
due  to  the  cerebral  erethism  engendered  in  these  men 
and  women  during  the  long  years  of  their  life  under  the 
empire  of  the  fear  of  death,  penal  servitude,  and  exile. 
This   incomprehension   on  the  part   of  sincere   and 
intelligent  Socialists  and  revolutionaries  is  to  be  noted  as 
one  of  the  maleficent  products  of  the  policy  which  is 
based  upon  authority  and  fear.     For  the  time  being  it 
complicated  the  international  situation;  from  the  first 
some  were  able  to  believe  in  the  probability  of  a  separate 
peace.    This  might  have  meant  the  death  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, and  it  might  also  have  forced  the  Western  Allies 
to  make  peace  without  further  sacrifice,  for  a>  matters 
then  stood  they  might  possibly  have  found  themselves 
unable  to  enforce  the  surrender  of  the  German  autocracy 
and  junkerism;  certainly,  had  Russia  become  Germany's 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  419 

ally  (see  Chapter  VIII.).  Nor  was  this  fear  without 
foundation,  as  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  events, 
which,  with  their  mighty  logic,  draw  men  along  with 
them  as  wisps  of  straw  are  borne  by  a  torrent. 

The  rulers  of  revolutionary  Russia,  the  leaders  of  the 
Councils  (Soviets)  of  Workers'  and  Soldiers'  delegates, 
the  peasant  Councils,  and  the  Provisional  Government, 
quickly  understood  how  completely  prejudicial  a  separate 
peace  would  assuredly  prove  to  the  establishment  of 
their  Revolution.  To  save  the  Revolution  the  Russian 
Socialists  were  inevitably  compelled  to  support  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  war  until  the  German  autocracy  should 
be  destroyed.  Here  human  solidarity  was  plainly  to  be 
seen  beyond  the  frontiers,  even  though  the  frontiers  were 
trenches  peopled  by  men  who  were  killing  one  another. 
And  this  human  solidarity  was  further  manifested  in 
another  way,  for  the  propagandist  mission  of  the  French 
and  English  Socialists  to  the  Workers'  and  Soldiers' 
Council  of  Petrograd  was  no  negligible  factor  in  the 
Russian  leaders'  understanding  of  the  present  situation. 
Just  as  the  French  and  English  Socialists  influenced  the 
Russians,  so  the  Russian  Socialists  and  the  revolutionary 
atmosphere  of  Russia  influenced  them,  awakening  in 
them  ideas  and  tendencies  which  are  finding  their 
repercussion  in  the  Socialist  world  of  the  West.  The 
unanimous  decision  of  the  French  Socialist  party  to  take 
part  in  the  International  Conference  at  Stockholm  was 
one  of  the  effects  produced  by  the  Russian  Revolution. 
Once  again  we  perceive  how  all  things  are  connected, 
how  all  cohere  together. 

"  The  Russian  revolutionaries  were  condemned  to 
fight,  and,  consequently,  they  had  to  resort  to  the 
offensive.  This  necessity,  pressing  upon  millions  of 
human  beings  in  the  full  ferment  of  revolution,  whose 
aspirations  were  pacific,  and  who  sought  to  resolve 
the  internal  social  problems  of  Russia  in  a  Socialistic 
spirit,  compelled  them  to  undertake  an  active  propa- 


420  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

ganda.  They  had,  indeed,  to  make  the  masses  see  or  feel 
the  unavoidable  necessity  of  continuing  the  war.  Among 
many  others,  one  man,  Kerensky,  yoked  himself  to  the 
task.  He  proved  to  be  indefatigable,  because  he  was 
burning  with  the  vivifying  flame  of  a  great  and  lofty 
ideal.  And  this  spectacle  assumed  the  greater  magnitude 
in  that  no  one,  in  the  West,  was  equal  to  a  similar  task. 
Neither  in  Great  Britain  nor  in  France  were  the  leaders 
capable  of  uplifting  the  masses,  of  utilizing  and  maintain- 
ing the  magnificent  spirit  which  filled  the  'peoples  of 
France  and  England  during  the  first  months  of  the 
world-war  (see  Chapter  II.). 

This  difference  was  due  to  the  fact  of  the  Revolution. 
It  shattered  the  bureaucratic  framework,  and  allowed 
men  to  rise  up  and  prove  themselves  equal  to  the 
situation.  The  observer  notes,  in  this  connection, 
this  important  sociological  phenomenon :  that  bureau- 
cracy, the  necessary  outcome  of  the  centralization  of 
powers  and  of  authority  based  upon  fear,  is  by  its 
very  nature  destructive.  It  killed  Tsarism;  it  is  on  the 
way  to  killing  Kaiserism,  and,  unhappily,  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  leading  the  German  people  to  the  brink 
of  death,  so  wholly  has  it  penetrated  the  people's  soul. 
It  has  weakened  Great  Britain  and  France.  Lastly,  it 
has  prolonged  the  war,  with  its  train  of  death  and 
bloodshed  and  ruin. 

The  splendid  energy  expended  by  these  men  of  the 
Russian  Revolution  in  sweeping  the  masses  along  with 
them  recalled  that  of  the  heroes  of  the  English  Revolution 
of  the  seventeenth,  and  the  French  Revolution  of  the 
eighteenth,  century.  In  all  these  cases,  despite  the 
difference  of  period,  despite  the  difference  of  social 
and  national  environment,  an  identical  spirit  of  revolt 
is  seen  at  work,  arousing  energies,  quickening  under- 
standings, and  calling  forth  initiative.  Once  again  we 
may  derive  from  these  facts  the  lesson  that  the  spirit  of 
true  revolution  is  beneficial  in  its  action,  and  that  man 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  421 

cannot,  for  this  reason,  too  assiduously  cultivate  it  in  all 
its  different  forms. 

Read  the  proclamations  of  the  Soviet  of  Petrograd, 
the  speeches  of  Tseretelli,  of  Skobelev,  and  above  all 
of  Kerensky,  made  in  Congress  or  to  the  soldiers,  in 
the  abridged  reports  of  the  newspapers,  and  you  will 
realize  their  greatness,  the  mighty  inspiration  which 
animates  them,  the  beauty  which  radiates  from  them  ! 
Only  the  admirable  message  of  President  Wilson  can 
be  compared  with  them.  There  has  been  nothing  like 
them  in  France  or  England.  We  must  go  back  to 
1792-93  to  find  appeals  which  breathe  such  a  love  of 
liberty,  such  a  spirit  of  solidarity.  In  the  Western  peoples 
narrow-mindedness,  misoneism,  traditionalism,  and  the 
lethargy  of  civil  and  military  rulers  prevent  the  de- 
velopment of  the  revolutionary  and  impassioned  state 
of  mind  which  the  Russian  leaders  victoriously  strove 
to  invoke. 

This  difference  of  attitude,  whose  consequences  are 
so  serious  for  humanity,  is  due  to  two  causes,  which  are 
intimately  connected:  the  youth  of  these  revolutionists, 
and  the  idealism  in  which  they  are  steeped.  One  must 
be  young  to  be  active,  enthusiastic,  self-confident,  and 
confident  of  success;  above  all  must  one  be  young  to 
have  faith  in  the  realization  of  the  ideals  which  are  dear 
to  one.  The  Russian  revolutionary  leaders  are  young 
men.  Where  they  have  reached  or  passed  their  fiftieth 
year  they  have  remained  young  in  the  spirit  of  prosely- 
tism,  in  ardent  passion,  in  the  longing  to  remake  the 
world ;  young  in  their  anti-traditional  conceptions,  their 
contempt  for  the  beaten  track,  and  their  philoneism. 
Age  may  perhaps  have  whitened  the  hair  or  beard,  have 
wrinkled  the  countenance;  but  theirs  is  still  the  spirit 
of  youth.  Do  they  n(A  belong,  by  virtue  of  their 
Socialist  and  anarchist  ^  ideals,  to  the  vanguard  of 
humanity  ?  They  confirm  what  is  said  in  Chapter  IX. 
— that  youth  alone  is  creative,  that  youth  alone  dares 


422  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

to  innovate.  Youth  thinks  more  of  ideals  than  of 
material  interests,  as  we  said  in  Chapter  V.,  and  the 
fact  is  verified  afresh  by  the  leaders  of  the  Russian 
Revolution.  Men  of  principle,  steeped  in  ideology, 
they  have  acted  with  far  greater  energy,  because  they 
had  faith,  than  the  Western  rulers,  without  principles, 
occupied  wholly  in  conciliating  everybody,  in  establish- 
ing the  so-called  sacred  union,  in  arriving  at  compromises 
which  permit  of  the  satisfaction  of  material  interests. 

The  warlike  propaganda  of  the  Russian  Socialist 
leaders  was  assisted  by  the  stupidities  of  the  German 
rulers,  who,  by  means  of  the  two  Swiss,  Grimm  and 
Haufmann,  prematurely  attempted  to  induce  the  Russian 
Government  to  conclude  a  separate  peace.  This  fresh 
blunder  on  the  part  of  German  diplomacy  was  due  to 
the  military  education  and  the  specific  mental  condition 
which  results  from  it.  The  professional  soldier  is  in- 
capable of  understanding  the  mentality  of  free  peoples, 
and  it  always  follows  that  he  is  guilty,  where  they  are 
concerned,  of  the  grossest  psychological  mistakes. 

The  proselytizing  activity  of  the  Socialist  rulers  of 
Russia  led  to  the  creation  of  a  warlike  frame  of  mind, 
resplendent  with  the  love  of  liberty  and  the  willing 
acceptance  of  voluntary  sacrifice  for  the  preservation 
of  that  liberty.  Thus  a  voluntary  discipline  replaced 
the  automatic  discipline  based  on  fear  of  the  mechanical 
soldiers  of  the  Tsarist  period.  The  world  observed  the 
unaccustomed  spectacle  of  an  army  with  soldiers' 
committees  which  caused  discipline  to  be  respected, 
distributed  decorations,  and  participated,  more  or  less, 
in  the  nomination  of  their  officers.  What  this  army 
was  worth  the  world  learned  from  the  offensive  of  the  first 
days  of  July.  It  revealed  the  might  which  resides  in 
an  ideal  which  has  fired  men's  minds;  it  proved  the 
superiority  of  the  free  individual,  obedient  to  a  high 
ideal,  over  the  individual  in  a  state  of  servitude,  obedient 
to  the  authority  of  others. 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  423 

The  victorious  offensive  of  the  Russian  armies  should 
have  given  the  Russian  Government  an  incalculable  in- 
fluence over  its  Western  Allies.  Of  this  it  was  com- 
pletely aware,  as  we  may  judge  from  these  lines,  which 
are  taken  from  a  Note  in  which  it  convokes  the  allied 
Governments  to  a  conference  designed  to  consider  the 
problems  arising  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula:  "It  is  indis- 
pensable to  note  that  the  military  operations  of  our  troops 
aty  weight  to  our  voice  in  international  affairs,  and  that 
the  word  of  the  Russian  democracy,  supported  by  the  deeds 
of  the  revolutionary  army,  is  acquiring  a  special  weight. 
This  is  very  important  in  view  of  the  projected  conference.'' 

By  the  publication  of  its  Note  to  the  Allies  the  Pro- 
visional Government  broke  away  from  secret  diplomacy 
and  definitely  entered  upon  a  course  of  public  diplomacy, 
involving  the  settlement  of  external  affairs  by  the  light 
of  day.  In  this  the  Russian  democracy  and  the  Ameri- 
can democracy  acted  alike.  And  they  will  both  force 
the  British  and  French  Governments,  which  are  still  so 
imbued  with  the  methods  of  autocracy,  to  act  as  they  do. 
Note  the  proud  and  assured  tone  of  these  few  lines. 
It  is  that  of  men  who  knew  their  power,  who  know  that 
it  was  based  upon  millions  of  men,  upon  a  soil  and  subsoil 
of  immense  wealth,  and  upon  an  ideal  which  was  deeply 
rooted  in  the  mind.  They  knew  that  they  were  almost 
the  arbiters  of  the  situation,  and  that  the  capitalist 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France  must  reckon 
with  them;  more,  that  they  partly  depended  upon  them 
for  the  termination  or  continuation  of  the  war. 

The  power  of  the  Russian  revolutionists  in  the  Concert 
of  the  Entente  Nations  seemed  a  guarantee  of  a  demo- 
cratic peace;  especially  as  the  ideals  of  these  revolu- 
tionists were  those  which  led  Mr.  Wilson  to  intervene 
against  the  Central  Powers,  while  the  democrats  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  were  in  agreement  with  the 
Russian  people.  If  even  yet  Russia  has  her  part  in  the 
peace  it  will  at  least  be  stable,  because  it  will  be  based 


424  LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 

upon  justice,  liberty,  and  equality,  and  because  it  will 
result  in  the  solidarity  of  the  nations.  It  will  be  a  peace 
such  as  that  whose  conditions  I  defined  as  long  ago  as 
March,  1916,  in  my  eleventh,  twelfth,  and  thirteenth 
lectures  (Chapters  XL  to  XIIL). 

***** 
To  check  the  bloodshed  and  the  devastation  of  the 
war  lies  in  the  hands  of  the  peoples,  not  of  their  rulers. 
It  lies,  above  all,  in  the  hands  of  the  German  people.  Let 
it  at  last  dare,  by  a  revolution,  to  affirm  its  repudia- 
tion of  the  aims  of  its  rulers,  and  of  the  hegemony  of 
Germany;  let  it  resolve  to  work  for  a  world  in  which 
the  peoples,  by  free  consultation,  shall,  in  freedom, 
dispose  of  themselves,  as  the  Russian,  French,  and 
British  democracies  demand  they  shall  do;  and  peace 
will  come  swiftly,  even  immediately,  for  the  Western 
Governments,  if  they  sought  to  oppose  it,  would  be 
swept  away  like  a  leaf  on  the  autumn  gales.  It  is 
enough  to  know  what  is  happening  and  what  is  being 
said  by  the  peoples  themselves  in  order  to  affirm  this  in 
very  truth.  The  destiny  of  the  world  is  gradually  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  Socialists,  as  we  saw  in  Chap- 
ter VII.  of  this  book.  Already,  in  Russia,  they  suc- 
ceeded awhile  in  assuming  the  power  of  the  State,  and  the 
responsibilities  of  power.  Will  they  be  able  to  do  as 
much  elsewhere  ?  It  is  probable:  the  circumstances 
will  compel  them  to  do  so,  and  the  men  will  reveal 
themselves,  for  men  are  largely  the  result  of  circum- 
stances. The  peace  which  the  peoples  themselves  will 
make,  without  the  intervention  of  the  diplomatists, 
will  be  a  peace  in  which  there  will  be  neither  conquering 
peoples  nor  vanquished  peoples.  And  yet  there  will  be 
those  who  will  be  vanquished,  for  there  are  those  who 
are  vanquished  already,  during  the  course  of  the  war: 
they  are  the  autocracies  and  their  supporters,  the 
Emperors  and  the  Kings,  the  professional  soldiers,  the 
clergy  and  the  castes  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  reaction; 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS  425 

in  short,  all  the  autocratic  elements  which  ruled  the 
world,  and  which  have  led  it  to  the  stupendous  blood- 
shed of  the  present  day:  to  devastation  so  enormous 
that  the  human  mind  cannot  form  an  adequate  con- 
ception of  it. 

If  it  is  possible  to  say  precisely  what  political  and 
social  progress  will  result  from  the  cataclysm  which  has 
ravaged  the  world  since  August,  1914,  we  may  with 
certainty  assert  that  its  general  consequence  will  be 
an  advance  in  the  direction  of  democracy,  and  to  some 
extent  of  Socialism.  After  the  war  the  world  will  enjoy 
more  liberty,  more  equality,  and  more  solidarity  between 
men  and  the  groups  in  which  they  live. 

PARIS, 
July  15,  1917. 


INDEX 


AZBIAL  raids,  281-283 

Age,  political  characteristics  of,  175, 

262-265 

Agriculture,  91,  93,  202 
Aid,  mutual,  193,  249,  273-278 
Aims  of  the  Americans,  393-398, 402 

of  the  Austro-Huagarians,  296- 
299 

of  Belgium,  304 

of  the  British,  295,  296 

of  Bulgaria,  302 

economic,  290-306,   393,   394, 
397 

of  France,  304,  305 

of  the  Germans,  289-295 

of  the  Italians,  299-301 

of  Japan,  296-299 

moral,  291-306,  394-398 

political,   291-306,    321,    394- 
389 

of  Portugal,  305 

of  Rumania,  303 

of  the  Russian  Empire.  301,  302 

of  Serbia,  304 

of  Turkey,  302 
Alliance,  Quadruple.    See  Germany, 

Austria,  Bulgaria,  Turkey- 
Alsace-Lorraine,  148,  253,  329 
Altruism,  273 
American  capitalists,  392-394 

Oil  Trust,  89 
Amphyctionic  Council,  role  of,  380- 

383 

Anarchists,  209,  213,  414 
Anarchy,  124,  275,  357 
Anglican  clergy,  173,  181 
Animism,  196,  197 
Annexations,   peace   without,   253, 

321,  417 

Antimilitarism,  66-69 
Antisemitism,  189 
Areopagitica  on  Censorship,  159 
Aristocracies,     pro-Germanism     of 

neutral,  09,  100,  120 
Aristocracy.     See  Nobility 
Armaments,  299,  369 


Armed  peace,  376,  377 
Armenians,  the,  315,  335,  400 
Arms,  men  under,  54,  55 

triumph  of,  seldom  ends  war, 

257 
Army,  Praetorian,  dangers  of  a,  369, 

381 
Arts,  national  character  of  the,  197- 

199,  364,  365 
Asiatic  Empires,  234,  295 
Asquith,  Mr.,  264-,  296 
Audacity,  163,  263,  389 
Australia,  173,  403 
Austria,  45,  89,  92,  94,   115,   148, 
158,  165,  186,  232,  235,  245,  256, 
289,  296-298,  302,  305,  306,  315, 
327,  -331-333,  415 
Austrian  secret  diplomacy,  45-    See 

Socialists 
Authority,  186,  188,  225,  303,  357, 

390,  400,  401 

military,  105,  155,  171-173 
spirit  of,  109, 118, 124, 125, 184, 

220,  243,  283 

See  also  Autocracy,  Autocratic. 

Autocracy,  100,  101,  105,  116,  126- 

128,  133,  143,  145-178,  184,  187, 

221,  223,  224,  236,  242-244,  248, 

259,  291,  298,  307,  308,  321,  322, 

334,  337,  349,  375,  388,  389,  395, 

398,  400,  404,  416-490 

Autocratic    government,    41,    243, 

302, 309 
harmful  nature  of ,  101, 116, 

149,  160 

states,  fear  a  factor  of  govern- 
ment in,  48 
tendencies,  105,  174 
Autonomy  and  independence  of  the 
small  nationalities,  327-337,  339, 
378-383 

B 

Bakunin,  208,  213,  225 
Balkan  States,  96,  97,  100,  101,  239, 
334 


Bankruptcy  of  Germany,  266 
Barbaric  epoch.     See  Survival  of- 


426 


INDEX 


427 


Belgian  Catholics,  182, 183, 187, 189, 

321 

losses,  31-35 
people,  139,  223 
women,  202 
See  also  Socialists 
Belgium,  31-35,  46,  47,  96-99,  103, 
123,  138,  160,  165,  174,  207-209, 
243,  272,  292,  295,  300,  304,  307, 
315,  321,  343,  344,  385,  394 
Benedict  XV.,  186 
Bernstein,  Edward,  215,  217 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  70,  120 
Bible,  the,    favours  violence    and 

reprisals,  180,  279 
Bigland,  Mr.,  on  export  of  linseed 

oil,  88 
Biological  conditions   due  to  war, 

319,  315,  316 
Birth-rate,    290,    291,     313,    314, 

318 

Births,  illegitimate,  204 
Bismarck,  O.  von,  281 
Blockade  of  the  Central  Empires, 
feebleness     of,     88,     93-95, 
255-258,  282,  386,  388,  407- 
409 

See  also  Triumph  by- 
Boers,  loyalty  of,  170 
Bohemia,  331.     See  also  Czechs. 
Bolivia,  387 
Boom,  industrial  and  commercial, 

after  the  war,  347 
Bosnia,  253,  332 
Botha,  General,  172 
Boundaries,  difficulty  of  determin- 
ing, in  devastated  districts,  363 
Branting,  Hjalrnar,  212 
Brazil,  387,  391,  406 
British  Catholics,  183,  187 
communiques,  43 
losses,  30 
mentality,    50,     51,    131-144, 

276 

soldiers,  65,  66,  67 
See  also  Socialists. 
Brutality,  caused  by  excessive  use 

of  spirits,  136,  137 
Budgets,  344,  345,  366,  367 
Bukovina,  303 

Bulgaria,  isolation  of,  86,  101,  128, 
146,  168,  170,  232,  239,  245, 
302,  334,  337 
losses  of,  31-35 
Billow,  Prince  von,  122 
Bureaucracy,    evils    of,    etc.,   106, 
109,  126,  160,  203,  212,  220,  221, 
244,  301,  309,  328,  334,  337,  419, 
420 


Caesarism,  157,  173 
Calvinists,  violence  of,  180 
Cambon,  M.,  his  conversation  with 

von  Jagow,  44 
I  Canada,  173,  403 
1   Capital,  needCof,  after  war,  351 
Capitalism,  80,  81,  88,  90,  92,  98, 
99,  141-144,  206,  222,  224, 
227,  265,  266,  290-304,  306, 
351,  353,  378 
American,  392-394,  410 
!   Capitalist  classes,  solidarity  of  the, 

80,81 
conflict  between  national 

fractions  of,  306,  389 
interest  of  the,  88,  92,  93, 
100,  141,  224,  227,  229, 
245,  265,  266,  278,  289- 
305,  347,  397,  398,  415- 
417 
the  State  of,  and  the,  92, 

113,  141-144 

Caprivi,  on  naval  blockades,  94 
Carol  of  Rumania,  101 
Carson,  Sir  Edward,  obtains  arms 

from  Germany,  172 
compared  with  Casement,  173, 

403 

Casement,  Sir  Roger,  173 
Caste  interest,  307 
Castes,  conflict  between,  306,  307 
Catholics  and  Catholic  Church,  99, 

130,  172,  180-197 
Caucasus,  the,  190 
Causality,  economic,  95,  132,  133, 
217,  218,  289-305,  319,  353,  377, 
384,  385,  386,  394,  397,  408 
Causes  of  the  war,  338,  392,  393 
Cavell,  Miss,  50,  137,  203 
Censorship,  the,  128,  133,  145-102, 

164,389,413 

Central  Empires,  the,  231-259.    See 

also  Germany,  Austria-Hungary. 

Centralization,  93,  221,  228,  309, 

325,  326 

Chamberlain,  Houston  Stewart,  118 
Chauvinism,  199,  226 
China,    298,    299,    387,    391,  405, 

407 
Christ,  teachings  of,  137,  163,  170, 

180,  185 

Christianity,  179-189 
Christian  duties,  180 

ideals,  140,  180,  185 
Churches,  the,  180-189,  193,  377 
Civilians,  losses  among,  37 
as  soldiers,  55,  56 


428 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


C1*M  conflict,  211,  227,    331-354, 

369,  392 
mentality,  177 
working.     See  Workers. 
Glasses,  the  capitalist,  80,  81,  88, 
90,   92,    113,   141-144,   174- 
177,  227,  278,  292-295,  306, 
347 

hierarchy  of  the,  90,  163,  164 
social,  265,  266 
Clausewitz,  281 
Clemenceau,  G.,  154 
Clergy,  Anglican,  173,  181 

hierarchy  of  the,  181.  188 
orthodox,  126,  181 
propaganda  of,  durimg  war,  199 
Climatic  conditions,  effects  of.  267- 

273 

Coal,  importance  of,  90,  91,  271,  272 
Coercion,  policy  of,  51,  95,  90,  173, 
174,  184,  223,  225,  302,  399, 
400 

See  also  Fear. 

Collective  responsibility,  280,  281 
Collectivities,  small,  are  better  for 
the  people's  interests,  101,   102, 
309,  326 

Colonies,  German,  255,  337 
Commerce,    maritime,    affected    by 

war,  84 

Commercial  boom  after  war,  347 
conditions  opposed  to  the  in- 
dustry of  war,  72,  73 
disturbance,  82-91 
Communalization  of  property,  362, 

363 
Communiques  of  the  General  Staffs, 

41,42 
Compulsory  labour,  112,  113,  222, 

223, 387-389 
service,  133,  134,  173,  256,  265 

of  property,  265 
Confiscation,  92 

Congress  of  Internationals  at  Stock- 
holm, 417-419 
See  Socialists. 

Conscience,  individual,  is  character- 
istic of  nationality,  323 
Conservative  forces,  116-144,  174- 
177,  183,  226-229,  248,  321,  339, 
389,  398,  403,  404, 415 
Constantine  of   Greece,    101,    167, 

240,  417 
Constantinople,  239,  254.  255,  301, 

336,  337,  396 

Constraint.     See  Coercion,  Fear- 
Consultation,  free,  of  peoples,  253- 

255,  325,  341,  403,  414,  415 
Convention,  the  Irish,  405 


Conventions,  International,  320 
Co-operation,  396 
Co-operative  societies,  225 
Copper,  German  greed  for,  272 
Corruption,  government  by,  98,  302 
Cosmopolitanism  of  thought,  198 
Cost  of  the  war,  54-73,  342-345 

in    material    and    human 

lives,  74-81 
Courland,  241 

Courts,  International,  379-383 
Creeds,  war  and  the,  179-197 
Crime  and  militarism,  63,  64,  162, 

163,  281,  284-287 
Crimes,  German,  68 
Criminality  during  the  war,  63,  284- 
287,  356,  357 

juvenile,  317 
Crisis,  the  social,  162 

of  socialism,  225-230 

the  world,  170 
Critical  spirit,  119,  177,  205,  262. 

See  also  Spirit  of  Revolt. 
Croats,  253,  332 
Cuba,  335,  387,  391,  406 
Customs  Union,  347-350 
Czechs,  253,  324,  331,  332 

D 

Dalmatia,  253,  332 
i  Death  duties,  344,  362 

rate,  312 

Deaths  in  war,  31-37,  168,  319 
Debts,  State,  342 
Decorations,  survivals  of  tattooings, 

61,62 
Decrease  of  population  caused  by 

war,  314,  315 
Demobilization,  problems  of,  354, 

355 

Democracy,  its  definition,  40,  243 
effect  of  fear  on  the,  48 
forces  of  the,  100, 106-144 
interest  of  the,  93,  134,  323 
natural  to  man,  322 
Democracy,  324,  326,  394,  401 

advance  of,  a  consequence  of 

the  war,  287,  425 
versus  autocracy,  100,  101,  126, 
133,  135,  143,  145-178,  183, 
187,  211,  242-244,  248,  259, 
307,  308,  423 

Democratic  foundations  of  peace, 
321,  322,  339,  377,  398,  402,  416, 
423-425 
Democratization  of  society,  9$,  290 

406,411 

Demoralization     due    to     Govern- 
mental policy,  162 


INDEX 


Denmark,  96-99,  257 
Destruction,  indemnities  for,  78,  79, 

343 

self,  of  autocracies,  307,  308 
in  the  war,  73-81 

Determinism  of  the  acts  of  men,  81, 
96,  144,  166,  186,  209,  261- 
273,  285,  286,  289-304,  384, 
385,  388,  399,  401,  409,  415 
economic,  95 
universal,  91,  144,  311 
Diplomacy,  public,  401,  423 

American,  401 
secret,  44, 45, 155-157, 304, 338,   ! 

423 

Austrian,  45 
French,  44,  304 
German,  45 
Diplomatists,  319,  320 
Disabled,  pensions  for,  78,  79,  343 
Disarmament,  81,  299,  368-385,  399   > 
Discipline,  passivity  of,  49,  51,  56, 

113,  118,205,213,422 
voluntary,  49-51,  58,  59,  422 
Disturbance,  agricultural,  91 

commercial,      industrial      and 

financial,  82-91 
domestic,  37 

Docility  of  the  Germans,  123 
Duration  of  war.     See  War. 
Duties,  233,  344 
death,  344,  362 

E 

Economic  causality.    See  Causality,   : 

economic. 

equality,  132,  193,  346 
life,  of  France,  104-106 
of  Great  Britain,  106 
reconstitution  of  the,  104- 

114 
power,     256,     258,     408.     See   ! 

Triumph  by. 

Economy,  Budgetary,  366-368,  371    ! 
Education,  136,  233,  322,  367,  368 
basis  of,  48,  238 
fear  a  factor  in,  48,  49,   125,    ' 

137  238 
military,  56,  96,  120-124,  233,   i 

234,  422 
reward  and  punishment  in,  62, 

66,  67,  157 
by  suffering,  68 
Effects,  psychological,  of  the  war, 

355-362 
Egypt,  190 

End  justifies  the  means,  120 
.Ending,  logical,  of  the  war,  36,  75-   I 
77,  229,  241 


England.     See  British. 
Enlistment,  voluntary,  131,  133 
Entente,   Quintuple.      See  Franee, 

Great  Britain,  Russia,  Italy,  231- 

259 

Equality,  185,  224,  322,  325,  331, 

336,  388,  339,  350,  396,  425 
economic,  132,  193,  346 
in  military  life,  358 
of  sex,  203,  317 
spirit  of,  135,  136 

Equivalence  of  all  functions,  pro- 
fessions, etc.,  90,  91,  322 
Espionage,  163 

European  situation,  the,  139,  340 
Evolution  of  war,  382,  383,  415 
Example,  most  effective  method  of 

teaching,  322 
Excommunication,    national,    380, 

381, 399 
Exhaustion  of  the  human  material, 

36,  257,  258 

war  of,  255-259,  391,  392 
Expeaditure,  educational,  367,  368 
military  and  naval,  368 
state,  344,  345 
war,  76-81 
Exports,  suppression  of,  87,  88 

F 

Famine,  313,  409 
Fear,  effects  of,  97,  121,  128 

a  factor  of  education,  48,  49, 

125,  137,  238 

military  education,  66,  67 

a  motive   of     human    actions, 

96,  97, 102, 163, 172,  175,  188, 

193-197,  213,  225,  233,  243, 

280,  284,  383,  400,  414 

Federation,  225,  228,  309,  31§,  326, 

326,  330,  333,  336,  339 
Female  labour,  202,  203,  352-354 
Feminism,  201-204,  222,  317,  318, 

390 
Ferdinand   of  Bulgaria,    101,  232, 

264 
Financial  conditions  opposed  to  the 

industry  of  war,  72,  73 
disturbance,  82-91 
Finland,  253,  292,  333,  334,  400 
Foodstuffs,   scarcity  of,   258,   312, 

313,  408,  409 
Force,  297,  298 
moral,  298 
France.    See  French,  and  general 

entries. 

Free  disposition  of  the  peoples, 
253-255,  325-327,  341,  403,  414, 
415 


430 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Tree  Federation,  309 

Trade,  337,  343,  344,  350 
Freedom  of  the  seas,  90.  307 
French  Catholics,  182,  183,  187 
communiques,  41,  42 
losses,  31-34 

mentality,  105,  129,  130,  139 
people,  223 
railway    workers'    strike,    134, 

135, 

regulations  for  travelling,  86,  87 
Revolution  of   1789,  263,  305, 

324,  421 

secret  diplomacy,  44 
Socialists.     See  Socialists, 
soldier,  the,  49,  57,  58,  65,  67 
Three  Years'  Law,  55,  56 
"  Frightfulness,"  M.  Andler  on,  39 
Frontiers,  closing  of,  85,  86 
Functions,  equivalence  of  all,  90,  91 

G 

General  confederation  of  labour,  213 
Staffs,  communiques  of  the,  41, 

42 
Geographical  conditions,    90,    131, 

143,  144,  210,  241,  267-273,  388 
Geological  conditions,  90,  267-273, 

388 

Georgians,  the,  324,  400 
German  communiques,  41,  42 
hegemony.     See  Hegemony, 
losses,  30-37 
organization  and  terrorism,  30, 

102 

secret  diplomacy,  45 
soldiers,  65,  137 
German  capitalist  class,  80,  81.    See 

Capitalism,  Capitalist. 
Catholics,  182-185,  189 
colonies,  255,  337 
faith,  118,  119 
megalomania,    116,    117.    121, 

122,  199 

petitions,  70,  293 
rulers,   70,   71,  116,  139.    See 

Rulers. 

Socialists.     See  Socialists. 
Germanic  race,  71,  117,  293 
Germans,  docility  of  the,  123,  150 
mentality  of  the,  46,   51,  59, 

116-123,  233 
Germany.   See  German,  and  general 

entries. 
God,  the  idea  of,  169,  181,  193,  194, 

196 

Gold,  export  of,  313 
reserve  of,  256 
See  War. 


Government,  225,  275,  307,  316 
autocratic  definition  of,  41 
by  corruption,  98 
democratic  definition  of,  40 
facility  of,  165 
by  fear  and  constraint,  128, 233, 

243 

military,  115, 116,  129, 176,  23£ 
by  old  men,  264 
by  untruth,  30,  40-43,  97,  125, 

128,  158,  159, 277,  413 
Governmental  mania,  234 
neutrality,  153 
power,  165 
Great   Britain.      See  British,   and 

general  entries. 
;  Great  Russia,  241 
i  Greece,  101,  160,  166,  168,  239,  240,. 

268,  302,  335,  387,  417 
i   Grey,  Sir  Edward,  289,  410 
Grotius,  on  The  Law  of   War  and 

Peace,  180 
Guatemala,  387,  391,  406 

H 

Hamon,  Augustin,  60,  62,  206,  285, 

324,  328,  372 
Hatred,    198-201,    259,    277,    321, 

364  400 
Hegemony,  German,  139,  214.  234, 

245,  253,  292,  293,  305,  330 
Herzegovina,  253,  339 
Hierarchy  of  the  classes,  90,  163,  164 
of  the  clergy,  181,  188 
of  the  professions,  90 
Hindenburg  on  compulsion,  48 
Holland,  96-99,  149,  160,  174,  185, 

212,  257,  376 
Home  Rule,  171-174,  184,  339,  340, 

404,  405 
Honduras,  387 

Hughes,  Mr.,  of  Australia,  296 
Human  dignity,  164 

material,  exhaustion  of,  36,  257, 

258 

Humanization  of  warfare,  impossi- 
bility of,  38 
Hungary,  76,   182,   189,  230,  232, 

245,  314,  333 
See  also  Austria. 
Hunger,  218.  313,  409,  412 
Hygiene,  social,  367,  368 


Ideals,  Christian,  140,  180,  185 

of  liberty,  183 
Ideas,  advanced,  175 

generation  of,  159 
Ignorance,  30, 156, 157,245,246,249 


INDEX 


431 


Illegitimate  births,  204 

Immorality,  164 

Imperialist    Powers    and    Nations. 

See  Germany,  Austria. 
Imperialistic  greatness,  121 
Impoverishment  of   the  State  and 

individual,  345 
Incaa,  the,  214,  223 
Income  tax,  344 

Increased  prices  of  products,  91,  92 
Indemnities  for  destruction,  78,  79, 

343,  344 
pecuniary,  255 

India,  174,  190,  339,  405,  406 
Indispensability,    mutual,    of    the 

Allies,  246-250 
Individual  conscience,  characteristic 

of  nationality,  323 
equivalence,  322 
impoverishment  of  the,  345 
liberty,  223,  265,  266,  310 
mechanization  of  the,  50 
property,  224,  265,  266 
transformation  of  the,  into  a 

gregarious  beast,  314 
Individualism,  124,  125,  223,  307, 

310,  326,  379 

Industrial  boom  after  the  war,  347 
conditions  opposed  to  the  war, 

72,  73 

disturbance,  82-91 
Industrialization   of   the  war,   59, 

292  293 
Industry  of  war,  the,  72,  73,  234, 

292,  293 

Infant  mortality,  314 
Insanity,  316 
Insularity,  131,  143,  210,  241,  246, 

267,  268,  296,  299 
Intellectual  life,  326 

minority,  the,  70,  166,  277,  278, 

290,  293,  300,  394 
Intellectuality,  136,  139 
Interests,  dynastic,  240 

of  the  Entente,  239-245 
of  humanity,  184 
material,  97,  102,  295 
of  the  people,  102,  229 
See  also  Capitalist  Class. 
International  character    of    Chris- 
tianity, 179-189 
of  feminism,  201-204 
of  Judaism,  189,  190 
of  Labour  and   Socialism, 

205-230 
of  Mohammedanism,  190, 

191 

of  the  sciences,  letters  and 
arts,  197-200 


International  conventions,  320 

courts  and  tribunals,  379-383 
International  Socialist  Bureau,  the, 

226 

International   Socialists  at    Stock- 
holm, 417,  418 
solidarity,  96,  97,  331,  397,  400, 

405,406 

Internationalism,  325 
Interpenetratioa  of  all  things,  267 
Inventors  and  the  inventive  spirit, 

106-109,  118 
Ireland,  51,  171-174,  339,  340,  387, 

403^05 

Irish  Catholics,  the,  184,  185,  404 
Italian  losses,  31-35 
Italians  of  Dalmatia,  etc.,  332,  333 
of  the  Trentino,  253,  335 
See  Socialists. 

Italy,  31-35,  102,  149,  166,  168, 
185,  187,  240,  243,  248,  249,  251, 
268,  269,  299-301,  305,  335,  417 

JJ  ace  use,  45 

Japan,  251,  296,  298,  400,  407 
Jaures,  Jean,  220,  304 
Jesuits,  the,  120,  188,  214,  223 
Jesus.     See  Christ 

Society  of.     See  Jesuits. 
Jewish  population,  the,  335 

problem,  the,  329 
Jews,  the,  189-192 
Journal  de  Qenlve,  33,  42,  68,  8i 
Judaism,  189-191 

Junkers,  the,   125,   171,   177,   178, 
188,  206,  217,  289,  399,  410,  415 
Juvenile  criminality,  317 

K 
Kaiser,  the,  188,  229,  232,  237,  251. 

264. 

See  also  Wilhelin  II. 
Kaiserism,  188,  189,  238,  399 
Kant,  159,  165,  397 
Kerensky,  420,  421 
Kiel  Canal,  the,  268 
Kings,    opposition     between     th» 

people  and  the,  100,  101,  240 
Knowledge,  diffusion  of,  249,  316, 

367,  368 

scientific,  262,  316,  368 
Kriegsbravch  im  Landkriege,  38,  39, 

112,  137.281,286 
Kropotkin,  Prince,  125,209,212,213 

L 

Labour  dearth  of,  352,  353 

and  females,  202,  203,  352-354 
forced,  112,  113,  222,  223,  387- 

389 


432 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Labour,  general   confederation   of, 

213 
international  character  of,  205- 

230 
manual,  is  indispensable,   142, 

224 

Party,  the,  134,  135,210 
regulation  of,  222,  353 
Unions,  110,  142 
and  workers,  110-114 
Labourites,  134,  205-230 
Landlords,  142 
Larkinites,  171,  172 
Law,  power  of  the,  142 

a  superior  force,  297 
Law  of  War  and  of  Peace,  by  Grotius, 

180 

Lawyers.     See  Jurists. 
League  of  Nations,  396,  397,  407 

See  also  Federation. 
Legal  professions,  261 
Lessons  of  the  war,  on  nearly  every 

page. 

Letters,  197-199,  364,  365 
Letts,  253,  400 
Liberals,  the,   oppose    compulsion, 

134 

Liberation,  national,  392 
Liberia,  387 

Liberty,  113,  114,  121,  125,  130, 
132,  134,  136,  149-152,  164, 
170-173,  178,  183-185,  208, 
209,  224,  225,  253,  254,  265, 
269,  304,  305,  308,  309,  323, 
324,  336,  339,  350,  390,  402, 
425 

basis  of  nationality,  324,  325 
definition  of,  51,  52 
love  of,  162,  174,  248,  266,  308, 

396 
power  of,  52,  53,  109,  110,  178, 

330,  331,  400 
spirit  of,  73,  136,  209,  227 
suppression  of,   by  rulers,   70, 

71,  129,  131,  211,  223,  309 
Liebknecht,  215,  216,  361 
Life,  standard  of,  344, 345, 362 

value  of,  266 
Liquidation,  general,  345 
Lithuania,  241,  333,  334 
Lithuanians,  223,  253,  324,  327,  400 
Literatures,  198,  199,  277 
Lloyd  George,  Mr.,  135,  138,  264 
Loans,  27,  265,  342 
London,  Pact  of,  250-255,  401,  402, 
Losses  of  civilians,  37 
of  material,  74^-81 
of  various  nations  in  the  war, 
30,  73-81,  168,  257 


Love  of  capital,  266 

of  liberty,   162,   174,  248,  266, 
308,  396 

of  mankind,  174,  266,  400 

of  novelty,  105,  106 

of  peace,  66,  165 
Lusitania,  the,  50,  102 
Lutherans,  the,  180,  181 
Luxemburg,  Grand  Duchy  of,  52, 

96,  99,  103,  211,  300,  304 
Luxury  trades,  84 

M 

Macedonia,  334,  335 
MachiaveUi,  285 

;   Machinery,  development  of,  351 
j   Magyars,  332,  333. 

See  also  Hungary. 
Man  dependent  on  the  products  of 

the  soil,  91,  270,  272,  388 
Manual  labour,  142,  224 
Marx,  Karl,  225,  306 
Marxists,  206 
Material,  economic,  258 

the  exhaustion  of  human,  36, 

257,  258 

interests,  97,  102 
raw,  99.  256,  257,  258,  408 
Materialism,  historic,  306 
Maximum  prices,  92,  221 
Mechanization   of   individuals,    60, 

108,  109,  124 
Megalomania,    German,    116,    117, 

121,  122,  199 
Men  under  arms,  numbers  of,  54, 

55 

government  by  old,  264 
requisition  of,  222 
Mentality  after  the  war,  358-360 
of  the  Belgians,  49,  50 
of  the  British,  50   51,  141-144, 

276 

class,  177 

of  the  French  soldier,  49,  57 
of    the   Germans,   46,   51,   52, 

116,  123,  233 

military,  39,  40,  60,  61,62,  72, 
73,  105,  116,  120,  121,  127, 
171,  175,  177,  233,  282,  369, 
881 

national,  177 
of  rulers,  157,  175 
Mercantilism,  92 
Mercier,  Cardinal,  182 
Mesopotamia,  255,  270,  335 
Meteorological  conditions,  267,  273 
Mexico,  387,  400 

Middle  class,  the,  135,  136,  289,  295. 
302 


INDEX 


433 


Might,  economic,  250,  258 

makes  right,  47,  71,  9(5,  97, 
103,  232,  201,  297, 
300 

as  a   basis  of  educa- 
tion, 48 
Milioukov,    pro-German    proposals 

of,  248 
Militarism,  112,  113,  120,  130,  173, 

175,  197,  204,  218,  237,  238, 
284-287,  307,  321,  356,  357, 
374,  376,  388 

bankruptcy  of,  56,  388,  408 
is  a  school  of  crime,  63,  64,  282, 

372,  373,  388 
Militarization,    120-123,    130,    143, 

233 
Military  authority,  105,  155,  171- 

178 

classes,  99 
code,  163 
discipline,  66,  67 
education,   56,   120,    121,   233, 

234,  238,  422 
government,  115,  116,  129,  155, 

176,  233 

life,  equality  in,  358 
mentality.     See  Mentality, 
power,  destruction  of,  258 
profession,  2<U,  282 
service,  compulsory,  133 
voluntary,  131-133 
spirit,  62,  72,  73,  95-97,  10'J, 
118,  197,  216,  233,  234,  261, 
422 

Militia.  56 
Miinetism,  270,  271 
Miners'  strike  in  South  Wales,  141, 

142,  146 
Mines,  271 

nationalization  of,  362 
Minority,  action  of  the,   165-167, 

243, 404-405 

rights  of,  329,  332,  337,  342 
Misoneism,  164,  283 
Missing  and  prisoners,  31-37 
Mittd  Europa,  by  F.  Neumann,  294 
Mohammedanism,  190,  191 
Money  in  the  war,  83 
Monroe  doctrine,  104 
Montenegro,  269,  315 
Morality,  162,  277,  278,  287,  299, 

309,  310 
Moratorium  of  debts  and  rental,  83, 

84,  222 
Morocco,  190 
Mortality  of  children,  314 
of  civilians,  37,  312,  313 
of  combatants,  312 


Mortality  of  non-combatants,  312 

of  prisoners,  312 
Motherhood,  314,  315 
Mountaineers  and  liberty,  2(39 
Mud,  270 

Municipalities  and  the  State,  93 
Munition  factories,  378 
Munitions  Act,  141-144 
Mutual  aid,  193,  249,  273-278,  411 

N 

Napoleon  I.,  121,  257,  327 
Natality,  diminished,  313,  370 
Nationalization  of  land,  mines,  etc., 

362 
Nationalism  of  expression  of  thought, 

198 
Nationalities,  nature    of  the,  323, 

325 
opposition  between  the  State 

and,  325 
policy  of,  253,  255,  307,  309, 

324,  325,  342,  395 
small,  253-255,  309,   321-327, 

374 

Nationality,  solidarity  basis  of  suc- 
cess, 323,  325 

Nations  in  the  war,  31,  35,  76,  386 
League  of,  the,  396 
neutral,  323,  399,  406 
treaties  between,  47,  297,  298, 

300,  319,  320,  374,  379-383 
Nature  and  democracy,  322 

the  world  of,  322,  384 
Naval  power,  94,  258 
Navy,  expenditure  on  the,  3(38 
Necessity  knows  no  law,  120 

of  German  conquests,  257 
Neo-Malthusianism,  291,  314,    318, 

319 
Nervous  tension,  destructive  effect 

of,  313-317 

Neumann,  Friedrich,  294 
Neurasthenia,  increasing,  316 
Neutral  nations,  323,  399,  406 

Socialists,  213 

Neutrality  of  Belgium,  violation  of 
the,  46,  47,  96,  97,  99,  13' 
295,  307,  394 
of    the    Bosphorus     and    the 

Straits,  239 
governmental,  153 
Newspapers,  censorship  of  the,  149, 

162 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  52 
Nietzsche,  F.,  119,  123 
Nobility,  the,  135,  136,  289,  302 
Non-combatants,  fate  of,  282,  2849 
312 

28 


434 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Norn-resistance  to  evil,  102, 167, 180, 

210 

Norway,  Norwegians,  98,  212,  324 
Notes,  governmental,  83,  256 
Novelty,  love  of,  105,  106 

O 

Obedience,  passive,  124,  160,  168, 
188,  197,  206,  217,  233,  23  J,  243, 
383 

Objects  of  the  war,  288-310 

Occasional  soldiers,  55 

Old  Testament,  brutalizing  influence 
of  the,  279 

Organization,  124 

Orthodox  clergy,  the,  126,  181 

Owners  of  property,  70,  142,  265, 
266,  289,  290,  293,  301,  303,  316 


Pacifism,  295,  304,  305,  401 

Pact  of  London,  the,  250-255,  401, 

402 

Palestine,  :>8(i 
Pamphlets,  irregular  censorship  of, 

161 

Pan- Germanism,  209,  395 
Pan-Slavism,  239 
Papacy,  the,  183,  187 
Paper  rnonoy,  83,  256 
Parasitism,  social,  224,  371 
Parliamentarianism,  116,  129,  133, 

207,  242,  298 

Parties,  of  advanced  ideas,  175 
Conservative,  174,  177 
Socialist,  205-230,  417 
truce  of  political,  128,  130,  133 
Peace,  armed,  81,  376,  377 

complexity  of  the,  320,  414 
conditions  of,  237,  252,  253- 

255,  319-340 

defective,   a   stupendous    mis- 
take, 252,  339 

on  democratic  foundations,  321, 
322,  339,  377,  398,  402,  415, 
423-425 
a  final,  377 

love  of,  66,  165,  218,  219 
offer  of,  235-238 
separate,  250-255 

by  Russia,  248,  307,  418, 

422 
the  work  of  the  peoples,  255, 

319,  424,  425 
the    work    of    scientists    and 

thinkers,  320 

Penal  sanction,  the,  132,  298,  380 
Pensions  for  widows  and  disabled 
soldiers,  78,  79 


Persia,  255 

Petitions,  German,  70,  293 
Petroleum,  a  spoil  of  war,  271 
Pius  X..  186 

Poland,    127,    160,   223,  235,   236, 
241,  253,  292,  315,  327-329,  333, 
343,  896,  400 
Poles.     See  Poland. 
Political  development,  233 

life,  133,  135,  136,  207,  208 
phenomena,  95,  130,  131 
spirit,  122,  143 
Polytheism,  196,  197 
Pope,  the,  181,  185,  187 
Portugal,  306 
Poverty,  218 

Power,  economic,  256,  258,  408 
of  liberty,  52-53 
naval,  94,  258 
possession  of,  165 
of  State,  the,   169,   170,   L'2.', 

297,  307,  308,  314,  325 
temporal,  187 

Powers,  Central  or  Imperial,  the, 
23 1-  259.  See  also  G  ermany , 
Austria. 

delegation  of,  102 
relation  between,  231-255 
Western,Eastern,  and  Southern, 
231-259.     See   also   France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy,  Russia- 
Prfetorian  Army,  369,  381 
Preponderance    of    Great    Britain, 

250,  251 
Prepotency,  170 

Press,  the,  133,  149-152,  245 
Prices  of  products,  91,  92 

maximum,  92,  221 
Priest,  180-189 

Union  of  the  warrior  and  the, 

120, 187 
Prisoners,  31-37,  91,  312 

and  missing,  31-37 
Products,  prices  of,  91-92 

value  of,  306 

Professional  soldiers,  5u,  59-61,  189, 
196,  257,  261,  262,  284,  285,  373, 
422 

Professions,  equivalence  of  all,  90, 91 
the  legal,  261 
the  military,  261,  282 
Pro-Germanism,  99,  100,  126,  185- 
188,  190,  212,  248,  250,  252,  259, 
307 

Progress,  of  democracy,  307,340,425 
in  human  knowledge,  107,  181 
of  liberty  and  equality,  340 
love  of  novelty  as  a  cause  of, 
105,  106 


INDEX 


Proletariat,  the,  178,  205-230,  316 
Prolongation  of  the  war,  138,  215, 
222,  229,  240-242,  250,  255,  259, 
356,  390 
Property,  boundaries  of,  363 

communalization  of,  362,  363 
compulsory  service  of,  265 
individual,  224,  265,  266 
system  in  Great   Britain,    93, 

135,  268 
war  as  a  means  of  acquiring, 

69-73 

Protectionism,  347-350 
Protectionist  policy,  347-350,  406 
Protestants,  99,  171,  180,  191,  279 
Prussia,  116,  123,  189,  296,  329,  330 
Prussian   Junkers,    125,    171,    177, 

178,  188,  206,  217,  237,  289 
State,  the,  183 
yoke,  the,  245 
Psychological  effects  of  the  war,  355- 

362 

of  disarmament,  372 
Psyt-Uologie    du     MUitaire    Profes- 
sionnel,  by  Aug.  Hamon,  60,  285, 
372 

Punishment,  defects  of,  as  a  method 
of  education  and  control,  62,  66, 
67,  113,  137,  163,  278,  298 


Quakers,  167,  274,  275 

R 
Race,  conditions  of,  118,  323 

Germanic,        the,        ludicrous 
theories  of,  71,  117,  118,  293 
Radicals,  130 
Raids,  aerial,  281-283 

submarine,  282,  283 
Railwaymen's  strike,  134,  135 
Rain,  effects  of,  270 
Rationalism,  183 
Raw  material,  99,  256-258,  408 
Reactionaries,   116-144,   161,    174- 

177,  227,  321,  339,  389,  398 
Rebellion,  169 

Sinn  Fein  the,  51, 171, 172, 404 
VendSean-  the,  172,  173 
Recruiting,  voluntary,  131,  133 
Referenda,  national,  253-255,  325, 

341,  342 
Referendum,  of  the  Alsatians  and 

Lorrainers,  329,  330 
of  the  Czechs,  Moravians,  and 

Slovaks,  331,  332 
of  the  Poles,  327,  328,  330 
of  the  Schleswigers,  329,  330 
of  the  Yougoslavs,  332,  333 


Regression,  133 

Relation  between  Powers,  231-255 

Religion,  122,  176,  179-197 

of  the  State,  the,  118-120,  150, 

160,  169,  207,  222,  233 
Religious  renaissance,  the,  191-197 
Report  of  the  Committee  on  Alleged 

German  Outrage*,  64 
Reprisals,  278-287 
Reproduction,  a  State  function,  314 
Republicanization  of  the  world,  397 
Republicans,  Irish,  172 
I   Requisitions,  92,  221 
!   Responsibility,  collective,  280,  281 
of  the  war,  45,  46,  288,  289, 

306 

Results  of  warfare,  37,  38 
Revolt,  53,  102,  108,  109,  121,  164, 
167-169,  209,  211,  217,  218,  220, 
269, 420 
Revolution,  the  English,  420 

the  French,   17,  89,  263,  305, 

324,  420 

influence  of,  420 
the  Russian,  386,  387,  391,  403, 

407,  411-425 
world-wide,  259,  391,  392,412, 

413,  415 

Revolutionary  centre,  the,  France, 
290 
movement  after  the  war,  360- 

362 

situation,   138,   176,   218,   220, 
221,  229,  255,  259,  354,  360- 
362,  387,  390,  410-412 
spirit,  the,  229,  255,  359-362,, 

412-414 
Reward,  as  a  means  of  education, 

62 

Richepin,  Jean,  199 
Right,    might   makes,  47,   71,    96, 

97,  103,  232,  297,  300 
of   minorities,    329,   332,   337, 

342 

natural,  298 
of  peoples,  396 
Rivers,  269,  270 

Route,  oversea,  possession  of,  306 
Ruin,  national,  77-81,  259 
Rulers,  70,  157,  164,  168,  169,  173- 
178,  206,  209,  221,  224,  232, 
233,  235,  240,  243,  244,  261- 
265,  275.  384 

incapacity  of,  309, 310,  316,  422 
of   the   Socialist   parties,   216, 
218,  219,  221,  230,  289-301, 
306,  313,  314,  397,  412,  4212 
Rumania,  128,  149,  160,  235,  303, 
332,  333,  336,  387 


486 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Rumanian  losses,  31-35 
Rumanians   of    Trans vlvania,   253, 

332  333 

Russia.  31-34,  91,  95,  102,  lir>.  1  Hi, 
125-198,  139,  148,  165,  190, 
196,  208,  235,  236.  239.  241, 
247,  248,  250,  258,  291,  301, 
302,  304,  307,  321,  327-329, 
334-337 
Great,  334 
White,  333,  334 
Russian  losses,  31-34 

revolution,  the,  386,  387,  391, 
397,  400,  403,  407,  411-425 
Socialists,  212,  415,  417-425 
Ruthenes,  126 

S 

Sanction,  penal,  132,  298,  380 
Scandinavia  during  the  war,   123, 

149, 160,  376 
Scarcity    of    foodstuffs,    258,    312, 

313,  408,  409 
Schleswig,  253,  329 
School  of  crime,  war  as  a,  63,  64, 

163 

Sciences,  the,  197-199,  364.  365 
Scientific  spirit,  262 
Sea,  as  a  bond,  268 

mastery  of  the,  87,  93,  94,  97, 

98,  102,  257,  258,  268 
routes,  306 

Seas,  freedom  of  the,  90,  397 
Secession,  War  of  the,  255-258 
Secret  diplomacy,  44,  45,  155-157, 

304,  338,  423 
treaties,  416,  417 
Selection  by  war,  315 
Separate  peaces,  248,  250-255,  307, 

418,  422 
Serbia,  31-35,   165,  223,  239,  269, 

272,  304,  315,  332,  335 
Serbian  losses,  31-35 

women,  202 
Serbs.     See    Serbia,    Herzegovinia, 

Bosnia,  Dalmatia,  Yougoslavs 
Service,  compulsory,  133,  134,  173, 

256,  265 
of  property,  265 
military,  131-134,  173 
voluntary,  256 

Servility  of  the  German  people,  30 
Sex,  equality  of,  303,  317 
Sexes,  relations  between,  318 
Shakespeare,  118 
Shaw,  G.  Bernard,  118,  200,  279 
Sinn  Fein   rebellion.  51.    171,   172, 

404 
Situation,  European,  the,  139 


Slovaks,  253,  331 
Social  classes,  265,  266 

crisis,  162 

democracy.       Sec      Socialism. 
Socialists. 

hygiene,  367 
Socialism,  205-230,  389,  409,  425 

centralized  and  non- centra- 
lized, 210,  214,  225,  228 
Socialism,  crisis  of,  225-230 

Federalist,  225,  226 

of  the  Incas,  214,  223 

influence  of,  229,  230,  389 

of  the  Jesuits,  214,  223 

State,  210,  214,  225 

strength  of,  228-230 
Socialistic  measures,  221-225,  388, 
409 

propaganda,  228,  229 
Socialists,   130,  161,  205-230,  253, 
265,  387,  417 

Austrian,  226 

Belgian,  207-209,  214 

British,  209-211,  226,  419 

Congress  of,  213,  214,  219,  417, 
448 

Danish,  212 

French,     207-209,     213,     214, 
215,  218-220,  226,  3(M,  419 

German,   206,   207,   213,   214 
218,  226,  290,  395 

Italian,  212 

Neutral,  213 

Russian,  212,  415,  417-425 

Swedish,  212 

Sociality,  175,  276,  277,  315 
Society  of  Jesus.     See  Jesuits 

of  nations,  396,  397,  407 
Soil,  formation  of  the,  322 

and  the  man,  91,  270,  272,  388 
Soldiers,  British,  65-67 

civilian,  55,  56 

are  destroyers,  not   producers, 
371 

French,  49,  57,  58,  65,  67 

German,  65,  137 

occasional,  55 

professional,  55,  59-61, 189, 191, 
257,  261,  284,  285,  373,  422 
Solidarity,  193,  249,  339,  396,  425 

the  basis  of  nationality,  325 

of  the  capitalist  class,  80,  81 

international,  96,  97,  331,  397, 
400,  405,  406 

of  Kings  and  Emperors,  101 

of  peoples,  104,  273-277,  331, 
388   394 

terrestrial,  91,  266-273,  388 

universal,  91,  144 


INDEX 


437 


South  Africa,  170,  172,  403 
America,  96,  387 
Wales,  miners'   strike  in,   141, 

142,  146 

Sovereigns,  solidarity  of,  101 
Soviets,  the,  419 

Spain,  96,  97,  102,  149,  160,  185,  387 
Specialization  of  work,  267 
Spirit  of  authority,  the,  109,  118, 

124,  125,  184,  220,  242, 383 
of  brutality,  the,  136,  137 
critical,  the,  119,  177,  206,  262 
democratic,  the,  243 
of  equality,  the,  135,  136 
of  liberty,  the,  73,  136,  209,  227 
military,  the,  62,  72,  73,  95-97, 
109,  118,  197,  206,  238,  239, 
261,  422 

political,  the,  122,  143 
of  revolt,  the,  53,  102,  108,  109, 
121,  164,  168,  169,  209,  218, 
220,  269,  420, 
revolutionary,    the,    229,    255, 

359-369,  412-414 
scientific,  the,  262 
Socialist,  the,  220,  229 
of  sociality,  the,  175,  276,  277, 

315 

of  tradition,  the,  261,  262 
of  violence,  the,  59,  138,  317, 

356 

Standard  of  life,  344,  345,  362 
State  and  the  capitalist  classes,  92, 

113, 141-144 
debts,  342 

expenditure  of  the,  344,  345 
impoverishment  of  the,  345 
and  the  municipalities,  93 
nature  of  the,  325 
power   of   the,   109,   170,  222, 

297,  307,  308,  314,  325 
Prussian,  the,  183 
religion  of   the,  118-120,  150, 

160,  169,  207,  222,  233 
Socialism,  210,  214,  225 
Statistics  of  expenditure,  78-81 

of  losses,  30-37,  76-81 
Stockholm  Conference,  the,  412,  419 
Strikes  in  Germany,  France,  etc., 

411 

of  miners,  141,  142,  146 
of  railwaymen,  134,  135 
Submarines,  94,  223,  247,  258,  279, 

282,  283,  313,  386,  395,  398 
Subsidizing  newspapers,  159 
Subsoil,  the,  271,  272,  388 
Suez  Canal,  the,  268,  270 
Suffering,  educative  effect  of,  68 
Superstitions,  193-197 


Survival  of  the  barbaric  epoch,  71* 
72,  86,  87,  113,  117,  137,  164,  178, 
180,  193-197,  203,  214,  223,  234, 
281,  284,  295 

Sweden,  96-98,  174,  185,  212,  334 
Swiss   Confederation,   imitation  of 

the,  254,  332 
nationality,  323 

Switzerland,  68,  85,  88,  89,  96-99, 
115,  123,  149,  153,  174,  185,  292, 
325,  335,  376 

Syndicalism,  130,  141,  142,  221 
Syphilis,  204 

T 

Tag,  Der,  49 

Taxation,  44,  77,  342,  344,  345,  362 
Taylor  system,  the,  50,  109 
Temporal  power,  187 
Terrestrial    environment,    the,   91, 

266-273 

Terrorism,  29,  30,  38,  39,  71,  137, 
153,  163,  233,  274,  279-287,  300, 
302,  398,  399 

Tolstoy,  127,  167,  210,  401 
Trade,  Free,  337,  343,  344,  350 

Unions,  etc.,  114,  130,  134,  135, 

141,  142,  225,  354,  355 
Transylvania,  253,  303,  332 
Treaties  between  nations,  47,  297, 
298,  300,  319,  320,  374,  379- 
383 

secret,  416,  417 
Treaty  of  September  5,  1914,  on  the 

separate  peace,  250-255 
Trentino,  the,  253,  333 
Tribunals,  international,  379-383 
Triumph  of  arms,  257,  388 
by  blockade,  257,  388 
by  economic  power,  258,  388 
of  Western  Allies,  257,  258,  320 
Truce  of  parties,  128,  130,  133 
Truth,  245,  246,  249.    See  Untruth. 
Turkey,  31-35^  190,  232,  245,  255, 

268,  302 

Turkish  losses,  31-35 
Mussulmans,  190 
population,  335 
Tyranny,  155,  164,  169,  266 

U 

Ukraine,  241,  253,  327,  333 
Ulster,  172,  403-405 
United  States,  the,  89,  96,  98,  102- 
104,  160,  173,  185,  325,  335, 
376,  385 

in  the  war,  386,  387,  391-411 
Untruthfulness  of  Governments,  30 
as  a  means  of  handling  men,  40- 
43,  97,  125,  158,  159,  277,  413 


438 


LESSONS  OF  THE  WORLD-WAR 


Utility,  basis  of  the  conduct  of  war- 
fare, 284 
criterion  of  the    best   means, 

283,  284 
Utopias,  341,  375,  385,  398 


Vengeance,  279 
Venizelos,  101,  167,  240 
Victory.     See  Triumph. 
Violations  des  lois  de  la  guerre  par 

rAllemagne,  64,  68 
Violation     of    the     neutrality     of 
Belgium,  46,  47,  9G, 
97,    99,    139,    295, 
307,  394 

of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Luxemburg,  96, 
97,  99,  300,  304 
of  women,  204 
Violence,  policy  of,  the,   127,   158, 

167,  168,  180 

spirit  of,"£he,  59,  138,  317,  356 

in  the  war,  29,  31,  38,  39,  71, 

163,  204,  274,  283,  284,  316, 

317,  357 

Voluntary  limitation  of  birth.     See 

Neo-Malthusian  ism . 
recruiting,  131,  132,  133,  256 
V  one  iirts,  159 

W 

"  Wait  and  see,"  policy  of,  138,  249 
War  and  the  capitalist  interests,  88, 
89,  265,  266,  373,  392,  393 

losses  during  the,  71 

duration  of  the,  240-242,  278, 
292  357 

the  end  of  the,  36,  75-77,  229, 
241 

evolution  of  the,  382,  383,  415 

as  a  means  of  acquiring  prop- 
erty, 69-73,  295,  356,  373 

as  a  means  of  settling  disputes, 
47 

nature  of  the,  61,  64,  73,  281- 
287,  356,  372,  373 


War  is  a  revolution,  415 

a  school  of  anarchy,  357 

a  school  of  crime,  162,  163,  281, 

284-287,  356,  372,  373,  388 
of  Secession,  255-258 
selection  by,  315 
and  social  classes,  265,  266 
a  work  of  destruction,  73 
Warfare,  horror  of,  64,  65,  283 
humanization  of,  38 
methods  of,  282-287 
results  of,  37,  38,  162 
utility  the  basis  of,  284 
Wealth,  the  basis  of  modern  society, 

98,  265,  266 
displacement  of,  346 
taxation  of,  342,  345 
war  a  method  of  acquiring,  69- 

73,  295,  356,  373 
Western  Allies.     See  Entente 
Widows,  pensions  for,  98,  99 
Wilhelm  II.,  188,  229,  232,  237,  251, 

264 
Wilson,   President,   238,   372,   393, 

395-404,  415-117,  423 
Wisdom,    of   the   old    and   of   the 

young,  265 

Women,  201-204,  222.     See  Fem- 
inism. 

Work,  specialization  of,  267 
Workers,  the,   110-114,   136,   141- 
144,  205-230,  295,  309,  352-354, 
388,  409,  410,  419 
Working  class.     See  Workers. 
World,  hegemony  of  the,  139,  292 
republicanization  of  the,  397 
Wounded,  the,  31-37 


Yellow  Book,  the,  290 
Yougoslavs,  the,  332,  333 
Young  Turks,  the,  302 
Youth,  175,  262-265,  315,  421,  422. 
See  Influence  of. 


Zeppelins,  278,  281,  283 


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